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Abstract 
Authorities throughout the world have increased the presence of forfeiture legislation aimed 
at targeting the growing wealth of organised criminals. The concept of removing the use and 
enjoyment of tainted assets, the proceeds of crime, has become the governing mantra 
espoused as the driving force behind the juridification of confiscation statutes. The focus on 
criminal proceeds inevitably invites accounting, as a profession, to join the legal fraternity as 
a medium in the prosecution of forfeiture matters. 
Accounting is invited to contribute to the forfeiture adjudication in regard to its economic 
expertise, that advises with regard to monetary considerations, such as, the valuation of 
assets, the movement of funds and in establishing unexplained wealth. This specialist area is 
referred to as forensic accounting, with its validating influence being felt as judicial advice 
within the courtroom and in the ratification of judicial remedies to the community. The 
research uses Habermasian (1929 to present) rationality to examine the enhanced active 
communication arising from the facticity of accounting within the context of the legal system. 
Resisting the totality of reliance upon the philosophical thought of one proponent, this 
dissertation applies the research of critical accounting researchers to the role accounting plays 
in the provision of validating expert evidence. Professional accounting attributes, 
simultaneously position accounting technologies inside and outside the courtroom. The 
treatise recognises the appropriate use of professionally endorsed patterned accounting 
principles that provide reliable substantiation and assist the communication of judicial 
decision-making. 
Pragmatically, the research questions then consider the endorsement of appropriately 
deployed patterned accounting principles for use in forfeiture matters. Through the broad 
application of uniform evidence rules, it is argued that the presentation of expert forensic 
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accounting methodologies in legislative genres that engage similar issues to those of 
forfeiture, present valid utility when applied to the determination of unexplained wealth. 
Further the treatise reviews 48 cases reported under the unexplained wealth provisions of 
forfeiture legislation between 2011 and 2016.  
The thesis concludes with the recognition of the role accounting plays in the juridification of 
forfeiture law, based on the proposition that the deployment of forensic accounting 
technologies, using professionally supported patterned principles, is a valid strategic 
approach to the denial of the enjoyment of the proceeds of crime. However, contrary to the 
rhetoric attendant with the introduction of juridified statutory clauses, the research fails to 
show the broad implementation of forensic accounting in support of unexplained wealth 
strategies. As a policy recommendation, this thesis suggests that a number of policy aims 
would be better realised if forensic accounting technology were to be more fully recognised 
and deployed in the service of the aims of the forfeiture statutes. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
For three decades courts in the developed world have expanded modern forfeiture law as a 
means to recover private wealth that is – demonstratively or presumably – the product of the 
proceeds of criminal activity.  Much of this process is expected to depend upon the 
deployment of accounting technology; more particularly, those forms associated with the area 
of forensic accounting.  This deployment requires the valid communication of accepted 
accountancy skills that are recognised by the accounting profession. This communication 
must come through the legal profession, the members of which are not necessarily 
knowledgeable about accounting principles. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
nature of such deployment, both in the positioning of accounting within the legal context and 
operationally in the recent history of case law.   
This thesis aims not to extend forensic accounting technologies, but to study the 
legitimisation process of how the accounting profession brings forth knowledge in the context 
of court-recognised expertise. Building on generally accepted accounting practices, the 
thesis’s enquiry is into the integration of accounting knowledge, as applied to the facts before 
the court, in a manner that is legitimised by the legal profession and the community 
ultimately accepts. In fact, accountancy competencies that are broadly practiced by CPAs or 
Chartered Accountants
1
 as basic skills may not be able to provide the communication and 
legitimacy the forensic accountant requires to serve as an expert influence. The research aim 
is to illuminate the legitimisation and communicative action strategies deployed between the 
expert accountants and the legal profession, with particular emphasis on the new legislative 
genre of providing remedies for unexplained wealth.  
                                                     
1
 The reference to CPAs and Chartered Accountants is a broad description of accounting accreditation; that is, 
fulfilment of the requirements for membership of CPA Australia and/or the Australian and New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
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To that end, this thesis will consider the contribution of legal and accounting theorists (such 
as Habermas 1987, 1996; Weber, 1905; Nozick, 1974; Robson, 1992; and Latour 
1987,1988a) to understanding role of accounting as a medium (or vehicle) that influences 
democratic support for the legislative expansion inherent in juridification, specifically as 
applied to asset forfeiture. At the practical level, the research will examine 48 case 
judgements taken from the Australian Commonwealth, State and Territory legislatures, the 
rules of opinion evidence, several judicial and parliamentary reports into confiscation 
legislation and the history of forfeiture statutes in order to provide the first comprehensive 
conceptual and historical framework to understand how accounting evidence has functioned, 
specifically in relation to forfeiture law. Whilst the thesis’s primary focus will be the 
Australian jurisdictions, countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Ireland 
occupy influential positions that affect the proliferation of forfeiture legislation both in the 
requirement for such statutes, the manner in which the law is crafted and the degree of 
administrative influence
2
 (Young, 2009).  Accounting itself is recognised as having an 
important role in distributive justice, and its integration with the legal process of confiscation  
gives expert accounting evidence  the potential to  contribute to judicial decision-making and 
perceptions of truth and fairness
3
. Therefore, the application of this study’s findings should 
be widely applicable to jurisdictions beyond the countries it examines. The importance of this 
research lies in its systematic articulation of professionally accepted forensic accounting 
processes as it rationalises accounting’s role in law, and in the reflective and critical 
questions that emerge from this process about the appropriateness of accounting as a medium 
that participates in the determination and distribution of both justice and liberty. Specifically, 
                                                     
2
 Note the inclusion of Ireland due to its early adoption of a holistic approach to the administration of forfeiture 
laws (multi-agency taskforce) and Ireland’s consequent influence on the European Union. Irish legislators were 
called upon to pursue innovative responses to the management of organised crime following the high-profile 
murder of journalist Veronica Guerin in June 1996. The Irish response was an early integration of accounting 
and legal expertise into the one taskforce approach. 
3
 This statement will be discussed at length later in this thesis with reference to the accounting literature and its 
context of providing a true and accurate account of money-related issues and compliance strategies. 
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these questions concern the idea of just deserts (see Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974) and 
questions of liberty that focus on the right to the enjoyment of one’s private property without 
coercive State practices (see Mill, 1864; Nozick, 1974). This thesis provides an original 
contribution to the knowledge of accounting as expert evidence, specifically as entered into 
the court for matters pertaining to criminal forfeiture. Moreover, because judicial remedy is 
most often dispensed in monetary terms, this thesis informs the application of accounting as a 
medium that has a growing influence in distributive justice, which is a strong element in the 
judiciary’s struggle to adjudicate the ‘right’
4
 decision and the community’s acceptance of the 
‘correct’ remedy.  
The modernist position of accounting holds that the numbers that constitute the tools of 
accounting reflect reality (Gaffikin, 2008, p40), giving rise to accounting’s perceived 
reliability. However, accounting theorists recognise both quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of accounting (Arrington and Puxty, 1991; Chua, 1995) as accountants make professional 
decisions  based on how specific modes of accounting technology are deployed, and in what 
context. In this regard, accounting has attributes of both art and science: the art of 
interpretation and the rigour of scientific repetition. This leads to questions of what 
accounting technologies are used, and how they are appropriately applied, to deliver valid 
meaning and reliable authority to the legal adjudication process. The legal system is 
obviously governed by the legal profession; however, when economic impact must be 
articulated, forensic accountants have an instrumental role in contributing to the trier of fact’s 
resolution. The question then arises, particularly for lawyers without accounting skills, as to 
exactly how individual accounting technologies are recognised as providing valid advice to 
the judicial process. 
                                                     
4
 The right or correct judgement is a complex notion subject to various lenses, contexts and due processes. The 
attributes of a ‘right’ or ‘correct’ decision will be revisited later in this dissertation and will inform the method 
used in this research. 
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This research broadly considers this dilemma.  Initially it draws on the academic 
considerations of the highly influential German social and political philosopher Jurgen 
Habermas (1929 to present). As he is a member of the second generation of the Frankfurt 
Institute
5
, Habermas’  his thinking informs a range of professional domains, including law 
and accounting,
6
  establishing the foundations of a normative version of critical social theory 
based on a general theory of human interests, knowledge and inquiry. He describes the law as 
a colonising influence on society, or, as he terms it, the ‘lifeworld’. He  proposes a test for 
whether substantive claims  will be approved by the law and the system whilst being accepted 
by the lifeworld. ‘This test consists of universal rules of discourse – reciprocal accountability, 
inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to presuppose counter-claims, and non-
coercion’
7
 (Lehman, 2006, p8). In this manner, Habermas offers accountants a  way to 
determine whether accounting maxims are valid or invalid at the quantitative and qualitative 
levels, and their subsequent  contribution to the broader discourse on legitimacy. Habermas 
postulates his ideal speech framework as ‘an intuitive reflection of the conditions people 
would use to justify validity claims’ (Lehman, 2006, p26).  More directly, his research 
connects the transportability attributes of accounting, as described by Latour (1987, 1988a) 
and Robson (1992), to place the accounting  discourse simultaneously inside the courtroom 
and outside in the community. In this way, he articulates the same reasoning, distilled from 
the dominant logic of economics, to enable accounting to function in both an internal and 
external medium. 
                                                     
5
 The Frankfurt Institute, otherwise known as the Frankfurt School, refers to a group of post-World War II 
researchers who initially applied Marxism to the development of a radical interdisciplinary social theory 
(www.britannica.com/biography/Jurgen-Habermas accessed August, 2015). 
6
 Although Habermas does not directly write about accounting, his thinking has been broadly applied to 
accounting as a profession; for example, see Power and Laughlin (1996). 
7
 Habermas (1993, pp56–57) states that ‘we presuppose a dialogical situation that satisfies ideal conditions in a 
number of respects, including…freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of 
participants, absence of coercion in taking positions, and so forth’ (p56). 
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As this accounting research is positioned within a legal framework, it examines the 
significance of the court and court rules in  promoting impartiality and rational discourse and  
testing of the validity of expert (accounting) statements. The research discussion recognises 
the court’s obligatory passage points and entry barriers (Clegg, 1989) for reasonable 
adjudication, avoiding relativism
8
. It contemplates the nature of expertise, identifying those 
of its attributes that challenge and enhance communication. The research proposes that 
expertise is democratised through the emergency of patterned principles that interpret 
accounting maxims and statements as properly validated within the court; yet, at the same 
time, they create links with society’s structure and its common norms and values.  
The research argument examines the pragmatic context and application of forfeiture law; 
therefore, it considers the history and modern gestation of forfeiture statutes as the context for 
the legislation itself and for the judicial decision-making. Whilst forfeiture statutes have long-
standing roots, the modern use of confiscation remedies to address serious and organised 
crime is punctuated with reports and official statements that position accounting technologies 
alongside the law to address ‘follow the money’ deprival strategies. Further, the research will 
consider the evidential environment, particularly from the formal legal perspective (Uniform 
Evidence Act 2008), to appropriately equalise the accounting expert evidence  in matters that 
have been brought to the court under different statutes
9
. The research will also review 
bureaucratic reporting with respect to the achievements in responding to organised crime that 
have emerged from  the implementation of state-sponsored forfeiture. For this review, 
                                                     
8
 In other words, this research presupposes that truth, knowledge and morality exist not just in relation to 
culture, society and historical context, but in accordance with a system of rules and norms reflected in duly 
processed (juridified) statutes, administered by a legal process. 
9
 The rules of evidence pertaining to opinions expressed based on specialist knowledge are now based upon the 
same interpretation of expert-evidence rules as applied across common law (Feckleton and Selby, 2002). This 
facilitates consideration of expertise from one legal genre into another, removing the necessity to re-establish 
basic admissibility. 
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jurisdictional authorities’ annual reports have been assessed individually and collated for 
comparison with the stated objectives of the statutes. 
The final part of this dissertation is based on the reported judgements of cases, from matters 
brought under several non-forfeiture legislative genres (such as taxation and equity) and the 
48 reported forfeiture cases between 2011 and 2016. The inquiry specifically targets the 
accounting technology that supported forensic accounting arguments relevant to the State’s 
confiscation of assets. To this end, the research aims to identify the patterned principles 
associated with the use of specific forensic accounting technologies and then the reasoning 
that would allow transference from the non-confiscation legislative genre to matters that arise 
under forfeiture legislation or, pre-emptively, in developing ‘follow the money’ strategies.   
Research Questions 
The thesis follows a mainly interpretive path. The main research question is: 
1. Descriptively, how has the application of accounting technologies in forfeiture law 
cases evolved? 
To provide a scholarly contribution to the future of accounting evidence, as well as to 
forensic accounting and its interface with the law and judiciary, the first research question 
leads to the second: 
2. What are the attributes of the ‘appropriate’10  accounting technologies described in 
question (1)? 
  
                                                     
10
 The attributes of ‘appropriateness’ will be discussed further in the theoretical and methodology sections of 
this proposal; see Chapters 3 and 7. 
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Structure of this Research 
This thesis is structured in 10 chapters: 
1. Introduction  
2. Definitions and Concepts 
3. Literature Review 
4. The Research Argument 
5. Formal Acceptance of Expert Evidence 
6. Forfeiture Legislation 
7. Expert Opinion Evidence 
8. Accounting Evidence 
9. Forensic Accounting Expertise in Forfeiture Legislation 
10. Conclusions and Further Research 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the scope of the research and the research questions. It provides an 
end-to-end view of the issues discussed in the dissertation, and how that discussion  relates to 
answering the research questions within the academic scope of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2: Definitions and Concepts 
Chapter 2 considers a number of underlying concepts that pertain to the consideration of legal 
and accounting principles and philosophy. It is important to consider these concepts 
separately before they are brought together, informed by the literature review, as a 
contribution to the research argument in Chapters 3 and 4. The dissertation’s foundation 
within Habermasian logical rhetoric frames the role of expertise, specifically forensic 
accounting expertise, with influence in a communicative structure involving rational 
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validation and simultaneous alignment to the lifeworld and the system. Contextual topics, by 
their nature and complexity, may justify dissertations of their own; however, this chapter 
serves to position such topics within the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Rather than relying entirely on the philosophical thought of one proponent, this dissertation 
draws from a range of thought that combines legal and accounting considerations with 
relevant sociological contributions. It presents the theoretical diagram (Chapter 3, p49) that  
illustrates the core position of accounting in this thesis: it absorbs intellectual and practical 
influence and radiates the translation of a range of philosophical and procedural 
considerations within a rational legal system and lifeworld structure. Consequently, the 
literature review is presented by topic  before the individual concepts  are integrated into the 
research’s logical argument (Chapter 4).  
 
Consideration of Habermas’s description of the role of expertise in communicative action 
dominates the initial literature review; however, as Habermas did not directly address the role 
of accounting, let alone that of forensic accounting, many other considerations can inform the 
research narrative. Habermas positions expertise as an influencing agent or a medium; 
however, he argues that expertise needs to be understood in order to sway communication. 
Other theoretical considerations assist this understanding, chiefly theories of redistribution, 
the collaborative functions of the legal and accounting professions, the nature of the 
accounting metaphor and the influence of its inscriptions on revealing the ‘truth’. These 
concepts, illuminated through the literature review, contextualise the connections that flow 
between the steps in the research argument in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: The Research Argument 
The fourth chapter uses the concepts discussed in the literature review to form a stepped 
argument that articulates the role of forensic accounting in juridification, adjudication and 
communication of the judicial decision. The chapter argues that the legal profession requires 
accounting expertise to contribute to the discourse that underpins their decision-making 
process and validates its economic remedies, particularly when these are articulated and 
settled in monetary terms. Accounting expertise legitimises the legal argument by applying 
the accounting metaphor to numerically quantify, validate and translate the court’s judgement 
for internal and external audiences. 
  
Through evaluation of a credentialed patterned principle of implementation and justice, 
crafted from peer-accepted forensic accounting knowledge and methodologies, this chapter 
considers how the ‘correctness’ of the judicial decision is communicated. Validation of the 
ontological attributes of these methodologies is also considered at a more pragmatic level, 
with specific application to forfeiture legislation; it is applied in later chapters to answering 
the research questions. 
Chapter 5: Formal Acceptance of Expert Evidence 
This chapter provides an important context for the role of expertise within the court, from a 
pragmatic viewpoint based on statutes, precedents and professional guidance. Accounting 
expertise must be seen as a recognised area of professional expertise that the legal profession 
formally invites into proceedings, in the category of expert opinion evidence (Unified 
Evidence Acts, 2008). The law controls the obligatory passage points and tests that must be 
passed before access to the trier of fact is granted. This chapter commences with the 
important recognition that evidence presented in court usually arises from a direct witness, 
10 
 
but that an exception has been made to allow the presentation of expert opinion in the form of 
expert witness testimony. The purpose of such testimony, also known as opinion evidence, is 
to add to the discourse that assists the trier of fact to adjudicate the matter, and aims to extend 
judicial knowledge through expert analysis, interpretation and explanation. To be heard by 
the court, it must be relevant to a fact in the matter and not unduly prejudicial. This chapter 
reviews the judicial determinations and deliberations with regard to the acceptance of 
evidence,  and examines the changing statutory obligations and specific attributes built up 
from common law  and from higher court and eminent judicial precedents. The chapter 
concedes that expert access to the court is at legal discretion and, as discussed by Harbermas, 
is not always transparent and clear. Once entered, expert evidence is subject to a range of 
practical legitimacy tests, from logical analysis and proper explanation to cross-examination. 
It is admitted that access to the court is paramount, as without presentation to the trier of fact, 
the expert’s opinion cannot contribute to the debate.  
The chapter moves on to review the attributes that the accounting profession itself has issued 
in the form of binding instructions to qualified forensic accountants. The elements of relevant 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards are considered together with their alignment 
with legal standards and evidence statutes. This chapter contributes to the response to the 
research questions by illuminating the legal acceptance and validation of expert accounting 
evidence. 
Chapter 6: Forfeiture Legislation 
This chapter considers forfeiture legislation as a genre, including both Proceeds of Crime 
Acts (‘POCA’, ‘POC’) and Unexplained Wealth (‘UW’) variants. It is important to 
understand the gestation and changing purpose of the legislation, as well as its history: from 
its earliest manifestations of attainder, deodand, and smuggling, through to the resurrection of 
asset confiscation as a method to curtail the profits of the drug trade. The ‘modern’ 
11 
 
interpretation of forfeiture legislation as a national and international response to target the 
assets of criminals involved in money laundering and organised crime is considered from the 
viewpoint of treaty-led juridification. The chapter’s legislative focus remains on the 
Australian debate that has led to the harmonisation of Commonwealth, State and Territory 
statutes. The chapter reviews the conclusions, recommendations and agreements of several 
national and international conference outputs and reports, and examines the input of key 
contributors from entities such as the United Nations, crime commissions and the police. 
Incremental juridification is identified as statutes progressively incorporate new and further 
powers, such as the reverse onus of proof, combinations of civil and criminal remedies and 
unexplained-wealth provisions. The changes in administrative and evidential requirements 
that increase the need for accounting expertise are highlighted, along with specific provisions 
that require accounting attention, such as the provision of accounting evidence to support or 
oppose a POCA/UW application.  
This chapter reviews the generic attributes of forfeiture legislation, then considers specific 
provisions relevant to expert evidence testimony within the forfeiture genre. This shows that 
statutory requirements can inform the pragmatic responses to the research questions, as is 
examined in later chapters. 
Chapter 7: Effectiveness of Forfeiture Legislation 
This chapter considers the effectiveness of forfeiture legislation by comparing its espoused 
aims at its introduction with the published outcomes of its enforcement by the accountable 
bureaucracy. The reasons cited for the introduction and juridification of POCA and UW 
statutes rely primarily on depriving criminals of their use and enjoyment of ill-gotten gains. It 
is important to evaluate this objective because its achievement or otherwise distinguishes the 
claims made in support of specific juridification, such as in the parliamentary debate about 
the introduction of changes to legislation. The chapter relies on the information provided 
12 
 
annually across each Australian jurisdiction about the progressive application of forfeiture 
remedies. This information is mostly provided in a minimalistic quantitative manner as a 
small part of holistic agency reporting. The information pertaining to confiscation matters is 
initially reported in this thesis across individual jurisdictions before being aggregated and 
compared to the aggregated information with regard to organised crime, the primary target 
area of forfeiture. None of the various jurisdictions presents combined information, despite 
the recognition that organised crime knows no administrative borders.   
This chapter compares the value of confiscated or retained property with estimations of the 
economic proceeds and effects of organised crime. Given the massive imbalance between the 
confiscated sums and the estimations, is it is uncertain whether the deployment of accounting 
technology is an effective response to the espoused forfeiture objectives and an appropriate 
basis for juridification in the forfeiture legislative genre. Progressive trends and the effect of 
increased injection of accounting expertise into the compliance and investigative domain 
through more recent task-force responses give rise to questions for further research. 
Australian outcomes and approaches are contrasted with international experience,  
specifically noting the issue of attrition and the accounting expertise either brought into  or 
inherent in the judicial and administrative structures that address forfeiture. This 
dissertation’s conclusions and assessments  regarding the effectiveness of forfeiture 
legislation contextualise the contribution made by the proper deployment of accounting 
technologies at the case (matter) level. The chapter thus broadly informs the response to the 
research questions as well as directions for future research. 
Chapter 8: Accounting Evidence 
Chapter 8 examines the evidence given in court by forensic accountants in matters that bear 
similarities to forfeiture cases. For example, cases that include judicial interpretation and 
comment on accounting issues that concern valuation, cost of living and undeclared cash 
13 
 
transactions direct the precedent for forfeiture matters, even though the case at hand may be 
from another statutory genre. In this regard, forensic accounting evidence in matters brought 
under the taxation acts, equity claims and family law gives an indication as to the courts’ 
legal acceptance of accounting technology and particular forensic accounting methodologies 
and methods. This review is important, as it provides a judicially “consecrated” addition to 
the accounting evidence narrative, which can be transposed to areas of forfeiture 
jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis. 
The chapter  reviews the relationship of forfeiture jurisprudence at the issue level with the 
legal and accounting concepts relevant to asset confiscation. Whilst the chapter maintains its 
central focus on Australian jurisdictions, it refers to judicial comment from key international 
legislatures where appropriate. The purpose of considering forensic accounting evidence 
from genres other than forfeiture litigation, and from other jurisdictions, is to understand the 
actual legal interpretation of forensic accounting evidence by judges. This interpretation 
includes the balance of different experts’ opinions and the judge’s integration of the 
accounting facts with other legal objectives. For example, judges in family law have, over 
time and through precedent, referred to the concept of “value to the owner” (Scott and Scott, 
2006 at 45)
11
 that does not fully align with an accounting valuation, yet has become the 
dominant valuation concept to be deployed by forensic accountants in family law matters. As 
the court favours this dominant concept, forensic accountants must now address their 
accounting technology to report on and evaluate the “value to the owner”. Pragmatically, 
adherence to an accepted judicial view of accounting evidence provides significant input into 
this dissertation’s response to the research question, as one of the main objectives of expert 
opinion evidence is to influence the adjudicative discourse. If an accounting technology has 
been accepted in some judicial form, it therefore influences the court unless explicitly set 
                                                     
11
 “The concept of ‘value to owner’ considers and takes into account the benefits to a particular owner even 
though this may not be based on a hypothetical third party purchaser” Scott & Scott (2006) FamCA 1379 at 45. 
14 
 
apart. If an accounting technology has not been hitherto accepted by a court, it may have to 
be presented with extensive reasoning to justify its selection and validity. Because accepted 
accounting methodologies transfer to patterned principles that underpin the clarification of 
accounting concepts across legal genres, the specific accounting practices discussed here are 
detailed in the appendices. The accounting ontology, methodology and methods referred to in 
this dissertation professionally peer supported, demonstrating attributes aligned to accounting 
knowledge and skills that could also be applied to POCA and UW matters. The outcomes of 
this chapter’s research inform facets of the response to the second research question, 
sponsored by their prior application within various legal genres, yet validated with respect to 
the essential attributes of confiscation. These research outcomes inform the future 
development of forfeiture strategies that rely heavily on accounting to articulate income and  
measure gaps that indicate the use and enjoyment of tainted funds.  
Chapter 9: Forensic Accounting Evidence for Forfeiture Matters 
This chapter provides the pragmatic basis for answering the research questions, through the 
review of the judgements in 48 forfeiture cases. Based on the theoretical positioning of expert 
evidence considered in earlier chapters, the case-level review maps the development of 
forensic accounting evidence specifically in confiscation matters. Judicial comment on the 
acceptance or denial of the accounting technologies and methods presented to the court is 
compared with the credence expected to be shown to the accounting evidence where it 
concurs with the content and approach discussed in earlier chapters (particularly Chapters 7 
and 8). The ontological alignment of accounting gap analysis methodologies as applied to the 
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structure of forfeiture legislation is broadly discussed,  and the specific sections of the 
Australian statutes that the judiciary have considered in obiter dicta
12
 are considered. 
The first research question is specifically answered from an internal court perspective based 
on the contextual material in earlier chapters, considered in conjunction with judicial 
feedback contained in official judgement summaries at the case level. The second research 
question is answered from an external perspective through the articulation of the proper 
accounting solution to address the particular issues that arise between the legal discourse, 
judicial decisions and community norms. For example, the deployment of accounting gap 
analysis methodologies, coupled with valid precedent responses that constitute a strategic 
approach to specifying the sources of tainted funds and unexplained wealth. It is noted that 
this chapter reflects on the potential for the use of pre-emptive accounting strategies to 
support UW litigation; however, analysis of case judgements fails to reflect such strategic 
approaches being put before the court. 
Chapter 10: Conclusions and Further Research 
The final chapter revisits the topic of this dissertation and reflects on the particularisation of 
the two tranches: a theoretical and a practical response to the role of accounting as a medium 
of juridification. The chapter notes the incongruence between accounting’s articulated 
facilitation role enunciated during and after the juridification process and the lack of focus on 
the deployment of accounting-led strategies to address the repatriation of tainted funds from 
criminals. The chapter reflects on the role of accounting in the matters put to the court and as 
an influencing medium of juridification, finding that the judgements indicate an absence  of 
strategic use of accounting technologies as a direct, pre-emptive assault on organised crime, 
                                                     
12
 ‘Obiter dicta’ refers to the judge’s expression of opinion or consideration of an issue in court or in a written 
judgement.  
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contrary to the espoused aims of the statutes when presented to parliaments in the act of 
juridification. 
The chapter also revisits the research questions in light of the investigation and context of the 
previous chapters: 
a. Descriptively, how has the application of accounting technologies in forfeiture law 
evolved? and 
b. What are the attributes of ‘appropriate’ accounting technologies described in 
question (a)? 
The responses to these questions are related to the value of this dissertation in terms of 
additional knowledge available to forensic accountants and expert accounting witnesses. 
Future research is suggested that could be undertaken into the patterned principles that would 
legitimise the role of accounting as a fulcrum to advance strategies aimed at the identification 
and quantification of tainted funds arising from and use for, but not necessarily directly 
linked to, organised crime. 
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Chapter 2: Definitions and Concepts 
This chapter introduces the discussion of definitions and concepts, including the varying use 
of terminology associated with the accounting processes that bear on this dissertation. For 
clarification, Table 2.1 provides a brief reference to the separation of definitions and concepts 
that evolve from the dissertation’s title.  
Table 2.1: Definition and Concepts Summary 
   
Forensic Accounting Technology 
Refers broadly to the deployment of a range 
of accounting techniques in a manner that 
facilitates discussion in debates or forums. 
 
 
Accounting as a Medium of Juridification 
Generally, refers to an increase in formal 
statutes or law 
 
 
The Pragmatic Context of Forfeiture Law and 
Its Application 
 
Refers to the setting within which to explore 
how accounting influences the objectives of 
redistributive justice. 
 
 
A significant motivation for undertaking this thesis topic is that, in the writer’s 
experience
1314
, members of the legal profession make little or no distinction between basic 
numbers and accounting, viewing accounting simply as the rote production of a report or ‘set 
of figures’. Yet professional accountants (particularly scholars of critical accounting) 
                                                     
13
 The author’s experience includes the provision of over 100 accounting expert court reports as well as 10 years 
as a senior public servant with the Australian Taxation Office, where duties included regular meetings with the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to monitor and pursue prosecutions linked with taxation.  
14
 The author’s experience has not led to this research being reflexive, as it has not influenced the approach to 
the research or the method of analysis. In this regard the author’s experience has merely given rise to the 
important recognition of the issue of strategic active communication between expert accountants, the legal 
profession and the lifeworld. 
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recognise that accounting has both quantitative and qualitative attributes (Chua, 1986; Arens 
and Chapman, 2006; Gaffikin, 2008). Particular terms, including the word accounting itself, 
represent slightly different, yet aligned, concepts. The word accounting refers to the body of 
accounting knowledge that distinguishes it as a profession that includes the certified 
associations and membership of accounting bodies. Membership is granted following the 
passing of specified barriers to entry, such as academic and practical competence in a core set 
of accounting skills and knowledge. This is an important distinction because professional 
accreditation recognises the acquisition of an exclusive body of knowledge – that is, expertise 
– as hegemonically recognised both within and outside the profession. The term accounting 
technology represents the technical consolidation of accounting methodologies
15
; that is, the 
reasoned thought behind accounting methods that ontologically validates those methods when 
properly performed. Accounting methods are the processes that lead to the production of 
accounting outputs such as financial reports, quantification techniques and analysis. 
Accounting action refers to the actions that arise from accounting methods and, in a 
Habermasian
16
 sense, contribute to communicative action. The term accountingization will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, represents the use of accounting as a behavioural direction 
mechanism; for example, using accounting measures to reward particular behaviours, 
outcomes and ‘efficiencies’
17
. 
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 In the absence of a theory of accounting, the accounting genealogy has been constructed through the peer 
acceptance of various methodologies providing conceptual rigour. The profession and accounting bodies 
(sometimes government-supported) define methodological acceptability, which they enforce through 
membership and disciplinary constraints. Consistent with a modernist vision, the accepted accounting 
methodologies were initially seen to lie within the philosophy of science; however, in the late 20
th
 century they 
have been augmented by theories of economics, finance and psychology (see Gaffikin, 2008). 
16
 The philosophy of Habermas will be extensively considered in this dissertation. The reference here is that 
accounting action contributes to Habermas’s process of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) 
17
 There is debate in areas such as health and welfare about the actual achievement or desirable effect of 
accounting-directed efficiencies and cultural change. Nevertheless, accounting-directed efficiencies are claimed 
and, in some cases, legislated, as with the UK’s New Public Management philosophy (see Power and Laughlin, 
1992; Nyland et al. 2006). 
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 To effectively contribute to communicative action that arises from the court, accounting 
needs to be positively aligned with the legal process, as demonstrated in the acceptance of 
forensic accounting expert evidence to assist the court. The important question about this 
alignment is whether it is “grounded in criticisable reasons and is, thereby, made rational” 
(Arrington and Puxty, 1991, p32). Accounting’s basis in numbers deployed remotely
18
 
(Robson, 1992) holds its rationality across jurisdictions and culture, informing public 
argument and providing grounds for democratic communication of legal adjudication and 
decisions. Accounting brings the perceived rationality of science
19
 to the linguistic legal 
process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In this way accounting adds facticity and strength to 
the legal narrative through the validity of numbers, particularly evident where words (the 
decision) need to be translated into money (the remedy). 
Forensic Accounting Technology 
Forensic accounting refers broadly to the deployment of a range of accounting techniques in a 
manner that facilitates discussion in debates or forums. It may include accounting 
technologies associated with the tracing or flow of funds, valuations, accounting performance 
or net worth. Specifically, in this research, such discussion is within the legal context. 
Forensic accounting technology is deployed as expertise when rectification of injustice with 
regard to the possession of property is required. For example, the court may call on forensic 
accounting techniques to articulate the transactions leading to the acquisition of property 
using the proceeds of a criminal act (Queen v. Ferguson, Saddler and Cox, 2009). In this 
instance, a forensic accountant may be able to trace the utilisation of funds directly to or from 
a specific crime, to fulfil the predicate crime requirements of ‘Proceeds of Crime’ legislation. 
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 In this case ‘remotely’ means ‘deployed from outside the legal system’; that is, from the accounting body of 
knowledge into the legal system, and then, after endorsement, outside into the lifeworld. 
19
 This is not a claim that accounting is a science; however, its positivist attributes and alignment with scientific 
method create the perception of accounting as a science, and it is that perception that is the concern of this 
dissertation (see Gaffikin, 2008). 
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More broadly, expert accounting technology may be utilised to articulate, value and quantify 
illegitimate sources of wealth for the purposes of actions taken under ‘Unexplained Wealth’ 
legislation
20
 utilising gap analysis type techniques (Crumbley et al., 2005; Botha, 2009; 
Nigrini, 2011; Shalak et al., 2012; Albretch et al., 2014; Kranacher et al., 2013). 
Such technologies define the point of commencement as the economic position of a subject 
before the suspected or known perpetration of criminal acts, which leads to methods  like the 
compilation of an opening balance sheet position. Accounting analysis continues with respect 
to income and expenses (in line with profit and loss methods) over the duration of a period of 
asset accumulation controlled by the subject, before an ending position, similar to a closing 
balance sheet, is calculated for comparison to the beginning financial position
21
. The term 
‘unexplained’ implies that the legitimate net income accumulation during the period of 
analysis is insufficient to explain either the coverage of lifestyle expenses or the improved net 
asset position quantified by deducting the ending balance sheet from the beginning balance 
sheet. That is, the gap between the explained and the unexplained financial positions bears 
examination (Crumbley et al. 2005; Nigrini, 2011; Shalak et al., 2012; Albretch et al., 2014). 
In this manner, the accounting method computes the inexplicable incremental financial 
position, as distinct from the anticipated yields of each financial investment.  Expertise in the 
form of accounting methods such as transactional analysis, cash flows, capitalisation, 
standard living costs, net worth analysis and asset betterment can be employed to assist the 
court with its adjudication (for example, see Chapter 8). Forensic accounting expertise 
removes the ‘messiness’ of transactional data, instead organising it into rational 
understanding (commencing with debits and credits) that facilitates digestion by the court 
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 ‘Unexplained Wealth legislation’, in general, refers to forfeiture legislation or statutory provisions that 
instruct and justify asset confiscation on the basis of an unexplained gap in one’s wealth. That is, the wealth has 
been established to be in excess of that acquired by legitimate, explainable means. 
21
 In this regard the opening and closing balance sheets articulate the financial position at specific points in time, 
whereas the profit and loss statement reports the aggregate position  resulting from all transactions between two 
points in time (that is, the time of the opening and closing balance sheets). 
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(Albretch et al., 2014). The court then has a basis on which to make a just decision (Shalak et 
al., 2012).  In this way, accounting flows from outside the court to become a medium 
supporting juridification that fortifies the court’s objective to deliver justice, often settled by 
financial penalty (or forfeiture) that is either grounded in the expert’s calculation or 
prescribed by statute and punitively administered.  
Given the escalating use of accounting technology in the judicial process (see Moore, 1991; 
Carter, 2006; Clarke, 2002; Kirby, 2011) it is important to understand how courts use 
accounting evidence, its impact on judicial decisions, the favoured substance and form of 
accounting technologies and the attributes of influential or non-influential accounting 
evidence (Selby and Freckleton, 1999). The public rationale for the use of forensic 
accounting is to serve the values of the lifeworld
22
; that is, to use the accounting inscriptions
23
 
(Latour, 1987, 1988a) and the dominant metaphor of number (Morgan 1988; Robson, 1992) 
to support the precision, rigour and accuracy of a judicial decision. “Accounting, both in 
research and practice, has given the central place to the use of quantities as the dominant 
mode of information” (Robson, 1992 p686). Classically, Plato asserts that “the properties of 
number appear to have the power of leading us to reality” (Plato, translation [1941] p236). 
Specifically, in the international expansion of the forfeiture legislative genre, the presentation 
of accounting evidence, the choice of accounting technology and the conduct of the forensic 
accounting process, as presented to the court, may influence the outcome of matters that form 
a crucial part of a country’s control of organised and large-scale crime
24
.  
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  ‘Lifeworld’ is a sociological concept  that refers to the world as it is experienced or lived (Edmund Husserl, 
1936). Habermas sees the lifeworld as representing the qualitative, symbolic values and influence of society, 
whereas the ‘system’ is more quantitative, built around the mediums of money and power (Habermas, 1984). 
23
 The term ‘accounting inscription’ refers to “the material and graphical representations that constitute the 
accounting report: writing, numbers, lists, tables” (Robson, 1992) This includes the dominant metaphor of 
‘number’. 
24
 The link between forfeiture legislation, confiscation action and remedies to combat organised crime will be 
discussed throughout the first five chapters of  this dissertation. 
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Legal adjudication requires rational explanation both internally (between legal participants) 
and externally (to the community). The legal story needs to be adjudicated by the court, then 
related to the community for their approval. Telling the tale requires translation from legal 
linguistics, making the facts digestible to an audience who do not have the expertise, access 
or time to consider the primary legal framework and legal discourse. The translation must 
connect with community estimations of legitimacy, particularly when the judicial decision is 
exercised in monetary terms (such as compensation, forfeiture, penalty or redistribution). The 
rationality of accounting technology serves in matters of economic disputation as an ideal 
translator between linguistic legal argument, statutory imperatives, adjudicated judgement 
and community legitimacy. . Legislative juridification is grounded in effective translation; 
that is, the necessity to explain proceedings to the community so that their democratic support 
for the judicial system is gained and maintained. The community must accept the rightfulness 
of legal processes and the validity of decisions for the proper functioning of laws and the 
enacting of statutes to continue.  
This dissertation takes its initial argument from the influential theorist Jurgen Habermas,  
considering accounting as expertise within Habermas’s description of communication and 
legal processes. Whilst Habermas does not directly refer to accountants, others have used 
Habermasian philosophy in describing accounting’s expert role within bureaucracies and 
communities (Arrington and Puxty, 1991; Laughlin, 1987; Power, 2013, 1968; Roberts, 
1988; Puxty and Chua, 1989). Habermas has theorised and debated extensively in his major 
works Between Facts and Norms (1996 [1992]) and Theory of Communicative Action Vol 1 
(1984 [1981]) and Vol 2 (1987 [1981]); only a fraction of  his broad program has been 
extracted to inform this thesis, with particular focus on  how accounting expertise influences 
the bureaucracy (the system, which includes the legal system) and the community (the 
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lifeworld), and how this is facilitated by the steering mechanisms of money and power. 
Habermas refers to this process as 'colonisation'.   
The research argument then reflects on two theories of distributive justice (Rawls, 1971; 
Nozick, 1974) that are based on the perceived need for redistribution under circumstances of 
inequitable attainment, such as through enforcement of proceeds of crime statutes, when 
tainted assets are acquired through criminal acts or from the proceeds of crime. The process 
of redistribution is considered on the basis of rational principles, termed ‘patterned principles 
of justice’, that the community recognises as consistent and fair (Arrington and Puxty, 1991; 
Cooper, 1977; Vallentyne, 2007; Wellman, 2002). Patterned principles are similar to a 
formula for redistribution. A patterned principle of justice holds that a distribution of goods is 
just only if it meets a particular pattern. For example, Rawls (1999) relies on principles of 
fairness to determine just redistribution, whereas Nozick (1974) relies on historical 
entitlements to recognise just acquisition and the requirement for redistribution where just 
acquisition has not occurred. 
Patterned principles provide the conceptual validity to which accounting technologies 
connect to inherit their validity. The process by which a patterned principle is accepted by the 
community is one where the community’s values and norms are accommodated by, or 
reflected in, the pattern that gives the principle validity. The pattern is recognised, accepted 
and understood by both the sender and the receiver, with common regard for the issue of the 
communication. It therefore leads to communicative action being ‘wired’ from one group to 
another (Habermas, 1981). Accounting technologies are instructed by patterned principles, 
such that their ontology is also validated by their alignment with community norms. 
Accounting, therefore, supports the calculation of an equitable redistribution, essentially 
through the legal process of injecting accounting knowledge into court adjudication and 
judicial decision-making. Whilst the legal system is administered and controlled by the legal 
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profession, accounting expertise is permitted to inform the legal process, through special 
leave as expert opinion evidence (Uniform Evidence Act (Cth), 1995 and aligned legislation), 
if appropriate conditions are met (Doyle, 1987). Accounting, in the form of forensic 
accounting, must be presented through the legal process (Clegg 1984; Practice Note CM7, 
Federal Court of Australia, 2013) to legitimise its communication. This dissertation argues 
that accounting inscriptions provide unique, rational attributes (Latour, 1987, 1988a; Robson, 
1992; Chua, 1989) that enhance the communication from within the legal system to convince 
the community that the associated legal process and outcomes are broadly valid. Consistent 
with Robson’s argument (1992), accounting techniques and calculations can be “translated 
into broader social, economic and political discourses not normally associated with the 
apparently neutral, technical discourse and practices of accounting” (p566). 
The dissertation then moves on to analyse the practical use of accounting to communicate and 
translate monetary messages from within the legal system, and to analyse the example of 
forfeiture legislation. This discussion initially reflects on forfeiture legislation, the nature of 
confiscation statutes (civil or criminal) and the evolution of forfeiture as a judicial remedy 
from the historical concepts of deodand and attainder to a responsive compliance measure to 
prevent criminals’ use and enjoyment of tainted assets. The specific role of expert opinion 
evidence and inclusions for forensic accounting evidence (as expert opinion evidence) to be 
admitted, presented and considered by the court are contemplated (Talve, 2013, Bronstein, 
1999; Dwyer, 2008; Frye v. United States, 1923; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
1993; Makita v. Red Bull, 2006). Further, the purpose and subsequent effectiveness of 
forfeiture legislation in achieving its aim to reduce and prevent organised crime is examined 
through  comparing the purposeful statements made by those who proposed confiscation 
legislation with the statistical outputs to date, qualitative feedback from the relevant 
enforcement agencies and case outcomes. 
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Finally, after case-based research, the thesis evaluates and proposes rational attributes of 
forensic accounting evidence suitable to provide valid expert opinion in forfeiture litigation 
matters. This deliberation is informed by the examination of accepted professional 
perspectives. As forensic accounting occupies a position using both accounting and legal 
knowledge
25
, this research is informed by legal and accounting thinking.  Recognition of the 
legal role of judicial gatekeeper
26
, theoretical literature on legal concepts of entitlement, legal 
decision-making, adjudication and evidence informs this research from foundational as well 
as purposeful perspectives. The mixing of the two professions itself acknowledges the 
coupling of professional standpoints whilst individual professional status as either 
accountants or lawyers is maintained and enforced
27
. Forensic accounting is only one area 
where the accounting and legal professions mix; others include the application of statutory 
performance, governance and regulation. However the professional mix in forensic 
accounting places greater focus on the blend of professional content rather than professional 
hegemony
28
. 
Of importance in this work is consideration of how legal decisions are affected by the 
addition of external expertise, specifically accounting expertise. Literature on 
accountingization (Power and Laughlin, 1992) and expertise deployed in the form of 
accounting messages at a distance (Robson 1992) is considered with respect to accounting’s 
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 Forensic accounting primarily relies on the accounting body of knowledge knowingly exercised within the 
legal context, but is also informed by behavioural aspects of psychology and criminology (see Albrecht et al., 
2009). 
26
 The court is the judicial forum where forensic accounting evidence is heard. The courts are the domain of the 
law, and therefore legal training is required to admit and assess accounting evidence (both in presentation and 
judgement). Hence those with legal accreditation define and interpret evidence, admitting it into the court 
through their role as legal gatekeepers.  
27
 Whilst forensic accountants must be cognisant of legal processes and concepts, such as those pertaining to 
evidence, they remain qualified accountants, not qualified lawyers. Similarly, those legally qualified may 
develop the skills required to interpret (and cross-examine) accounting evidence; however, they are not therefore 
qualified in accounting. Such professional distinctions are enforced by the formal rules of professional 
membership as either an accountant or lawyer. Maintaining a professional designation is a matter of professional 
compliance and membership. Compliance is enforced by conformity to membership norms such as appropriate 
continuing education and subscription payments. 
28
 This is despite the fact that forensic accounting also fuses concepts from other professions such as psychology 
and criminology (see Crumbley, 2007) 
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legitimising ‘scientific’ influence and communicative inscriptions (Morgan, 1988; Latour, 
1987; Moonitz, 1961; Mattessich, 1962; Duncan, 1982; Chua, 1986; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). In the Australian context, the work of Selby and Freckleton (1999) and Freckleton, 
Reddy and Selby (2001) add practical research that reflects on how the legal fraternity 
(judges and magistrates) read and digest accounting messages.  
As previously noted, the theoretical work of Habermas in particular provides a framework to 
understand forensic accounting’s role as expertise in judicial communication and the 
construction and maintenance of legitimacy. Power and Laughlin (1996) refer to the 
‘Habermas effect’ within such fields as law and accounting: 
There is now considerable familiarity with the contours of Habermas’ thinking 
and increasing interest in its implications for the practice of social research (p 
441) 
This research uses Habermasian critical theoretical analysis, applying it to the pragmatic 
context of the clarification of accounting expertise, as a medium in the discourse of 
adjudication that leads to legal decisions in forfeiture law. Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action is applied to understand the integration of the court’s deliberative 
decision and its action analysed with respect to the social control of regulated activities 
(ranging from evidence to legal enforcement), expressed in discourse that includes symbols 
(such as accounting calculation) (Habermas, 1987, pp43-60). Of importance is Habermas’s 
description of the role of expertise in the capture, rationalisation and translation of the legal 
process of adjudication, for both the court participants and the wider audience. in aligning the 
sent message with  the received and thus  forming the basis of communicative action. 
Communicative action then underpins the democratic support necessary for the juridification 
process. With respect to the forfeiture genre, the legal argument is constructed from the need 
articulated by Nozick (1974) to rectify injustices in property acquisition and transfer (see 
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Nozick’s third rule of justice), and is thereafter informed by Habermasian theory of law, 
communicative action and the facilitation role of expertise (in this case accounting). The 
convergence of these perspectives is encapsulated in a theoretical framework diagram 
(Chapter 3, p44).  
The role of expertise from outside the law is considered, specifically with respect to 
accounting. In this regard forensic accounting is centrally positioned to use its a priori
29
 
knowledge and the factitious attributes of calculation and number to translate and resonate 
legitimation messages. The role of expertise in legal adjudication is considered theoretically, 
as well as with respect to its form (for example, a formal written report or oral evidence) and 
process (for example, the objectives of the presentation of opinion evidence). Hence, the 
literature  on opinion evidence is contemplated  as theoretical, statutory and authoritative 
guidance (see Chapter 5). 
Accounting as a Medium of Juridification 
The title of this study locates accounting as a medium of juridification.  That concept is 
complex but, in general, refers to “the tendency towards an increase in formal (or positive, 
written) law”  (Habermas, 1987, p 359).  Juridification is a metonym for a broader late-
modern social process in which public life is increasingly formalised, quantified and 
approached in an ‘objective’ way (see, for example, Laughlin, 1987; Arrington and Puxty, 
1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1994).  This is not merely an expansion of the volume of 
regulation but the inclusion of new tenets in existing statutes; for example, the inclusion of 
                                                     
1. 29 A priori: relating to or denoting reasoning or knowledge which proceeds from theoretical deduction rather 
than from observation or experience (Oxford Dictionary, accessed 2017). 
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the reverse onus of the onus of proof
30
 within legislation regarding the proceeds of crime. 
Juridification also includes the convergence of different areas of expertise under the 
legislative process; for example the inclusion of accounting measurements or quantification 
in sections of statutes not otherwise concerned with accounting.  As Habermas notes, 
juridification fits this broader context of the formal rationalisation of the public sphere: 
From this standpoint we can distinguish processes of juridification according 
to whether they are linked to antecedent institutions of the lifeworld and 
jurisdicially superimposed on socially integrated areas of action or whether 
they merely increase the density of legal relationships that are constitutive of 
systematically integrated areas of action (1987a, p 366). 
Habermas contextualises the concept of juridification within welfare state expertise as being 
intended to support social integration but often achieving the opposite (Power and Laughlin, 
1996): the front line and social workers are linked and driven by values and work practices 
undisturbed until colonised by legal formality and (as an extension) the financial logic of 
accounting. The tenets, norms, methods and standards of pre-existing expertise are annexed 
and overrun by the rational (scientific) logic of a legal/accounting structural coupling.
31
 In the 
context of this research, structural coupling refers to the values of accounting and law 
becoming intertwined with social values that support both professional and social legitimacy. 
Reference to the coupled process conceals the prior self-referential regulatory procedure (in 
this case within the legal profession). The expertise of accounting is ‘attached’ to the legal 
framework that dictates the formal and informal need for the calculation of outputs, 
efficiencies or remediation that accompany the legal instructions.  
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 In this regard, the accused or respondent to a forfeiture application bears the onus of proof that the property 
was not the proceeds of crime or is not tainted property; see, for example, Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 
2002(Qld) and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). 
31
 Structural coupling is a complex notion worthy of sociological study beyond this treatise; however, structural 
coupling will be briefly revisited in Chapter 2. For the current discussion, structural coupling of the 
legal/accounting professions refers to the combining of individual professional attributes to produce synergistic 
leverage, in this case through money (accounting) and power (law). 
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In this way structural coupling, through forensic accounting, supports juridification,  despite 
the tension that arises from the stress between the social power that endorses sanctioned law 
(such as, subjective rights) and sacred law that is sanctioned by social power (popular support 
towards the realisation of collective goals for the greater good).  For example, civil 
libertarians’ concerns with regard to unfair property seizure without conviction are 
overridden by the political imperative for the prevention of criminal enjoyment that arises 
from the use of their ill-gotten gains (see, for example, the submissions of the Queensland 
Council for Civil Liberties, the Law Society of South Australia, Liberty Victoria and the Law 
Council of Australia to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Inquiry into the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and Other 
Measures) Bill, 2012). 
Habermas has philosophised across a range of issues. This research is mostly concerned with 
how Habermas positions the authority of law and the legitimising role of experts in the 
support of the law. Habermas describes the public rationale for the use of expertise (in this 
case forensic accounting) to serve the values of the lifeworld; however, he also warns that the 
exclusive nature of expertise can inhibit discourse, such that it is only transparent to those 
who possess the expertise (Habermas, 1996). This expertise facilitates and legitimises 
communicative action (Habermas 1984) through its accounting inscriptions (Latour, 1987) 
and the metaphor of number (Morgan, 1988), as these enable the dissemination of 
information that permits judicial action to be interpreted and its power to be exercised at a 
distance (Robson 1992)
32
. Forensic accounting’s links to the antecedent accounting 
institutions provide legitimacy through independently acknowledged expertise. This expertise 
reifies legal claims through leverage upon regulatory procedures outside the self-
legitimisation of the legislative regime. Accounting expertise provides “material from which 
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 The concepts of communicative action, inscriptions, the metaphor of number and action at a distance will be 
discussed and developed progressively throughout this dissertation. 
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a durable individual and collective self-understanding can be made, turning them into 
influential sources of political judgement and deliberation” (White, 1995, p76).  
The idea of accounting for decision-making purposes seems an obvious role; however, 
scrutiny of accounting as a facilitation technology brings up questions about its role as a 
steering medium
33
 within the legal setting. In this context, Power and Laughlin (1992, p133) 
refer to the “increasing accountingization of things,” a process through which many aspects 
of both public, and indeed private, life are constructed through various modes of accounting 
and financialisation. 
‘Accountingization’ is perhaps an ugly word, but it expresses the sense in which 
accounting as a method may eclipse broader questions of accountability (Power 
and Laughlin, 1992, p 133).  
Accountingization is defined as “the displacement of core values within [this sector] of the 
economy by the invasive influence of financial measures and imperatives” (Lapsley, 1998, 
p.117). According to Langfield-Smith (1992), shared beliefs and values are seen as a 
prerequisite to collective functioning. Accountingization invades existing shared beliefs, 
adding to them a new benchmarking, technocratic system governed by the perceived 
legitimacy of accounting and economic reason. This may be evident in circumstances such as 
when an accounting system is introduced into an area that has previously been driven by 
goodwill or moral imperatives. The accounting system usurps the existing governance with 
its accounting measurement and priorities that may or may not be compatible with the former 
(now less powerful) beliefs and motivations. 
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 Habermas discusses the concept of a steering mechanism, which acquires its meaning from systems theory,  
as providing communicative mechanisms to facilitate adaptability. Accounting can be seen to steer economic 
activity, particularly as the language of business. The role of accounting as a steering mechanism will be 
revisited later in this dissertation (Habermas, 1996, 1984). 
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The Pragmatic Context of Forfeiture Law and Its Application 
The second part of this research’s title, The Pragmatic Context of Forfeiture Law and Its 
Application, provides the setting within which to explore the accountingization of 
redistributive justice. Specifically, this refers to the accounting attributes and technologies 
presented in the form of expert evidence in Proceeds of Crime (POC) and Unexplained 
Wealth (UW) legislation.  POC and UW legislation is intended to address the failure of the 
just acquisition and transfer of property (Nozick, 1974) that occurs when criminal proceeds 
are the source of property acquisition; that is, when tainted funds lead to tainted assets (see, 
for example, Remeikis, 2013; Tiozek 2013).   
Forensic accounting is employed to assist the trier of fact (mainly the judiciary) to make the 
‘right’ decision with respect to the redistribution of tainted assets. However, historically it is 
difficult to rectify the injustices of the past with respect to property acquisition, so the court is 
challenged to establish what belongs to whom and where the starting point is for a just 
beginning. Issues such as where assets are acquired through the co-mingling of funds (where 
tainted funds are mixed with untainted funds), the leveraging of tainted funds (where tainted 
funds are leveraged against legitimate borrowing facilities), mixed ownership (criminals and 
non-criminals holding equity positions) or beneficial owners hiding behind a veil of entities 
(corporate or trust structures) continue to arise. The ‘truth’ of beneficial ownership is 
frequently an accounting question pertaining to the control and distribution of funds. 
Expert evidence advising the court on these issues must be admitted to legal adjudication. 
Hence it must be of acceptable form and provenance to negotiate the obligatory passage 
point
34
 (Clegg, 1984) of opinion evidence as defined by statute and common law (see the 
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 In this case the obligatory passage point is the pre-court processes of challenging evidence, which must be 
passed for the evidence to be heard in court. Clegg (1984) describes the importance of adherence to the rules of 
passage through these points, which cannot be avoided;  the points are controlled by professions (in this case the 
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Australian Uniform Evidence Acts). The expert accounting evidence must also be understood 
by the decision-maker, a problematic factor given the “unfamiliarity of judges and barristers 
with commercial principles” (Craig and Reddy, 2004, p73). Expert opinion is only influential 
if it is allowed to be heard; that is, given entrance to the court as expert evidence. The entry 
of expert evidence is at the discretion of the presiding judge (a member of the legal 
profession), who controls the gateway with both statutory rules (see the Australian Unified 
Evidence Acts, 2008) and interpretation (that is, reference to precedent decisions; see, for 
example, Chapter 4). Expert evidence is a special category of evidence given dispensation to 
be heard,  as it assists the court in its adjudication. Like all evidence, it must first be relevant 
to the matter at hand. Unlike evidence in the form of direct facts from witnesses, expert 
evidence must comply with a number of attributes; whether it does may prevent it being 
heard, or may reduce its validity or veracity once heard.  
There is a rich history of accounting expertise presented in evidence across a range of legal 
genres such as family law and equity law. Both civil and criminal jurisdictions have been 
assisted by accounting expert evidence. Arising from these matters is a history of precedents 
and senior judicial commentary with regard to the appropriate context for expert opinion 
evidence. This has served to increase the proliferation of opinion evidence, specifically 
forensic accounting (Kirby, 2011). To maintain relevance, the specific content of accounting 
evidence must necessarily address the facts of the matter; in doing so the accounting expert’s 
‘story’ needs to draw from the recognised accounting body of knowledge, then, be applied to 
the adjudication at hand. Standardised responses are insufficient, as they lack the complete 
explanation to justify the expert’s opinion and the full consideration of the aspects of 
professional guidance found in the relevant Accounting Standards (see for example 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards – APES 215 Forensic Accounting Services; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
legal profession) at risk of penalty (in this case not allowing access and potentially non acceptance of expert 
status in future matters). 
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APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants). Whilst the provision of forensic 
accounting evidence may be bounded and guided by legal and accounting professional 
statutes, standards and precedent, the ultimate purpose of expert evidence is its contribution 
to the court’s adjudication. The court is searching for the ‘truth’
35
. The expert’s opinion only 
gains traction in the debate if it is deemed as ‘truthful’ by the trier of fact (the judge). The 
expert must influence the judge beyond his/her knowledge, to enhance the perception of truth 
through expression, clarity, logical thought, adequate investigation, independence, 
identification and exploration of specific issues (Michels, 2004). Accounting experts are 
obliged to explain and justify their methodology, including which methods they have 
discarded and adopted. 
Selby and Freckleton (1999, 2001) have highlighted the high degree of difficulty involved in 
translating accounting expert evidence to the trier of fact (judiciary and magistrates). This 
raises the question of professional integration of accounting knowledge within the legal 
profession’s domain. By necessity, the legal and accounting professions couple to produce a 
justifiable economic remedy; however, the extent of basic accounting knowledge within the 
judiciary and  its advisors remains undefined. Accounting is not a prerequisite subject or skill 
set for legal designations. In Ireland, political pressure following the murder of prominent 
journalist Veronica Geurin (1996) by organised crime members prompted the establishment 
of specific knowledge within those courts responsible for forfeiture remedies. The Criminal 
Assets Bureau Act, 1996 was the first multi-agency bureaucracy to focus on organised 
criminals’ illegally acquired assets. It included law enforcement, tax officers and social 
welfare officials who were specifically equipped with forensic accounting and financial 
analyst skills. This multi-professional task force has recently been adopted in the Australian 
commonwealth jurisdiction (Commonwealth Serious Financial Crime Taskforce). 
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 The concept of legal ‘truth’ will be further reviewed in Chapter 4. 
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The political message espoused to support the introduction of forfeiture legislation inevitably 
portrays the need for confiscation as a measure to deny organised crime the use and 
enjoyment of their ill-gotten gains (see, for example, Clarke (Victorian Attorney-General), 
2014; Bleije (Queensland Attorney-General), 2013). Whilst the behavioural results of 
organised crime may include some high-profile confrontational attributes (such as violence, 
murder, the use of weapons and stand-over tactics), its egregiousness is measured in 
economic terms.  So it is appropriate to reflect on the economic progression of forfeiture 
cases as a preventive measure compared with economic assessments of organised crime. In 
the Australian context, various accountabilities have existed at State, Territory and Federal 
levels that include the more recent formation of a bureaucratic task force to integrate 
expertise from several perspectives, including accounting. Australian authorities have learnt 
from the Irish experience, which has also been adopted to some degree in the United 
Kingdom’s bureaucratic structure. This thesis reviews the effectiveness of POC and UW 
legislation with respect to the stated aims of the legislators and the published achievements of 
task forces assigned to enforce it. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
Chapter Introduction 
As previously noted this dissertation does not rely upon the philosophy of a single proponent, 
rather its theoretical stance has been developed by the incorporation of eminent thought 
across a range of issues that pertain to both the theoretical and pragmatic interpretation of the 
research topic. This is important because the aim of the thesis is less about the accounting 
technologies and more about the legitimising strategies used in the .deployment of such 
technologies. In order to co-ordinate, these issues and position the intersection of the 
literature, a theoretical diagram has been developed that centrally positions the core matter of 
Expert Opinion Evidence (Forensic Accounting). The areas of literature that contribute to the 
debate radiate in and out of this central position to present a flow towards communicative 
action and lifeworld influence. 
The purpose of the Theoretical Diagram (p44) is to provide a pictorial road map for the 
integration of theoretical constructs that inform this research. It positions literary topics for 
review as distinct topics, whilst they remain connected to the overall purpose and flow of the 
research. This approach provides a theoretical framework for the stepped research argument 
and technical review discussed in chapters three, four and five. These chapters construct the 
context to ask and answer the research questions pertaining to forensic accounting’s 
contribution to, and acceptance by, the court. Further, the context is viewed from both within 
and outside of the legal system with specific attention given to accounting evidence that 
contributes to the genre of forfeiture law. 
In advancement of the account, this chapter cuts across debates postulated by Habermas (with 
respect to the law, expertise and communication), Nozick (concepts of justified entitlement 
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and redistributive justice), Rawls (patterned fairness of redistribution), Robson (accounting at 
a distance), Laughlin (accountingization) and Clegg (power and professional process 
domination). These authors refer to some underpinning concepts which, for clarity, are noted 
below, prior to further discussion of the literature.  
Key Concepts 
In order to assist the reader to follow the discussion in this chapter it is timely to reflect on 
some of the concepts that support the discussion. This introduction serves to reinforce key 
concepts employed in the theoretical interpretation that follows. As noted this dissertation 
draws on conceptions explored by Habermas (1929 - current) as applied to accounting within 
the context of the law. Habermas proposes his theory of communicative rationality (1981) 
arguing that “reason is tied to social interactions and dialogue” (Finlayson, 2005), with that 
reason having arisen from transparent deliberation.  Habermas rationalises that the social 
theatre that consists of one’s everyday ‘lifeworld’ interacts with the ‘system’ that contains the 
strategic activity of economic and administrative institutions and organisations. Money 
(monetarisation) and power (bureaucratisation) are manipulated such that the latter grows at 
the expense of the former, a process Habermas refers to as ‘colonisation’ (Chambers, 1996; 
Habermas 1985). 
 The Lifeworld 
The initial reference to ‘lifeworld’ comes from the biological consideration of the structures 
and elements that surround and contribute to the experience, nourishment and life of an 
organism. Edmund Husserl (1936) applied the term as the self-evident universe, a world in 
which subjects experience “living together in wakeful world-consciousness” (Husserl 
1936/1970 p108-09). For Habermas the lifeworld is the contextual environment of 
competencies, practices and attitudes represented in terms of one’s cognitive horizon 
37 
 
(Habermas, 1985).  The lifeworld is the everyday environment we share with others. It is both 
personal and intersubjective. In terms of this dissertation, the lifeworld is important, because 
it forms the populous that underpins the democratic processes, and therefore, by way of their 
vote, they elect the law makers, who in turn facilitate the juridification process by passing 
new and additional statutes. 
The System 
The system refers to the common patterns of strategic action that serve the interests of 
institutions and organisations (Habermas, 1984). That is, the professional and administrative 
context enhanced by technical rationality. In regard to this dissertation, the system is 
essentially the professional environment of the legal system including the legal profession, 
statutes, the courts and the bureaucratic administration of the law. 
 The Lifeworld and the System 
Habermas proposes that the system is implanted in the lifeworld, colonising it, fostering a 
self-interested rationalisation, that facilitates the manipulation and influence of consensus 
decisions. Over time the importance of the lifeworld’s local values, inherently understood 
between people, are subsumed and replaced by the system’s moral order. The new moral 
order fosters a new set of community norms, compatible with the expectations of the system.  
Juridification is both a symptom and a tool of this process as it replaces the lifeworld’s 
primary, morally based interconnections and decisions, with instructional statutes and legally 
interpreted remedies, which in turn, reinforce the new norms. Consensual understanding no 
longer co-ordinates interaction. Rather, interaction is directed by the consequences of self-
interested action (Baxter, 2011).  
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Intersubjectivity and accounting 
Accounting as a language assists in making the intersubjective meaning accessible to the 
lifeworld through translation of the actions of the system, primarily through the parlance of 
money. Accounting provides a new set of system accredited norms, which facilitate the 
system’s colonisation of the lifeworld.  The intent is to influence and co-opt the lifeworld 
members to support the democratic legitimacy of the system’s juridification agenda. 
Communicative action 
Communicative action is a sociological term developed by Habermas in his book The Theory 
of Communicative Action (1984). It refers to co-operative action undertaken based on mutual 
deliberation and rational argumentation. The process of argumentation is the “type of speech 
in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize 
them” (p18). Communicative action is enhanced by accounting as an influencing and 
clarifying medium, recognised by the lifeworld as expertise that is informative and 
understood if it meets certain conditions such as the delivery of proper patterned principles 
that are validated by the lifeworld’s norms. 
Patterned Principles 
The basis of patterned principles thought evolves from mathematical formalism where the 
world is described and understood in terms of patterns, articulated in precise language. That 
is, without detailed calculative knowledge, one can rely upon the outcome based upon 
adherence to a pattern of principles (for instance, a formula). The concept of relying on 
patterned principles for decisions has been applied beyond mathematics, such as in patterned 
principles of justice that determine just deserts on the basis of unhistorical determinants. A 
principle is patterned if “it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural 
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dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural 
dimensions” (Nozick, 1974, p156). Distributive justice is defined and interpreted according to 
some matching dimension, for example, the principles that inform a calculation as it is 
deployed by accounting technology. This is at variance with end-result and historical 
distributive theories which respectively consider the outcome and the prior processes in 
relative isolation. Patterned principles have scientific credibility, through repeatability, (Ball, 
2009) however they evolve through continuous intervention in people’s lives as the pattern 
for decision making is recurrently described to highlight the influential variables. Experts, 
including accountants, provide and update this description. Habermas is interested in the 
influence of these patterns in terms of a mechanism that co-ordinates communicative and 
strategic interaction (Habermas, 1985; Baxter 2011).  
Autopoiesis 
Autopoiesis (originally a biological term) refers to a system that can reproduce and maintain 
itself through self-organisation. It is autonomous and operationally closed, operating within 
self-referential feedback systems. The Law has been described as an autopoietic system, 
when it self-references between members of the profession even if they may have different 
titles and roles, for example an advocate, judge, lawyer, barrister, solicitor (Teubner, 1993). 
Similarly, accounting has been called autopoietic when it self-references, for example, when 
establishing peer accepted accounting principles (Robb, 1989; Mingus, 2007; Egbu, Botterill 
and Bates, 2001). Autopoietic expertise does not contribute to communicative action, because 
it is not understood by the lifeworld. Such expertise needs to be translated by a facilitating 
medium before it can exert any influence that arises directly from expert testimony.  
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Accountingization 
Strict interpretation of accountingization is the use of accounting technology to efficiently 
refine organisational processes such as for the purpose of profit maximisation. The 
calculative effect of accounting is brought to bear on the organisational goals becoming a 
(perhaps the) measure of achievement, often in preference to other moral organisational goals 
(Power and Laughlin, 1992). Of particular importance to this dissertation is the 
accountingization narrative that converts ‘bookkeeping fictions’ to ‘scientific facts’ 
(Littleton, 1933). For example, an amount coded to a general ledger account then becomes a 
factual component of that account that include both the quantitative and qualitative 
expression of that account, as if the coding to the account was a scientific certainty, rather 
than a result of professional determination and allocation (which may have been used to 
allocate coding to another account based equally on a professional determination of the 
attributes of the transaction). Accountingization fosters the acceptance of new accounting 
based norms for societal measurement, which are not necessarily limited to purely accounting 
reports. For example, an accounting measurement, such as profitability or a particular 
valuation, may produce a colloquial interpretation of ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘satisfactory’. 
Accountingization may propel accounting inscriptions to the forefront of the validation 
process, thereby legitimising a societal norm through a positive accounting description or 
correspondingly delegitimising through a negative accounting description. 
Obligatory Passage Points 
Clegg (1989) in describing his circuits of power as specific interpersonal flows, bases his 
work on Foucault’s theories of power, knowledge and resistance (Foucault, 1975, 1980, 1986 
and 1988).  Clegg’s circuits are three interacting “discursive fields of force”, socially 
constructed by organised human agency (the Episodic, Dispositional and Facilitative 
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Circuits) (p17). Obligatory passage points are controls for conduits to empower or 
disempower where the three circuits meet. For example, Court rules form an obligatory 
passage point that can legally empower an accountant through the determination of probity 
and access to the court as an expert witness, or alternatively in the negative, disempower an 
expert through denying access to be formally presented and heard. Such a passage point is 
obligatory in that it cannot be otherwise by-passed or circumvented. The legal profession, in 
managing the passage point (such as through sections of the Uniform Evidence Act, 2008 ), 
thereby controls the only access to the court available to forensic accountants. 
The Importance of this Chapter 
Cognisance of the influence of expertise dispensed through the legal system, in this case 
forensic accounting, this chapter is important because it reflects on both the legal and 
accounting professions as separate professions with inter-dependant and potentially 
synergistic responsibilities to the court, and to the populace, who rely upon correct 
dispensation of justice in circumstances that broadly prohibits the lifeworld’s direct 
assessment of individual matters. The importance of this chapter with respect providing the 
answers to the research questions is that the literature provides an ontological perspective and 
context within which to drill down to more pragmatic issues. 
This chapter is structured such that initial consideration is given to the research framework as 
presented in the Theoretical Diagram. This diagram puts expert opinion evidence (the prime 
research concern) in the centre of the discussion, informed by consideration of several genres 
of thought that arises from the professions (law and accounting), that pertains to nature of 
expertise and its influence, the validation of expertise and acceptable expert reporting, as well 
as the circular nature of the democratic influence and underpinning of the juridification 
process   . The chapter explains the diagram before considering the literature in three parts; 
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Part 1 – Expertise and the Law; Part 2 – The Accounting and Legal Professions; and Part 3 – 
Justified Re-distribution. 
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Theoretical Diagram 
The diagram centrally positions the process of validation of expert opinion evidence (in this 
case accounting expertise) through rational discourse. Forensic accounting provides a 
significant contribution to the rationalisation of the discourse through translating the legal 
linguistics into factitious quantification. The vehicle for this account is in the form of special 
entry to the court through Expert Opinion Evidence. The core consideration of this research 
pertains to the validation role forensic accounting plays, in terms of legitimacy, accounting 
technology, tools and techniques, professional presence and credible messages. Validation is 
facilitated by patterned principles of implementation and justice as constructed from the 
recognised accounting body of knowledge (expertise), integrated with the law (statute and 
common), to facilitate understanding and legitimacy in support of both system and lifeworld 
objectives (in the case of forfeiture, the prevention of the use and enjoyment of criminally 
tainted funds). The main focus of this study contextually straddles the professional 
boundaries of accounting and law, dealing with the facts of the matter at hand whilst 
cognisant of both the foundational accounting body of knowledge, the deployment of peer 
accepted, patterned accounting technologies within the legal environment. The professional 
knowledge, values and attributes of the individual legal and accounting professions come 
together to be structurally coupled around the facts of the matter to address redistributive 
justice. That is, both professions utilise overlapping professional structures and thought 
directed at explaining the matter, deducing and communicating an appropriate remedy inside 
and outside the courtroom. 
The judgemental arbitration of the law and the calculative facticity of accounting are both 
applied to the matter at hand in an effort to communicate the appropriate rectification of 
injustices from the breakdown of entitlement theory (see Nozick’s just acquisition/just 
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transfer, 1994) to the lifeworld. The lifeworld has an issue to resolve, in this case, that of 
crime prevention and the equitable rebalance of the proceeds of crime. Accounting has a 
teleological ontology in this respect as well as a history in the resolution of economic moral 
quandaries (Arrington, 2007). The system has a vested interest to champion this resolution as 
a valued contribution to the lifeworld, interpreted through the reliability of accounting 
numbers. The lifeworld looks to both the juridification (supported by argumentation) and the 
accountingization (supported by calculation) processes to help resolve the legal issues. In 
Habermasian terms, the lifeworld is colonised by the system through the use of the legal and 
accounting profession’s knowledge and their values that override, and replace, traditional 
collective norms (Habermas, 1996, 1984). Together they provide a contestable rational 
explanation of both process and outcome. The professions participate in exchange for the 
democratic connection with their political and monetary power to the lifeworld (the 
development of a professional hegemonic position and benefits). The lifeworld looks for 
comfort in the ‘right’ judicial decision, which it interprets with descriptive words and facts 
(inscriptions such as measurement or quantification) presented to them without the necessity 
of lifeworld members having to avail themselves of the proximity of the full knowledge of 
the facts of the matter at hand
36
. The community is concerned, but overall they cannot have 
access to the full proceedings. They rely on communication that provides a valid account to 
them.  In this manner professional expertise contributes to both the internal system and the 
external lifeworld through the provision of properly deployed patterned principles which 
serve as a surrogate to the alternative of full knowledge.  
Internally, the adjudicative purpose of the accounting validation process is to assist the 
judiciary in making the ‘right’ decision through legitimisation by the numbers, the 
factualisation of the ‘truth’ and communication of an action consistent with the value 
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 That is, avail themselves of the court transcripts or by personal court attendance during the hearing. 
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requirements of the lifeworld in an ‘ideal speech act
37
’. The audience relies upon accounting 
to inform the validation process, establishing accounting legitimacy as a patterned principle 
of justice, that is, an adjudicated outcome cradled by repeatable, sound and stable reasoning, 
akin to (the reliability of) a scientific process. For example, the accounting claims that can 
withstand validity testing discourse, particularly in the form of cross-examination. Further the 
claims can be recalculated to produce the same answer given the same assumptions, or an 
associated answer under the articulation of changed assumptions. This platform is familiar to 
the legal profession in their reference form of a precedent, that is, reliance upon prior, 
influential reasoning and judgements (obiter dicta of the trier of fact). However, precedent 
familiarity has little resonance externally, in the lifeworld, because it requires a priori legal 
knowledge, that is not generally available outside the boundaries of professional expertise.  
Externally, accountingization assists through interpretation of the facts of the matter through 
the lens of professional accounting methodologies, already accepted as contributing to 
distributive justice. The lifeworld recognises the legitimisation effect of accounting as it 
impacts in a range of regular management, reporting and monitoring activities. 
Accountingization reduces the legal ambiguities through the translation of qualities into 
quantities, linguisity into facticity and the perception of repositioning the argument into the 
trusted domain of science rather than art. Robson (1992) reflects that “the relationship 
between the signifier in language and the signified is arbitrary” whereas numbers have the 
“essence of their objects contained within them” (p690). In the absence of regular and 
specific evaluation of individual matters, the lifeworld rests upon an accounting function to 
facilitate Habermas’ communicative action, that leads to trust in the deliberative outcomes of 
the court. The legal system packages the numerical essence in recognisable patterned 
accounting technologies, taking them from within the centre of deliberation (the courtroom) 
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 The concept of a ‘valid speech act’ will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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to broad availability, with little alteration. When applied to POC – UW legislation it is the 
accounting quantification that validates the ‘reasonableness’ of the forfeiture action, in that it 
aligns the confiscation value with the scope of the profit and assets earned from criminal 
activity or as unable to be explained as being earned from legitimate activity. Accounting 
highlights the gap in numbers with greater specificity than can be linguistically achieved. 
This is not necessarily readily apparent as the prima facie numbers may not reflect a range of 
monetary and equity issues, such as, economic structures, co-ownership, costs, time value of 
money and mixing legitimate with illegitimate monetary sources. Accounting interprets 
according to its professional logic, rules and process, explainable to the judicial process to aid 
and enlighten the ‘right’
38
 decision (Kirby, 2011). Accounting aligns to patterned principles 
with the lifeworld’s moral measure on one axis and various credible quantification methods 
on the other. This correlation advises the conversion of numbers (amounts) to proportional 
remedy. For example, where a high assessment of conspicuous wealth intersects with the 
absence of a proper explanation of legitimate accumulation, then the remedy expectation 
should be a considerable redistribution of wealth rather than a mere token adjustment, such 
as, forfeiture limited to a single seizure
39
. 
The accounting translators, forensic accountants, are admitted to their interpretive positions 
by formal legal acceptance based upon recognised expertise passed through the legally 
administered gateway of expert opinion evidence (see for example the Uniform Evidence 
Acts
40
). Ironically, it is largely accountingization that also interprets the validity of the UW-
POC genre (at the institutional level) by accounting for the collated results of UW-POC 
action compared with the espoused economic aims of the legislation. Accounting therefore 
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 The concepts of ‘right’, ‘correct’ and ‘true’ judicial decisions will be discussed in chapter 3. 
39
 For example, only confiscating cash money found on hand at the boarder rather than full inspection of the 
source and context that created this and other tainted funds. 
40
 The Uniform Evidence Acts refer to the harmonised Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmanian, Norfolk 
Island, Victorian, Western Australian and Northern Territory Evidence Acts. 
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translates to the lifeworld the forfeiture remedy as well as its broader legislative effectiveness 
(see Chapter 4). 
If the lifeworld comprehends and accepts the accounting translation it integrates both the 
outcome and the method of its attainment into its tenets (becoming colonised in Habermas’ 
terminology). The lifeworld rewards the legal profession with the political power of 
acceptance (and potential further juridification) and the accounting profession with the 
steering control of money. The three value systems (Legal, Accounting and Lifeworld) 
become entwined through structural coupling
41
 and mutual recognition.  Accounting becomes 
an integral part of the law’s juridification process. It intervenes with the strength of numerical 
inscriptions, tautens the linguistic ‘letter of the law’ and acts as an interpretive, and 
potentially a control, tool of the system. It is consumed by the lifeworld, which in turn 
rewards hegemonic status to the expert professions. 
Literature Review 
The predominant argument of this research is that the role of expertise in general, and 
accounting expertise in particular, supports juridification of the legal system through the 
enhancement of the communicative action that, in turn, supports the judicial process. 
Accounting adds to the discourse and provides augmentation of the legal account. It is against 
this purpose that a range of literature has been reviewed in chapters 1 and 2, that informs the 
legal context of the source of expertise in general and specifically accounting, the role of the 
expert and the specific contribution of expert knowledge. Further categories of literature are 
reviewed pertaining to the formal, judicial, acceptance of expert opinion evidence, the 
pragmatics of POCA-UW legislation and the effectiveness of the implementation of modern 
forfeiture statutes in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The first part of this literature review proceeds to 
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 In this regard, structural coupling refers to mutual dependencies, mutual reinforcement and mutual benefits. 
49 
 
explore the diagram (p42) in greater detail by means of theoretical examination of the role of 
expertise, particularly within the legal system. This review draws heavily from the work of 
Habermas (1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1996). Literature in this regard includes Habermas’ 
writing as well as critical commentary from a range of authors. The second part of the 
literature review considers relevant issues pertaining to the accounting and legal professions, 
specifically concerning their coupling in the adjudication and juridification processes. The 
attributes of accounting and law are explored not merely in regard to the merge of common 
territorial borders, but with respect to the two professions’ mutual overlapping coexistence 
that allows the provision of evidence to enhance the qualitative and quantitative expression of 
judicial consideration. The attributes of accounting that position it as legitimate expertise are 
contemplated, with the further consideration of the literature pertaining to the formal 
provision of expert opinion evidence at the court interface (‘courtroom door’) deferred for 
specific attention in chapter 5. 
The third focus of the literature review is with regard to the correction of ownership through 
justified redistribution, particularly that which arises from the deliberations of Nozick (1974) 
and Rawls (1999). Such consideration ventures further into the area of patterned prescriptions 
for redistributive justice both in terms of legitimacy and validity, before revisiting Habermas 
in the context of ideal speech acts that provide the ‘truth’ and validity to effect 
communicative action.  The purpose of these three sections of the literature review is to build 
a relevant cognisance that supports the research argument articulated in chapter 2. That 
argument is also augmented with reference to the literature at a more pragmatic level, to 
provide a direct focus oriented toward the research questions. 
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Part 1   Expertise and the Law 
The helicopter context of the diagram is the law, therefore the first consideration is the realm 
of legal theory drawn upon from the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas (1929 – current), a 
leading German sociologist and philosopher in the convention of critical theory and 
pragmatism. Linked to the Frankfurt School
42
 of philosophers, he has written broadly 
addressing the conditions that allow for social change and the formation of rational 
institutions (Held, 1980). Most relevant to this thesis are Habermas’ thoughts on the law and 
active communication espoused primarily in his books Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996) [1998] and Theory of 
Communicative Action (1984) [1989]. Habermas builds upon Kant’s (1724-1804) regulatory 
ideas of rational consensus, to explore the tension between facticity and validity within the 
law (1996). That is, between “factual generation, administration, and enforcement in social 
institutions on the one hand and its claims to deserve general recognition on the other” (Rehg, 
1998 pxi). Habermas’ analysis is an extension of his rational theory of communicative action 
(1984) without the moralistic oversimplifications of Kant. Habermas references this as a 
‘post-metaphysical’ approach with his philosophical reliance on “notions of validity, such as 
truth, normative rightness, sincerity and authenticity”. The law then is both a system of 
“coercible rules and impersonal procedures that also involves an appeal to reasons that all 
citizens should, at least ideally, find acceptable” (Rehg, 1998 pxi, pxiii; Habermas, 1992). 
Two views of the law: Internal and External 
According to Habermas the law is a “distinctive system, … fundamentally about arguments 
…. providing the material correlate of the theory of communication” (Power and Laughlin, 
1996, p456). He references two views of law; that of deriving legitimacy from democratically 
                                                     
42 A school of social theory and philosophy associated in part with the Institute for Social Research at the Goethe University 
Frankfurt (Held, 1980) 
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established statutes, in order to convert moral norms to legal norms (Habermas 1996, p147 to 
153) and; that at a contextual level dealing with rational adjudication (Habermas 1996, p230-
237). In the first sense he describes: 
mobilizing citizens’ communicative freedom for the formation of political 
beliefs that in turn influence the production of legitimate law, illocutionary 
obligations of this sort build up into a potential that holders of administrative 
power should not ignore (p147). 
In the second sense he describes a process of discursive lawmaking which relies on the 
rational assent of participants for its binding nature. 
….. the understanding of law …. can guarantee a sufficient measure of legal 
certainty only if it is intersubjectively shared by all citizens and expresses a 
self-understanding of the legal community as a whole. This holds mutatis 
mutandis for a procedural understanding of the law, which reckons from the 
start with a discursive competition between different paradigms. 
…. A single judge must conceive her constructive interpretation fundamentally 
as a common undertaking supported by the public communication of citizens. 
…. Professionally proven standards are meant to guarantee the objectivity of 
the judgement and its openness to intersubjective review (pp223-224). 
Law making is therefore seen as entwined with communicative power for the purpose of the 
common good, “an account of communicative action in terms of validity claims that must be 
vindicated in discourses of varying types” (Rehg, 1998, pxix). In this fashion the “discourse 
principle”, as Habermas describes it, “acquires the shape of a democratic principle” 
(Habermas 1996, p458). That is, discourse validates laws such that “only those norms are 
valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses” (p107). 
The discourse principle impartially justifies and legitimises legal norms without direct 
recourse to moral questions for justification (pp118-131).  The Habermasian view of law is 
internally related to democracy that reflects rule by the people and the rule of law rather than 
rule over the people and the rule of men (Habermas 1995). In essence this refers to a system 
of self-legislation (Rose 1984) which is externally constituted through institutionalised rules 
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that ensure the required communicative conditions are met (Shelly, 2007) and internally 
constituted by the consequent rational discourse. “The judge represents integrity – self-
government – to the community, not of it” (Habermas 1996 p223). 
Legal discourse is predominantly of a linguistic nature, at times erring towards autopoietic 
construction bounded by institutionalised language of a specialised (expert) character, that 
resonates with the legal audience. Its recognised audience is the legal profession, the litigants 
and the public, perhaps in descending order of importance (Goodrich, 1987, p117). The dual 
tasks of legal rhetoric are to provide an account (in the context of the applicable law) and a 
commentary of the “argumentative techniques and value logic that will best serve the 
credibility or acceptability of the exercise of judicial will” (Goodrich, 1989, p117). The 
account has significant importance for legal argumentation “because it strengthens the 
disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds” (Perelman and 
Olbrechts, 1969, p50). The account is one side, which operationalizes the discourse principle 
to function as a rule of argumentation or a reflective form of communicative action that 
requires the interests of each person be given equal consideration. The law “stabilizes 
behavioural expectations”, “justifying basic rights of due process”, and ensures the discourse 
principle such that the “legitimacy of legal norms can be tested” (pp219-224). The discourse 
principle becomes the standard for the legitimacy of law to which this dissertation will return 
later. 
Juridification 
Blichner and Molander (2005) refer to juridification as both a descriptively and normatively 
ambiguous concept when they distinguish five dimensions of juridification. Descriptively, 
definitions range from mere proliferation of the volume of law through to the effect of legal 
monopolisation, the expansion of judicial power, through to guidance with regard to the 
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expectation of lawful conduct. Normatively, juridification is seen as the “hallmark of 
constitutional democracy, the triumph of rule over despotism”, that is the provision of legally 
assured rights through the rule of law (Blichner and Molander, 2005). Habermas (1984, 1987, 
1996) takes the complexities of both descriptive and normative juridification to his 
colonisation process, that is, (in this case) the systemised process of legal norms legislatively 
supplant individual moral co-operation (such as, habits, loyalties and trust). The lifeworld is 
invaded by the system (in the form of legal process). Generally this refers to the ‘social 
community’ of the lifeworld which is connected by inherent value systems and jointly held 
perspectives, then has those value systems redefined and changed by the invasion of another 
value system, in this case the legal system. Juridification compliments democratisation 
legislatively to preserve the rights of citizenship and rights of social participation (1996, 
p152) but at the expense of separate individual rights. The colonisation process preserves the 
discourse principle in the form of communicative freedom of all citizens and as the primary 
determinant of legitimate juridification not restricted by natural or moral rights (p127).  
Normative juridification is limited to the service of communicative justice that reflects a 
shared sense of what is right given the lifeworld values and beliefs. This principle of 
democratic legitimacy results from ‘interpenetration’ of the specific form of law: 
Only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent 
(Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn 
has been legally constituted (Habermas, 1996, p110). 
Looking at juridification from the top down through the prioritised colonisation of law, 
Habermas (1996) applies a different perspective from those who apply critical accounting. 
Critical accounting supporters apply a bottom up lens on how accounting becomes a crucial 
medium of juridification where “areas of life subject to legal intervention have also been 
opened up to the possibility of calculative strategies” (Power and Laughlin, 1996, p457). The 
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law then comes to depend on expertise “not only concerning the technical features of 
production but also concerning the psychological features of the producing subjects” (Miller 
and Rose, 1990, p2). From above, legitimate juridification guarantees the principle of having 
discourse, whereas, accounting contributes to the content of that discourse from below, that 
is, from the facts of the matter rather than from the legal principle. Whilst Habermas does not 
specifically reference accounting, the research espouses that accounting is a medium of this 
juridification. It is a facilitating medium in the sense that accounting contributes content to, 
and translation of, the discourse. “If one views it empirically, law often only provides the 
form that political power (in this case accounting and the translation of money) must make 
use of” (Habermas 1996, p137). Accounting deploys patterned principles of operation to 
explain its interpretation of facts adding to the discourse, in a credible manner. 
Accounting provides the facticity through a power external to the law. Accounting brings 
authoritative inscription
43
 techniques supporting patterned, repeatable responses to the 
argument (as will be discussed in due course). Accounting assists the juridification process 
“by adding a system of coercible rules and impersonal procedures that citizens find 
acceptable” (Rehg, 1996 p xi). Accounting comes from the legal process (such as from expert 
evidence) but binds the moral view through reasoned calculation. Sponsored by the system, 
juridification expands in search of mutual recognition by the lifeworld, manages the risk of 
dissent through the employment of expertise (for example, calculation by forensic 
accountants). 
Accounting enters into the application discourse (application of the law to the matter under 
consideration), with the intent to clarify relevant characteristics of the matter, to facilitate a 
determination that is appropriate in accordance with the applicable norms, and suitable for 
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 Authoritative inscriptions are messages recognised as having support and credence. In this case numbers in a 
format that has the support and credibility of accounting both as a knowledge and as a profession. 
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translation into broader discourse to provide validation. Accounting is not inherently 
concerned with juridification (see, for example, the gestation of CLERP 9 harmonisation with 
The Corporations Act 2001 in the Australian Context
44
) (Brown and da Silva Rosa, 1998), 
however in combination with the legal profession it is recognised both within and outside the 
court. Accounting’s legitimising message assists to justify juridification messages. For 
example, accounting quantification of the effects of organised crime and the value of 
unexplained assets, controlled by high profile suspected or proven criminals, is coupled with 
the legal discourse that further legislation is required to ensure a ‘fair’ distribution of assets 
and to prevent use and enjoyment of tainted gains (see Australian Crime Commission, 2015; 
Organised Crime Strategic Framework, 2015; Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce, 
2011). This enhanced discourse then supports new laws such as those that reverse the onus of 
proof as to whether assets are untainted. 
Legitimacy of the Law 
The concept of legitimacy is at the heart of Habermas’ description of the law, derived from 
Immanuel Kant’s concept of the universal principle of rights (Kant, 1785 [1959]; Korsgaard, 
1985), albeit that Kant embedded that legitimacy in the morally oriented freedoms of free 
choice. Kant’s view of the law is therefore subordinated to morality.  Instead, Habermas fixes 
the law’s legitimacy in free discourse, where rational consensus underpins regulatory ideal 
and the tension within the internal-external legal dichotomy. For Habermas, legitimisation 
involves an unconditional claim which remains true beyond the current context, that is, it is 
commonly understood as to its normative value in an everyday realm. It is this legitimate 
claim that is the subject of discourse that provides the momentum for communicative action, 
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 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) modified the Corporations Act 2001 in order to 
strengthen the financial reporting framework and improve investor confidence. The modifications placed legal 
obligations for the use of Accounting Standards by accountants.  Legislative inclusion was driven by the 
legislature rather than the accounting profession who preferred a self-governing model.  
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to which we will return to in regard to the role of expertise in chapter 4. The theory of 
communicative action espoused by Habermas in his earlier tome (1984), holds that social co-
ordination is brought about through language. Language seeks to communicate in a more 
meaningful way than mere semantics and grammar, to provide a message about the objective 
world that rational people should accept from a just viewpoint and in respect for other people. 
Language is presented in arguments that provide reasons “proffered in discourse that redeem 
a validity claim raised with constative or regulative speech acts: thus they rationally motivate 
those taking part in argumentation to accept the corresponding descriptive or normative 
statement as valid” (Habermas 1996, p226). This is a strength of the law and its linguistic 
approach. Language through discourse therefore legitimises and makes normative a statement 
based upon argumentation for internal consumption, however for the external audience the 
premise of the argumentation does not rest upon the statement alone, but requires the support 
of the structure of the argumentation process:  
such a theory relies on a strong concept of procedural rationality that locates the 
properties consititutive of a decision’s validity not only in the logicosemantic 
dimension of constructing arguments and connecting statements but also in the 
pragmatic dimension of the justification process itself (Habermas 1996, p226).  
Habermas postulates that “the legitimacy of legal norms is gauged by the rationality of the 
democratic procedure of political legislation” (Habermas 1996, p232). This rationality is 
supported not only “by the rightness of moral judgements” but by “the availability, cogency, 
relevance and selection of information”, and “the authenticity of strong evaluations” (p233). 
Accounting assists the discourse principle, to provide authenticity for evaluation, to combine 
with the law (structurally coupling), to increase rigour (the facticity of number), to 
formularise understanding (the deployment of patterned principles) and to connect with 
wider, familiar forms of evaluation (such as, accountingization and accounting as a 
recognised metaphor).  
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At the contextual level the legal system provides an administrative framework for 
procedurally regulated bargaining, that tests resolutions for consistency from a judicial 
perspective. In this form, the law takes its legitimacy merely from its legality, to provide the 
basis of judicial decision-making. That is, the law’s power arises because it exists as a statute 
that merely requires judicial interpretation, as applied to the facts of the matter. The judge’s 
decision forms a paradigm “usually equated to the judge’s implicit image of society” 
(Habermas, 1996, p392). That paradigm is a “social construction of reality”
45
which, in 
pragmatic form, carries directional value either as statutory interpretation or precedential 
instruction, or both. The judges’ paradigms rarely include perspectives supported by personal 
accounting skills at a professional level and often do not include accounting interpretation 
ability (Selby and Freckleton, 1999, 2001).  
Habermas initially argues that expert cultures inhibit discourse due to the use of exclusive 
concepts and language (Habermas, 1984). However when expertise is applied within the 
court’s internal context, governed by the legal system’s discourse rules, the judicial view of 
reality is aided in its description. Expert evidence goes beyond the observation of facts with 
an informed contextual interpretation. Expertise brings with it a “rhetoric of technical 
validity” vital to its own legitimacy, yet “conditionally assignable, bestowed on the 
interpretation of the matter” (Power and Laughlin, 1996 p457). Expert rhetoric facilitates the 
discovery of possible means of persuasion which is reliant on the presentation and reception 
of it message, such as, using peer accepted standard practices within accounting technology 
(Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP) to explain, interpret or contextualise the 
facts of a matter. At the same time, Habermas puts that the law is only legitimate to “the 
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An extended discussion of the social construction of reality is beyond the scope of this research however it can 
be noted that the theory is that persons and groups interacting in a social system create, over time, concepts of 
each other’s actions, which become habituated into reciprocal roles. Hence in this context the judge’s social 
context shapes his/her view on what he/she (and therefore the court) accepts as real. See, for example, Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966. 
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extent that it emerges from a broadly inclusive process of participative democracy” (Baxter, 
2002 p205), that is, a return to the discursive rule of law. The legal discourse is rationalised 
against the administrative power inherent in the statute, and is limited by its influence on the 
communicative power that arises from the citizens’ public discussion. This limits the courts 
to the “discourse of application” where they adjudicate according to legitimately accepted 
norms applied to the facts of a matter rather than engaging in a “discourse of justification” 
with regard to the creation and acceptance of the norms themselves (Baxter, 2002; Habermas, 
1996). Accounting evidence is also limited by rationalisation against the terms of the statute 
and is an influencing factor on public discussion, however, it is limited to the “discourse of 
application”, with little contribution to the “discourse of justification”. 
Expert Cultures 
If the discourse of legal application is to be assisted by expertise to inform both the internal 
and external audience, the court must remove the problems Habermas raises with expert 
cultures, such that, the expert’s contribution is tailored to assist not to inhibit discourse. Two 
problems arise, firstly, that the character of expert knowledge is specialised and therefore 
inaccessible to a broad audience, and secondly, that the expert culture sees the audience as a 
pitiful and ineffective victim. Politically expert cultures are seen as a hegemonic threat to 
democracy and equality. The imbalance of knowledge violates notions of equality (Turner, 
2001), however under the steerage of the legal system, expertise is required to openly 
contribute to the discourse principle. The law brings to bear public scrutiny through formal 
review, formal questions and cross-examination. The law imposes an implied warranty on 
experts, that they must stand ready to justify their claims. In this manner the expert’s 
discourse and credibility becomes tied to the account of public reason (Habermas, 1996). 
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First and foremost accounting is an independently recognised area of expertise, professionally 
distinct, that commands its own set of knowledge, technology and principles
46
. Accounting 
exists separately from the law and although accounting has statutory links (for example audit 
and accounting standards, taxation legislation) they give rise to independent professional 
practices, processes and standards of quantification, qualification and explanation (Chua, 
1986; Fargher and Cooper, 2009; Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933). The accounting message 
is legitimised through its many roles (management accounting, taxation accounting, 
environmental accounting, financial accounting and forensic accounting) and the wide group 
of stakeholders that rely on accounting reports (lenders, shareholders, superannuants, 
valuators and community stakeholders). Accounting then stands accused, prima facie, of the 
first problem, that of being aloof with respect to knowledge, and potentially also of the 
second, albeit that accounting can claim to have a long fulfilled the stakeholders’ expectation 
of providing regular standardised economic explanations such as annual financial statements 
and audit assurance
47
. Of further concern is the supposed neutrality of experts which 
Habermas implicitly questions in his reference to ‘expert cultures’. Expert knowledge can be 
taken to be a specially informed ideology, that masquerades as and is accepted by ordinary 
people as ‘fact’. The deeper claims of the expert remain hidden therefore what is agreed to be 
fact through discourse is potentially not the product of open debate but of the pronouncement 
of authoritative experts, a peer group. Thus in order to preserve the discourse principle the 
ideological character of, and accessibility to, expert knowledge needs to be resolved. 
However Habermas decries that resolution is inhibited by steering mechanisms such as the 
law, power and money which are deployed by experts who are culturally distant from the 
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 Note the professional accreditation processes of CPA Australia, the Australian and New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants and their international counterparts, which are based upon distinct academic credentials 
and acquisition of specific knowledge. 
47
 Here it is recognised that there is a broad debate that pertains to the inclusiveness, clarity and worth of 
financial reporting. To explore this debate further in this thesis would deviate from the core purpose of the 
dissertation (see for example Chea, 2011). 
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constitution of the life-world (Habermas, 1996). In this way the discourse principle can be 
seen to be inhibited by unresolved circular references between groups of mutually supportive 
experts. 
Cognitive Authority 
Merton (1976) refers to a similar notion as “cognitive authority” (p26) in that experts attain 
authority through cognisance of distinctive knowledge and ideology. Cognitive authority 
theory developed from social epistemology in reference to the type of expertise influence that 
would be rationally recognised as being appropriate (Wilson, 1983). Cognitive authorities 
exert influence related to their areas of expertise, epistemic authority, rather than authority 
arising from their position or status. Cognitive authority is open to resistance and submission 
(Turner, 2001) which is fundamentally understood by the manner in which people construct 
knowledge based on first-hand experience or learning second-hand from others. In the case of 
experts they contribute to the creation of second-hand knowledge, in this case, disseminated 
through the legally controlled discourse principle (Chea, 2011). The dissemination of second 
hand knowledge is not limited to the expert content but is dependent on the attributes of 
distribution such as judgement of information quality
48
 and the relative positioning of the 
cognitive authority
49
 (Rieh, 2002). The weight of the cognitive authority depends on both 
recognised expertise and reputation. The legal system qualifies the expertise and reputation 
by means of assessing and granting court access (see chapter 6). The legal system therefore 
provides its own regulated process for the anointment of the expert and expertise. 
From the lens of cognitive authority, Habermas’ expert culture can be challenged. Indeed the 
legal rules that oversee the court formally facilitate this challenge as a process rather than as a 
                                                     
48
 A full discussion of the attributes used to quality assess information is beyond the scope of this research. For a 
summary of approaches to individual quality assessment see Savolainen, R. 2007,  
49
 That is, the status of the holder of the cognitive authority, for example some professions may be held in higher 
regard by the lifeworld because their expertise may be seen to be better aligned to lifeworld values or norms. 
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discrete event. Compliance with the rules of opinion evidence, fulfilment of the explanatory 
criteria of professional and ethical accounting standards, as well as cross-examination, allow 
informed, rational and democratic questions to be asked with regard to the witness’ 
authoritative status, thereby returning ultimate authority to the people (through legal 
representation), who reject or accept the expert’s claims based on the expert’s  responses 
(Turner, 2001, p123).  
Part 2  The Accounting and Legal Professions 
The Accounting and Legal Professions 
“Law is vulnerable to the justice of humour” (Goodrich, 2005, p294), 
perhaps law is also vulnerable to the justice of calculation? 
‘”We are all commanded to know the law – and yet legal practice and legal language are 
structured in such a way as to prevent the acquisition of such knowledge by any other than a 
highly trained elite of specialists in various domains of legal study” (Goodrich 1987, p7). 
Whilst the accounting and legal professions share remote origins
50
 their independent 
gestation has not been smooth. Both accounting and law are recognised as distinct 
professions with their own membership criteria, body of knowledge and hegemonic positions. 
In this regard, the law has maintained the ultimate power of legitimisation through control of 
the legislative process, that adjudicate issues where generally accepted accounting principles 
and processes have been tested and challenged. Napier and Noke (1992) note a mutually 
beneficial cross fertilization between the law and accounting although the legal relationship 
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 In the mid nineteenth century Scottish accountants petitioned to have their own charter as a distinct 
profession. Prior to that, modern accounting was delivered simultaneously with legal advice, often in a similar 
form to today’s forensic accountants where “accountants then incorporated the duties of expert financial 
witnesses into their general services rendered. An 1824 circular announcing the accounting practice of one 
James McClelland of Glasgow promises he will make “statements for laying before arbiters, courts or council.” 
(Nurse D. 2002 "Silent Sleuths". AICPA). The original distinction between the accounting and legal professions 
developed with respect to audit type specialties (Fargher and Cooper, 2009).  
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has been somewhat dominant. Further “the respective claims of accountants and lawyers to 
professional expertise have been expanding, bringing the professions into commercial 
rivalry” (Napier and Noke, 1992 p 31). Bromwich and Hopwood (1992) point out that the 
law regulates accounting, a position that is sustained in the Australian context, such as, 
through the regulation of accounting and audit standards under the Corporations Act (2000). 
There is limited research regarding the interface between accounting and law with more 
consideration given to the boundaries rather than the interface itself (Carter, 2006, p2). This 
research, and the nature of forensic accounting, considers the interface itself, the crossover of 
professional knowledge and contributions between the two professions, that is, forensic 
accounting. Accounting plays an increasing social role (see, for example, accountingization 
below) “defining expectations, interactions and power relations, through the provision of 
information” (Carter, 2006 p3). In Habermas’ view the law plays a steering role between the 
external system and the internal lifeworld. Accounting supports this role through the addition 
of more expertise and legitimisation. The law capitalises on the leverage of power assisted by 
accounting’s leverage of money, particularly evident where the law imposes financial 
penalties or a fiscal settlement. 
Both professions cement their status, through utilisation of rules of practice to maintain 
hegemonic control of obligatory passage points
51
 within the system. In this regard the 
discourse available through the court system is the domain of the law, whereas, financial 
reports, valuations and transactional detail are the domain of accounting. Accounting controls 
the construction and auditing of financial accounts whilst law controls access to the judicial 
system (see Clegg, 1989). In order to seek legal discourse on a financial issue the matter must 
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 Clegg (1989) describes how professions establish and maintain control of nodal points including, 
administrating obligatory passage points through rules that fix relations and membership, and owning 
innovation and techniques. These gateways form the borders of the profession, for the hegemonic benefit of 
members and to the exclusion of non-members (pp187 – 239)  
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proceed through the appropriate path of accounting verification and legal entry as 
administered through each of the appropriate professions’ passage points. (see chapter 6). The 
interdisciplinary contribution of accounting and law contributes to the social discourse to 
enhance the understanding of legal consequences and outcomes through the more common 
parlance of money. Accounting’s contribution is most important when the outcome of the 
legal process is expressed in the metaphor of money, such as, an amount assessed to be paid 
for financial punishment, compensation or forfeiture.  
The law delivers its message linguistically, attempting to argue with logic, transcending from 
norms to reasons, whereas accounting relies on facticity to extend its computable meaning. 
Accounting can be interpreted as portraying the world as “written in numbers” (Keat and 
Urry, 1975, p244). Accounting presents as a deliguistifying medium (Power and Laughlin, 
1996). The daily practice of law appears to treat accounting as ‘fact’, or science. These labels 
hold considerable power and perceived legitimacy in order to validate the matter at hand. To 
label as ‘fact’ denotes certain notions of truth, objectivity, general acceptance and correctness 
supporting a realist ontology (Hussey, 1988; Waldron, 1994; Wittgenstein, 1974). The 
reliability of numbers is an essential characteristic that contributes to the usefulness of 
accounting information (Maines and Wahlen, 2003). Researchers in accounting have 
accepted that quantification is the hallmark of ‘science’ (Chambers, 1966, 1980; Mattessich, 
1962; Sterling, 1970; cf. Chua, 1986; Hines, 1988; Lyas, 1984). The normative view of 
expert accounting evidence is that accounting standards, generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) and the facticity
52
 of accounting should lead to consistent, clear, rules-
based opinions, that converge and concur given the consistency of available facts (FASB 
1980). The apparent objectivity of accounting standards and the accurate calculability of 
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 The facticity of accounting evolves from the numerical base of calculation and money in contrast to the 
linguisity of law evolving from conceptual (and potentially codified) argument. This differentiation will be 
revisited later in this chapter with respect to accounting’s patronage towards legal arguments reflected in 
monetary transfer remedies. 
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accounting variables presents an expectation of professional ‘tightness’ and lack of 
variability. That is, repeatability as ‘truth’ in numbers (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
The combination of text and number sign systems blend together to establish a better account 
(the story). That is, a sense of “communion centred around particular values recognised by 
the audience” (Habermas, 1996, p51) that serves to enhance both the account and the judicial 
decision. Habermas refers to this strengthening of the account as ‘formal pragmatics’ 
(Habermas, 1985; Baxter, 2011), “rationally reconstructing the necessary presuppositions of 
communicative action" (Baxter, 2011 p12). His theory focuses on the use of ‘speech acts’ as 
validating communicative action, which is an area that this research returns to in greater 
detail in chapter 2. The core concern of this research’s questions are the attributes and content 
of speech acts of forensic accountants that strengthen the account in forfeiture matters. 
Professional coupling 
Professional coupling has been discussed in the literature under headings such as ‘structural 
coupling’ (Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993; Teubner, 1987) or ‘loose coupling’ (Lingard et al, 
2014; Manning, 1984, Koff and DeFreise, 1994). Weick ( 1976) defines loose coupling as “a 
situation in which elements of an organisation are responsive but retain evidence of 
separateness and identity”  (in Lingard et al, 2014, p4). Structural coupling recognises similar 
parameters under a tighter domain in which “all that takes place is determined by the 
system’s structure at that instant” (Romesin, 2002, p15). Structural coupling to a system 
defines the point where juridification becomes a positive or negative steering force (Teubner, 
1987).  This can happen through reliance on self-referential professional structural coupling 
“when relevance criteria are not met or when the conditions of self–reproductive 
organizations are endangered” (Teubner in Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993, p 340). From a 
Habermasian perspective adverse professional coupling occurs when the professions are 
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bound to the system and do not perform their role as a medium in response to the lifeworld’s 
needs. The perspective of structural coupling informs this research by bringing forth 
cognisance of the management of the tension between professional autonomy and 
interdependence, which shapes the collaborative professional practices, as well as recognition 
of the potential for juridification to breach the legitimacy link, through the over prioritisation 
of the system connection (for example, producing laws supported by the legal system and not 
by the populous). 
Loose coupling operates at the boundary of professions with the literature mainly citing 
research that reviews professional teams in the medical field (Lingard et al 2014), policing 
(Manning, 1984) and education (Koff and DeFriese, 1994). The professional participants “use 
autonomy and interdependence as resources to achieve complex goals in collaborative 
settings” (Lingard et al. 2014 p1). Loose coupling is a more cohesive notion transcending 
disciplinary hierarchies, even if only at the professional extremities. This approach aligns to 
the potential for law and accounting to draw on independently recognised bodies of 
knowledge and practices to progress the discourse principle. Accounting knowledge brings a 
translational role to the facts of the matter, augmenting the legal argument, as required, in a 
calculative manner.  
Habermas (1996) describes separate but interlocutory roles of the law and expertise (in this 
case, accounting). In this sense he makes a distinction between law as an institution and law 
as a medium with its steering qualities (1984). Law and expertise inform and steer the 
justification discourse in their own separate manner. Law from its statutory reframing of 
norms and values, and expertise from its hegemonic knowledgeable authority (in 
accounting’s case) of money. Professional coupling (between law and accounting), has the 
potential to capitalise on the broader base of extended professional knowledge, but only to 
the extent that it is not welded to an authoritative system that makes use of the law to fulfil its 
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own functions, inconsistent with lifeworld legitimacy. Legitimate juridification supported by 
professional coupling is therefore interventionist to the extent that it is reflexive to the values 
and nature of the lifeworld (Teubner, 1986, 1987). 
Accounting Inscriptions – The Accounting Metaphor 
The arbitration process requires expertise to assist in its deliberation (Power & Laughlin, 
1996). Expertise marshals the facts of the matter into a credible, informed story. In this case 
forensic accounting provides that expertise, to augment the account, specifically in the 
dominant metaphor of the number (Morgan, 1988; Hooper & Low, 2000; Waters-York, 
1996). People are accustomed to using metaphors in ordinary daily life to simplify the 
communication of ideas (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Carter, 1990). This is particularly true in 
the business context where complex issues are clarified through metaphoric analogy (Bolman 
and Deal, 2003; Robbins and Coulter, 2010). “Metaphors focus more on addressing the 
cognitive or conceptual similarities between the metaphor and the reality of the situation 
which the metaphor is describing” (Vevaeke and Kennedy, 2004). A metaphor enables an 
idea to be communicated, which is difficult to represent in literal language (Carter, 1990). In 
the professional context metaphors facilitate the social construction of perceptions (Young 
2001) which Habermas would argue in terms of facilitating communicative action. 
The accounting metaphor of number portrays a linguistic precision that reduces ambiguity 
(Walters-Yorks, 1996, Arrington and Francis, 1989). Robson (1992) refers to the 
“quantitative orientation of accounting enabling action at a distance” (Robson, 1992, p686). 
Accounting provides a numerical code to the philological interpretation of legal texts through 
a manner of quantification that is stable, transportable and combinable. That is, the 
accounting numbers retain their stable, reliable character inside and outside the court room 
and can be added and subtracted given the combination of other accounting or valuation 
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evidence (Robson, 1992). Accounting aids the logic and unity of legal postulation to present a 
formal construction “claimed to privilege both [the legal] system and objectivity as a function 
of [that] system” and “with it the legitimation of the binding validity of legal norms” 
(Goodrich, 1987, p39).  
Accounting at a Distance – The Accounting Message Inside and Outside the Court 
As most of our knowledge cannot be received directly
53
, messages are derived through 
inscriptions representing worldly knowledge. Accounting inscriptions include “various 
techniques to mark, write, record, and tabulate” (Latour, 1987; Robson, 1992 p689). 
Accounting inscriptions facilitate ‘action at a distance’ because their factitious nature 
provides a reliable translation of remote events and decisions which they signify (Law, 1986, 
Robson, 1992). Inscriptions disseminate their message through mobility (“the ability to move 
back and forth between settings”), stability (“of relation between the inscription and its 
context”) and combinability (allowing the receiver to “aggregate and tabulate creating norms 
through which to make comparisons”) (Robson, 1992 pp689 – 697). 
The action at a distance concept is important because it explains how the legitimacy of 
accounting’s numerical metaphor is transmitted to and recognised by the populous where 
they assess and most likely accept the message as confirming the ‘right’ adjudication. The 
distance is from within the court where the audience can be fully informed through the 
experience of the proceedings, to the community outside the courtroom and remotely located, 
unable to rely upon personal experience of the judicial events. Nevertheless, the internal 
machinations of the courtroom are of concern to the outside audience who require a reliable 
interpretation, albeit through secondary information. 
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 The lifeworld is so vast that only a small proportion of knowledge can be based on personal experience or 
even second hand testimony hence one relies upon a systemised approach to assimilate messages. (Habermas 
1984, 1996) 
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Patterned Principles in Accounting and ‘Accounting at a Distance’ 
Accounting’s reputation is legitimated by claims to represent the accuracy of numbers in a 
replication of scientific theory (Mattessich, 1962; Chambers, 1966; Chua, 1986). Its metaphor 
(Morgan, 1988) is viewed as hard knowledge with precision, rigor and objectivity (Duncan, 
1982). Yet accounting can have a qualitative dimension (Briers and Chua, 2001) allowing 
application of accounting technologies to a broader interface with the lifeworld. Unlike 
mathematics, accounting numbers are presented with both an internal and external context 
that gives the data a patterned meaning. The argument is that “the quantity that is expressed 
by a number is a quantity of “something and that something has a quality” which is 
“disclosed or rather constructed through the operation of the concepts of prior knowledge” 
(Frege, 1991). Therefore, if the populous has prior knowledge they can relate to the 
accounting of those things (for example, money, as it represents economic value or 
purchasing power). 
Accounting is based on inscriptions (Latour, 1988a) with unbounded mobile qualities of 
stability and combinability. That is, accounting is recognisable and understandable across 
boundaries making it a useful tool of the system in colonisation of the lifeworld (Habermas 
1996). Accounting inscriptions form a regular and intelligible arrangement, discernible by the 
populous, familiar with the measurement of things in accounting terms (such as financial 
reports, economic data and valuations). Accounting inscriptions inherently include 
formularisation in their construction based on regulated professional rules. The combination 
of these inscriptions in a credible and perhaps familiar pattern validates an economic outcome 
that is reusable, transportable and translatable. The external legal discourse is made richer 
through the legitimate structure of its calculation, not just its outcome. The discourse benefits 
not only from legitimisation of the outcome but in the argumentative discourse that gives rise 
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to its construction, for example, the deployment of peer accepted accounting techniques to 
the calculation of a penalty or confiscation remedy. 
The appropriateness of such techniques addresses the research questions which, when 
deployed in combination and with a targeted outcome, can be referred to as patterned 
principles on which to base judicial decisions. Patterned principles for distributive justice 
shall be considered in greater depth later in this chapter, as the code that influences the 
lifeworld’s acceptance of judicial remedies particularly when deployed towards the forfeiture 
genre.  
Accountingization 
Accounting has become broadly recognised as a legitimate quantification tool due to the rise 
in the ‘accountingization’ of things. Accountingization is a term coined by Power and 
Laughlin (1992 p133) and is primarily a reference to “explicit standards of performance” and 
“greater emphasis on output controls” that have permeated public and private business 
activity over the past two to three decades. Accountingization has been recognised as a 
medium of juridification through its nexus between legislation and outcome performance, 
such as, in the U.K. New Public Management (NPM) doctrine (Sevic, 2002; Power and 
Laughlin 1992; Hood, 1995). 
Accountingization has been described in change studies (Weick and Quinn, 1999), theorising 
that the information from the organisation’s environment impacts on the behaviours and 
behavioural interpretations of that organisation (or in Habermasian terms, the system’s 
information leveraged for colonisation). The studies highlight the need for the organisation to 
“make it [the information] meaningful for the members of the organisation and its goals” 
(West and Turner, 2004, p299). Accounting technology is utilised for interpretation, with 
reliance upon its wide financial authority. Hood (1995, p93) claims this can be seen as part of 
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“a broader shift in received doctrines of public accountability and public administration” 
(p93). He notes that “accounting was to be a key element in this new conception of 
accountability, since it reflected high trust in the market and private business methods” (p94). 
The medium of accounting language has been used to translated economic rationalism (for 
example, of the NPM), to describe more cost centre units, break down the identification of 
costs, to  improve the description of cost structures and to align financial reporting to private-
sector norms (p96). 
The connection of accountingization to this research is not as a direct addition to specific 
legislation or measures of output in and of themselves, but from the overarching perspective 
that the legitimising force of accounting translates public legislation into accounting facts and 
measures (predominantly money). “The steering media of money and administrative power 
are anchored in the lifeworld through the legal institutionalization of markets and 
bureaucratic organisations” (Habermas, 1996, p75). The medium of market legitimised 
money is embedded through accountingization into the legislative process. Power and 
Laughlin (1996, p462) comment that Habermas sees “the solution to the colonising effects of 
money and markets in terms of the legitimizing role of public law”, that is, the validation 
provided by legally facilitated discourse. 
Habermas notes the tension that exists between legal norms (that are promulgated by statute) 
and the facts of implementation (such as, a threat of legal sanction) (Habermas 1996, p30). 
Forensic accounting often facilitates the threat of legal sanction in the form of redistribution 
of money such as financial penalties or forfeiture. Money converts information to 
communication, “substituting for special functions of language” (Habermas 1987a p70). 
Money steers economic sub-systems and administration, such as, the administration of UW-
POC remedies, with normative support from statutes and the state (for example Proceeds of 
Crime legislation). Simultaneously money is not dependent on the state alone for 
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legitimisation because, as Dodd (1994) points out, “money possesses contradictory qualities 
as both a medium which requires normative support throughout society in order to exist and 
an economic instrument which symbolises and generates major asymmetries of wealth and 
power” (Habermas 1987a p75). Money and accounting as a support to monetary calculation 
are “chronically embroiled” in the explanation of the system and the lifeworld (pp76-77). 
Accounting is simultaneously the technology of calculating transactions whilst being 
reflectively constructive (Hines, 1988), having persuasive and enabling characteristics which 
“create particular financial forms of visibility for abstract and organisational phenomena” 
(Potter, 2005, p265). Accountingization assumes validity at the technological level without 
cognisance of the ambiguity and problematic nature of accounting over functionalizing the 
system (Power and Laughlin, 1996). The force of the apparently factual, derived from logical 
and mathematical treatments, acquires an objective authority “behind the backs” of 
participants, operating inside of the law (Habermas, 1996, pp39-40). 
Part 3   Justified Re-Distribution 
Distributive Justice 
In order to progress to advising the ‘right’
54
 decision regarding the ownership of property (or 
its removal), a brief consideration
55
 of property ownership is necessary. ‘Property’ in general  
is a term “for rules that govern people’s access to and control of things like land, natural 
resources, means of production, manufactured goods, money and other tangible and 
intangible assets” (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2004). The pragmatic component 
of this research centres on the justification of private property rights (as opposed to common 
or collective property). Private property rights refer to a “kind of system that allocates 
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 The concepts of ‘right’, ‘correct’ and ‘true’ decisions will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.  
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 The philosophical consideration of property and property rights is a broad topic, a subject considered over 
many years by philosophers, academics and practitioners. A full consideration of property rights is therefore 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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particular objects, like pieces of land, to particular individuals to use and manage as they 
please, to the exclusion of others, and to the exclusion also of any detailed control by society” 
(Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2004). Private property arises through a system of 
social rules, so private property is continually in need of public justification because it 
requires public force and expense to uphold these social rules (Ackerman, 1977). 
Kant (1797) refers to the universal principle of justice when he considers an act to be right as 
long as “its guiding maxim permits one person’s freedom of choice to be conjoined with 
everyone’s freedom”.
56
 He inferred property rights from nature to agency “it is a duty of right 
to act towards others so that what is external (usable) could also become someone’s” (Kant 
1797 [1991] p74) Kant therefore describes individuals as inviolable self-owners with basic 
rights to the fruits of their labour. The right to private property in John Locke’s political 
theory assumes that a man is subject to the laws of nature and self-preservation. It follows 
that any product of man’s physical labour belongs to him/her and one is able to appropriate 
anything un-owned through his/her labour, provided he/she leaves “enough and as good” for 
others (see Locke, Chapter V, Second Treatise of Government, 2005 [1690]).  Such unilateral 
subjective property rights cannot acquire legitimacy without being ratified by an arrangement 
that respects everyone’s interests, such as, property rights in a civil constitution to settle who 
is the owner and on what basis (Hutcheson 2002, Kant [1797]). 
Rawls’ (1971) and Nozick’s (1974) acquisitional justice theories both specify the initial 
situation and, after deliberation, accept the outcome. Rawls’ is an end-result theory of 
fairness with the representative worst-off person being no worse off than he would have been 
in any other possible situation (the difference principle) (Kilcullen, 1996). His viewpoint is of 
society as a co-operative pursuit of individual interests, hence the rectification of injustice is 
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 A detailed discussion of the doctrine of natural rights and analysis of rights such as duties, permissions and 
power is beyond the scope of this research. 
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one that prioritises liberty and rights arising out of the principles of justice harmonised with 
rational goodness. Rawls refers to the ‘social surplus’ obtained by co-operating with society, 
that is, by obeying the law and participating in society one is owed distributive justice. 
However, Rawls has been criticised for his reliance on his patterned principle of people 
“maximising the minimum”, that is, the unbiased rational pursuit of the greatest benefit of the 
least disadvantaged as the basis for wealth distribution. 
Nozick’s is a process theory that is historical and unpatterned where people have rights to the 
things they produce, which can be laid out in a historical story. Entitlement Theory has three 
principles including the need for rectification. “To Nozick, the unconscionable thing is that 
anyone should feel justified in appropriating property that is rightly entitled to someone else” 
(Fraser, 2011, p1). It is a theory of justice that claims we can tell whether a distribution (or 
redistribution) of goods is just or not by looking at its history. Nozick recognises the need for 
re-distribution, however, he does not provide a theoretical prescription for that redistribution. 
When applied to POC-UW legislation the need for redistribution would be recognised 
through reviewing the historical lack of genuine attainment, or the direct funding of an 
acquisition from the proceeds of crime. This dissertation recognises the predominance of the 
historical reasoning for the need to enact redistribution in the POC-UW context, however, the 
need requires a process of redistribution that is validated by the application of a patterned 
process. A patterned process that accounting can provide. 
Entitlement Theory 
UW-POC matters are influenced by the manner in which assets were acquired (historical), 
however this is an unpatterned narrative. Nozick’s Entitlement Theory is unpatterned in that 
“the distribution resulting from acquisition is not correlated with anything else such as moral 
merit, need, usefulness to society; people may be entitled to things got by chance or gift” 
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(Kilcullen, 1996, p1). Entitlement Theory is instructional with respect to its three core 
principles however being unpatterned the methods of rectification (third principle) are 
inconclusive. 
The three main principles of Nozick's Entitlement Theory are: 
 A principle of justice in acquisition dealing with the initial acquisition of 
property and the terms under which it is being held; 
 A principle of justice in transfer explaining how property can be exchanged 
and transferred from one to another; and 
 A principle of rectification of injustice describing how to deal with property 
that is unjustly acquired or transferred, including victim compensation and 
long past transgression (Nozick, 1974). 
Nozick believes that if the world were wholly just, only the first two principles would be 
needed, that is, everyone would be entitled to what they have and hence society is just
57
 
(Duignan, 2014). Nozick’s theory shows the connection of justice with entitlement and the 
overriding importance of the concept, however, it does not include elements of fairness or 
just deserts or reciprocity that should be embedded within any concept of justice suitable for 
validation by the lifeworld. Nozick does not propose the rules of rectification other than 
noting that it is an important task for each society to work out operable policy details for 
rectification.  
UW-POC matters are a statutory process of rectification, however, such rectification needs to 
include the elements of fairness in order to sustain legitimate system and lifeworld support 
for the remedy. Habermas notes the importance to rely on fairness in reference to Weber’s 
fifth principle of the “methodical conduct of life” (Habermas, 1984, p164-5)  The status 
Nozick places on historic considerations is limited in this respect, however it informs the 
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 For Nozick distributive justice, no matter how unequal, is only dependent on the nature of the transaction that 
facilitated the distribution of ‘holdings’, as he refers to property.  
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legal debate with a sense of comfort embedded in the review of historic actions, a stance 
familiar to the court. Review of these actions is by particular attention to the historical facts 
of the matter and not formularised as to the outcome (as opposed to Rawls’ maximising the 
minimum). Historical discourse by itself that contributes to the Court’s argumentation is 
equally particularised in that it requires detailed knowledge of the past actions that surround 
the facts of the matter. Such knowledge is complex and lengthy, unsuitable for assessment 
and validation by a broad and remote audience unfamiliar with the evaluation of that level of 
detail. For example, a chronological description of criminally acquired assets might require 
individual scrutiny over an unbounded period that contains many intricate and unwieldly 
transactions, which are too complex for broad translation without expert interpretation. 
Rawls’ and Nozick’s notions inform the concept of rectification that support the foundations 
of fairness and historical occurrence, however they require the assistance of expertise to 
broadly translate rectification beyond the limited onlookers in possession of the full detail. 
Broad translation requires a patterned response recognisable through structure and discipline 
by the system and lifeworld. Here the patterned response is one of process (or formula) rather 
than one of ideological fulfilment. With respect to UW-POC matters forensic accounting 
provides the patterned process, in peer accepted methods, that reconstruct, interpret and 
simplify the data using accounting technology.  
Forensic accounting presents a basis for fair distributive justice when the community 
(through legal adjudication) assesses that the first two entitlement principles have been 
violated. Specifically, that the principles of justice in acquisition, or in transfer, have been 
violated by either proven use of the proceeds of crime or implied, unexplained, illegal means 
of possession. UW-POC legislation is required to invoke rectification through asset 
forfeiture. The UW-POC statutory provisions (the law) commence the rectification process, 
however accounting ultimately resolves the forfeiture redistribution through quantification of 
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the acquisition argument and the monetary transfer remedy. Accounting technology 
legitimises the adjudication and validates the judicial message by economically balancing 
questions of rightful or tainted entitlement. 
The right decision 
Albeit that Weber (1864-1920) anchored his thesis in protestant ethics, rather than the 
Habermasian discourse principle, his methodical conduct of life influenced the development 
of the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984, p143-366). Of Weber’s five 
principles, number 5 states: 
The methodical rigor of a principled, self-controlled, autonomous conduct of life, 
which penetrates every domain of life because it stands under the idea of assuring 
oneself of salvation (Weber in Habermas, 1984, p165). 
Habermas interprets Weber’s analysis effecting the judicial system and its organisations as 
formal consideration of their vocational ethic in terms consistent with the moral-practical 
consciousness of the system and lifeworld. That is, the legal system’s deliberation and 
decisions need to be seen via the discourse principle to be ‘right’ and consistent with the 
system and lifeworld’s values in order to spread purposive-rational action
58
 (1984, p166-
168). If this is not the case the message to the populous becomes fragmented, with the 
creation of disunity of reason. If accounting evidence is to be presented to assist the judicial 
decision making process it must be trustworthy, a reflection of an accepted pattern recognised 
as telling the ‘truth’. That is, the expertise must be marshalled in a manner deemed as correct, 
be embedded in the values of the court and the lifeworld, be able to be translated and 
legitimised into the internal and external discourse. Attributes include the expert evidence 
that meets the test of cognitive authority, delivered as a valid speech act, based upon 
articulated, peer accepted methodology and sufficiency of investigation and reporting (see 
chapter 3).   
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 Habermas describes purposive-rational action in terms of directed human behaviour with rationally aligned intention. 
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Patterned Principles of Justice 
Particularly, in the absence of primary information, the lifeworld relies on a patterned 
inscription to provide secondary knowledge. The lifeworld can test the patterned inscription 
for consistency against the lifeworld’s values and norms. That is, expertise expressed in 
accordance with its moral and functional merit, that may vary in its calculation details, but is 
marshalled along the dimension of a code reinforced by accepted norms. This is similar to a 
mathematician who relies on the application of a recognised formula (or pattern) for 
consistency rather than undertaking a range of individual calculations to compare the final 
single unit calculation. In same way, in the legal genre of Family Law, a patterned principle 
has evolved through the court preference of expert accounting evidence consistent with the 
concept of ‘value to the owner’.  Sprouting from the valuation of impaired minority 
shareholdings, the legally determined principle has grown to direct accounting methodology 
in a manner specifically to suit the ‘reality’ of the Family Court
59
 (see Warnick J in Ramsay 
and Ramsay, 1997). A patterned principle of justice is supported by both, an ontological 
reasoning and a properly executed methodology. In mathematical terms the proper formula is 
ontologically sound, having been structured according to the rules of mathematics and 
therefore belonging by first principles to equations known as formulae. The formula is then 
applied to various values in a peer accepted methodological application that produces a 
reliable, meaningful result. Similarly accounting ontologically validates its ‘formulae’ 
according to the generally accepted accounting principles and then deploys accounting 
technology according to those principles to produce a reliable, meaningful contribution to 
communicative action (Gaffikin, 2009). 
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 Contrast the equity court’s valuation (willing buyer/willing seller) case of Spencer (1907) with the valuations 
accepted in Family Law cases such as Marriage of Reynolds (1984) 10 Fam LR 388, Hull and Hull (1983) FLC 
91-360, Sapir and Sapir (No 2) (1989) FLC 92-047, Turnbull v Turnbull (1991) FLC 92 258, Ramsay and 
Ramsay (1997) FLC 92-742, Best and Best (1993) FLC 92 418, B&B (No 2) (2000) 26 FLR 437 and Wall and 
Wall (EA83 of 1999). 
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When applied to the UW-POC context it becomes clear that, as wealth may have historically 
been illegally attained or transferred, rectification is required. Such rectification, that requires 
asset redistribution, is generally contrary to the lifeworld’s endorsement of libertarian 
principles, necessitating a morally supported pattern being applied to suitably account for the 
injustice in acquisition. The research argument in chapter 4 picks up this discussion within 
the steps that directly reference the patterned principle of redistribution that anchor 
confiscation remedies to lifeworld values. 
Communicative Action 
Patterned principles underpin purposive-rational discourse leading to communicative action 
which in turn supports or denies juridification. They utilise natural language, which rationally 
binds individuals based on deliberation and argumentation. Communicative action provides 
legitimacy when it resonates with those involved in the discourse, which collectively 
strengthens the democratic process that bolsters legislative legitimacy. This involves 
accepting truth claims (about the objective world) and moral claims (about rationally 
acceptable norms). In this way, Habermas sees communicative action as the basis of morality, 
democracy and the legitimacy of law (see Habermas, 1984). 
This principle has to begin with, the cognitive sense of filtering reasons and 
information, topics and contributions in such a way that the outcome of a 
discourse enjoys a presumption of rational acceptability; democratic procedure 
should ground the legitimacy of law (Habermas, 1996, p151). 
The power of this discourse is also reflected in a motivational response where collective 
objectives are integrated with the “normative regulation of behavioural expectations” (p151). 
Action is then directed towards integration and solidarity. That is “action which explicitly 
raises claims to truth, rightness and sincerity within institutional contexts in which such 
claims can be consensually resolved” (Power and Laughlin, 1996, p444). 
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The dual structures of the internal ‘system’ and the external ‘lifeworld’ utilise communicative 
action for resolving pragmatic enquiry, mediating between these two fundamental 
arrangements. Here law (and accounting) have a special place providing a legitimised 
steering role beyond the other steering systems of money and power. Law has a priority role 
to provide communicative action with argumentation that is reflective of the lifeworld norms, 
to test “real abstractions” in the “core zones of the lifeworld” (Habermas, 1987 p374).  
Accounting provides a compact of support through the accounting metaphor and the 
deployment of accounting technology in the manner considered in Chapter 4, The Research 
Argument. 
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Chapter 4: The Research Argument 
Introduction to the Research Argument 
This chapter deals with the role of accounting expertise in the validation of evidence and 
judicial remedy within the pragmatic context of forfeiture legislation. Part 1 of this chapter 
follows the logical argument summarised in Table 1. The argument provides a stepped 
framework that initially considers the context of juridification, supported by the law, coupled 
with accounting. Part 2 then considers the nature, role and purpose of accounting in that 
amalgamation, as well as the pragmatic application of forensic accounting in order to provide 
acceptable evidence, specifically focused on asset deprival. The purpose of this chapter is to 
build on the literature review of chapter 3, such that the theory can inform the more 
pragmatic application to POC-UW legislation. The importance of this chapter is that it 
connects the theoretical arguments that pertain to the topics raised in the first three chapters, 
into a logical format, which can be applied to lead to a reasoned reply to the research 
questions. Academic and judicial literature contribute to aspects of the research argument, 
which is reviewed in both a theoretical and pragmatic sense. This is important because the 
research questions, in and of themselves, may appear fickle, perhaps easily answered without 
due attention to the applicable definition of the word ‘appropriate’. To reiterate, the two 
research questions are: 
1. Descriptively, how has the application of accounting technologies in forfeiture law 
cases evolved? 
2. What are the attributes of appropriate accounting technologies described in question 
(1)? (highlight added) 
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The word ‘appropriate’, interpreted as suitable, apt or proper in the circumstances, implies a 
measure that fits with some criteria or standard. In this case, the research argument turns on 
the word ‘appropriate’ for the formation of the research criteria that are to be applied to the 
inspection of forensic accounting evidence at the case level (see chapters 8 and 9) and for 
future research into accounting led UW remediation strategies. Such criteria or standards are 
circularly referenced, back to the purpose of the argument, that is, to understand how expert 
forensic accounting evidence supports the discourse that, in turn, underpins the legitimacy of 
juridification. Expert evidence that fits the ‘appropriate’ criteria can be translated to be 
validated with respect to the system and lifeworld norms that legitimise [or de-legitimise on 
the contrary] when attached to legal proceedings. This chapter considers the notion of 
‘appropriate’ criteria from various viewpoints to culminate in a framework from which to 
evaluate instances and patterns of forensic accounting evidence in the forfeiture genre. 
In this chapter, Habermas’ view of expert culture, as an aloof disconnection, is challenged by 
the idea of the experts’ cognitive authority that is contested through systemic processes such 
as cross-examination. That is, the legal system procedurally creates transparency and the 
translation facility that dilutes Habermas’ attributes of exclusivity and barriers to cognisance, 
such that, the evidence is understood inside and outside the courtroom. The legally enforced 
discourse of the courtroom breaks down the barriers to cognisance of expertise, and the law, 
such that, the narrative of the litigation is available to the community. This contest is viewed 
from a theoretical viewpoint (that of an ideal speech act), from a pragmatic viewpoint (that of 
the sufficiency, truth and validity of the report), from an assurance standpoint (that of 
formally meeting professional accounting standards and advice) and peer accepted 
consistency (such as, reliance upon Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and 
appropriately conducted forensic accounting methods). Expert evidence in compliance with 
the statutory specifications and common law articulation (the judicial interpretation) is the 
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subject of chapter 5, which is, in turn, connected to the research argument in the compilation 
of the proper investigative methodology for chapters 8 and 9. Consideration of the need for 
rationality and reason in the truthful vision (that arises from the expert’s narrative) is 
discussed through the application of Weber’s empirical mode of cultural rationalisation 
(1864–1920)
60
. Habermas extends Weber’s need for rationalisation as a central element of 
legitimacy reflected in ideal speech acts. The concept of an ideal speech act directly relates to 
how expert opinion influences communicative action, in order to influence the behavioural 
dispositions and the conduct of life and ultimately in democratic juridification. The ideal 
speech act effects the legitimacy of the expert’s evidence, which is necessary for the 
acceptance of the expert’s opinion within and outside the court. 
As chapter 5 will consider the legal formality of expert evidence’s access to the court’s 
processes (the legal admission and acceptance of opinion evidence), a brief reflection of how 
this structural rationality reflects in Weber’s purposive-rational approach
61
 is due. Empirical 
and analytical knowledge (such as accounting) contribute to purposive-rational action 
through the application of their strategies and techniques. In the accounting example, the 
strategies are based upon the achievement of rational objectives and that the accounting 
techniques, are rational, peer accepted methodologies which have been deployed with the 
support of incrementally logical, stepped processes. For example, accounting may be used to 
establish a rational objective, such as, an acceptable return on investment, then accounting is 
                                                     
60
 Max Weber was a significant contributor to modern social science (modernity). His two most celebrated 
contributions were the ‘Rationalization Thesis’ and the ’Protestant Ethic Thesis’. This dissertation calls upon 
some points Weber raises in his rationalization thesis as they pertain to the need for the legal system and 
particularly the courts to champion rational decision making over concepts of ritual, superstition and deity. 
Weber's theses were far-reaching spanning several disciplinary, methodological, ideological and philosophical 
reflections that extend beyond the bounds of this dissertation. Habermas, 1984, devotes significant space to 
discussion of Weber’s philosophy and extractions that assist the development of Habermas’ opinions. 
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 Max Weber viewed sociology as a science of social action rather than the social-structural view of his 
contemporaries (Durkheim, Spencer). He focussed on the subjective meanings attached to one’s actions. 
Purposeful-rational action is chosen through rational consideration of both the goal of, and means for, an action. 
Value-rational action is an action that is rationally pursued, however, the goal may not be rationally defined (for 
example, the pursuit of salvation). 
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also deployed to rationally monitor economic performance to comment on the achievement or 
otherwise of that objective (such as progressive rates of return). In terms of forfeiture matters, 
accounting may be deployed to articulate the details of a fraud, then also deployed to follow 
through the use of the proceeds of that crime and their mixture with untainted funds. 
Simultaneously, competences and motives promote value-rational action that combine to give 
the rational action legitimacy (Habermas, 1984, p174). Again, the example of accounting, 
supports the community’s values and norms with the rational quantification processes aimed 
at the fulfillment of norms, consistent with the community’s value system. For example, 
accounting methods can be used to establish and follow genuine sales transactions, then 
deduct associated costs, to logically arrive at a profit, irrespective of the argument of whether 
it is morally right to take a profit from that sort of transaction or not (for example, from a 
charity).  
Pragmatically, this chapter then reviews the competencies and motives of accounting experts 
(specifically forensic accounting) at a ‘truthful’ level, that is, the framework required to 
compile evidence that fulfils the elements of an inquiry that can rationally be presented and 
accepted as true. This framework presents a normative rationality expressed in adherence to 
patterned principles, which are then applied to peer accepted forensic accounting techniques 
and strategies. The literature on ‘legal truth’ is reviewed both with respect to the legal 
creation of ‘truth’ and the legal acceptance of ‘truth’. The conclusion from this investigation 
is that validity is a better proxy for truth
62
 in the context of expert opinion evidence and 
therefore validity defines ‘acceptability’ as pivotal to the second research question. Validity 
is supported by proper deployment of accounting techniques in accordance with accounting 
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 Concepts of truth extend well beyond the scope of this thesis, even when limited to within the legal 
framework. The argument in this chapter presents the case for validity as a workable proxy for truth rather than 
the penultimate view of what is truth for, and from, the legal perspective. Validity is then carried forward to the 
research methodology, to answer the research question of ‘appropriate’ (or valid) expert evidence for forfeiture 
litigation.  
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professional guidance, proscription and assurance (for example, as contained in APES 215 - 
Forensic Accounting Services, or in the detail prescribed in a range of accounting standards). 
Also peer acceptance of accounting and audit practices (at the methodological level) are 
validly deployed in a suitable manner to be relied upon for forensic accounting evidence to 
establish undisclosed and other forms of tainted income. The thesis will return to peer 
acceptability and assurance of accounting practices supported by the judiciary in chapter 8. 
Judicial Rationalism 
The research argument is based on the rationalist approach, which logically relates the legal 
system to a process of rational discourse to justify the validity of claims, in this case made by 
expert accounting witnesses. Habermas cites Weber as using the term ‘rationalisation’ to 
“designate the growing autonomy of the law and morality, that is, the detachment of moral-
practical insights, of ethical and legal doctrines, of basic principles, of maxims and decision 
rules, from the world-views in which they were first embedded” (Habermas, 1984, p162). 
Weber was concerned that modern society had become increasingly interested in efficiency, 
predictability, calculability and dehumanization (Weber, 1904–1905/1958). Rationalisation is 
influenced by scientific study and technological advances, particularly in Western society 
over the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. Rationalisation was typified by modern society’s 
movement from reliance on customs and traditions to the development of practices supported 
by rational thought for the common good. This has been evident in the growth of 
bureaucracies and systems such as the law and responsible ethics
63
 (even though religion may 
retain an interpretive influence).  Weber describes four types of rationality as the practical 
rationality of selecting the best fit day-to-day activities; theoretical rationality, cognitively 
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 In this regard ‘responsible ethics’ refers to logical consistency between ethical decisions and the behaviour 
that follows from those decisions, also referred to as acting virtuously.  Ethics provide a rational basis for the 
moral behaviour that logically defines what a virtuous person would do in the situation to enhance the common 
good (see Rousseau, 1712-1778).  
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considering the world through abstract concepts; substantive rationality, when making the 
best choice in order to achieve an end where values and actions are most congruent, and 
formal rationality in the selection of choices with respect to the larger social structure after 
the calculation of and quantification of the most efficient methodology (Brubaker, 1984; 
Habermas, 1984; Kalberg, 2014; Levine, 1981). 
“All human beings engage in practical rationality in attempting to solve the routine and daily 
problems of life” (Levine, 1981, p12). In Weber’s terms people seek the “methodical 
attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise 
calculation of adequate means” (p293). Theoretical rationality involves “an increasingly 
theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts” 
(Weber, 1958, p293). When related to evidence, this entails the attribution of causality, 
logical deduction and the composition of meaning. “It is derived from the inherent need of 
actors to give some logical meaning to a world that appears haphazard” (Ritzer, 2007 p43). 
Substantive rationality, considers groups of socially acceptable values. Specifically, Weber 
(1921/1968) linked this to “economic oriented social action” directed by some higher value 
principles that direct the means to an end. The rational calculation of the means to an end is 
reflected in formal rationality, under which, the method of calculation is corralled based on 
accepted rules, regulations and laws (Kalberg, 1980). The legal system and bureaucracy 
institutionalise or formalise rationality, to determine the means to an end in accordance with 
their rules and laws (Ritzer, 2007). Through this rationalisation process the charismatic 
appeal of emotions, magic, sacred traditions and revelation are replaced by formal ethics 
based on general principles and legal norms, which count as conventions (or precedents). 
They can be considered and applied to the methodical conduct of justice through rational 
adjudication and “profane decision” (Harbermas, 1989, p163). In this manner, justice is 
rationalised, not according to those occupying positions of authority as personal rulers, but 
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more perennially, as “the legally constituted authority relating to citizens called on to obey 
the law by the official that enforces it” (p163). 
Purposive - rational 
Justice is rationalised and is purposefully pursued and calculated in Weber’s terms because, 
the “methodical rigor of a principled, self-contained autonomous conduct of life, … 
penetrates every domain of life because it stands under the idea of assuring oneself of 
salvation” (Habermas, 1989, p165). In other words, the desire to obtain salvation through 
pursuing a logically argued “life of good intent” is culturally important. Relating this to the 
modern legal system, the rational communication of judicial administration, process and 
decision is important in the diffusion of purposive-rational action, that democratically 
legitimises punitive remedies and the systemised statutes, because, put simply, it contributes 
to a “life of good intent”. Purposive-rational behaviour is achieved through the employment 
of rational technique, that is “consciously and systematically oriented to experience and 
reflection” (MacIntyre, 1971 p251-2 in Habermas 1989, p169). Accounting represents one 
such group of techniques. Habermas assumed Weber’s rationality argument in his concept of 
ideal justifiability or the consensus theory of truth where “the truth condition of propositions 
is the potential assent of all others”; thus “the universal-pragmatic meaning of truth ….. is 
determined by the demand of reaching a rational consensus” (Habermas 1971/2001, p89). 
This interpretation of truth is understood with respect to the ideal speech situation. 
Part 1 The Research Argument 
The research argument (‘the argument’) presented for this dissertation is consistent with a 
purposive-rational approach to the interpretation, adjudication and active communication of 
justice. Table 1 presents the argument that underpins this research, as a stepped purposive-
rational approach that commences from the broadest perspective at the top stage and that 
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progressively moves to more specific issues at the bottom, where the research questions are 
connected. The argument’s rationale is built around the rational progression of accounting’s 
quantitative augmentation of the legal account to bring influence to the adjudication within 
the court and to enhance the message for communicative action outside the court. The 
argument reflects on this purpose in terms of accounting’s support for the system’s influence 
on the lifeworld acceptance of legal norms and, in circular reference, the consequent 
influence on the lifeworld’s democratic support for legal juridification. That is, the argument, 
although presented linearly in table 1, is in fact, circular because better understanding of legal 
decisions and the higher lifeworld confidence is with respect to the right decision that has 
been made, in turn reinforces greater democratic support for new and changed laws. The 
research argument is expressed by step (11 steps) in order to assist its cognitive explanation, 
whereas the application of the argument is, in practice, fluid, interlocked and progressive. 
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Table 4.1: Point Summary of  the Research Argument
64
 
 
1. Juridification is occurring whereby law is increasing its presence both at the 
legislative and administrative level; 
 
2. To support this process the law needs legitimacy and power to define statute 
(democracy) as well as legitimacy and means to effect decisions based on 
those statutes (communicative action); 
 
3. Juridification increases the law’s ability to steer the resolution of economic 
disputes, specifically unjust ownership of property; 
 
4. Accounting (forensic accounting) is structurally coupled with the law in this 
juridification, particularly at the adjudication level because resolution of 
economic disputes is defined, expressed and understood in monetary terms; 
 
5. It is important that the law provides and communicates the ‘right’ outcome 
of adjudication so that it maintains legitimacy (authority and power) in both 
the internal system and external lifeworld; 
 
6. The ‘right’ outcome needs a medium of expression recognised by the system 
and lifeworld for its validity and fecundity; 
 
7. Accounting provides the metaphor of ‘number’, already recognised for its 
role in distributive justice and holding professional ‘expert’ status; 
 
8. In providing the ‘right ‘ outcome the law strengthens its account utilising 
accounting technology to provide a factitious ‘scientific’ decision 
synergistically aiding both professions’ legitimacy; 
 
9. The lifeworld does not have the time, inclination nor capacity to adjudicate 
each matter but it wants to be satisfied that the matters are correctly 
adjudicated; 
 
10. Forensic accounting provides the lifeworld with a legitimate patterned 
justification (translation) the lifeworld can rely upon to be ‘right’; 
 
11. So, pragmatically, how has accounting evidence in the forfeiture genre 
evolved and what is the legitimate patterned accounting justification for 
evidence pertaining to forfeiture matters? 
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 This argument has been applied to juridification in favour of the influence of forensic accounting. The 
argument has been developed by the author for the purpose of this thesis. The argument is not proposed to 
be exclusive to the field of forensic accounting and may be appropriated for other disciplines that influence the 
juridification process. 
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Stepped Explanation of the Research Argument  
Step 1: Juridification is occurring in Western societies as people look towards statutory 
remedies to societal issues (Blichner and Molander, 2005). The political process effects 
parliamentary representation, which, once a mandate is obtained, sponsors legislative 
resolutions for a range of issues that arise locally, nationally and internationally. As 
recognised by the Westminster system, the separation of powers
65
 then fosters separate 
administrative and judicial responses to juridification. Administration is increased, with 
bureaucratic skills and capacities harnessed in support of new and changed legislation. The 
judiciary is asked to adjudicate on an increasing amount of new matters that include those 
that do not have readily available precedents. The proliferation of confiscation and forfeiture 
statutes are a good illustration of both new legislation and of tenets within that legislation that 
push the boundaries of the purpose and infiltration of the law. For example, the recent 
addition to forfeiture statutes of the reverse onus of proof, where unexplained wealth is 
deemed to have been unlawfully acquired. In such cases, those charged are required to prove 
that their wealth was lawfully obtained, rather than the onus being on the prosecution/plaintiff 
to prove that assets arose from tainted proceeds. In this manner the boundaries of traditional 
legal concepts such as “innocent before being proven guilty” are pushed out, replaced by the 
new legal purpose and thereby reach into the community (ALRC Interim Report 127, 
Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, s 11 Burden of Proof). Other pertinent examples 
are the increased unified legislative intervention in industrial relations (Clark, 1985), national 
security (Knott, 2014), corporate regulation (see the CLERP process leading to the 
Corporations Act 2001 and harmonisation
66
), evidence (ALRC report 102 to Uniform 
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 The principle of the separation of powers is that, in order to prevent oppressive government, the three 
powers of government should be held by separate bodies—the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary—which can 
act as checks and balances on each other. www.aph.gov.au › ... › Powers, practice and procedure › Infosheets. 
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 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) modified the Corporations Act 2001 in order to 
strengthen the financial reporting framework and improve investor confidence. 
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Evidence Law
67
) and Unexplained Wealth provisions (Law Council of Australia 2014). 
Teubner (1997) comments that “the phenomenon of juridification is a partial aspect of 
societal evolution and cannot be effectively reversed by delegalisation strategies” (p19). 
Teubner notes that juridification is not merely the proliferation of laws, but the propagation 
of statutes in new areas, as well as new types of laws, such as, the movement from proceeds 
of crime legislation to new laws based on unexplained wealth. 
Step 2: The broad perspective of juridification relies upon democratic support for its 
proposal, drafting, acceptance and importantly, legitimacy, without which the law cannot, in 
the long term, be effective. Laws require democratic support to be brought into statute and 
they require democratic support to be effectively administered (see chapter 2). Democratic 
backing is gained and maintained through the support of communicative action materially 
influenced by constituent opinion (Habermas 1984, 1996). 
By mobilising citizen’s communicative freedom for the formation of political 
beliefs that in turn influence the production of legitimate law, illocutionary 
obligations of this sort build up into potential that holders of administrative 
power should not ignore (Habermas, 1996, p147). 
Step 3: Having secured increased legislative capacity, the law’s steering power over the 
resolution of legislative disputes is increased as application of the legislation brings matters 
within the arbitration of the courts (Habermas 1996). Juridification, in this sense, increases 
judicial power complete with the law’s indeterminacy
68
 and potential lack of transparency 
both in the form of lack of openness and intelligibility (Blichner and Molander, 2005). 
Specifically, in this research, new laws bring the unexplained and assumed illegal acquisition 
and ownership of economic assets under the law with its attendant discourse, conditions, 
rules and regulations. 
                                                     
67
 The Australian Law Reform Commission report 102 considered and extended the existing provisions of the 
Uniform Evidence Acts in areas such as opinion evidence (amongst others).  
68
 In this sense indeterminacy refers to the lack of clarity about how statutes (particularly new ones) are to be 
interpreted in the formation of rules and precedents. 
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Step 4: Accounting provides institutional support (structurally coupled with the law) 
synergistically assisting the internal processes of the new legislation by converting the facts 
and behaviours in question into economic quantification and accounting inscriptions. 
Accounting is already qualified as a moral discourse “as the saying (writing) of something 
about economic activity to someone else, with economic activity understood as originating 
from human purpose to transform the conditions of lived experience” (Arrington, 2007). The 
law is then provided with a recognisable monetary expression to adhere to its linguistic 
description that gives a more powerful expression of its context and condition.  
Step 5: In order to maintain continued democratic support, the law needs to give the 
community (lifeworld) confidence that the court’s decisions are ‘right’ and ‘correct’. The 
community needs to believe in the continuance of proper structure and delivery of the law. 
Alternatively, as indeterminacy and lack of transparency increase, the democratic legitimacy 
of statutes erodes as the populous ceases to understand the legal machinations. Greater 
importance and dependence is placed on expert interpretation for a suitable explanation both 
within and outside the jurisprudential community. Whilst the nature of a ‘right’ or ‘correct’ 
decision will be considered separately in due course, nevertheless it can be accepted that a 
proper outcome is expected to arise from the adjudication discourse, which is expressed in 
testimony, cross-examination and judicial comment. The material content and outcomes of 
this discourse are required to be effectively communicated to the community in order to 
garner their acceptance. 
Step 6: Step 6 can be summarised as gaining validity from the community. The community 
needs to receive the communication in the form of an understandable discourse that 
empowers them to be able to agree that the judgement is ‘right’. The discourse must be 
translated and clarified from within the court, to the outside, based on credible inscriptions 
and language countenanced by the legal system and received by the community with equal 
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authority. Validity reflects judicial rationalism, rationalised against recognised authoritative 
patterned principles. 
Step 7: Accounting responds to the community’s and system’s rationalistic needs by adding 
‘facticity’ in content and context of the legal communication. In its content, accounting uses 
the metaphor of ‘number’ to quantify and in that quantification an attendant qualification
69
 
(the aspects of what is being counted) and further associated quantification (proportionate 
quantification of further aspects of what is being counted). In this context accounting brings 
its own description, professional credibility and history of accepted expertise, as the basis of 
reporting and decision making.  
Step 8: Accounting strengthens the proper legal account both internally and externally by 
combining numerical facticity with the legal narrative to address the tension between the 
facts and norms. Accounting facts are re-contextualised in legal linguisity without the loss of 
the power of accounting’s scientific rhetoric or the transportability of the monetary metaphor. 
Accounting professionally couples with the Law to provide ‘harder’ social-scientific 
inscriptions, (Latour, 1987, 1988a) synergistically enhancing the communicative power of the 
‘softer’ qualitative discipline of law.  That is, the values of economic reason, expressed 
through accepted accounting practice, technologies and expertise, are integrated with, and 
augment, legal values and norms, acknowledged in the primary setting of the court. This 
mixture of accounting and legal professional content gives rise to a reliable code or credible 
pattern to be applied to, and relied upon for, specific contexts.  Pragmatically, accounting 
expertise is acknowledged by the legal domain of the courts through adherence to the concept 
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 The quantification of something implies the quantification of the quality aspects of what is being quantified. 
For example, the quantification of 6 motor bikes means that 6, two wheeled conveyance vehicles (or what one 
agrees as being a motor bike), are the subject of the quantification. That thing, that is a motor bike, has qualities 
(a seat, wheels, handlebars, brakes, engine) and further quantities that are proportionate to the original 
quantification (6 motor bikes = 12 wheels). 
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of opinion evidence, its rules, guidance and judicial prerogatives (Arenson and Bagaric, 2007, 
p508-526). 
Step 9: Accessibility to the courts and legal functions is limited by space, time and 
knowledge. The community as a whole finds the court system inaccessible, however they 
recognise the importance and potential invasiveness
70
 of the legal system. Therefore, the 
community require confidence that proper decisions are being reached. They do not have the 
access, time nor capacity to evaluate judicial outcomes or the effect of legislation that 
pertains to specific circumstances, however they recognise a vested community interest in the 
comfort of the court’s ‘valid’ operation. 
Step 10: An influential method to communicate the court’s proper operation is to authenticate 
adjudicative outcomes based on an accepted formularised discourse. That is, accepted in 
terms consistent with lifeworld norms, grounded in lifeworld values and preferences for the 
good life. Forensic accounting provides such formularization in the production of accounting 
technologies consistent with peer accepted calculation methods, that have credibility from 
professional acceptance and a moral purposeful outcome. Such methods are available for 
questioning by fellow experts as well as cross-examination by qualified legal counsel. They 
provide an avenue for assumptions to be drawn out and tested in order to establish a 
legitimised pattern, before becoming the basis of calculation. The methods which fit the 
pattern can be applied consistently to calculations or varied in such a manner that they 
enlighten the differences between calculations. If the pattern has validity and is properly 
applied, the legitimacy is bestowed on the calculation, giving the lifeworld assurance that the 
number is correct and properly construed.   
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 In this regard the recognition of the potential that a legal decision may cascade to effect (and bind) the 
community by redefining lifeworld norms with potentially intended and unintended consequences. 
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Step 11: The final step of the research argument is the application of the communicative 
action that arises from the 10 earlier steps, in this case, to the forfeiture legislative genre. This 
research aims to understanding prior forensic accounting evidence in the forfeiture and 
similar genres to understand what patterns and methods have been accepted by the courts or 
should legitimately be accepted by the courts. As explained in the following chapters, the 
Australian judiciary have not considered many forfeiture cases and even less of these have 
addressed forensic accounting evidence that has extended beyond a mere counting exercise. 
Therefore, in answering the second research question, cases in other jurisdictions (such as, 
the U.K., Ireland and the U.S.) and similar genres (such as, taxation cases that estimate 
undeclared cash earnings and valuations) will add to the analysis. Further, consideration is 
made of legitimate forensic accounting technology professionally utilised to estimate 
unexplained wealth, and the application of generally accepted accounting practices to these 
forensic accounting calculations, which may provide new knowledge for those in the legal 
fraternity tasked with joining or adjudicating the legal discourse of justified re-distribution.  
Part 2 ‘Appropriate’ Criteria for Forensic Accounting Expert Evidence 
General 
In assessing the concept of the ‘appropriate’ criteria for forensic accounting expert evidence 
one needs to review what are proper standards, principles and measures that the accounting 
expert needs to communicate to give their evidence. In order to analyse these elements in a 
logical manner this dissertation has segmented the discussion into five areas. They are; 
theoretical; functional; assurance; peer acceptance; and system requirements. Of these, the 
first four will be discussed in this chapter, whilst the system requirements, which comply 
with the formal legal system’s gateway rules of access (the obligatory passage point rules), 
95 
 
will be discussed in chapter 5. All areas will be discussed with reference to contemporary 
literature, statutory rules and professional guidance within the constraints of this thesis. 
The theoretical discussion considers evidence as the ontological presentation of the truth, 
legitimacy and as a valid speech act, all aimed at influencing active communication internally 
and externally to the courtroom. The functional discussion considers more pragmatic 
elements of evidence that also contribute to the rational discourse in defence of the truth 
claim and that contribute to the legitimacy of such a proposition. The assurance discussion 
considers the relevant professional advice that the presentation of forensic accounting 
evidence needs to consider and abide by, whilst the elements of peer acceptance include the 
proper deployment, construction and conclusions drawn from accounting technologies. All 
five areas provide the basis of rational discourse questioning and are the basis for the defence 
of the legitimacy of claims presented as opinion evidence. 
From Expert Cultures to Expert Cognisance 
Habermas presents expert cultures as steering mechanisms being converted over to the media 
of power and money, becoming elitist, “splitting off from contexts of communicative action 
in daily life .… leading to a one-sided rationalization or reification of everyday 
communicative practice” (1984, p330). Expert cultures develop autopoietically (a system 
capable of reproducing and maintaining itself), “developing according to their own logics and 
cut off from any influx from everyday consciousness” (p355). Experts acquire normative 
status, that suspend challenges to validity claims through their reified status and hegemonic 
professionalism
71
. 
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 Habermas see this as a “signature of modernity” where a sophisticated culture inserts itself over a ‘tribalist’ 
culture producing on-sided imperatives with no need for “justification in terms of transcendental grounding” 
(Habermas 1984, p397). 
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Linguistically expressed from a statutory viewpoint, autopoietic court decisions under 
colonisation risk the loss of their ties to the lifeworld notions of fairness and ‘rightness’. 
Justice by itself becomes systemised by the coloniser and loses its connected legitimacy. 
Habermas’ legitimacy arises from procedure rather than through attainment of independently 
specified normative objectives or “substantive moral choices” (Flores and Himma, 2013, 
p123). The two types of procedural requirements are that “of legal constitution of decision 
processes and that of moral - political assent of all citizens secured through reasoned 
deliberation” (Zurn, 2007) 
The law provides the venue for reasoned deliberation to reinstate validity challenges, to strip 
away the expert’s ideological veils, with the objective to mediate everyday practice. Formal 
pragmatics are used to reconstruct the (expert) knowledge that has previously been 
fragmented out. This discourse tests the validity aspects of truth, normative tightness and 
authenticity, for rational
72
 reasoning. The expert makes their claim under an implied warranty 
that they stand ready to justify their utterance, albeit that it is based upon specialised 
knowledge. The law, through cross-examination and peer expert review, provides the 
empirical framework to test the plausibility of claims, breaking down the “normative context 
of bourgeois culture”. The rational communication “ingrained in the use of language” is 
deployed to reach a non-reified understanding communicable to everyday practice 
(Habermas, 1984, p397-398). 
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 In this regard the term rational is understood as having to do with the provision of reasons for beliefs or 
actions. For an illustration of this definition see Richard Norman’s saucer of mud example. “To want simply a 
saucer of mud is irrational, because some further reason is needed for wanting it. To want a saucer of mud 
because one wants to enjoy its rich river-smell is rational. No further reason is needed for wanting to enjoy the 
rich-river smell, for to characterize what is wanted as ‘to enjoy the rich river smell’ is itself to give an acceptable 
reason for wanting it, and therefore this want is rational” (1971, pp63-64; cited in Habermas, 1984, p16). 
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Theoretical 
Truth 
‘Truth’ is an important concept with respect to the law, a concept broader than can be fully 
considered for this dissertation
73
. The law defines truth through the use of conventions which, 
once “sufficiently specified and determined in virtue of the social practices that constitute the 
law” (Balkin, 2003, p102), become autopoietic in terms of defining things that are true as 
legal claims, in the eyes of the law (Haack, 2002). In this regard the law ‘creates’ truth giving 
rise to considerable real world consequences (Balkin, 2003, p102). For example, the court’s 
judgement that a defendant has received unexplained wealth is a matter that becomes ‘true’ 
when the court, after adjudication decides this is so, therefore denoting the receipt of 
unexplained wealth as now being the truth. In the manner of creating this ‘truth’ the law has 
exercised power in its determination of the issue as being true or false and the consequences 
that flow from that decision. The propagation of legal truths shape active communication 
however, the law’s power to enforce legal truths may or may not be a reality as it may clash 
with other knowledge, norms and other forms of the truth shaped by alternative institutional 
purposes. For example, a civil matter may attest that something is true “on the balance of 
probabilities” whereas a criminal may not find the same thing true “beyond reasonable 
doubt”. In creating truth the law has the capacity to ensnare and colonise community norms 
and to enforce or argue dichotometrically as either ‘right or ‘wrong’. It is this dichotomy that 
the adversarial judicial system is most concerned with, as distinct from the truth of 
substantive fact.  
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 For a broad consideration of the law and truth see the conference papers from the Federalist Society 
Conference on Law and Truth, Yale Law School March 2002, Also Moore M.2002. Regarding procedural truth, 
see G L Certoma, 1982, The Accusatory System v the Inquisitorial System: Procedural Truth v Fact?, 56 
Australian Law Journal 288; Regarding legal truth, see Robert S Summers, 1999, “Formal Legal Truth and 
Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding, 18 Law and Philosophy 497; Joseph M Fernandez, 2009, An 
Exploration of the Meaning of Truth in Philosophy and Law, 11 University of Notre Dame Australia Law 
Review 53 at 79-80. 
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Therefore this research refrains from such consideration of truth (which is best left to the trier 
of fact) in preference for the exploration of validity, in particular, the validity of expert 
evidence. In essence this is the legitimacy found in the internal and external presentation of 
expert evidence and in the legitimacy arising from investigative questioning by qualified 
inquisitors. As Viscount Simon LC commented “A court of law ….. is not engaged in 
ascertaining ultimate verities: it is engaged in determining what is the proper result to be 
arrived at, having regard to the evidence before it” (Hickman v Peacey, 1945, at 318.). 
Habermas cites Peirce’s explanation of truth as “ideal assertability” being the “vindication of 
a criticisable claim under communication conditions”, justified in front of “an audience of 
competent interpreters that extends ideally across social space and historical time.” (Pierce, 
1931 in Habermas, 1996, p15). Initially developed with respect to scientific claims, 
Habermas notes similar “structures and pre-suppositions” (p15) in everyday validation of 
communication aimed at discursively reaching a common understanding of the world. Thus 
Habermas extends Pierce’s “community of investigators” (p15) to active communication with 
the broader community of interpreters.  
In a Habermasian sense, empirical truth is found in the assertion (the truth-bearer) that has 
been subjected to discourse directed towards rational consensus, which brings out the truth 
(Habermas, 1971 [2001] p86). More recently he articulates a “pragmatic epistemological 
realism” (2003a, p7) where “the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-
maker” (Bohman and Rehg, 2014). In this regard truth testing at the logical level relies on 
more scientific, empirical critique. At the dialectic level discourse resolves reasoned 
challenges and support from alternative theories and reflections. At the rhetorical level 
discourse seeks a truth agreement from a universal audience relating to the objective world. 
Habermas weights truth as a subset of validity, with validity construed through “idealizations 
that are connected with the medium of language” (Habermas 1996, p17). Agreeing with 
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Frege (1848-1925) and Peirce, Habermas writes “ideas are then considered to be directly 
embodied in language, so that the facticity of linguistic signs and expressions as events in the 
world is internally linked with the ideal moments of meaning and validity” ….. “the 
difference between the truth of a proposition and its being taken to be true is accounted for by 
explicating truth as a rational assertability under ideal conditions and hence only in reference 
to the discursive redemption of validity claims” (1996, p34-35).  In this regard the external 
communication of what is proper is validated by the discourse of justification, to prove the 
worth of the statement against current and future objections, such as, those in our expert 
evidence example, that arise from qualified cross-examination or rational questions from peer 
experts. Discursive review and questioning exchanges reasons, to  build a rationally 
motivational force, to accept or reject validity based on the strength of the reasons presented, 
and the risk that better reasons or a change of context may arise. 
Ideal Speech Acts 
Truth, validity claims and reasons are presented through speech acts (the elementary units of 
communication). The propositional content of speech acts “establishes a relationship between 
an utterance and the outside world” (Schoop, 2001). This dissertation takes a rather narrow 
perspective of speech acts in terms of the expert’s articulation of ideal speech acts. Again, the 
scope of speech act theory, is broader than this thesis allows, so the focus for this dissertation 
will be on speech acts in their support of validity claims (and hence influence on active 
communication) or valid speech acts. Habermas pragmatically approaches the speech act with 
the postulation that “we understand a speech act when we know the kinds of reasons that a 
speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer that he is entitled, in the given 
circumstances, to claim validity for his utterance – in short we know what is acceptable” 
(1998b, p232). That is, the inherent claims of a speaker (such as the expert giving evidence), 
contain some form of claim that the speaker is bound to justify in order to gain validity and 
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acceptance if the hearer responds with an affirmative position (1984 pp95-97; p282; p297). 
The speech act pre-empts discourse which includes the processes of argumentation and 
dialogue. With regard to argumentation, the term refers to “that type of speech in which 
participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them 
through argumentation” (p18). The outcome of such discourse that uses language for mutual 
understanding, is rational support for communicative action. Support for communicative 
action can be tested through questions during rational discourse, which, in the legal example, 
is supported by cross-examination, judicial inquiry and the opposition’s peer evidence. 
The attributes of the speech act itself, as well as its reasons and context, provides the basis for 
testing questions, the answers to which affirm or deny validity. Habermas sees speech act 
theory
74
 as the basis of communicative competence, that emanates through language as 
reconstructive science under the conditions of rationality (Rehg, 2011). Communicative 
rationality is said to concern all three worlds being the objective, subjective and social (inter-
subjective). This Habermas derives from “the basic attitudes toward the objective world of 
what is the case and a basic attitude toward the social world of what can legitimately be 
expected, what is commanded or ought to be.” (Habermas, 1984, p49).   
The objective world is defined as “the totality of all entries about which true statements are 
possible” (Habermas, 1984, p100) therefore, a true or false estimation is allowed of the set of 
circumstances propositioned as expressed beliefs or intentions. The subjective world is the 
“totality of the experiences of the speaker to which he has privileged access and which he can 
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 Consideration of speech act theory in this thesis is limited to the way in which words can be used not only to 
present information but also to carry out actions as immediately relevant to evidential discourse, specifically as 
defined by Habermas. Academic consideration of Speech Act Theory is broad, incorporating a number of 
perspectives and contexts worthy of individual consideration in depth beyond the scope of this research. It traces 
its genealogy from consideration of locutionary, illocutionary and percocutionary acts including such acts as 
promising, ordering, greeting, warning, inviting and congratulating. Green, Mitchell, 2015, Speech Acts, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/speech-acts/>.  
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express before a public” (p100). It exists in alliance with the objective and social worlds, this 
private world of desires and feelings, once expressed, is judged on the sincerity and 
truthfulness of the utterance. The speaker employs a self-expressive mode very relevant to the 
communication of expert opinion evidence where an expert’s view is asserted for contest or 
acceptance. (Dwivedi et al, 2012). The subjective world has two contributing components 
being the “spontaneous expressions of subjective experiences” and “the institutionally bound 
speech acts” (Habermas, 1984, p100). The latter is particularly relevant to forensic 
accountants who give evidence within well prescribed professional norms and standards. In 
such cases the action that relates to the norms, and the underlying norms themselves, are both 
criticisable.  
The intersubjective or social world is defined as “the totality of all legitimately regulated 
interpersonal relations” (Habermas, 1984, p100). Norms are the essence of the social world 
that connect its members and provide the social force recognised for uniting and binding 
membership. “Actions of an actor are judged based on their normative context, i.e., whether 
their actions are in accord or deviate from the existing norms. Second, norms are justified 
according to whether they embody the values and interests that are recognised as legitimate 
by those affected. Hence relations between actor and the social world are judged according to 
their legitimacy and justification” Dwived et al, 2012, p16). In developing the inter-
subjective world Habermas offers an ethical-political model referred to as the “ideal speech 
community” which orients public argument toward the formation of a rational consensus 
(Arrington and Puxty, 1991). Communicative action “relies on a cooperative process of 
interpretation in which participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the 
social, and the subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only one of the three 
components in their utterances” (Habermas, 1984, p61). A common three world reference 
system is used to speak and to listen. Hearers can contest an “utterance in three respects: 
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depending on whether it is expanded to a statement of fact, an expression of feeling, or a 
command, they can call into question its truth, its sincerity, or its legitimacy” (p27). If the 
speaker and the hearer form agreement then the utterance is legitimised even if the utterance 
fits within one world (p120). Pragmatically, the relationship between the three worlds must 
retain internal alignment in order to maintain legitimacy. Communicative action requires 
consistency between the thematic evaluations of the worlds.  
One cannot accept the truth of an assertion but at the same time doubt the 
sincerity of the speaker or the normative appropriateness of his utterance; 
the same holds for the case in which a speaker accepts the normative 
validity of   a command but suspects the seriousness of the intent thereby 
expressed or has his doubts about the existential presuppositions of the 
action commanded (and thus about the possibility of carrying it out) (p121). 
Questioning Cognitive Authority 
Chapter 2 discussed the concept of cognitive authority as essentially the denotation of the 
power and influence an expert acquires by the fact that they possess and exercise expertise, 
based upon a select knowledge or skill set not generally available in the community. The 
discussion so far in this dissertation has leaned towards Habermas’ communicative rationality 
that presupposes the equal social capital of those who participate in the discourse. That is the 
ideal of power-free communication (McNeely, 2003). 
However, such an ideal is illusory where the speaker has unequal cognitive authority. 
Habermas himself subscribes to the view that expertise prevents communicative action, when 
the knowledge and skills that inform the discourse are not equally understood by the hearer. 
He theorises that expert subsystems “build up irresistible internal dynamics and 
systematically undermine the domains of action” which are dependent on informed social 
integration (Habermas, 1984, p327). Therefore, expertise suffers from being aloof from its 
audience as well as treating its audience as pitiful and ineffective victims. Further, specific to 
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accounting, it has been shown not to be a disinterested technology
75
 “due to the presence of a 
multiplicity of interests that can be brought to bear on it” (Arrington and Puxty, 1991 p33). 
Accounting presented in evidence therefore requires a critical eye as to inherent interests that 
may influence expert testimony (for example, the selection of different valuation 
methodologies). Accounting has claimed an external legitimisation, outside its own discourse 
that is “revealed through systems of rules that are privileged over other ways of 
understanding and other approaches to the production of knowledge”, that is, court 
recognised, professional expert knowledge (see chapter 5). However, critical accounting 
scholars believe that such knowledge claims can be indeterminate (Arrington and Francis, 
1989, p1).  
Expert opinion witnesses have an inherent cognitive authority because the exclusive nature of 
their testimony is that their knowledge and/or skills must be distinguished from those 
generally acquired. Chapter 5 explores the meaning of this distinction in detail, taking 
particular note of statutory requirements, judicial feedback and instructive precedents. The 
law is therefore presented with a challenge, that is, to preserve the distinction that creates 
cognitive authority, whilst simultaneously facilitating the broad transfer of evidential 
information to a general audience. The law requires expert evidence to be knowledgeable and 
authoritative in terms of peer acceptance and distinct from the everyday person, yet 
democratised without undermining, such that, the testimony’s status (legitimacy) and content 
is understood both internally and externally on an equal forum. 
The law is tasked with providing the structural framework for the rational questioning of the 
expert’s cognitive authority, which it does, firstly, through the application of the criteria that 
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 Whilst accounting for many years had been seen as a disinterested technology, more recently critical 
accounting theorists have shown that accounting can mask a “conservative ideology bias” (Tinker et al, 1982 
p167) and “take on meaning through an accounting text’s placement within the web of the whole range of texts 
presented to us as part of the written present of our social structure” (Cooper and Puxty, 1994, p127). Arrington 
and Francis (1989) note that “an emerging body of critical accounting literature subverts the mainstream view 
that knowledge of accounting is grounded in objectivist and foundationalist principles” (p1) 
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allows access to the court (that is, being granted expert opinion witness status), then through 
the formality that allows the expert witness to present their evidence (in chief), through 
alternative expert opinion, through cross-examination or through judicial enquiry of the 
expert. Under the common law justice system
76
 the judge is neutral (attempting to determine 
the truth of the case), whereas, the advocates that represent the parties are adversarially 
opposed (Hale, 2004). The U.S. and U.K. based legal systems subscribe to the “philosophy of 
the adversarial system in that the truth will more likely be reached if both sides of the issue 
are fully presented and that this is more likely to occur if the sides are presented by partisan 
advocates” (Scontas v Citizens Ins. Co., 1969). 
 In their representative capacity, legal advocates may bring forth expert witness testimony 
either in favour of their client (or prosecution or defence) or as a single expert on behalf of 
both parties
77
. However the expert testimony is brought, it is, by the act of admission to the 
court, formally subject to investigative discourse with regard to the validity of the testimony. 
The specific qualifications of judicial officers (lawyers-barristers) include investigative 
discourse in the form of strategic question and answer techniques aimed at querying the truth 
and validity of an expert’s claim. Such skills are transferable across types of expertise, 
however, they may also engage the services of an alternative expert either directly (by 
entering alternative expertise into court) or indirectly (as an advisor to assist in the crafting of 
suitably detailed and researched questions, often known as a ‘ghost expert’). 
Justifying a validity claim 
This research is therefore concerned with the justification of validity claims within the arena 
of expert opinion evidence. Pragmatically, the objective component of the claim is exposed to 
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 The common law justice system gives precedential weight to the body of past court decisions by judges, 
particularly of a higher court, in making consistent future decisions. (Washington Probate, "Estate Planning & 
Probate Glossary", Washington (State) Probate, s.v. "common law", 2008) 
77
 This distinction is discussed in chapter 5. 
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questions about the rightness and truthfulness of the claim; subjectively, the claim is laid 
open to tests of sincerity and professionalism of the expert; and inter-subjectively the claim is 
subject to relationship testing such as independence, potential conflicts or peer acceptance of 
methodologies. The test is made more difficult due to the lack of a scientific absolute and 
often varies in accordance with evidential contexts which are socially constructed (Gibson, 
2009). “Scientific method (in the court) is geared to reduction of sources of error and bias to 
the smallest possible degree, often using statistics to quantify ‘certainty’ and the magnitude of 
possible error. This engenders confidence in results but is always only the best estimate 
obtainable. Which is why distinction is drawn in the philosophy of science between certainty 
of knowledge and certainty itself as an absolute that exists independently of our ability to 
know it” (Habermas 1996, p3). 
Habermas would have it that communicative action is the original mode of language used in 
the speech act, which would be the focus of judicial testing discourse, however he also 
recognises other modes of language including “the figurative, the symbolic and indirect mode 
of language use” (Cooke, 1994, p22) as well as the strategic, perlocutious
78
 use of language 
(Habermas, 1984, p120-21). The testing discourse therefore needs to penetrate the 
illocutionary effect of expert testimony such that the “manifestly strategic linguistic activity” 
(Cooke, 1994, p24) is exposed, to shine light on the inherent philological context of the 
testimony’s validity claim. Use of the accounting metaphor in testimony, albeit factitious and 
stable, does not exempt testimony from etymological meaning. On the contrary gestation of 
the numerical semantics may require more specific testing discourse to confirm validity in 
regard to the proper numerical extraction and application. Here, the validity of the patterned 
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 Habermas does not separately define “perlocutious” [recall he wrote primarily in German therefore his work 
is subject to translation] however it is aligned with his concept of communicative action as the precursor act of 
speaking (or writing), that persuades or convinces the action. That is, the speech act has the aim of action but in 
of itself does not constitute action.  
106 
 
principle behind the calculation may provide more morphological reliability than the resultant 
number itself.  
The vehicles for the testing discourse arise through expert evidence-in-chief (evidence given 
by the expert to the court), cross-examination of the expert, evidence provided by an 
alternative expert and inquiring questions from the trier of fact (magistrate or judge). Cross-
examination is the interrogation of a witness by one’s opponent that occurs after the direct 
presentation of evidence (in-chief). Direct presentation of evidence is led by the appropriate 
legal representative who brought such evidence to the court. It is a core element of a trial 
which can be extremely influential (Lubet, 2004). Cross-examination has two main 
objectives, consistent with the role of investigatory discourse: that of “eliciting evidence to 
assist your case, and eliciting evidence to damage your opponent’s case” (Thompson, 2009). 
Cross-examination is typically limited to questions that pertain to the evidence offered during 
the direct examination and may be followed by a re-examination. The chief ‘rule’ of cross-
examination, known as the ‘Browne v Dunn rule’ (1893) is one of fairness, demanding that a 
cross-examiner cannot contradict the testimony of the witness without first putting the 
alternative evidence to the witness in order to allow them to attempt to justify the 
contradiction (MWJ v The Queen, 2005; R v MAP, 2006). In the case of expert opinion 
evidence this may mean the introduction of evidence by an alternative expert. (Thompson, 
2009; Beckett, 2012). 
Functional 
From a functional perspective the validity of an expert witness testimony commences on 
shaky ground as, despite formal adherence to codes of conduct prescribed by the courts to the 
contrary (see chapter 5), expectations are that an expert witness will testify corresponding to 
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the interest of the party who calls them. Judge G.J. Samuels
79
 disparagingly referred to the 
expert witness as tending “to present the same image in legal literature as the lawyer does in 
Shakespeare; venal, grasping and fit to be hanged”. This is however, a product of an 
adversarial legal system. The courts mainly rely on cross-examination as the primary source 
of validity testing discourse. Pragmatically the cross-examination of expert witnesses is set 
out in two parts: that of admissibility (chapter 5) and that of weight (Perry and Hampel, 2005; 
Maiden, P. SC, 2010). Querying an expert witness typically attracts leading questions 
regarding issues such as: 
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 Gordon Jacob Samuels was a British-Australian lawyer and NSW Supreme Court Judge (1972-1992) who 
was appointed as the 36
th
 Governor of NSW (1996-2001). The statement was reportedly made regularly in 
Expert Witness Cross Examination seminars (Maiden SC, Bar Practice Course, 2010). 
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Objective: 
 Correctness of the facts upon which the opinion is based; 
 Validity of choice of methodology and methods given the circumstances; 
 Accuracy of the methodology and methods used including calculations; and 
 Gaps in tests and investigations. 
Subjective: 
 Expert qualifications and experience; 
 Independence; and 
 Bias. 
Inter-subjective: 
 Articulation and explanation of assumptions; 
 Validity of assumptions; 
 Reasoned and logical process leading to the expert opinion; and 
 Comparison between opinion and that of other expert opinions  
(NSW Bar Association, 2010). 
Expert opinion evidence is usually presented in the form of a written report which is then 
entered into the court through affidavit. Having been allowed as testimony the expert 
warrants the defence of their report through validating discourse, in the form of cross- 
examination. The expert report takes the form of an investigative report that addresses the 
issues of the matter at hand, fulfils the expert’s professional guidelines and in completion of 
the expert’s obligations under the relevant statute that facilitates expert opinion evidence. 
Specifically, for the forensic accounting expert witness such guidance is found in the 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards (such as APES 215) and the professional 
association’s codes of ethical and professional guidance. In this regard the profession comes 
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to the court with its own (accounting) peer supported legitimising rules (as discussed in the 
assurance section, below). 
Pragmatically, the expert accounting evidence, presented in the form of a report addressed to 
the court, arises from an investigation of the facts of the matter at hand. The manner of 
investigation materially affects the validity of the evidence and it is the rationality of the 
investigation and conclusions that arise that are the focus of the court’s discourse. The 
investigation is the deployment of accounting technology in an inquiry aimed at advising the 
court with respect to facts and expert interpretation. The inquiry does not provide the answer 
to the main question of the matter in front of the court, as that is the prerogative of the trier of 
fact, usually the judge (see chapter 5).  
A valid investigation 
Much of the legal discourse with respect to the investigation has focused on the independence 
of the investigator and the investigation (see chapters 2 & 5), however, the attributes of an 
investigation that contribute to its validity and the validity of the investigative conclusions 
cover broader parameters. Michels (2010) presents a practical taxonomy of an investigative 
report for a reliance and duty investigation, which parallels the purpose of an evidential 
expert report. He dissects the investigation as the satisfaction of his ‘truth standard’, which, 
as previously discussed, contributes to the validity of the expert evidence. He holds that the 
“degree of certainty implied by the investigative effort” as a core element in the maintenance 
of expert authority throughout the court’s validation discourse. This commences with an 
accurate account of the facts, not mere “conjecture, personal opinion nor a simple 
transmission of client information or advocacy” (p102). An accurate account is objective, 
tempered with professional judgement within the boundary of the expert’s field of expertise 
110 
 
(see chapter 5). Philosophically,
80
 this is referred to as “metaphysical objectivity” where the 
“existence and character of the entity in question is independent of the human mind, 
including perceptions, beliefs, judgements of the investigator” (Michel 2010, p104). Expert 
testimony is objective in the strongest sense when independent of the expert’s state of mind 
or community norms or when influenced by the circumstances within which it is established. 
An expert opinion is “no longer objective when it strays beyond the boundaries of acceptable 
professional interpretation of the materials” (p109). 
Objectivity is also tempered with procedure that rationally leads to a valid account, that is, 
‘epistemological’ objectivity. Epistemological objective validity arises from the rational 
deployment of cognitive and procedural features of an investigation that enhance the 
prospects of arriving at the right answer. “Epistemological objectivity obtains when either of 
the following is true: (1) the cognitive processes at issue reliably produce accurate 
representations, or (2) the cognitive processes are free of factors that are known to produce 
inaccurate representations” (p110). In this regard, the expert’s evidence derives its validity 
from the inquisital nature of the investigation where, contrary to the adversarial approach, the 
evidence must later withstand questioning in order to defend its validity. Epistemological 
validity therefore stands on procedural legs that must withstand the testing discourse of the 
court, such as, questions about the deployment of accounting technologies, inspection with 
respect to what transpired, what standards govern the process, what results the standards 
mandate and the reliability of the process as deployed. 
Again, Michels (2010) postulates some tools of epistemological objectivity noted as 
independence, sufficient inquiry, evidentiary reliability and professional judgement. That 
valid expert testimony must be independent, has been a significant focus of precedent case 
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 This thesis recognises objectivity as a determinant of an expert’s validity open for examination, however, it 
does not investigate further concepts of legal objectivity. (See Leiter, 2002). 
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law (as discussed in chapter 5), however, at this juncture two types of factors that influence 
independence need to be considered: advocacy conflicts and biasing influences. Advocacy 
conflicts materialise as both overt and inadvertent efforts to protect or advance the interests of 
the client. In this respect, the role of the expert witness is very different to the role of the 
lawyer who represents their client, a fact that sometimes lawyers need to be reminded of, 
when they present expert testimony in litigious and adversarial situations (Beran, 2009).  
Biasing interests that can affect the validity of an expert account range from close personal or 
professional associations, to previous associations with other expert reports related to the 
matter (see, for example, Rich v ASIC, 2004), to a commitment to a particular genre of 
expertise or previously expressed opinions that may limit the scope of accepted ontologies. 
For example, an expert forensic accounting witness may have a particular view on the 
application, of say, valuation, that limits the analysis that the expert is prepared to undertake 
in a particular matter, despite peer approved alternative methodologies. Biasing interests may 
be overt or subtle and may not result in an invalid account. The bias may therefore be 
subjected to limited judicial acceptance and discretion (see chapter 5), that is, impairment to 
the evidence’s validity but not deemed totally invalid. For example, the bias may lie 
somewhere between knowing, intentional, reckless, negligent or inadvertent, that leaves 
plenty of room for professional interpretation within the validation discourse that adjudicates 
between these boundaries. 
The validity of a report is grounded in the scale of enquiry, such that it is sufficient to 
uncover the facts that concern the matter at hand (p 116). “The quality of an evaluation 
depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based” (Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct R 2.3, 2007). In practice, the amount of enquiry is limited, 
particularly with respect to the deployment of accounting technology. It is normal practice for 
accounting to define a commencement and conclusion period (for example, Profit and Loss 
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Reports) or comparisons of particular snapshots in time (for example, the Balance Sheet 
Report), or to specify a particular transaction (for example with date, time and transaction 
details). With respect to the validity of evidence, the question of sufficiency of investigation 
turns on insufficiency, that is, answering the question that, if further inspection was 
conducted, would it materially elucidate the findings? This is a higher standard than whether 
the consequence of further inquiry would make a finding more or less probable than without 
further inquiry (Basic Inc v Levinson , 1988, 231-32).  
Sufficiency of inquiry is dependent on the latitude and resources made available to the expert 
and the consequent scope and depth employed by the expert given such latitude and 
resources. Specifically, the expert needs to be afforded the necessary latitude (such as access 
to documents, contracts and ledgers) and adequate means (such as allocated funds and skilled 
staff) to enable coverage of the appropriate investigative territory to sustain valid responses to 
the court’s testing discourse. Pragmatically, a forensic accountant not able to engage 
sufficient resources or investigative latitude should decline the position of expertise, at risk of 
being found wanting during cross-examination. The available resources and latitude shapes 
the scope and depth of an investigation, that is, the range of factual events and issues an 
expert can explore and the level of penetration of inquiry into those events and issues. A valid 
account requires sufficient scope and depth of investigation to reflect sufficient factual 
inquiry. For example, a forensic accountant would need to account for an issue to determine 
whether it was a one-time event or an occurrence on multiple occasions, or similarly, whether 
one issue of impropriety was an indicator of a number of associated issues or a trend. Scope 
and depth can be graphically pictured (see Diagram 2-1) as the horizontal axis representing 
the range of issues the forensic accountant will explore, whereas the vertical axis represents 
the depth or extent of inquiry taken into each issue. This gives a continuum of evidence that 
may illuminate a large array of issues without much depth, to a single issue which is 
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extremely deep and pervasive. For example, unexplained wealth may arise from the 
commission of a single lucrative criminal activity or it may be the result of an accumulation 
of activities either from various criminal pursuits that occurred at one time, or from a number 
of tainted activities that have occurred over a period.  
The nature of evidence also has a material effect on the validity of an inquiry, in that the 
primary facts as gathered, have an inherent reliability which has a material effect on an 
investigator’s inquiry. Special concerns about evidence reliability need to be considered, 
addressed and articulated transparently to the court’s rational discourse. This covers the 
identification and finding of facts as well as “the care and deliberation in evaluating the 
evidence collected” (Michels, 2010, p118). The expert witness relies upon claims, defensible 
not only on the facts and the deployment of accounting technologies, but in respect of the 
surrounding and support processes, for example, proper document handling, chain of custody 
of evidence
81
, secure storage and organised recall. Further, the expert must consider the 
elements that contribute to their claim, such that, the structure of the claim is itself 
contestable through testing discourse on both content and process. In this regard, the expert is 
expected to exercise professional judgement based upon their expertise. Therefore, the layers 
that underpin and contribute to the construction of an expert opinion are also contestable 
through the court’s rational discourse. The expert’s selection and emphasis “can profoundly 
shape the factual narrative” (p119), thereby providing an account sensitive to distortion other 
than the biased perspective previously noted.    
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 In this context the chain of custody refers to the chronological and logical procedure that allows the 
documents that are relied upon by the expert witness to be reliably logged to prove their integrity from seizure 
through to production in court (Lexisnexis.com). 
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Diagram 4-1: Graphical Representation of Scope and Depth of an Investigation 
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Professional Analysis and Interpretation 
The forensic accounting expert’s accounting analysis and conclusions are constrained by 
professional standards of analysis and interpretation, a “community bound enterprise” 
(Wendel, 2005) where “the criteria for reasonable exercise of judgement are elaborated 
intersubjectively among an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity” to 
accounting (p1,167). Formally this constraint is proclaimed in guidance that either directly 
addresses forensic accountants or broader guidance to those who claim professional inclusion 
under membership of professionally recognised accounting bodies. Specifically, the 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board issued (APES) 215 is applicable to the 
provision of Forensic Accounting Services, which describes the fundamental responsibilities 
of members who supply such services. APES 215 purposely includes expert witness 
testimony. APES215 has mandatory and advisory requirements including explanations and 
discussion. The standard does not stand alone but is read in conjunction with other 
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professional standards and legal obligations pertaining to members classified as professional 
accountants. First and foremost members are instructed that their conduct must comply with 
the APES110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, specifically, in order to meet the 
member’s public interest obligations, that include being, “and be seen to be free of any 
interest which may be regarded as being incompatible with the fundamental principles of 
Section 110 Integrity and Section 120 Objectivity of the Code” (sec 3.3). Further, a 
professional accountant is instructed to ensure their independence, exercise professional 
competence and due care, maintain confidentiality and adhere to a process of professional 
engagement (APES 305). 
Distinction is clearly made with regard to the provision by professional accountants of expert 
witness services (sec 5) and the report communicated to the court as the basis for informing 
the adjudication. The standard APES215, section 5 (see Appendix A), highlights the need to 
review and separate the objectives for providing a forensic accounting expert opinion, with 
other objectives for services provided that may be seen by an informed third party to present 
a potential conflict or impediment to independence. The standard couples with the legal 
requirements (statutory and common law) in mandating the member’s compliance with their 
paramount duty to the court, duty to assist the court objectively and in an unbiased manner, 
and to remain within the area of the member’s expertise. Of paramount importance, in the 
practical provision of expert witness services, are the mandatory instructions for the 
completion of the formal report upon which such services depend. There are 15 legal 
requirements or restrictions in paragraph 5.6, which essentially parallel legal requirements 
extracted from statutes (for example, the Unified Evidence Acts) and case precedents that are 
commonly cited. This easily facilitates legal-accounting professional coupling, that 
commences from the common use of legal instructions and investigative scope. Paragraph 5.6 
mandatorily states: 
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(S)subject to any legal requirements or restrictions, a Member providing an Expert 
Witness Service shall clearly communicate in any Report:  
(a) the instructions received, whether oral or written;  
(b)  any limitations on the scope of work performed;  
(c)  details of the Member’s training, study and experience that are relevant 
to the matters on which the Member is providing expert evidence;  
(d)  the relationships, if any, the Member or the Member’s Firm or the 
Member’s Employer has with any of the parties to the Proceedings 
(including any of the matters referred to in paragraphs 3.8, 5.1, or 5.2) 
that may create a threat or a perceived threat to the Member’s obligation 
to comply with the fundamental principles of the Code or the Member’s 
paramount duty to the Court, and any appropriate safeguards 
implemented; 
(e)  the extent, if any, of reliance by the Member on the work of others;  
(f)  the opinions formed by the Member;  
(g)  whether an opinion is provisional rather than concluded, and, if so, the 
reasons why a concluded opinion has not been formed;  
(h)  the significant facts upon which the opinions are based;  
(i)  the significant assumptions upon which the opinions are based and the 
following matters in respect of each significant assumption:  
(i)  whether the Member was instructed to make the assumption or whether 
the Member chose to make the assumption; and  
(ii)  if the Member chose to make the assumption, then the reason why the 
Member made that choice;  
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(j)  if the Member considers that an opinion of the Member may be 
misleading because a significant assumption is likely to mislead, then a 
statement to that effect and an explanation of why the assumption is 
likely to mislead;  
(k)  where applicable, that the Member’s opinion is subject to the veracity of 
another person’s Report upon which the Member’s Report is based;  
(l)  the reasoning by which the Member formed the opinions, including an 
explanation of any method employed and the reasons why that method 
was chosen;  
(m)  a list of all documents and sources of information relied upon in the 
preparation of the Report;  
(n)  any restrictions on the use of the Report; and  
(o)  a statement that the Expert Witness Service was conducted in accordance 
with this Standard.       
(APES 215 - paragraph 5.6) 
It should be noted that many of the requirements of paragraph 5.6 are designed to enhance 
open and rational discourse by mandating the reporting of contextual material as well as 
material (significant) assumptions that effect an expert’s process or opinion. This is further 
supported by the retention of working papers, methods and calculations that underpin the 
forensic accounting service as provided (paragraph 7.3). 
Professional accounting and audit standards vary in their relevance to expert accounting 
witnesses, with particular connection to the facts of the matter and the context of the case
82
. 
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 As the accounting (APES) and audit (AUASB) standards are a significant proportion of the accounting body 
of knowledge they will be relevant to almost all expert accounting opinion assignments. Therefore, discussion of 
exactly how the content and analysis of these standards are directly relevant to accounting expert opinion is not 
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The legislative influence of these standards is found in their independent legal authority 
under the Corporations Act (Cwth) 2001 (sec 296, 334). They serve to support the 
accountingization of things and to validate the accounting body of knowledge from authority 
outside the court, but importantly, with the power of the law. In such a manner, the law uses 
the power of its ‘left hand’ to support the legitimacy of its ‘right hand’ and to narrow the 
distance between the two professions by embedding both professional bodies of knowledge in 
the same broad statutory system. The community recognises the cognitive authority of both 
professions, structurally coupled, through common statutory legitimisation, but distinctly 
different, in their professional and potentially emancipatory
83
 messages, validated in either 
linguisity (the law) or facticity (accounting) (see the discussion of Jeremy Bentham in 
Gallhofer and Haslam, 2005, p64-65).  
Peer Acceptance  
The concept of peer supported accounting practices that validate a forensic accountant’s 
expert evidence has been established at the theoretical level (intersubjective legitimacy), the 
assurance level (APES 215 and similar guidance) and at the judicial level (see chapter 5).  
Specifically, peer supported forensic accounting practices rely upon several methodologies 
that devolve to specific methods, which are peer supported when logically conducted and 
rationally argued. Deployed correctly, these methodologies and methods can be rationally 
defended and explained in the court’s testing discourse. Distinctively, accounting 
methodology refers to “the framework of the means for gaining knowledge …….. and thus 
sets the limits of knowledge” (Gaffikin, 2009, p7), whereas, methods refer to the specific 
accounting techniques deployed to gather data, analyse and produce information. Peer 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pursued in this dissertation, except as directly relevant to aspects that define the patterned principles of 
accounting technologies discussed in chapters 8 and 9 with respect to UW-POCA accounting evidence.  
83
 In this regard the reference to emancipatory messages is the attempt by both professions to communicate 
externally from the court. As discussed earlier accounting publicity to some extent breaks down the expert’s 
cognitive authority in favour of active communication however hegemonic forces remain problematic to a 
genuinely open process.  
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accepted methodologies relevant to POC-UW matters can be sorted into several categories 
such as: 
 Basic Accounting Principles; mainly the economic entity assumption, the time period 
assumption, the cost principle, the matching principle, the materiality principle and 
conservatism, 
 Direct Income Reconstruction; mainly transaction tracking and documentation, and 
 Indirect Income Reconstruction; mainly the deployment of methods used “to develop 
indicators of concealed income and hidden assets” (Kranacher et al, 2011), and 
 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Accounting Standards; mainly focused 
on financial accounting, however, they may be relevant to the interpretation of a 
particular accounting procedure in a matter.   
Each of these methodologies instructs a range of methods which are carried out in a series of 
purposive-rational steps designed to achieve the methodological objective. The most 
appropriate method depends on the facts of the matter and the information available to the 
forensic accountant, the scope of the investigation and the certainty of conclusion required for 
the accountant to form and sustain their expert opinion. A description of methods that belong 
to the methodologies above are included in the appendices of this dissertation, as they are 
referenced to, and form an explanatory note to their reference in the cases referred to in 
chapters 8 and 9.  Due to the relatively few publicly available documented forensic 
accounting reports that have been presented in evidence, this dissertation explores peer 
accepted forensic accounting methodologies and methods accepted in cases that align with 
forfeiture purposes (see chapter 8). For example, matters that concern undisclosed income 
under taxation legislation and under family law or matters that concern redistribution under 
equity tort law. 
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The normative view of expert accounting evidence is that accounting standards, generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and the facticity
84
 of accounting should lead to 
consistent, clear, rules-based opinions that converge and concur given the consistency of 
available facts. The apparent objectivity of accounting standards and the accurate 
calculability of accounting variables presents an expectation of professional ‘tightness’ and 
lack of variability. However, the nature of accounting expertise is that it relies upon 
professional judgement with regard to the deployment of accounting technology under the 
principles based instruction of accounting standards. Brown (1993) notes three kinds of 
professional judgement: semantic, pragmatic and institutional. The incompleteness of 
accounting standards such that they require the expert to utilise professional judgement 
contributes to the uncertainty of the professional discourse and hence is an important variance 
for cross-examination that requires defence of validity based upon the valid speech act, rather 
than merely, the shield of professional rules. 
Conclusion 
Articulating a stepped approach to the role of accounting expertise facilitates the progressive 
consideration of the important components in an expert witness’ account that influence the 
internal and external contexts of the courtroom. The expert witness must develop their 
credibility through making a valid contribution to the court’s discourse and to the extension 
of that discourse outside the walls of the court. The validity of the expert evidence is 
carefully constructed through a grounded ontological and epistemological objectivity. It is 
tested through objective, subjective and intersubjective queries. The legal system provides 
both formal and informal methodology to support validity testing. The most formal 
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 The facticity of accounting evolves from the numerical base of calculation and money in contrast to the 
linguisity of law evolving from conceptual (and potentially codified) argument. This differentiation will be 
revisited, with respect to accounting’s patronage towards legal arguments reflected in monetary transfer 
remedies. 
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methodology is that deployed by the court’s legal gatekeepers, who exercise the provisions of 
the Uniform Evidence Acts and apply the espoused learnings that have arisen from 
precedential judgements and formal authoritative reviews. In chapter 3, the research reviews 
the formal process of the expert evidence as it finds its way into the courtroom, past the 
obligatory passage points administered by the legal system. In this regard, the case level 
considerations have been complemented by a number of prominent reviews, as well as 
legislative advice and statutory changes.  
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Chapter 5: Formal Acceptance of Expert Evidence 
Chapter Introduction 
At the core of this thesis is the effect of expert accounting evidence
85
 within the legal 
adjudication process. However, such expertise is not readily invited into the legal debate held 
within the hierarchical, authoritative structures, known as the legal system. The court, as the 
legal system’s central forum, has its peculiarities, rules and conditions.  Normal witness 
testimony is limited to those who have experience of the events pertaining to the matter at 
hand. Expert opinion testimony does not fall within those parameters. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review and analyse the specific exclusion
86
 that allows 
opinion evidence to contribute to legal adjudication. The legal fraternity controls the only 
access point for opinion evidence to be heard, through interpretation of access requirements. 
Therefore, the gestation and alignment of evidence statutes (for example the Evidence Act 
(Cwth), 1995) and the development of key judicial (common law) precedents are materially 
important in order to understand the influence of expert opinion evidence in modern judicial 
processes (Kirby, 2011). In this regard, the statutes of the individual jurisdiction need to be 
recognised. As previously noted the Australian federation has provided an unusual legal 
context in which the Australian Commonwealth Government (also known as the Federal 
Government) has limited constitutional powers granted to it either constitutionally or by 
agreement from the states. This has led to the construction of legislation at the 
Commonwealth level with the intention of it being mimicked at the state level
87
. The 
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 Where reference is made to ‘expert witness’, ‘opinion witness’ and ‘expert opinion witness’ they refer to the 
same role regarding the provision of specialised testimony based upon expertise. 
86
 In this regard ‘exclusion’ serves to include such evidence, not exclude it. The exclusion is from non-
admittance. It is not unusual for the law to express itself in such apparently reverse terms that can contribute to 
misunderstandings to readers without a legal background.   
87
 As interstate business and individual movement have increased in Australia, the need was felt for greater 
uniformity of law, between jurisdictions, on particular subjects, in order to gain efficiencies and clarity. The 
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mimicking process requires the formal adoption of the same (or very similar) legislation 
through each state and territorial parliament. 
The current status of the Uniform Evidence Acts is that they have been adopted in the 
following form in the jurisdictions of the Commonwealth of Australia, New South Wales, 
Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory.  
 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), enacted in February 1995 (also by agreement to be used 
in the ACT) 
 The Evidence Act 2011 No. 12 (ACT) received assent on 13 April 2011 
 The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), enacted in June 1995 
 The Evidence Act 2001 (Tas). 
 The Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). 
 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 taking force on 1 January 2013 in 
the Northern Territory. 
Whilst the Uniform Evidence Acts constitute an evidentiary code, “to a certain extent it is a 
break from the common law past” (Stuesser, 2010, p73). Queensland and Western Australia 
remain hybrid jurisdictions, in that the common law prevails, but there is significant ad hoc 
legislative reform. The Evidence Act 1929 (SA) has not adopted the Uniform Evidence Act 
provisions. Despite the lack of harmonisation of evidence law in these jurisdictions, in 
practice, the issues that pertain to expert opinion evidence are similar throughout Australia 
(and for that matter the United States and United Kingdom) albeit that the legal interpretive 
authority may rely more on common (case) law than on statute. As is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
process of unification can be any of three methods: a) National Applied laws (or template legislation); b) 
National Model Legislation, enacted as mirror acts; and c) Legislation of the States referring legislative power to 
the Commonwealth. The Uniform Evidence Acts represent a mirror act process. See as examples the 
Corporations Act 2000, Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), Business Names Registration Act 2011 
(Cth), Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth). 
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scope of this dissertation, specific emphasis is placed on accounting evidence, however, it 
must be recognised that the issues of expert evidence are broadly applicable across many 
areas of recognised expertise. Non-legal (but professional) theoretical insight, into the 
hierarchical legal power structures, is drawn from Clegg’s Circuits of Power (1999), which 
describes the empowerment of expertise as its message is legitimised and expert membership 
is accommodated within a structured domain such as the courtroom. 
The statutory borders placed on court access and the framework of testimony are evaluated 
by the ‘trier of fact’, that is, within the prerogative of the judge. This chapter will analyse key 
cases from the Australian, the United States and the United Kingdom’s jurisdictions where 
the explanation of the court’s judgement has given rise to informed thought, or a precedent, 
or where such an earlier precedent has directly been challenged. Such decisions reflect 
influential judges’ rationale with regard to the requirements for expert evidence to be allowed 
into the court as well as the attributes and limitations of the evidence itself. In this regard the 
hierarchy of judicial opinion is important, taking into account decisions made by leading 
individual judges, courts of appeal and more senior courts. 
Reflective of the need for expert witness’ claims to be validated within the courts’ testing 
discourse, this chapter, comments on recent changes to the courts’ processes to test validity 
and to open up the expert’s cognitive authority to challenge. Such processes flow from the 
expert’s original evidentiary report. In this respect the court’s power is exercised through 
direction to the (opposing) expert witnesses to produce  joint reports in suitable form, and/or 
to participate in joint, simultaneous, cross examination (referred to as “hot-tubbing”). 
Concurrent with the judicial lens, this chapter considers the prescriptions of legal codes or 
court rules, as a separate but influential determinant of the expert witness framework. 
Similarly aligned, the codes and prescriptions of the accounting profession are appraised, in 
the later part of this chapter, from two perspectives. Most directly, the Accounting 
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Professional and Ethical Standards (such as APES 215 – Forensic Accounting Services) 
which advocate a minimum level of attributes and inclusions that should be included in an 
accounting professional’s expert report and testimony. Further, recognition of opinion 
evidence is underpinned by the accepted accounting body of knowledge, hence the content of 
an accounting expert’s report is expected to be consistent with accepted peer methodology 
and practices. Such peer practices are further considered in chapter 8. 
The importance of this chapter for this research, is that, consideration of expert opinion 
evidence requirements, from the courtroom perspective, inform the subsequent case studies, 
as well as, commentary with respect to the structural expectations of the legal system in 
receipt of expert testimony. The legal system has structural nodal points where the flow of 
evidence is allowed, blocked or mitigated (Clegg, 1999). These nodal points
88
 cannot be 
bypassed. They have their own rules, processes and assembly which need to be understood 
and obeyed at risk of penalty or exclusion. The rules, processes and assembly are expressed 
in statutes and common law. That is, an expert who delivers testimony must adhere to the 
principles espoused in statutory instructions and judges’ interpretations. The consequences of 
non-adherence may be episodic punishment (such as exclusion from presentation or down 
grading of influence through judicial mitigation) or durational (such as damage to reputation 
or professional retribution from the accounting or legal professions), (Clegg 1999). The 
chapter is segmented into four parts. Part 1 considers the predominance of the legal domain 
with respect to the acceptance of expert opinion, Part 2 reviews the rules of providing expert 
opinion evidence, Part 3 extends this discussion to the formality of court rules and codes of 
conduct for expert witnesses. Part 4 refocusses the expert witness instructions to those 
specifically addressing the accountant’s professional obligations. This chapter is important 
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 Clegg refers to “nodal points” as key positions or places where people do what is expected of them. The nodal 
points are “links in the chain that follow and redistribute rules and orders they have received ….. thereby 
reconfirming and validating the system” (Poluha, 2004, p199)  
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because it reviews the structural boundaries imposed on expert accounting witnesses. Without 
cognisance of, and adherence to these boundaries experts run the risk of not being heard or 
having their message downgraded and potentially incurring episodic or more permanent 
sanction.  
Part 1: The Legal Professional Domain 
The court system is by nature the domain of the legal profession, yet it is the obligatory 
passage point through which the non-legal expert must pass in order to exercise 
empowerment of their message to the social system. Clegg describes three circuits of power, 
the episodic circuit, the dispositional circuit and the facilitative circuit. Obligatory passage 
points “are positioned at the junctures where the three levels (or circuits) of power interact” 
providing the channels for empowerment and disempowerment (Boje and Rosile, 2001, p90). 
The court provides the fulcrum where the three circuits are leveraged between themselves, 
providing a forum for expert witness legitimisation and validation. For example, the episodic 
circuit provides the court’s daily work routine and ordered legal process (e.g. schedule, 
appearance, order, legal formality); the dispositional circuit constructs meanings and 
memberships (e.g. position, rules of address, stabilisation of legal rank); and the facilitative 
circuit provides the disciplinary system of rewards and punishment (Clegg, 1999, p208). 
Access to the court itself provides meaning and membership, a prima face legitimisation for 
the expert who, by their message, in turn legitimises the court. The expert may attempt to tell 
their story either by means of a formal report or by their presence in the court, or by both. 
The presentation of a written court report, usually tabled in the court by affidavit, makes the 
expert available to the court for examination on the contents of their report (to validate the 
expert’s claim through testing discourse, usually cross-examination). 
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Expert evidence has been presented to courts over a long period. Saunders J, 1554, in 
Buckley v Rice stated: 
…if matters arise in our laws which concern other sciences and faculties we 
commonly call for the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns, which is 
an honourable and commendable thing for thereby it appears that we do not 
despise all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage 
them  at 191. 
In contemporary times the use of expert opinion witnesses has “increased dramatically …. 
both in its frequency and complexity” (Davies, 1997, p188). This increased presence of 
experts in court has led to a body of judicial comments with regard to the treatment of such 
evidence and expertise. Judicial commentary covers the admission, content, expression and 
qualification of expert testimony. Court entry is contingent upon judicial discretion, albeit 
instructed and advised by legislation and precedent. Such instructions “can never be free of 
surplus or ambiguous meaning: they are always indexical to the context of interpreters and 
interpreting” (Clegg, 1999, p201). In this regard, the lawyers, barristers and judges partake in 
the interpretive gatekeeper role through the avocation, contestation and adjudication of the 
privileged access necessary to present expert knowledge to the court. The interpretation is 
often adversarial, with lawyers aligned to their client’s interests. This is in direct contrast to 
the expert’s overriding duty to dispassionately advise the court, rather than the client, who 
may have engaged them (and who may pay their account).  The expert gains empowerment 
through the agency specifically delivered by statute, mainly (in Australia) the Evidence Act, 
2008
89
, which delegates authority at the discretion of the legal profession on the tacit basis of 
“organisationally negotiated order” (Strauss, 1978). That is, the primacy of instruction arising 
from legitimate legislation duly passed into law. Other jurisdictions such as the United 
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 Reference to the Evidence Act, 2008, refers to the harmonised approach to evidence acts in Australian and 
may be seen as representative of any of the specific Evidence Acts of the Commonwealth or the States and 
Territories. 
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Kingdom and the United States have similar legislative frameworks that apply to the 
admission and acceptance of expert opinion evidence. 
Interpretive authority extends the statutory mandate though the articulation of reasoned 
judgements in landmark cases that carry precedential messages. A precedent is defined as a 
"rule of law established for the first time by a court for a particular type of case and thereafter 
referred to in deciding similar cases" (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1979, p1059). A precedent on 
an issue is therefore, a collective body of judicially described principles that guide a court on 
issues to consider when interpreting the law. It is a central principle in common law 
jurisdictions, such as in Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA. In this manner a 
decision in a current case may influence decisions in similar future cases. Precedents can be 
binding (must be followed) or persuasive (advisory when applied with relevance). Precedents 
that arise from case or common law are as equally influential as statutory law. Precedents are 
relied upon across jurisdictions, carried through the recognition of logical argument across 
unrelated legal systems (for example, from the US legal system to the Australian system
90
), 
or the direct lineage of hierarchy (for example, from the British based legal systems to 
Australia, or from within the domestic Australian legal system from higher courts to lower 
courts). This concept was initially of ‘precedent’ guidance but ‘principle’ controlled. That is, 
the judicial thinking around a legal principle that has been informed by its application to a 
scenario (within a matter or case). However, in the early 20
th
 century, precedents evolved as a 
resistance to outside influence, not merely for guidance, but to encourage an ordered legal 
process directed at “wisdom in result” (Llewellyn, 1949, p396). Informative precedent cases 
from the US include tests of admission such as the Frye (1923) rule, which was later replaced 
by the four Daubert (1994) tests for the rejection of unreliable scientific evidence. General 
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 The use of international legal materials is a contentious issue in Australia, particularly in the context of using 
such materials in constitutional interpretation and in relation to basic human rights. The decision of the High 
Court of Australia in Al-Kateb v Godwin, 2004, provides a clear example of the different opinions on this issue. 
Kirby, 2006. 
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Electric Co v Joiner (1997) and Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael (1999) followed, that ruled on 
the sufficiency of expert testimony with regard to relevance, clarity rather than jury 
confusion, and the use of unusual knowledge criteria. In the British/Australian context, the 
seminal cases are Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) and Sydneywide Distributors 
Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd, which pertain to the obligation of an expert report to 
comply with the expert’s prime duty to the trier of fact; ASIC v Rich (2005) and Evans 
Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd (2003) which concern the potential conflict arising from 
roles and obligations; The Ikarian Reefer (National Justice Compania Naviera SA) v 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1993) which outlines the duties of expert witnesses and Clark 
v Ryan (1960) which discusses the requirement of an expert to provide evidence beyond 
matters that the trier of fact could determine by themselves. 
When the judiciary exercise their access authority they must be disciplined, regulated and 
abide by constituted rules inscribed within the legislation, as well as, consideration of these 
precedent decisions empowered by the relative status of the deciding court or judge. 
Discretional liberty is hierarchical with the appeals process open to episodic disciplinary 
comment should a lower jurisdiction stray. For example, the explanation of a full court or 
eminent judge’s decision may (and has) re-fix(ed) the acceptable context of expert evidence. 
Repeated as a precedent, the decision is then recognised in future adjudication, becoming a 
disciplinary boundary, that future experts must be cognisant of, and abide by. If a lower court 
judge deviates from a precedent, without an appropriate alleviating change in context, then an 
appeals court may provide an overriding judgement accompanied by adverse episodic 
comment. Therefore lower court dissent from precedent is rare. A “case holds with authority 
the rule on which the court there chose to rest the judgement; more, that the rule covers, with 
full authority, cases which are plainly distinguishable on their facts and their issue, whenever 
the reason for the rule extends to cover them”. However, it is also correct to say that “a case 
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holds with authority only so much of what the opinion says as is absolutely necessary to 
sustain the judgement. Anything else is “distinguishable” and non-controlling for the future” 
(Llewwllyn, 1945, p395). Specifically, the presentation of expert accounts in court is 
governed by the concept and boundaries of “expert opinion witness testimony” (Evidence Act 
1995, sect 79), which grants privileged access to a special witness whose role is to inform the 
courts with respect to matters within a knowledge set, rather than as a “real witness”, who is 
only a describer of observed facts.  
Evidence is the means by which a fact is proven (Anderson, 2014). A “real witness” is a non-
hearsay
91
 witness who can testify to the facts of the issues to be decided by the court and be 
cross-examined. Generally a witness may only give evidence of the facts that the witness has 
actually observed (Wilson, 1999). Evidence is inferential, structured within the burden and 
standard of proof and other “forensic reasoning rules designed to prevent juries reading 
decisions on insufficient evidence or falling prey to reasoning fallacies” (Roberts and Aitken, 
2010, p20; Roberts and Zuckerman, 2010, ch15; ) The admissibility of evidence is structured 
around the primary rule of evidence being “that if evidence is not relevant it is inadmissible; 
if evidence is relevant it is admissible unless a specific rule of exclusion operates to exclude 
it” (ALRC Report 38 at [119]). The credibility of a “real” witness and their testimony 
depends on the extent to which they are recognised as a source of reliable information about 
the matter they have been called upon to testify.  
The rules of evidence regulate what witnesses can say and what physical evidence may be 
introduced, in line with two broad principles: 
 to provide the court with the best evidence; and 
 to establish rules of fairness (Anderson et al, 2014, p78). 
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 Hearsay evidence can be a complex notion, however, it is best described as a “statement by a witness that a 
fact occurred, when the witness did not actually observe the occurrence” (Wilson, 1999) 
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Best Evidence  
Best evidence means that original evidence is preferable to secondary or copy evidence and 
often applies to documents, data and physical items that may be introduced through 
association with oral witness testimony. Similarly, it is assumed that “first-hand information 
is more reliable than second-hand gossip, and consequently direct oral testimony is preferred 
to hearsay” (R v Adams, 1996 at 481). This thread of evidential hierarchy is built upon 
inferential common sense, however strength in this hierarchy does not guarantee admission of 
evidence, nor weakness guarantee omission because admission judgements also reflect 
normative decisions on fairness, rights and in some cases cultural specifics (Roberts and 
Aitken, 2010) 
Fairness and Probative Value 
Rules of fairness prevent the admission of evidence that is disproportionately prejudicial, 
compared to its value in proving a relevant fact. In other words, evidence could be excluded 
because “the probative value of the relevant inferences that could be drawn from the evidence 
is outweighed by the potentially prejudicial impact of other, illegitimate inferences that the 
evidence might support or suggest to the fact-finder” (Roberts and Aitken, 2010, p22). The 
probative value of evidence is the “ability of evidence to make a relevant disputed point more 
or less true” (Wex Legal Dictionary, 2015), that is, seeking the truth. The Uniform Evidence 
Acts Dictionary, describes probity as “the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect 
the assessment of the probity of the existence of a fact in issue” (Uniform Evidence Act (Tas) 
s3(1), 2001). The relevant section 135 of the Evidence Act, 1995 gives the trier of fact 
discretion to exclude evidence: 
The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:  
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(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party, or  
(b)  be misleading or confusing, or  
(c)  cause or result in undue waste of time  (s 135). 
The judicial test of the probative value of specific evidence is one of balance rather than that 
of a clear line. Multiple factors must be weighted by the judge in the arbitration on whether to 
allow the evidence into the courtroom. This has been the particular focus of review for 
evidence of credibility or character.  The term “substantial probative value” was found to 
impose a higher standard of relevance than “significant” in R v Lockyer (1996) by Hunt CJ, 
requiring the evidence being admitted to be “important” or “of consequence”. Opinion 
evidence of a circumstantial nature has been successfully challenged (R v Burton, 2013). 
Probity has been left to be open to a great deal of judicial interpretation which the judges 
appear to have been reluctant to relinquish (McNicol, 1999). Therefore the interpretation of 
probative value of an expert witness testimony is largely a matter of individual judicial 
interpretation (Lord Denman in Doe d Jenkins v Davies at 323). Heyden J in Dupas v The 
Queen, 2012, noted that in the judges making their decision on probative value, it is never a 
question that the judge can decide conclusively
92
.    
Part 2: Rules of Evidence 
The rules of evidence are the gatekeeper’s tools for use when assessing entry to the court 
through “admissibility”, that is, allowing evidence to be heard by the magistrate, judge or 
jury. Obviously, if an expert’s evidence is deemed not to be admissible it lacks any influence 
in the adjudication. Even if an expert’s evidence is admitted, its influence may be diminished 
through legal instruction (for example from the judge), in effect, questioning the extent of the 
probity of what has been presented. The rules of evidence come from the relevant evidence 
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 see also R v XY, 2013 where the issue of probity arose where differential conclusions could be drawn from 
the expert evidence, and in that manner not conclusive. 
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statutes which, in Australia, have been largely harmonised between the Commonwealth and 
each state through the Uniform Evidence Acts. These acts grew out of the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (ALRC) in 1987. The acts have codified the common law rules of 
evidence operating until that time as well as extending some provisions which will be 
discussed in the narrative below (McClellan CJ, 2009).  
Relevance 
Generally, admissible evidence is any testimonial, documentary or tangible evidence that 
may be used to introduce or support a point presented by a party to the proceedings. 
However, the first principle of admissibility is relevance, tending to prove a fact or issue by a 
credible witness (Wilson, 1999). The applicable legislative instruction is found at s 55 
(Evidence Act, 1995). It has the intention of “only a minimal logical connection between the 
evidence and the fact in issue is required, sufficient to make the fact in issue more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence” (ALRC Report 26 Vol 1). As accepted 
in R v Clark (2001) at [111]–[112], s 57 allows for provisional admission of evidence, subject 
to relevance being established in the adjudication process, where its relevance is unclear at 
the outset. 
The relevant sections of the Evidence Act (Cwth, 1995) are: 
SECT 55 
Relevant evidence 
             (1)  The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were 
accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the 
probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. 
             (2)  In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant only because it 
relates only to: 
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                     (a)  the credibility of a witness; or 
                     (b)  the admissibility of other evidence; or 
                     (c)  a failure to adduce evidence. 
SECT 56 
Relevant evidence to be admissible 
             (1)  Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a 
proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. 
             (2)  Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. 
SECT 57 
Provisional relevance 
             (1)  If the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a 
party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding 
that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the 
evidence is relevant: 
                     (a)  if it is reasonably open to make that finding; or 
                     (b)  subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the 
proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding. 
             (2)  Without limiting subsection (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act 
done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one or 
more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose 
(whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise), the court may use the 
evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed. 
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SECT 58 
Inferences as to relevance 
             (1)  If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the 
court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an 
inference as to its authenticity or identity. 
             (2)  Subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may 
properly be drawn. 
The definition of relevance is made irrespective of its eventual acceptance, but proceeds on 
the assumption that, if accepted, the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the 
existence of a fact in issue in the proceedings (Adam v The Queen, 2001 at [22], [60]). The 
emphasis is therefore on the capability of the evidence, rather than the weight, except where 
issues of credibility or reliability may be such, that in a particular case, the evidence may not 
be able to perform that task (R v Shamouil, 2006, at [62]-[63]). This means that the relevance 
of evidence is initially accepted with some latitude that it has relevance, but that the relevance 
may only become apparent as the matter continues and, if this does not eventuate, the judge 
mitigates the evidence by discounting the evidence’s relevance (Street, CJ, 1992). The judge 
is “not required to or permitted to make any assessment” of whether a jury or the trier of fact 
would accept the evidence (Judicial Commission of New South Wales 1995, Pt 3.1). 
Admissible evidence must be capable of assisting the inquiry in some probative
93
 manner (as 
the whole of the evidence) and given it satisfies this general principle it is admitted unless 
excluded by a discretionary rejection (BBH v The Queen, 2012: Heydon J at [97]–[104]; 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [152], [158]–[160]; Bell J at [194]–[197]). Assessment of relevance 
is made by the legal profession (for example, a judge, potentially the trier of fact) based, not 
upon legal expertise per se, but on broad life experience and the context or circumstances of 
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the matter. Assessment of witness credibility becomes irrelevant if the evidence has been 
admitted by the court for its relevance to a fact, in which case, issues with regard to witness’ 
credibility are best tested under the court’s discourse, such as cross-examination.  
Expert Opinion Evidence.  
Despite the term ‘opinion’ not being defined in the legislation, the opinion rule, is that, 
“evidence is generally not admitted for the purpose of proving the existence of a fact about 
the existence of which the opinion was expressed” (s76 Evidence Act, 1995). This is a 
tautological issue in that a related issue concerns the extent to which facts stated by an expert 
as forming the basis for the expert’s opinion can be admitted as evidence of the facts already 
stated. However, opinion evidence for another purpose can be used for that purpose with 
specific exceptions including expert opinion at s79
94
.  The relevant section in full reads: 
SECT 76 
The opinion rule 
             (1)  Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a 
fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. 
             (2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of an opinion contained in a 
certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act 
other than this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate 
or other document has evidentiary effect. 
Note:          Specific exceptions to the opinion rule are as follows: 
*          summaries of voluminous or complex documents 
(subsection 50(3)); 
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 In this regard, it is similar to the admission of hearsay, for a non-hearsay purpose, but later is also used for 
hearsay, as in the legislation at sec 60. For a full discussion see ALRC102, 2005, Chapter 7.   
137 
 
*          evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence 
(section 77); 
*          lay opinion (section 78); 
*          Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs 
(section 78A); 
*          expert opinion (section 79); 
*          admissions (section 81); 
*          exceptions to the rule excluding evidence of judgments and 
convictions (subsection 92(3)); 
*          character of and expert opinion about accused persons 
(sections 110 and 111). 
                   Other provisions of this Act, or of other laws, may operate as further 
exceptions. 
SECT 77 
Exception: evidence relevant otherwise than as opinion evidence 
The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because 
it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the 
existence of which the opinion was expressed. 
 
SECT 78 
Exception: lay opinions 
The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if: 
                     (a)  the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise 
perceived about a matter or event; and 
138 
 
                     (b)  evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account 
or understanding of the person's perception of the matter or event. 
SECT 79 
Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge 
             (1)  If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person's training, study 
or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of 
that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. 
             (2)  To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1): 
                     (a)  a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a 
reference to specialised knowledge of child development and child 
behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual 
abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and 
following the abuse); and 
                     (b)  a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the 
person has specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in 
paragraph (a), a reference to an opinion relating to either or both of the 
following: 
                              (i)  the development and behaviour of children generally; 
                             (ii)  the development and behaviour of children who have been 
victims of sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences. 
 SECT 80 
Ultimate issue and common knowledge rules abolished 
                   Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about: 
                     (a)  a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or 
                     (b)  a matter of common knowledge. 
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These sections have statutorily articulated many of the common law developments regarding 
the rules of evidence with respect to expert opinion witnesses. Commencing with a 
description of the opinion rule, the legislation moves to the important s79, which converts the 
previous “exemption” based on specialised knowledge, from judicial enquiry to statutory 
provision. These sections are followed up by s135 to s137 which give general judicial 
discretion to exclude any otherwise admissible evidence. Whilst these later sections have 
wider application than merely opinion evidence, they nevertheless retain their potency when 
applied to expert testimony. 
Expert Opinion 
Opinion, defined as “an inference from observed and communicated data”, was applied in 
Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) at 629 and accepted by 
the Full Federal Court in Bank of Valletta PLC v National Crime Authority (1999) at [20] and 
Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) at [10]. 
Further the Corporations Act 2001 defines an expert by stating an “expert in relation to a 
matter, means a person whose profession or reputation gives authority to a statement made by 
him or her in relation to that matter” (Corporations Act (Cth), 2001, s9). The concept of 
expertise is recognised as a “high level of specialised skill or knowledge in an area” 
(Cambridge English Dictionary, accessed 2016), however, the legal challenge to expertise 
also considers the knowledgeable area, such that the area itself, is subject to validity testing 
and is peer accepted, rather than, as derogatorily expressed by Sidney Phipson (1992), “as 
being revolting to common-sense, and inconsistent with the commonest honesty” (p439; see 
also Blom Cooper, QC, 2006). 
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Field of Expertise to Specialised Knowledge 
S79 replaces the traditionally referred to, common law test of “field of expertise” with the 
concept of “specialised knowledge”.  Freckleton and Selby (2009) refer to the field of 
expertise as a “formal sphere of knowledge” (p52). Common law in Australia is not settled 
with respect to the definition of the required body of knowledge for an expert opinion, 
however, the judicial debate has been conducted along the lines of the reliability of such a 
body. This debate has been influenced by significant Australian and United Kingdom judges, 
such as, Dixon CJ, Gaudron, J and King CJ as well as the logic that has evolved through 
United States cases such as Frye v United States (1923) and Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals (1993). 
Dixon CJ cited, with authority, J.W. Smith in Clark v Ryan (1960): 
On the one hand it appears to be admitted that the opinion of witnesses possessing a 
peculiar skill is admissible whenever the subject-matter of inquiry is such that 
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment 
upon it without such assistance, in other words, when it so far partakes of the nature 
of a science as to require a course of previous habit, or study, in order to the 
attainment of a knowledge of it ... While on the other hand, it does not seem to be 
contended that the opinions of witnesses can be received when the inquiry is into a 
subject-matter the nature of which is not such as to require any peculiar habits or 
study in order to qualify a man to understand it.  (Smith, 1876 in Carter v Boehm, 
p577 cited at 491) 
Three key points are raised, firstly, that the purpose for the admission of expert evidence is to 
assist the judge, or the trier of fact, in their adjudication towards reaching a decision. 
Secondly, that the evidence is proffered on the basis of a knowledge set and experience 
attributed to the expert but not available to the judge, and thirdly, the evidence as presented 
must provide assistance for the court to inferentially advance their adjudication (Ligertwood, 
2004 at 7.44). The judgement in the United Kingdom case, Bonython v R (1984), is 
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influential in Australia, as a reference test for the “field of expertise”. King CJ commented, 
for consideration that expert evidence was permissible: 
(a) whether the subject matter of the opinion is such that a person without 
instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience would 
be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance of 
witnesses possessing special knowledge or experience in the area, and  
(b) whether the subject matter of the opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or 
experience which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a 
reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special acquaintance with which by 
the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court (at 46-7). 
The purpose of the “field of expertise” test, as confirmed in Clark (1960) and Bonython 
(1984), is to safeguard the fidelity and reliability of the science or technology upon which the 
expert evidence relies, through probing the organisation and peer acceptance of the 
underpinning knowledge. Historically, this has arisen through a line of common law 
judgements. (McClelland CJ, 2009).
95
 In Frye v United States (1923), a case concerning the 
admission of expert evidence arising from a polygraph test, the court instructed that expert 
testimony must be based on “scientific methods that are sufficiently established and 
accepted”: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognised, and while 
the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a 
well-recognised scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained acceptance in 
the particular field in which it belongs. (at 1014) 
Frye’s general acceptance test has gained positive traction in Australian legal argument 
however there is “no single approach to the question of whether there is a demonstrable field 
of expertise” (McClellan, 2009 p7). There are Australian cases that “adopt a test of general 
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acceptance within the scientific discipline
96
, other authorities that require the court to 
exclusively consider the reliability of the source of the evidence
97
 and authorities that adopt 
both tests
98
” (p7). The particular concern regarding the application of Frye to Australian law 
is that the recognition of a field of expertise is placed with the profession rather than the trier 
of fact. Freckleton and Selby point out that the language of Frye might be used to determine 
the substance of the expertise however further enquiry of the profession may be used to 
determine the applied technique’s reliability (Freckleton and Selby, 2009).  
The Australian Law Reform Commission, as designers of the uniform evidence legislation, 
recommended against articulating an exclusionary rule in s79, in favour of a broader 
approach, mitigated, where necessary, by the court’s discretion at ss135-137 (ALRC 26 at 
743; also Einstein J in Idaport at 244-246). The commission cited difficulties in 
implementing exclusive tests with respect to what accepted theories and techniques may 
constitute a “field” for expertise. The general discretion with regard to the relative probative 
value of the evidence was preferred in order to avoid “misleading or confusing the tribunal of 
fact” (s137). Even so, the debate with respect to the reliability of an expert witness’ testimony 
continues to rage around the application of s79 or s135 and s137. 
Again, in the United States Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) provided 
powerful judicial comment regarding the standard for admitting expert testimony, which 
indirectly overturned the Frye standard with reference to “specialised knowledge”. Daubert 
dealt with two children, born with serious birth defects which their parents claimed had been 
caused by the Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals product, Bendectin. The plaintiffs successfully 
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argued, under the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (1975), that the rules superseded the 
common law Frye decision, in that the rules do not require general acceptance of the 
specialised knowledge. In part, the United States, rule 702 (Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975), 
states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise …. (rule 702). 
Spigelman CJ held in R v Tang (2006) that the Daubert meaning of “knowledge” was the 
same as required for s79
99
. In response to the Crown’s efforts to introduce identification 
evidence from a “face and body” expert, he commented: 
“[T]he word knowledge connotes more that subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation. The term applies to anybody of known facts or to any body of ideas 
inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on ”good grounds” …. Proposed 
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation” (at 590). 
In this regard, Spigelman went on to conclude that the appropriate validation of the expert 
was not forthcoming, describing the evidence as merely subjective and “bare ipse dixit”
100
 (at 
154). The status of the “asserted body of fact or corpus of ideas” (Freckleton and Selby, 
2009, p174) was not sufficiently deduced from recognised principles and hence not validated. 
The word “knowledge” must “exist at a higher level than that of a mere understanding or 
belief, which may not derive from known facts or accepted rules on good grounds” 
(McLelland, 2009, p13).  On good grounds, in this context, is a reference to the ability to 
traceably adduce inferences from the facts of the matter, that is, in reference to the reliability 
of the science, discipline or system of logic, on which the opinion is validated. This is 
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 Spigleman did not think that Daubert had further meaning for s 79 than the definition of “knowledge” (see 
McLellan, 2009) 
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 “bare ipse dixit” is an assertion without proof; or a dogmatic expression of opinion. 
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particularly evident when an expert’s opinion is based on emerging or novel disciplines. 
Daubert quoted Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) in the decision: 
Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation. The term “applies to anybody of known facts or to any 
body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds  
……. But, in order to qualify as “scientific knowledge”, an inference or 
assertion must be derived by scientific method (p 9-12).
101
 
Daubert continued to expand on the considerations, for the trial judge, with respect to the 
reliability of scientific method or theory as expert evidence, such as; “ i) whether the theory is 
generally accepted in the scientific community; ii) whether the theory/method has been 
subjected to peer review and publication; iii) whether the theory/method has been tested or 
can be tested; and, iv) whether the potential or known rate of error is acceptable” (1993, also 
see McClellan 2009 p16). Einstein J, in the NSW context, affirmed the Daubert view in 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George (1997) and Lakatoi Universal Pty Ltd v Walker (1999). 
However Spigelman CJ differed in Tang (2006) finding that evidential reliability is not a 
consideration under s 79.10. More recently the decision by McMurdo J’s decision in Cairns 
Regional Council v Sharp (2013 at 18) reinforced the decision in R v Bonython (1984 at 46-
47) indicating that the common law jurisdictions may be “closer to accepting reliability as a 
relevant consideration in relation to admissibility of evidence” (Freckleton and Selby, 2013). 
In the Australian Uniform Evidence Acts Rules, s79 codifies the words “has specialised 
knowledge” for those jurisdictions who have adopted the legislation. This poses three 
separate questions, which must be answered in the affirmative before expert evidence is 
admitted to the court. Firstly, does the witness have “specialised knowledge”? Secondly, is 
that knowledge “based on the person’s training, study or experience” and finally, is the 
opinion of the witness “wholly or substantially based“ on that knowledge (s79). Section 79 
                                                     
101
 The Daubert matter focussed on purely scientific opinion evidence however similar principles have been 
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“requires a nexus, first between the knowledge of the expert (“specialised knowledge”) and 
their training, study or experience and then, between the expert’s opinion and that knowledge 
(McLelland CJ, 2009 p 4). The burden of proving this nexus rests with the party seeking to 
adduce that evidence, to be proven “with precision” (Mason P. in R v G, 1997). 
Gleeson CJ, considered the underpinning knowledge base of an expert (psychological) 
opinion in HG v Queen (1999). He commented: 
An expert whose opinion is sought to be tendered should differentiate between 
the assumed facts upon which the opinion is based, and the opinion in 
question… [T]he provision of s79 will often have the practical effect of 
emphasising the need for attention to requirements of form. By directing 
attention to whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised 
knowledge based on training, study or experience, the section requires that the 
opinion is presented in a form which makes it possible to answer that question. 
(at 39). 
Crucially, reference to the reliability of the expert’s knowledge base was noted by Gaudron J 
in Velevski v The Queen (2002): 
the concept of “specialised knowledge” imports knowledge of matters which are 
outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons and which is 
sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of 
knowledge or experience. 
A more liberal view was considered by Heerey J in Cadbury Scheweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell 
Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd: 
…the Turner (1975) rule, adopted in Murphy (1989), is a separate requirement. 
Even if a proffered opinion is that of a person suitably qualified within an 
organised area of knowledge, if that area is not outside the experience of 
ordinary persons, the opinion will not be admissible. 
The concept of the expert witness’ testimony as requiring knowledge outside that of an 
ordinary person has sometimes been contentious for expert accounting witnesses. This is 
particularly evident when the accountant’s evidence is described as “merely the summation of 
numbers” (R v Ferguson; R v Sadler; R v Cox, 2009)  which can be seen as within the 
mathematical skills of both the trier of fact and of the average person. It is noted, that the role 
146 
 
of a forensic accountant is varied with recognised specialised knowledge associated with the 
calculation of economic damages, breaches of contract, securities fraud, tax fraud, money 
laundering, business valuation, monetary transactional analysis and computer forensics 
(Crumbley et al , 2005). However, such knowledge may depend on the clarification and 
explanation of monetary transactions, similar to a person’s personal purchasing and banking. 
It therefore falls to the expert accounting witness to distinguish their work from that of the 
ordinary person. Such distinction should account for “training, study [and] or experience” 
which the ALRC should include experience as: 
An expert should be defined as a person who ‘has special knowledge, skill, 
experience or training about a matter’, and that he generally be able to give 
opinion evidence that utilises his specialised knowledge, skill, experience or 
training. Experience can be a sounder basis for opinion than study. Not to 
include special experience as a qualification would keep valuable evidence from 
the courts. (ALRC 26, vol 1, paragraph 742). 
Accounting as Expert Knowledge 
An accounting expert testifying based on accounting knowledge fulfils the concept of a 
specialised knowledge expert provided their opinion remains both relevant and within the 
accounting’s professional body of knowledge. This fulfilment may have to be established 
voir dire
102
 on the balance of probabilities. In the case of the accounting profession, being 
based on a body of knowledge is well recognised the court may not take a liberal relevance 
approach, seeking a very specific skill set. For example, an accountant may be able to 
understand and articulate business operations but the court may require specific knowledge of 
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types of product losses within the operation (R v Kobina Amponsem, 2014). Mere prior 
recognition of accounting expertise into court is not sufficient to guarantee its entry as a 
specialisation under the context of a different matter. Accounting needs to go further to prove 
that the accounting inscriptions are more than the common knowledge of assembling a 
budget or the management of personal accounts (R v Ferguson; R v Sadler; R v Cox, 2009). 
Pickering refers to this as the “performative idiom” (Pickering, 1995, p414) where 
“accounting is understood as concerned with “doing things” in the world and involving an 
emergent interplay between human and material agency” (Dambrin and Robson, 2009). This 
same interplay can “commonise” accounting such that transactions may be understood 
without need for fiscal interpretation. As such, accounting evidence can fall foul of the 
common knowledge rule, particularly where the accounting expert opinion is mostly based on 
a list of transactions, such as, in-out transactions in a ledger or notebook.  
To be soundly within the concept of “specialised knowledge”, the accounting metaphor needs 
to be presented from the position of a professional discipline, that allows the expert’s opinion 
to assist the court with financial clarity. The adjudication process is tasked with making 
decisions pertaining to the actus reus and the mens rea, otherwise known as the guilty act and 
the guilty mind. Except in cases of strict liability (where mens rea is not required) those 
elements of a case must be established beyond reasonable doubt (in criminal cases) or on the 
balance of probabilities (civil cases). The expert’s testimony goes to the illumination of these 
elements together with causation. The terms actus reus and mens rea “do not have any 
meaning in themselves” (Allen, 2016, p15) they require context and application which may 
be supplied by the expert witness. Accounting evidence has greater relevance to actus reus 
and causation. 
Actus reus is made up of “the conduct of the accused and the state of affairs which is the 
proscribed effect of that particular crime” (Wilson, 1999). The conduct (including omission) 
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that is punishable by law. “The conduct may be at large” (such as any conduct causing 
financial loss) “or prescribed specifically (such as the making of a false pretence) or by 
reference to some test (such as in a charge of attempt where the actus reus is conduct which 
is sufficiently proximate to the completion of the crime)”. (Wilson, 1999). The conduct must 
have causation, that is, must substantially contribute to the state of affairs, that causes the 
result in fact, having more than minimal impact, as well as in law. Whilst the accounting 
body of knowledge is generally recognised by the court, this specific application of the rule 
will be discussed further in chapters 8 and 9 of this dissertation. 
Exclusionary Discretion 
As discussed earlier, the Evidence Act, 2008, confers exclusionary discretion in ss135-137. 
This serves to reinforce the overall probative value of the evidence but also to exclude 
evidence that may be “misleading or confusing” (s135(1)(b)) or evidence that may “cause or 
result in undue waste of time” (s135(1)(c). Whilst the earlier issues of admissibility and 
reliability of expert evidence may err towards being allowed to be heard it is with respect to 
their further review under ss135-7. Further comment by the trier of fact, under these sections 
may still lead to exclusion or it may lead to the evidence being put together with judicial 
mitigation of its probity (for example, a contextual comment from the bench regarding the 
relative weight provided to the evidence being presented). 
“Wholly or substantially based” on Specialist Knowledge 
This condition limits the expert witness to providing evidence within their area of expertise 
(specialised knowledge) and not outside that area (s78). Further an expert must point to the 
assumed facts that are the basis of their opinion. Gleeson CJ observed that: 
Experts who venture opinions (sometimes merely their own inference of fact), 
outside their field of specialised knowledge may invest those opinions with a 
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spurious appearance of authority, and legitimate processes of fact-finding may 
be subverted. (HG at 44) 
For example, in the case of R v Bradbury (2015) the NSW Police’s forensic accountant for 
the prosecution reported that the defendant was under financial stress, which the prosecution 
took as his motive for the murder of his wife. The defence pointed out that, among other 
deficiencies in the accountant’s report, the forensic accountant was pontificating on a 
psychological condition, outside the professional expertise of an accountant. The result was a 
declaration of no case and withdrawal of the prosecution by the Department of Public 
Prosecutions. 
It is not for the expert witness to decide on the ultimate issue before the court, but to assist the 
court with advice pertaining to the issues of fact that the court needs to consider. In its 
consideration, the court needs to be able to understand the expert evidence in order to 
determine how much weight to place upon it. It is for this reason that an expert must describe 
the basis for the formation of their opinion including articulating the foundations of their 
logic. Heydon JA noted this could be achieved by the expert witness providing: 
... the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy 
of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own 
independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in 
evidence.
103
 (Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles, 2001, at 59). 
Further: 
[W]hat an expert gives is an opinion based on facts. Because of that, the expert 
must either prove by admissible means the facts on which the opinion is based, 
or state explicitly the assumptions as to fact on which the opinion is based … 
One of the reasons why the facts proved must correlate to some degree with 
those assumed is that the expert's conclusion must have some rational 
relationship with the facts proved. (at 64). 
The issue here for forensic accounting expert witnesses is a negative one of having their 
evidence excluded under s135, or having the probative value of their evidence reduced 
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through judicial mitigation. The use of s135 is the preferred resolution when an expert fails to 
describe how an opinion is formed from the basis of their specialised knowledge, applied to 
the facts of the matter (ALRC Report No 26, vol1, par 750). The view in Makita (2001) has 
been seen, in subsequent decisions, to represent a “counsel of perfection”, most notably in 
Sydneywide Distributors v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002), where “proper disclosure of the 
factual basis of the opinion” (Branson J at 10) could be tested under the court’s discourse if 
deemed admissible. Her honour said: 
It is sufficient for admissibility, in my view, that the trial judge is satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities on the evidence and other material then before the judge 
that the expert has drawn his or her opinion from known or assumed facts by 
reference wholly or substantially to his or her specialised knowledge. (at 16). 
Their Honours went on to say that fundamental propositions arising from a discipline do not 
have to be each referenced back to an appropriate authority, however they remain open to the 
testing discourse of cross examination to allow the expert to validate their views. Similarly, 
Heerey J reflected on the requirement for an expert witness to prove the facts on which their 
opinion is based in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea chocolate Shops Pty Ltd. He 
concluded that there was a line of common law authority allowing expert testimony without 
full substantiation but diminished in its impact under the scrutiny of the legal discourse
104
. 
Following Instruction 
One of the more recent issues arising from the increasing use of expert witnesses, particularly 
forensic accountants, is the production of an expert report consistent with, and limited to, the 
legal instructions of counsel. While the perennial issue of expert witness independence can be 
addressed under the probity v prejudice conundrum (ss135-137), recent case reviews have 
highlighted a limitation on expert witness reports through truncated or directed lawyer’s 
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 See Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002); Neowarra v Western 
Australia (2003); Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) (2004); Ramsey v Watson (1961). 
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instructions regarding the preparation of the expert report (Freckelton and Selby 2014). “A 
fundamental obligation of those commissioning expert reports is to ask open-ended, non-
leading questions, so as not to bias the answers elicited” (pviii). Garling J in John v 
Henderson (no 1), (2013) reiterated the principle that everything should be done by legal 
counsel to present the expert as neutral and non-partisan. The forensic accounting expert 
witness should be acutely aware of the instructions given to them by counsel, as they have an 
obligation to publish them as part of their report. This recognition should pre-empt and avoid 
any truncation or direction that may interfere with the expert’s overriding duty to advise the 
court dispassionately according to the expert’s knowledge and experience, taking into 
account previously discussed arguments supporting concepts of legal truth and validation 
(chapter 2). In this regard pre-trial alternatives may be useful to expert witnesses, such as an 
expert conclave, where opposing experts get together, without the restrictions of lawyers, to 
sort out the reasons and basis for their disagreements and the areas of agreements and to 
advise the court accordingly. It is noted that Australia leads the world in the use of innovative 
expert witness management techniques aimed at reducing the cost of litigation in the 
adversarial court system. Expert conclaves and expert ‘hot tubbing’ (where more than one 
expert is simultaneously placed in the witness box and asked questions from each litigant) are 
two such innovative techniques. 
Privileged Communications 
One of the important differences between the Uniform Evidence Laws and those jurisdictions 
relying on common law, is the treatment of draft reports and communications between the 
expert and counsel. Under the Uniform Evidence Laws draft reports and such 
communications are unavailable for discovery. Under the common law approach, set out by 
Lingren J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp, 2003, and again 
by Dodds-Streeton J in Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5), 2013, two principles arise. 
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Firstly, that the expert’s working documents, including data sets, are not privileged 
communications, and secondly “disclosure of the report in order to rely upon it in litigation is 
an implied waiver of the privilege with respect to the original instructions to the expert from 
the lawyers” (Freckleton and Selby, 2014, pix). On the contrary the Uniform Evidence Law 
provides that where the “dominant purpose” of the expert’s report or communication is to 
advise the client the privilege claims are allowed, preventing opposition access. These 
principles are important to forensic accountants who conduct investigations in preparation to 
providing an expert report to the court. Investigations require the preparation, analysis and 
variation of data based calculations given a variety of assumptions, that may be accepted or 
rejected in the final court report. Therefore jurisdictional variances may be meaningful in the 
rigour of contemporaneous explanations of how data is managed along with the reasons for 
acceptance or rejection, not only of the methodologies, but the actual calculations.  
Hindsight Bias 
In a fast changing world, decisions arrived at in the compilation of an expert report that rely 
upon an investigation at a point of time, are valid decisions based on the facts and 
assumptions as stated. As the progression of a matter from investigation to report to court 
may take many months or longer issues relevant to the forensic report may have changed, 
assumptions may have been clarified, predictions become settled facts. The temptation arises 
to bring today’s values and standards into yesterday’s report in a manner referred to as 
“hindsight bias”. As noted in Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd v Sage Group plc (no 3) (2013) this 
is not appropriate conduct leading to the probity of the report to be diminished. There is 
nothing sinister in experts changing their minds, however, such a shift should be separately 
articulated with accompanying reasoning (Feckleton and Selby, 2014). 
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Procedural Delivery 
The increased admission of expert evidence has created a number of practical concerns for 
court. Traditionally each expert is tediously walked through their report, assumptions, 
processes, methodologies, methods and findings. The expert is then asked to compare their 
findings with those of other experts or other evidence. The court time is further extended for 
cross-examination, judicial questioning and re-examination. The testing discourse is often 
artificially constrained by the nature of the questions, often giving little respect to the expert 
and their level of knowledge. The thrust of adversarial conflict places the expert in a position 
that prioritises justification over the objective of helping the court. Freckleton et al (1999) 
studied Australian Judges, and subsequently magistrates, regarding their perception of expert 
testimony and found that “35% considered bias as the most serious problem with expert 
evidence and another 35% considered that the presentation or testing of the expert was the 
most serious problem. This was manifested in their differing concerns about poor 
examination in chief (14%), poor cross-examination (11%) and the experts’ difficult use of 
language (10%)” (Rares, 2013 at 3). 
Procedurally, expert evidence is usually admitted as evidence-in-chief, that is, in the form of 
an affidavit or written statement which can then be reiterated in the witness box if necessary. 
This leads to the expert witness being questioned on their report’s contents by the party who 
leads the expert’s evidence, before potential cross-examination from the opposing side 
followed by re-examination if necessary. Specifically, when expert witnesses disagree with 
each other in regard to the content of their expert opinion, the courts have developed unique 
forms of testing discourse, such as, a compulsory combined report or an expert witness ‘hot-
tub’. A compulsory combined report is constructed such that it is in a substantially reduced 
format (usually three pages). The report is a brief to the judge stating the points agreed upon 
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by the experts and the points disagreed by each experts (usually one page each). The report is 
often ordered to be completed in a very short time, at the expedience of the court. 
“Australian courts and agencies have been acknowledged as having the most experience with 
the ‘hot tub’ method in which the experts give their evidence concurrently” (Rares, 2013). 
Yarnall, 2009, recognises that the ‘hot tub’ process is an Australian innovation (p312; Wood, 
2007).  The ‘hot tub’ approach refers to the concurrent presentation of expert evidence by two 
or more experts placed in the witness box together, at the same time. Questions are then 
asked of either or both (or all) of the experts who respond, as they are addressed or in turn.  
The judge or listener can hear all the experts discussing the same issue at the same time 
to explain his or her point in a discussion with a professional colleague. The technique 
reduces the chances of the experts, lawyers and judge, jury or tribunal misunderstanding 
what the experts are saying.  (Rares, 2013).  
There is, however, no necessity that experts agree on their opinions (Thorn v Worthing 
Skating Rink, 1876).  
Part 3: Court Rules and Codes of Conduct 
Similar to the differences between Australian jurisdictions in evidence acts, there are 
significant variances in the law and rules regarding the administrative requirements for expert 
witnesses presenting to national, state and territory courts. These administrative requirements 
are expressed in the statutes pertaining to each jurisdiction with a number having explicit 
codes of conduct. Strict adherence to the codes, as applied in each jurisdiction, is important, 
at risk of having the expert opinion report excluded on what may be seen as a technicality 
(Charrett, 2015). The relevant statutory clauses specify procedural requirements and content 
for expert reports, procedural rules for expert conclaves and the presentation of expert 
opinion evidence in court.  
Table 5.1 aligns the jurisdictional requirements with the relevant legislation and statutory 
clauses. Overall the statutes cover the general and procedural issues in relation to the rules for 
giving expert evidence, overarching obligations for expert witnesses and their reports, 
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minimum mandatory content of reports, procedures for specified experts such as those 
appointed by the court or jointly appointed by all parties as a single expert. 
Table 5.1: Australian Federal, States and Territories: Jurisdiction- Legislation - Rules and Code alignment 
Jurisdiction and 
evidence law 
Evidence Act 
Civil Procedure Rules relating 
to expert evidence 
Expert Witness Code of 
Conduct 
Supreme Court of the 
Australian 
Capital Territory 
[ACTSC] 
Uniform Evidence 
Act Evidence Act 
2011 (ACT) 
Court Procedures Rules 2006 
(ACT) Part 2.12 Expert 
Evidence Rules 1200—1246 
Schedule 1 Expert 
Witness Code of Conduct 
Federal Court 
of Australia [FCA] 
Uniform Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth) 
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) 
Rule 5.04 and Part 23 Experts 
RR 23.01—23.15 
Practice Note CM7 
Expert Witnesses in 
proceedings in the Federal 
Court of Australia 
Supreme Court of 
New South Wales 
[NSWSC] 
Uniform Evidence 
Act 1995 (NSW) 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005 (NSW) Rules 31.17—
31.54 
Schedule 7 
Expert Witness Code of 
Conduct 
Supreme Court of the 
Northern 
Territory [NTSC] 
Uniform Evidence 
Act Evidence Act 
2011 (NT) 
Supreme Court Rules (NT) 
Order 44 Expert Evidence  
Supreme Court 
of Queensland [QSC] 
Common 
law Evidence Act 
1977 (Qld) 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
1999 (Qld) Ch 11, Part 5, 
Division 2 Rules 423—429S 
 
Supreme Court 
of South Australia 
[SASC] 
Common 
law Evidence Act 
1929 (SA) 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 
(SA) Rules 160, 161 
Part I Practice 
Direction  5.4 Expert 
Witnesses (Rule 160) 
Supreme Court 
of Tasmania [TSC] 
Uniform Evidence 
Act Evidence (2001) 
Tas 
Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) 
Part 19 Division 5 Expert 
Opinion Evidence Rules 514—
517 
 
Supreme Court 
of Victoria [VSC] 
Uniform Evidence 
Act Evidence 2008 
(Vic) 
Supreme Court Rules 2005 (Vic) 
Order 44 Expert Evidence Rules 
44.01—44.06 
Form 44A Expert 
Witness Code of Conduct 
Supreme Court 
of Western 
Australia [WASC] 
Common 
law Evidence Act 
1906 (WA) 
Rules of the Supreme Court 
1971 (WA) Order 36A Expert 
Evidence Rules 1—9 
 Source: Legislation review: MTECC 
 
Where a jurisdiction has an explicit Code of Conduct the expert witness is usually required to 
specifically acknowledge that they have read the Code and have understood it. The expert has 
to confirm that they have complied with the Code and agree to continue to comply with it. 
The codes articulate that the overarching duty of an expert witness is to assist the court and 
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not to be an advocate for a party. The expert witness must comply with court directions and 
co-operate with other expert witnesses as required by the court. For example, a court may 
direct a conference with another expert, with the objective to produce a court report that sets 
out the opinions where experts agree or disagree and stating the reasons why they disagree. 
An expert must endeavour to reach agreement and must not act on legal instructions to 
withhold or avoid agreement with other experts
105
.  
Giving Evidence in Court 
The common initial method for delivering expert testimony is the provision, to the court, of a 
complying, written report led as evidence-in-chief. As noted, the expert report forms the basis 
of an expert’s assertion which can then be complimented by oral testimony and subsequently 
validated through testing discourse such as cross examination. Procedural rules require a 
complying report before oral testimony is permitted, that is before an expert can give an 
exposition of their opinion or their opinion of another expert’s opinion. The scope of 
evidence -in-chief is limited to matters aligned to the expert report. An expert, once their 
report has been admitted, must be made available for cross-examination and the cross-
examination may be conducted separately or concurrent with other experts. Courts have some 
discretion such that expert evidence is given in the most appropriate manner for the 
circumstances, such as the order in which expert evidence is adduced.   
Part 4: Accounting Standards 
As discussed an expert witness is deemed so because of their demonstrated competence in a 
body of recognised knowledge. As an example, an accounting expert witness can reference a 
body of knowledge that includes the professional and practice instructions issued by the 
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 Western Australia is an exception in that it does not have procedural rules or Code of Conduct provisions in 
this regard. 
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Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB). Such instructions are increasingly 
harmonised internationally and, in Australia, carry the legislative weight of the Corporations 
Act (Cth) 2000 and its state and territory aligned statutes. As an expert witness it is therefore 
important to be aware of and properly apply AASB standards as they are relevant to the 
methodologies and methods employed to produce an expert opinion or report. Proper 
application of accounting standards ensures that the expert accounting evidence has prima 
facie peer support, hence adding credibility to any testing discourse. Accounting standards 
and principles (along with peer accepted methods) form the basis for valid patterned 
principles to be deployed by expert accounting witnesses.  Of particular note however, are the 
situations where the specialised knowledge of the forensic accountant has been deliberately 
mitigated by the court under the judicial prerogative that pertain to specific legal genres. 
Examples of this include valuation (which has a variety of judicial precedents relevant in 
various legal genres, such as, in establishing compensation for forced acquisition or family 
law value to the owner) and asset tracing under equity law. The judicial prerogatives that 
influence the application of accounting technologies are further considered in chapter 8 of 
this dissertation with respect to their relevance to the UW/POCA statutory application of the 
‘control’ concept and the court’s adjudication. 
The Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APES) issues professional and 
ethical guidance standards which contain both mandatory and advisory guidance for 
professional accountants who are members of the three professional accounting associations, 
that is, CPA Australia, The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand 
and the Institute of Public Accountants. Formed in 2006 to develop and issue, in the public 
interest, high quality professional and ethical standards (APESB Statement of Purpose, 2016). 
The APES cover a wide range of professional engagements or assignments. They are grouped 
by series: APES 100 series cover the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants; APES 200 
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series cover Professional Standards applicable to all members; with APES 300 and APES 400 
series specifically addressed to members in public practice and business in that order. 
The APES perform a guidance and governance role in the manner of Clegg’s (1989) 
dispositional circuit, that provides rules of practice and social meaning. Failure to comply 
with the mandatory instructions of APES gives rise to episodic professional punishment, 
administered by the professional associations. More relevant is that non-compliance with 
APES may be brought up in court against the expert accounting witness reducing their 
credibility in the validating discourse by discounting the expert’s reliance on properly 
deployed, peer accepted, patterned principles. Whilst aspects of several APES are relevant to 
the expert accounting witness (particularly the APES 100 series) it is APES 215 – Forensic 
Accounting Services that is most relevant to the preparation and delivery of an expert witness 
report. 
APES 215 is well aligned with the legal framework discussed above as it has arisen as 
informed by both the Evidence Act and common law. Specifically, this standard covers the 
provision of ethical Forensic Accounting Services (mandatory sections in bold), which 
include as a primary purpose, accounting investigations and the provision of expert 
accounting evidence in proceedings. The standard emphasises independence both in actual 
fact and perception, appropriate expert competence and due care, confidentiality, proper 
professional engagement terms, prevention, mitigation and transparency with regard to 
potential and actual conflicts of interest. The standard expressly addresses the content of an 
expert accounting report which bear considerable similarity with the statutory provisions and 
precedent resolutions discussed earlier. Mandatory contents of an expert forensic accounting 
report are:  
a. the instructions received, whether oral or written;  
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b. any limitations on the scope of work performed;  
c. details of the Member’s training, study and experience that are relevant to the 
matters on which the Member is providing expert evidence;  
d. the relationships, if any, the Member or the Member’s Firm or the Member’s 
Employer has with any of the parties to the Proceedings that may create a 
threat or a perceived threat to the Member’s obligation to comply with the 
fundamental principles of the Code or the Member’s paramount duty to the 
Court, and any appropriate safeguards implemented;  
e. the extent, if any, of reliance by the Member on the work of others;  
f. the opinions formed by the Member;  
g. whether an opinion is provisional rather than concluded, and, if so, the reasons 
why a concluded opinion has not been formed; (h) the significant facts upon 
which the opinions are based;  
h. the significant assumptions upon which the opinions are based and the 
following matters in respect of each significant assumption:  
i. whether the Member was instructed to make the assumption or whether the 
Member chose to make the assumption; and (ii) if the Member chose to make 
the assumption, then the reason why the Member made that choice;  
j. if the Member considers that an opinion of the Member may be misleading 
because a significant assumption is likely to mislead, then a statement to that 
effect and an explanation of why the assumption is likely to mislead;  
k. where applicable, that the Member’s opinion is subject to the veracity of 
another person’s Report upon which the Member’s Report is based;  
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l. the reasoning by which the Member formed the opinions, including an 
explanation of any method employed and the reasons why that method was 
chosen;  
m. a list of all documents and sources of information relied upon in the 
preparation of the Report;  
n. any restrictions on the use of the Report; and  
o. a statement that the Expert Witness Service was conducted in accordance with 
this Standard. 
Members are instructed of the need to promptly inform legal representatives of changes of 
opinion or any reliance on information subsequently found to be false or misleading. The 
member has an obligation to maintain a quality control system to support the forensic 
accounting assignment which includes the maintenance of appropriate working papers that 
capture the details of calculations, determinations and estimates. Due to the obvious impact 
contingency fees would have on the actual or perceived independence of the expert 
accounting witness such arrangements are prohibited in favour of proscribed fees and 
remuneration. 
Conclusion 
The forum for the formal delivery of forensic accounting evidence will always be a venue 
controlled and managed by the legal profession. The prime setting is the courtroom, that 
adjudicates specific cases under the authority and condition of the evidence acts and other 
relevant statutes. The forensic accountant must pay due deference to this authority in order to 
make a claim and to substantiate its validity, without probative damage. The trier of fact 
(judge or magistrate) relies upon both statutes and common law precedent to inform their 
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assessment of the forensic accountant’s evidence before informing the court to allow or deny 
evidential access and the appropriate weigh such evidence should carry. 
Whilst the court assess and allows expert witness testimony, largely on the recognition of the 
origin of such evidence, from peer accepted knowledge (in the case of accounting, a 
professional body of knowledge), it is at the court’s discretion to contextualise the knowledge 
for the court’s purpose. Therefore, in the case of accounting, methodologies have arisen that 
the court has assessed as being more appropriate to the court’s objectives in matters such as 
in equity cases, family law, compensation and common law. Recognition of these show how 
judicial prerogative has shaped the framework of the accounting expert’s testimony, while 
respecting the statutory pillars of evidence. This informs the substantiation of accounting 
evidence suitable for UW/POCA matters. Similarly, understanding of this contextual 
hegemony provides the background for communicative action, in that the lifeworld assesses 
the accounting evidence with respect to the alignment of the court’s (the system’s) context 
with lifeworld expectations. For example, if the court remains inhibited by concepts of 
discrete accounting entity structures or is the court’s thinking expanded by prioritisation of 
overriding concepts such as an individual’s centralised economic control of those entities. 
This dissertation considers this discussion further in chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6: Forfeiture Legislation 
Introduction 
The process of juridification is of important to this research. Specifically, juridification in 
forfeiture law, which can be seen in the evolution of statutes and the extension of statutory 
provisions, advised by experts, who deploy their expertise in support of the colonising 
ambitions of the legal system as described by Habermas (1984, 1987, 1996). The vehicles for 
driving and positioning juridification have been national and international conventions and 
periodic reviews, each advising incremental enhancements to forfeiture laws after input from 
experts. Modern forfeiture revitalises ancient notions of confiscation that have added new 
concepts which oblige the newly (suspected) affluent to establish legitimate entitlement to 
their wealth.    
This chapter looks at legislation that belongs to the forfeiture genre, initially from a historical 
viewpoint, then from the context in which the juridification of forfeiture legislation have been 
justified and legitimised. The espoused forfeiture objectives, mainly to remove the use and 
enjoyment of the proceeds of crime and to prevent the funding of further crime, are, in of 
themselves, uncontroversial, however it is the “means adopted to achieve those objectives 
which generate controversy” (Maxwell, 2011, p1). Specifically, juridification as reflected in 
the statutory removal of judicial discretion, the lack of necessity for a predicate conviction 
and the reverse onus of proof, which have been contentious (Odgers, 2011; Gray, 2012; 
Bartels 2010; Cranny, 2011; Sentelle J, 1989; Fisse, 1992). The burden of proof has also been 
reduced from the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”, to the civil standard of on 
“the balance of probabilities” in many cases (Skead and Murray, 2015; Young, 2009; 
Friedlander et al 2010). 
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Initially, reflection on the extensive history of confiscation provides a deontological view of 
legally enforced forfeiture in the name of god or the king. This arose as an instrument of 
remediation, power or sacrifice depending on the circumstances. More recent appropriation 
consideration has been driven as a means to address organised criminal activity, particularly 
the increasing incidence of drug-related crime. Juridification has followed the 
recommendations of international and domestic conferences (United Nations 1987, 1988, 
2003, 2004; FATF 1970, 1990, 2012, Costigan, 1983, PJCLE, 2010). The conference 
recommendations provide statutory legitimacy by fulfilling the discourse principle, 
underpinned by apparent democratic discussion, which is also aided by the representative 
considerations that accompany the introduction of laws and the bargaining process required 
to deliver parliamentary support for the adoption of statutes.  
As previously discussed, expertise plays a pivotal role in the interpretation and support for 
juridification, both with respect to the legitimisation of forfeiture statutes and in the 
adjudication of just confiscation remedies. This chapter reviews the binding of expertise to 
specific statutes, their instruments and their jurisdictions. Of particular note are the 
similarities and differences that guide and bind the synergies between legislative design, 
purpose and expert involvement. For example, when the statute stipulates that when property 
is “proceeds of unlawful activity” or “an instrument of unlawful activity” it must be forfeited 
to the Commonwealth (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)). Property is proceeds of an 
offence pursuant to it being “wholly (or partly) derived or realised” (s 329(1)), however the 
terms ‘derived’ or ‘realised’ are not defined. Defining such terms interpreted to fit the 
specific circumstances opens the role for expert court advice (see Jeffrey v DPP, 1995; 
Studman v Commonwealth DPP, 2007). 
Expertise can only perform its role when appropriately credentialed by the specific statute 
and matched with jurisdictional legitimacy (such as enforceability), therefore the nature and 
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limitations of specific legislation must be acknowledged. This chapter highlights legislation 
that applies to the Australian precincts covered by this research, as well as the discussion of 
practice regimes (for example, civil or criminal) and legislative instruments (for example, 
restraining orders, forfeiture orders and pecuniary orders). Comments from other influential 
domains such as the United Kingdom, United States and Ireland are noted as they inform the 
discussion that has accompanied the dissemination of Proceeds of Crime Acts (POCA) and 
Unexplained Wealth legislation (UW) within the federalised Australian system. Whilst this 
discussion is, by necessity, heavily reliant on legality (that is, the letter of the law) the 
research’s ultimate perspective is one of how the statute mutually influences, yet requires, 
accounting expertise. Accounting, guided by the legislation, deploys its inscriptive metaphor 
as a claim to representational accuracy within the legal context of process and 
instrumentation. Representational accuracy is not simply the production of a result but of 
credible expert deployment of proper techniques that represent a reliable pattern of 
construction (patterned principles). The facts of the matter and the context are transformed 
through the financial language of proceeds assessment, quantification and equity (Robson, 
1992). As has been admitted by law enforcement (FBI, 2012; NSW and SA Police 
submissions to the PJCLE, 2012) this is a new role for the expert and the law, particularly 
suited to the forensic accountant, who can advise the adjudication process, not with respect to 
guilt and incarceration, but in the discourse of money and finance.  
The remote foundations of forfeiture legislation are found in the common law doctrines of 
attainder and deodand (U.K. 14
th
 to 17
th
 centuries), and their flow-on to British colonies, in 
statutory forfeitures from the mid 1800’s and the annals of customs laws. The lack of expert 
quantitative support, as well as arbitrary and pecuniary execution of confiscation laws,
106
 saw 
forfeiture statutes loose legitimacy and their use curtailed, until more recent times, when the 
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 As will be discussed, the punitive use of forfeiture in loss of favour or alternative regime support became 
commonplace under a succession of British monarchy and was extended to colonies such as the Americas.  
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international community
107
 resurrected their status in the fight against significant and 
organised crime. The contemporary use of forfeiture laws to redress significant and organised 
crime follows the consideration of national and international reports. Juridification through 
new legislation and its upgraded contents has been promulgated by the United Nations, 
influential nation states such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
Commonwealth of Australia and individual Australian States and Territories. Templated 
legislative prescriptions have been advocated (PJCLE 2012), however, various jurisdictions 
have implemented a mixture of statutory remedies, often the result of the bargaining process 
required to obtain the required minimum consensus to pass the appropriate bills through each 
parliament. 
The history of forfeiture laws 
Attainder 
Attainder is a term derived from the Latin attincta meaning stained or blackened. It was a 
concept derived from the ancient Greek and Roman notion of infamy and the European 
feudal notion of outlawry. (Schall, 2006) Attainder has variously been used for a judicial 
process that declares guilt and punishment without the privilege of trial. Examples, 
particularly from England between 1300 and 1800, were for High Treason that resulted in 
horrific executions such as being ‘drawn and quartered’. Attainder followed the death penalty 
removing the property of the perpetrator and any ‘blood’ rights such as inheritance.  Property 
(and peerage) was escheated to the Crown or Lord. 
Even without execution: 
Attainder involved the infliction of civil death on the offender. The offender’s 
property was forfeited to the Crown; he was prevented from entering contracts 
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 See United Nations Conventions discussed below. 
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or receiving property by way of gift or inheritance; his marriage was dissolved, 
his wife was made a widow, his children were orphaned. He lost all forms of 
civil capacity, including the capacity to give evidence or to sue (Edgely, 2010 
p403). 
The penalty of attainder was commonly used in the Wars of the Roses when successive 
governments, “from motives of both security and revenge wished to destroy its opponents as 
speedily and with as much appearance of legality as possible” (Lander, 2010). The obvious 
political use and abuse of attainder
108
 led to its eventual abolition by statute in England in 
1870 (House of Commons Journal, Vol 125, 1870) although some features live on in 
statutory form.  
In Australia, many of the features of attainder persisted until the demise of capital 
punishment (see, for example, Dugan v Mirror Newspapers Ltd, 1977), where the High Court 
held that attainder remained part of Australian law). The separation of duties principle 
established in the Australian Commonwealth Constitution (1900) serves to limit the 
application of attainder, however, the states remain free to permit such bills. In the United 
States attainder was outlawed under the Bill of Attainder Clause in the U.S. Constitution 
(Article I section 9), however, the punishment scope and effect of the clause is currently 
subject to some debate
109
 (Dick, 2011). The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the 
“legislation must not be intended to punish; legislation enacted for otherwise legitimate 
purposes could be saved so long as punishment is a side-effect rather than the main purpose 
of the law’” (Stark, 2002, p30) 
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 Such as, a convenient way for the King to convict subjects of crimes and confiscate their property. 
109
 For example, discussion on legislative remedies for issues such as anti-Communism and labour management. 
See also the ExxonMobil challenge to the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (Wilson, 1966; Carringan 2000)  
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Deodand 
Some interpretations of deodand relate back to the Old Testament.
110
 Literally a “thing 
forfeited or given to God” this concept was legislatively applied from about the 11
th
 century 
until 1846 in the U.K. on the causation of a person’s death. Deodand commenced with the 
object or instrument that caused the death and extending to ‘payment’ of some personal 
property to the crown (The Royal Almoner or the Sherriff) for application to a pious purpose.  
Coroner’s inquests were given the duty to determine the offending object causing death and 
determine its value. The operation of collecting and remitting a deodand was cumbersome 
and often opaque as sheriffs appear not to have had to detail remittances in their annual 
returns (Hale, 1778). With the arrival of the industrial revolution and potentially culpable 
factory machines (where any moving part contributing to death could be forfeited) the notion 
of deodand was found to be out dated and the practice was discontinued in 1846. Under the 
same parliamentary bill sponsored by Lord Campbell, dependents were given the right to 
pursue legal remedies (Smith 1967).  
In the United States 
Use of “writs of assistance”
111
 by King George III fuelled the excesses that contributed to the 
American Revolution. The government’s early use of seizure laws were a source of tension 
between colonists and the British Crown so civil forfeiture use was reduced
112
 (Adams in 
Bradley, 1988).  The United States Constitution protects property rights through both the Due 
Process Clause as well as “through a specific limitation on the scope of forfeiture in the 
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  "If an ox gore a man that he shall die, the ox shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten." Exodus 21:28-
30, cited in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974) as an historical origin of the 
deodand and in rem forfeiture. 
111
 A writ issued by a superior colonial court authorizing officers of the British crown to summon aid and enter 
and search any premises. Origin Expand. 1700-1710. dictionary.com, Random House. Officers of the Crown 
also collected commission on forfeited goods. 
112
 John Adams saw the confiscation issue in Wilkes v Wood (1763) involving pamphlets critical of the 
government leading to 49 instances of document seizures as being the spark of the American Revolution. 
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treason context” (Article III) (Schwarcz and Rothman, 1993). The U.S. First Congress 
however did adopt some forfeiture law in the maritime context that allowed for forfeiture of 
ships and cargo for evasion of customs duties and the illegal slave trade, whilst outlawing 
forfeiture as a consequence of federal criminal conviction (The Palmyra, 1827). In the 
American Civil War, forfeiture was used to confiscate rebel’s property and also with respect 
to the confiscation of Southern supporter’s assets with the U.S. Supreme Court upholding 
forfeiture “under the broad construction of the government’s military power” (Schwarcz and 
Rothman, 1993; see Miller v United States, 1871 at 659). American courts did not rely on the 
concept of deodand but crafted their own confiscation regime. 
Customs Laws 
The British Navigation Laws
113
 of the mid 17
th
 century, passed in the context of England’s 
expanding naval power, required imports and exports to be carried on British ships. 
Otherwise the ships or cargo could be seized and forfeited to the crown. Administrative 
forfeitures have a long history in customs laws, underpinning customs duties and generally 
permitting the seizing agency to proceed non-judicially against comparatively low value of 
property that has been illegally imported. A written notice of seizure is given to the person 
with an interest in the seized property, however, it is the property that is the defendant, 
known as in rem forfeiture. 
An in rem action is limited to property of the defendant that is within the 
control of the court. An action in rem is a proceeding that takes no notice of the 
owner of the property but determines rights in the property that are conclusive 
against all the world.  The object of the lawsuit is to determine the disposition 
of the property, regardless of who the owner is or who else might have an 
interest in it. Interested parties might appear and make out a case one way or 
another, but the action is in rem, against the things. 
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 The British Navigation Acts were a series of laws enacted between 1651 and 1850 that restricted the trading 
rights of ships within the British Empire, preventing direct trade from the Netherlands, Spain, France and their 
colonies. (Clapham, 1910) 
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West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2008  
 
Customs forfeiture could therefore be enforced against the cargo or ship even if the owner 
was outside the jurisdiction. Customs legislation promulgated to jurisdictions such as the U.S 
and Australia supported the practical state necessities of enforcing admiralty, piracy and 
customs duties. For example, the Australian Customs Act 1901(Cth) allows for the forfeiture 
of instruments of smuggling such as ships or boats and carriages or animals used in 
smuggling (ss 228-229). 
Forfeiture Laws and Drugs 
Most of the 20
th
 century was a lull in respect of forfeiture legislation, with the exception of its 
extensive use with regard to Prohibition
114
 in the U.S. when legislation facilitated the seizure 
of equipment, product, cash and vehicles used by ‘bootleggers’
115
. Modern juridification of 
confiscation laws began in 1970, with the U.S. Congress approving a new approach to white 
collar crime by passing the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organisation Act (‘RICO’). 
RICO included forfeiture provisions aimed at removing the economic benefit of crime as a 
distinct and different response from incarceration alone. Parallel provisions were included in 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. RICO “stated that a 
convicted defendant forfeited to the government any interest acquired through the 
racketeering activity and any property right obtained through RICO’s prohibited activities” 
(Garretson, 2008, p46). 
RICO took the next step in modern forfeiture juridification by “imposing forfeiture directly 
on the individual (in personam) as part of a criminal prosecution”
116
 (Garretson, 2008, p46). 
                                                     
114
 Prohibition (1920-1933) was a U.S. constitutional ban on the sale, production and transportation of alcoholic 
beverages (Blocker, J. 2003). 
115
 Bootleggers are those people who are in the illegal business of transporting (smuggling) alcoholic beverages. 
116
 As opposed to in rem, in the guilty property as previously discussed p7. 
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An in personam action can affect the defendant's personal rights and interests 
and substantially all of his or her property. It is based on the authority of the 
court, or jurisdiction, over the person as an individual rather than jurisdiction 
over specific property owned by the person. A court with in 
personam jurisdiction in a particular case has enough power over the defendant 
and his or her property to grant a judgment affecting the defendant in almost 
any way. 
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2008  
 
The growing egregiousness of drug distribution and the apparent wealth of its proponents 
provided the momentum for the United Nations Economic and Social Council to adopt the 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in Vienna, 
1988. Delegates from 106 states signed the Convention subject to state “ratification, approval 
or act of formal confirmation” (Para 21).  Australia ratified the Convention in 1992. The 
Convention contains article 5 – Confiscation, that recommends each signatory state to adopt 
measures to facilitate the deprival of proceeds from drug offences (detailed in Article 3). 
Forfeiture legislation is mandated (Art. 5 Para. 1), along with adequate capacity for 
investigation (Art. 5 Para. 2), access to fiscal information (Art. 5 Para. 3) and international 
co-operation (Art. 5 Para. 4). Notably, Art. 5 Para 7 introduces reversing the onus of proof in 
forfeiture legislation stating: 
Each Party may consider ensuring that the onus of proof be reversed regarding 
the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation, to 
the extent that such action is consistent with the principles of its domestic law 
and with the nature of the judicial and other proceedings (Art 5 Para 7).   
The status of the United Nations Convention provided legitimacy driving local juridification 
through its perceived expert consideration, support and determination. For example, the 
preamble refers to the social effects of drugs (including on children), as well as the links 
between drug trafficking and organised crime and corruption from an authoritative stance. 
The preamble then delivers the expertise in support of the expressed ‘desire’ to implement 
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statutorily supported change in line with the stated convention’s communique. Thus expertise 
is deployed directly as a medium of juridification as legislation is promulgated to local 
jurisdictions in support of treaty obligations.  
Type of Legislation 
Forfeiture legislation has two classifications that are ‘Civil’ and ‘Criminal’. The ‘Civil’ 
forfeiture legislative regime has two constituent groups: Proceeds of Crime (POCA) and 
Unexplained Wealth (UW). POCA legislation is “usually applied after a person has been 
convicted of an offence and applies to property acquired as a result of criminal activity 
proven beyond reasonable doubt” (Gray, 2012). POCA legislation can also include provision 
to confiscate assets used in the commission of a crime, similarly proven. As such, conviction 
usually results in automatic forfeiture. Civil action that does not require proof of a predicate 
crime requires the lower standard of proof being “on the balance of probabilities”
 117
. UW 
legislation or provisions usually extend the law such that it does not require a link between an 
individual’s significant wealth and a predicate crime and it reverses the onus of proof (Dixon, 
2012). The onus of proof normally places the duty to prove or disprove a disputed fact, to the 
required standard, on the prosecution (criminal matters) or the plaintiff (civil cases). The 
juridification of UW legislation has given courts the authority to order that an individual 
“proves the legitimacy of an unexplained amount of wealth”. In practice, this means that 
authorities have investigated and determined that an individual controls wealth beyond that 
reasonably expected, given the individual’s legitimate capacities to create income and wealth. 
The onus to prove legitimate accumulation or source of wealth is then with the individual. 
The ‘Criminal’ forfeiture legislative regime requires conviction for a predicate crime 
associated with the forfeited assets. The criminal forfeiture is seen as a punitive measure 
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 For criminal matters proof beyond reasonable doubt (the highest standard) is required. For civil cases the 
standard of proof is either by preponderance of evidence or by clear and convincing evidence (a lower standard). 
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associated with the commission of the crime and therefore requires the criminal standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The distinction between criminal and civil prosecution is 
sometimes unclear. Whilst there is a clear distinction with respect to the level of proof 
required for a decision, there are differences such as “civil orders not imposing a criminal 
liability, do not result in criminal guilt and do not expose people to any criminal sanction” 
(Crimes Legislation Amendment (Unexplained Wealth and Other Measures) Bill 2014, 
Explanatory Memorandum, p9). Nevertheless, UW prosecutions are “brought about by a 
public authority and have punishment and deterrence of breaches of Commonwealth law as 
one of their stated objectives” (p9). 
Further the relation between sentencing and confiscation is complex. The High Court of 
Australia has found that “punishment can only be inflicted after a finding of guilt at the 
criminal standard” however UW has been viewed as a ‘hybrid’ legislation (King, 2012, 
p337). Nolan (2013) summarises the argument (in the Irish context) as follows: 
The civil process is utilised by many countries, including Ireland, to combat 
criminal objectives. The property which is confiscated is deemed to be -
though not conclusively proven to be - the proceeds of crime. (Gray, 2012) 
But is this process truly a civil one? Gray posits that “forfeiture proceedings are better viewed 
as criminal in nature.” In this jurisdiction the label of civility ensured the POCA (Proceeds of 
Crime Act) Legislation’s survival (Meade, 2000). Because of this civil guise the courts are of 
the standpoint that the process does not, as McGuinness J states, have “all the features of a 
criminal prosecution” as “the procedures set out under The Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 are 
not criminal in nature …. Accordingly in this context the protections offered by Article 38.1 
of the Constitution are not applicable.” (Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau and Others, 1998) 
Therefore the sequasi-criminal proceedings are allowed to continue. On the other hand, 
Meade puts forward that the lack of a trial does not make the process any less criminal. 
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(Meade 2000). Conversely, a criminal sanction is being imposed and effectively punishing the 
individual for criminal activity without affording them the right to a fair trial. (Nolan, 2013, 
p64). 
The Victorian and NSW jurisdictions also commented on the distinction between recouping 
profits as distinct from being a penalty and forfeiture as a penalty in R v McLeod
118
 (2007) 
and International Finance Trust Company Limited v NSW Crime Commission (2009) where 
asset recovery was described as a necessary deterrent to the motivating greed of ill-gotten 
funds. In R v McLeod (2007) the court considered that both past, and the likelihood of future 
confiscation, could be taken into account when sentencing under the concept of 
‘proportionality’. This is where the loss of tainted property goes further than mere restoration 
of the ‘status quo’, such that, the confiscation has the effect on the offender that is a relevant 
component of sentencing. This is a question that the court could be assisted by accounting 
expertise, as it puts a financial variable alongside other considerations such as fines and 
incarceration. 
Forfeiture Laws and Money Laundering 
Another authoritative driver of domestic juridification in the forfeiture genre has been a flow 
on effect of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF), who produced 40 
recommendations that pertain to anti-money laundering
119
. Australia, the U.S. the U.K. and 
Ireland (via the E.U.) are amongst the 36 primary members. The FATF recommendations are 
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 The FATF Recommendations incorporating amendments were last issued in 2012. They were progressively 
developed from the 1970s and formally issued in their current form in 1990. They can be found at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/ 
internationalstandardsoncombatingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-
thefatfrecommendations.html 
174 
 
the internationally endorsed
120
 global standards against money laundering and terrorist 
financing (FATF 1990). Recommendation 3 – Money laundering offence, requires countries 
to adopt measures similar to those in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (referred to above) and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocols
121
 with regard to the 
confiscation of the proceeds of a variety of specified predicate crimes, that may be utilised in 
money laundering.  In particular Annex I, article 12 – Confiscation and seizure, states: 
1. States Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their 
domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable 
confiscation of: 
a. Proceeds of crime derived from offences covered by this Convention 
or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; 
b. Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for 
use in offences covered by this Convention. 
Recommendation 4 – Confiscation and provisional measures, and 38 – Mutual legal 
assistance: freezing and confiscation, are aimed at the prevention of criminal property being 
laundered or re-invested “either to facilitate other forms of crime or to conceal illicit 
proceeds” (FATF, Best Practices on Confiscation, p. 1). These recommendations place 
binding obligations on member countries including Australia, The U.S., The U.K. and 
Ireland. The FATF undertakes regular audits of member countries with respect to their anti-
money laundering programs (including POCA and UW legislation). An adverse audit result 
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 The FATF Recommendations set an international standard, which countries should implement through 
measures adapted to their particular circumstances. Member countries conduct bi-annual regional peer reviews 
(mutual evaluations) which are reported back to the task force which includes observer bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the united Nations. Practical sanctions restricting 
international financial access can be the result of a poor mutual evaluation. 
121
 Ratified by Australia in 2004 
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may embarrass a country internationally and preclude them from aspects of international co-
operation, access to funding and limits on banking transactions. 
i. United Nations Conventions and Confiscation 
1. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and 
the Protocols Thereto 2004 (‘ Convention against Organised Crime’), 
2. United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003  (‘Convention 
against Corruption’) 
3. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988 (‘Convention against Illicit Drugs’) 
The forward to the Convention against Organised Crime engages “civil society” in their fight, 
imploring nations to enhance their domestic legal regimes to harmonise and co-operate 
internationally, in order to “have a real impact on the ability of international criminals to 
operate successfully and help citizens everywhere in their often bitter struggle for safety and 
dignity in their homes and communities” (piv). Confiscation of unexplained wealth was first 
postulated by the United Nations at the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 1988). Article 5, paragraph 7 of that convention 
recommended that “each party consider ensuring that the onus of proof be reversed regarding 
the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation”     (para 7) 
The above three conventions (‘the conventions’) all reinforce the imposition of legislative 
obligations on ratifying countries with respect to confiscation and forfeiture. Consequently, 
they are a driver of the modern juridification of domestic and international forfeiture 
legislation both in terms of new legislation and in the inclusion of extended clauses (such as 
the reverse onus of proof). As the instruction with regard to forfeiture legislation is 
harmonised across the conventions, they are best considered in one line, albeit that specific 
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article and clause references will vary in accordance with each individual directive. Article 12 
Confiscation and seizure, of the Convention against Organised Crime, opens with forfeiture 
for the proceeds of crime. This article is similarly expressed in the Convention against 
Corruption (2003) and the Convention against Illicit Drugs (1988). The conventions go 
further, not only with their obligations for member nations to enact complimentary and 
supporting legislation, but with respect to additional terms for asset forfeiture. Specifically, 
states are broadly instructed to “adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable the 
identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item ..... (referred as proceeds of crime) …. 
for the purpose of eventual confiscation” (Art 2 s 2). Further, matters where the proceeds of 
crime have been converted into other property or intermingled with legitimate sources remain 
liable for confiscation up to the assessed value
122
 of the intermingled proceeds. State parties 
are instructed to empower their domestic courts “to order that bank, financial or commercial 
records be made available or be seized” (s 6), overwriting bank secrecy laws. 
Reversing the onus of proof is advocated in s 7 such that:  
7. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender 
demonstrate the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime or other property 
liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with 
the principles of their domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and 
other proceedings. 
Article 13 - International cooperation for the purposes of confiscation (Convention against 
Organised Crime) sponsors international facilitation through harmonious legislative 
provisions, such that, investigation and confiscation is not defeated  by international 
boundaries. Article 13 is aided by Article 15 – Jurisdiction, Article 16 – Extradition, Article 
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 Assessment by definition usually requires the evidence of an assessor, being the independent accounting 
expert. 
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17 – Transfer of sentenced persons, Article 18 - Mutual legal assistance , Article 19 – Joint 
investigations, Article 21 – Transfer of criminal proceedings and Article 30 – Other 
measures: implementation of the Convention through economic development and technical 
assistance. Table 3-1 highlights the content compatibility across the three U.N. conventions. 
Whilst the conventions include UW issues in the pursuit of criminal assets, there are no 
treaties or conventions that specifically address UW (AFP, Submission 9, 2012, p9). 
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Table 6-1: Content Compatibility Across the Three United Nations Conventions 
Section Content United Nations 
Convention against 
Transnational Organised 
Crime and the Protocols 
Thereto  
United Nations 
Convention against 
Corruption  
United Nations 
Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances  
Confiscation and Seizure Article 12 Article 31 Article 5 
Onus of Proof - Reversed Article 12 para 7 Article 31 para 8 Article 5, para 7 
Investigation, Identifying, Tracing 
and Seizure 
Article 12 para  2 Article 31 para 2, 3 Article 5, para 2 
Transferred and converted property Article 12 para  3 Article 31 para 4 Article 5, para 6(a) & (c) 
Intermingled Article 12 para  4, 5 Article 31 para 5, 6 Article 5, para 6(b) 
Banks, Financial and Commercial 
Records 
Article 12 para  6 
Article 31 para 7 
Article 40 
Article 5, para 3 
Third party rights Article 12 para  8 Article 31 para 9 Article 5, para 8 
International cooperation for the 
purposes of confiscation 
Article 13 
Article 37, 38, 39 
Chapter IV 
Article 55 
Article 10 
Disposal of confiscated proceeds of 
crime or property 
Article 14 
 
Article 5, para 5 
Jurisdiction Article 15 Article 42 Article 4 
Extradition Article 16 Article 44 Article 6 
Transfer of sentenced persons Article 17 Article 45   
Mutual legal assistance Article 18 Article 46 Article 7 
Joint investigations Article 19 Article 49   
Transfer of criminal proceedings Article 21 Article 47 Article 8 
Special investigative techniques 
 
Article 50   
Asset Recovery  Chapter V   
Source: Published Conventions: www.undoc.org/pdf/ 
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In Australia – Federal, State and Territorian Laws 
Before considering the passage of forfeiture legislation in Australia one must recognise the 
limitations of the Australian Federal system, specifically, those powers constitutionally 
passed onto the Commonwealth government, and those that remain under the control and 
administration of the states and self-governing territories. The Commonwealth of Australia 
was formed (1901) as a constitutional monarchy. The six (until then legally independent) 
states agreed to a constitution (the Australian Constitution, 1900) that defines the structure, 
powers and procedures, rights and obligations of the Commonwealth and of the states in 
relation to the Commonwealth. Only specific areas of statutory powers were given to the new 
Commonwealth and they did not include ‘law and order’. Such powers were limited to 
defence, foreign affairs, postal and communications and later taxation. Each of the six states 
independently retained control of their own police forces and associated laws. Two partially 
self-governing territories (Northern Territory (NT) and the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT)) have capacity to make their own laws, with the NT having their own law and order 
jurisdiction. The ACT relies upon the Australian Federal Police (Commonwealth) law and 
order statutes in respect of the legal genres that concern this research.  
This disparate ownership of the law and order legislative power has led to criminal 
jurisdiction shopping, where criminals relocate their activities or assets to a jurisdiction they 
perceive to be more favourable than another (AFP, 2012). Furthermore, where legislation is 
dependent on predicate crimes, there may be application difficulties if a predicate conviction 
was in another jurisdiction
123
.  As AFP Commissioner Tony Negus, Chair of the Australian 
Crime Commission Board observed: 
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 For example, if the assets for confiscation reside in one state and the conviction necessary for a proceeds of 
crime action was made in another state. 
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It is agreed across the board of the Australian Crime Commission that 
criminals will exploit any weaknesses that they can identify, and that 
includes weaknesses in legislation across jurisdictions or the weakest link, 
if you like, in the way that legislative processes have been constructed 
(PJCLE, 2012, Committee Hansard, p2) 
According to evidence given to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime 
Commission on the legislative arrangements to outlaw serious and organised crime (2009), 
the varying nature of these statutes has  driven criminals to move their operations and/or 
assets out of some jurisdictions into another (Andrewartha et al 2013; PJC ACC, 2009). 
Focusing on the Commonwealth jurisdiction, a civil forfeiture provision was added to the 
Customs Act 1901 (Cth) in 1977 (s 229A), whilst the need for specific Proceeds of Crime 
(PoC) legislation in Australia was raised in the Royal Commissions of the 1980’s (Williams, 
1999)
124
. This culminated in a push for a nationally consistent approach resolved by the 
Premier’s Conference of 1985 (Special Premiers’ Conference on Drugs, 1985).  
The Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth) (POCA 87) followed, that initiated conviction-based 
confiscation, however, this was eventually found to be ineffective due to the onerous level of 
proof required at the criminal conviction standard of beyond reasonable doubt. This point was 
highlighted in the Australian Law Reform Commission 1999 report Confiscation that counts: 
A review of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (ALRC Report No. 87). The report 
recommended that civil forfeiture be adopted (rec. 4) in uniform Commonwealth legislation 
(rec.  11). Further, the then Attorney General (2002), reflected in his second reading speech 
to the Proceeds of Crime Bill 2002 that the POCA 87 of the time “failed to impact upon those 
at the pinnacle of criminal organisations” (Hansard, 13 March 2002). The 2002 statute 
provided for conviction based orders, civil forfeiture for serious offences and civil forfeiture 
for indictable offences (Blakeney, 2012)  
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 See, for example, the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, The Hon Mr Justice DG Stewart, 
Feb 1983 
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Over the past 15 years there has not been the anticipated uniform approach to unexplained 
wealth legislation amongst the Australian Commonwealth, States and Territories. Each 
jurisdiction has pursued their own legislative agenda, with some commonality, and other 
divergent aspects, including a staggered implementation. (Victorian Police, 2012). Western 
Australia was the first state to enact civil forfeiture laws that extended their application to an 
unexplained wealth declaration against a person where it is more likely than not that the total 
value of the respondent’s wealth is greater than the value of the person’s lawfully acquired 
wealth. The unexplained portion of the wealth is payable to the State of Western Australia 
(Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)). The Northern Territory followed with the 
Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) having similar provisions (ss 67-72). Table 6-2 
shows the progressive enactment of Commonwealth and State forfeiture legislation which 
now all provide for both civil and conviction-based forfeiture. The most recent enactment 
was Tasmania in 2014 [The Crime (Confiscation of Profits) Amendment (Unexplained 
Wealth) Bill 2013].  
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Table 6-2a: Australian Proceeds of Crime and Unexplained Wealth Legislation 
Jurisdiction Act Title Enacted Criminal Civil UW 
Reverse 
Onus of 
Proof 
Commonwealth of 
Australia 
 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 
(Cth) 
1987 Yes No No No 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(Cth) 
2002 Yes Yes 
from 
2002 
from 2002 
Customs Act 1901 1901 Yes Yes No No 
Western Australia 
Criminal Property 
Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) 
2000 Yes Yes 
from 
2000 from 2000 
South Australia 
 
The Serious and Organised 
Crime (Unexplained Wealth) 
Act 2009 (SA) 
2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Criminal Assets Confiscation 
Act 2005 
2005 Yes No 
   
Victoria Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) 1997 Yes 
from 
2004 
from 
2004 
from 2004 
New South Wales 
 
Confiscation of Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1989 
1989 Yes Yes 
Yes  No 
Criminal Assets Recovery 
Act 1990 (NSW) 
1990 Yes Yes 
Yes  No 
Queensland 
Criminal Proceeds 
Confiscation Act (Qld)  
Yes Yes 
Partial 
2009 
Partial 2009 
Northern Territory 
Criminal Property Forfeiture 
Act 2002 (NT) 
2003 Yes Yes 
from 
2003 from 2003 
Tasmania 
Crime (Confiscation of 
Profits) Act 1993 
1993 Yes Yes 
from 
2014 
from 2014 
Source: individual legislation as per the Act Title column 
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Table 6b: Unexplained Wealth Provisions by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction Change Title Date 
Commonwealth The Proceeds of Crime Act (Cth) 
Crimes Legislation Amendment  (Unexplained Wealth 
and Other Measures) Act (Cth) 
2010 
2015 
Western Australia Criminal Property Confiscation Act (WA) 2000 
South Australia Serious and Organised Crime (Unexplained Wealth) Act 
(SA) 
2009 
New South Wales Crimiinal Assets Recovery Act (NSW) 
Criminal Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and 
Public safety) Act (NSW) 
1990 
2016 
Victoria Justice Legislation Amendment (Confiscation and Other 
Matters) Act 
2014 
Queensland Criminal Proceeds Confiscation (Unexplained Wealth and 
Serious Drug Offender Confiscation Order) Amendment 
Act (Qld) 
2013 
Northern Territory Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (NT)  2003 
Tasmania Crime (Confiscation of Profits) Amendment 
(Unexplained Wealth) Act 
2013 
 
Individual states, territories and Commonwealth forfeiture statutes vary particularly in areas 
of: 
 “whether a link to an offence is required (through either a reasonable suspicion than 
an offence has occurred or that a person has obtained the proceeds of an offence); 
 whether a court has discretion to make an order; 
 whether unexplained wealth provisions form part of a State’s asset confiscation 
legislation or are in stand-alone legislation; and 
 time limits on unexplained wealth orders” (PJCLE 2012, p65) 
In Australia – POCA and UW Reviews 
The passage of the changes to Commonwealth legislation has been punctuated by several 
significant reviews that have produced recommendations in regard to the crafting and 
operation of forfeiture legislation and its delivery. Specifically, the: 
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 report on the Independent Review of the Operation of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 (Cth) tabled in July 2006 by Tom Sherman AO pursuant to s 327(2) of that act 
(‘Sherman Report’).  
 Inquiry into legislative arrangements to outlaw serious and organised crime groups 
(2009), by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (‘PJCLE 2010’),   
 inquiry into Commonwealth unexplained wealth legislation and arrangements (2012) 
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (‘PJCLE 2012’),  
The Sherman Report  
The Sherman report was initiated by the statutory instruction (sec 327) that accompanied the 
introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), 2002 (Cth) that the functioning of the act 
be reviewed after 3 years of operation
125
. The review was tabled in Federal Parliament in 
October 2006, leading eventually to the amendments in schedule 1 of the Crime Legislation 
Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Bill (no. 2) 2009. This bill was subjected to 
further review under PJCLE 2010. 
Sherman commented that POCA 2002 was working better than its predecessor (POCA 1987) 
(p68), however, he recommended improvements based on submissions from Commonwealth 
agencies and other organisations, including non-government organisations (Executive 
Summary, piv). The nature of the recommendations broadly pertained to information access 
and sharing; extending the limitation for civil confiscation from six to twelve years; allowing 
for the making of ex parte orders; creating offences for failure to attend examinations and 
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 The Terms of Reference for the Review were to: 
 Gather information on the impact of the operation of the Act 
 Identify and consider any factors which have limited the achievement of the objectives of the Act, and 
 Make recommendations for any changes required to enable the Act to better achieve its objectives. 
Minister for Justice and Customs, Senator Chris Ellison appointed Mr Tom Sherman AO to conduct this 
independent Review.  Mr Sherman is a former President of the Legal Aid Commission (ACT) and Chair of the 
National Crime Authority.  Prior to that, Mr Sherman was Commonwealth Crown Solicitor and Australian 
Government Solicitor.  
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providing false or misleading information. With respect to the institutional expertise utilised 
to investigate POCA and UW matters, recommendation 4, the access provision for the 
Australian Customs Service (ACS), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC)
126
 to issue sec 213 notices, is important. Such 
notices allow an authorised officer to “provide a written notice to a financial institution 
requiring the institution to provide …” (sec 213(1)), specified information which can then be 
used for determinations and ultimately as evidence. 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Bill, 2010 (‘PJCLE 2010’) 
The PJCLE reviewed the Australian Crime Commission Act, 2002 (established under Part III) 
as part of a portfolio of inquiries into a range of national security matters including: 
 The legislative arrangements to outlaw serious and organised crime groups (2009) 
 Future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society (2007) 
 Amphetamines and Other Synthetic Drugs (AOSD) (2007) 
 Review of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (2005) 
 Inquiry into the trafficking of women for sexual servitude (2005) 
 Cybercrime (2004) 
 Australian Crime Commission Establishment Bill 2002 (2002) 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (serious and organised crime) Bill 2009 (CLA) typically 
espoused “targeting organised crime by strengthening criminal asset confiscation, including 
introducing unexplained wealth provisions, enhancing police powers …. Addressing the joint 
commission of criminal offences and facilitating greater access to telecommunications 
inception”. The amendments responded to the Sherman Report, drawing support from the 
PJCLE, 2010 report (which was tasked with reviewing the CLA Bill, 2009). Schedule 1 
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introduced unexplained wealth provisions targeting “wealth that a person cannot demonstrate 
that he or she has lawfully acquired”. Specifically, schedule 2: 
 Introduced freezing orders to ensure assets are not dispersed 
 Remove time limitations on orders 
 Provide for non-conviction based restraint and forfeiture of instruments of 
serious crime 
 Enhance information sharing 
 Reimburse legal aid (Schedule 2 CLA, 2009). 
Schedule 3 introduced model laws for controlled operations, assumed identities and witness 
identity protection. Schedule 4 extended the Criminal Code Act 1995 to include “criminal 
liability in relation to persons jointly committing offences” (p3). The CLA Bill had its 
detractors who railed against three key areas of change, that, “the regime undermines the 
presumption of innocence by reversing the onus of proof ….. is subject to a very low 
threshold test, which creates the possibility of the laws being used to harass individuals and 
that it distorts the investigatory incentives of police” (Croke, 2010). The juridification 
apparent in the second two concerns, has a particular focus on evidence, in that the threshold 
of ‘suspect’ is used, rather than the higher test of ‘belief’ and the second, in that the potential 
for the use of UW investigations with civil tests of proof as alternatives to the more virulent 
proof required for criminal prosecution (the balance of probabilities as opposed to beyond 
reasonable doubt as previously discussed). 
In order to obtain an UW order, an authorised officer must provide an affidavit that indicates 
there are “reasonable grounds to suspect that the person’s total wealth exceeds the value of 
the person’s wealth that was lawfully acquired” (Amendment Act s 179B(2)) and that there 
are grounds on which the officer holds a “reasonable suspicion that a person’s total wealth 
187 
 
exceeds his or her lawfully acquired wealth” (Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum:3). 
This threshold was criticized as being too low by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
and the Law Council of Australia and Civil Liberties, Australia, in their submissions to 
PJCLE 2010
127
. The Act does not precisely define the test of suspicion, however, the 
common law test between a ‘suspicion’ and a ‘belief’ might provide guidance, in that, an 
officer “need only show that there is a possibility rather than a probability that the assets 
were illegitimately acquired”
128
 (Croke , 2010, p154). 
The concern with regard to the potential for the ‘lazy policing’
129
 use of the lesser civil proof 
has arisen as a response to limited police resources and the abandonment of riskier 
prosecutions that carry the deterrent effect of prison. This thought predisposes the priority of 
law enforcement on criminal punishment, rather than, the use of forfeiture as another “tool in 
the armoury”
130
 of law enforcement that facilitates a choice of the instrument that creates the 
greatest detrimental effect on criminal behaviour. That is, the very basis of UW-POC 
remedies is the greater harm caused to criminals by making their money and assets targets 
for removal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
In the absence of any obligation to inform the court regarding “the reason why a criminal 
prosecution has not been brought or, if brought, has failed”,
131
 it has been suggested that the 
court should make sufficient efforts to assess the application, not taking on an inquisitorial 
role, “but merely buttressing the important oversight role that the courts have in relation to 
law enforcement authorities” (Croke 2010 p 155). This point is important, as it raises the 
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question of how the court, under a system of adjudication rather than inquisition, has the 
resources (in quantity and skill set) to conduct an onerous oversight. In Ireland, for example, 
a specialised agency (The Criminal Assets Bureau, ‘CBA’) and a specialised court is 
appointed to manage their civil forfeiture regime. Sufficient, specifically trained officers 
(including forensic accountants) are allocated to advise the judiciary and to present and 
review evidence (CBA Annual Report, 2015). They are protected by statutory anonymity as 
a safeguard against threats from serious criminals. (Criminal Assets Bureau Act, Ireland, 
1996, S 10). 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Bill, 2012 (‘PJCLE 2012’) 
Whilst establishing a specialised forfeiture court has not been a realistic suggestion for the 
Australian legal landscape (particularly given the disparate views of the federal-state system), 
the concept of law enforcement using UW as a primary pre-emptive tool was a particular 
feature of the PJCLE 2012. The basis of this inquiry was that, in the first two years following 
the passing of the Amendment Act 2010, no cases were brought to the courts. This was seen 
as “mainly because [according to] the evidence of the Australian Federal Police, the 
Australian Crime Commission and others in state jurisdictions, is that, effectively, their 
legislation does not work” (PJCLE 2012, Senator Wright 10:31). The committee records a 
formal round table discussion with the leaders of state and federal police forces, the ATO and 
other such stakeholders
132
. The main reasons cited for the legislation not working, were the 
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lack of legislative and operational harmony between the states, territory and 
commonwealth
133
 and the lack of certainty due to broad court discretion with regard to the 
application of UW orders
134
.  One of the main issues that arose from the fact that there were 
no cases taken to court, often due to legal uncertainty, was the circular reference that the 
court was not given the opportunity to interpret and clarify questions of uncertainty and 
consequently no precedents within the legislative genre materialised as a basis for future 
certainty. 
Alternatively, it was proposed that the police culture, particularly at the state level, was such 
that utilisation of UW remedies is contrary to “pursuing criminal elements, putting them 
behind bars because they have done the wrong thing, rather than taking away their assets and 
letting them walk down the street free” (Senator Parry, 2009, p22).  Several State Police 
Commissioners agreed with the need to make a cultural shift to focus on forfeiture without 
other punitive measures, citing changes that target the profitability of crime in order to tackle 
the top echelon who only invest in crime. (Mr Ashton, 2012; Commissioner Negus, 2011). 
The Commissioners also raised practical issues such as the requirement for new expertise (for 
example, forensic accounting skills and experience) to move into this “problem-solving, 
preventive model” (Commissioner Hyde, 2011). Specifically, the Commissioner recognised 
the critical role of money and the “power of accounting in the interpretation of evidence and 
the presentation of a case”. The need for (forensic) accounting expertise was further noted, in 
order to understand the rapid movement of money particularly offshore (Commissioner Hyde, 
Mr Ashton, Senator Parry). As Commissioner Hyde stated: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and investments Commission, Commissioner Tony Negus, Australian Federal Police, Mr Roman Quaedvlieg, 
Chief Police Officer, ACT Policing 
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 Three particular areas giving rise to this lack of harmony were cited as i) differences in legislation; ii) lack of 
clear asset sharing arrangements; and iii) limitations on information sharing. 
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 The court (Cwth) has discretion to make unexplained wealth orders, preliminary unexplained wealth orders 
and unexplained wealth orders even when relevant criteria have been satisfied or if the decision not to grant an 
order might be in the public interest. 
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…. you would need to have the specialised resources that are needed to get 
the outcomes you need. That would include forensic accountants and people 
with highly sophisticated computer skills as well, because a lot of the 
tracking of resources has a lot to do with finding a trail through technology. 
With that, of course, I am taking for granted that you do need investigative 
skills to go with it, so your detectives are going to have to operate in a new 
environment to deal with that. But that is not new. We are dealing with 
those things whether they are cyber investigations or just drug investigations 
in general. So you do need specialised people like forensic accountants and 
people with IT skills, but you need detectives that are going to complement 
all of that as well. (Commissioner Hyde, 2011, p22). 
Further Commissioner Hyde raised the complexities in regard to state and commonwealth 
international links (treaties, agreements, protocols) specifically, the facilitation of the ability 
to reach out and retrieve funds that have gone offshore. 
Whilst the PJCLE 2012 unanimously agreed that national UW/POCA legislative 
harmonisation was necessary, the most preferable delivery method continued to be debated. 
Proposals to rely upon enhanced referral powers were eventually superseded by the model 
statute approach where mirror legislation copies the same statute in each jurisdiction (similar 
to the uniform evidence and corporations law model legislation approach to evidence
135
). 
With this in mind the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Unexplained Wealth and Other 
Measures) Bill, 2014 was proposed. This bill presented eight of the PJCLE 2012’s 18 
recommendations, however the bill was not proclaimed until February 2015. The bill’s effect 
was to remove the court’s general discretion and to limit the court’s discretion in to make 
orders if there are sufficient grounds to suspect that the amount of undisclosed wealth is 
greater than $100,000 (Parliamentary Library Bills Digest No 57, 2014). There continues to 
be a lack of agreement amongst the states regarding the adoption of either a referral or mirror 
approach, or indeed any approach to harmonisation (Smith and Smith 2016). 
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Forfeiture Legislation  
i. Court Orders 
The general description of forfeiture laws covers forfeiture/confiscation orders, pecuniary 
penalty orders, restraining orders, unexplained wealth orders and literary proceeds orders. 
The court plays a core role in the operation of these orders as it is only through an application 
to a court that the enforcing authority may secure the order (Maxwell, 2011). In general, 
based on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: 
 restraining orders prohibit a person from disposing or dealing with the 
subject property; 
 forfeiture/confiscation orders which require a person to forfeit property to the 
Commonwealth; 
 pecuniary penalty orders which require a person to pay money to the 
Commonwealth based on the proceeds they have received from crime; 
 literary proceeds orders which require a person to pay money to the 
Commonwealth based on literary proceeds of crime; and 
 unexplained wealth orders requiring payment of unexplained wealth amounts 
(POCA 2002 (Cth) s 7) 
A court order is not necessary for every asset forfeiture as automatic forfeiture of property is 
specified in particular circumstances. For example, sec 228(1) of the Australian Customs Act 
1901 provides for the forfeiture of any ship or aircraft used in the importation of prohibited 
imports, and sec 229(1) provides for the forfeiture of the prohibited imports themselves. This 
measure has limited usage in the Australian context, however, similar acts have given rise to 
frequent and summary forfeitures in the U.S., such as the vehicles and contents used to 
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transport drugs between states
136
 (US Department of Justice, 2013, 1994). POCA 2002 also 
establishes and regulates a number of coercive measures to assist in the investigation of 
proceeds of crime matters. Those measures are: examination orders, production orders, 
notices to financial institutions, monitoring orders and search warrants (Sherman 2006, p7). 
The process of obtaining court orders leading to confiscation, as described in the act, at 
Chapter 2, (The Confiscation Scheme) of POCA 2002, leans heavily on the testimony of 
expert witnesses, particularly in the form of forensic accountants. Whilst an expert witness 
has a primary duty to the court
137
 there are four general perspectives requiring accounting 
expertise in the confiscation process being: 
1. The investigating authority (for example, the Australian Federal Police) must present 
their evidence to the authority bringing the motion (for example, the relevant 
Department of Public Prosecutions) of a reasonable opinion that wealth is 
unexplained or linked to a predicate crime or history of criminal activity. This 
requires at least prima face investigative (accounting) evidence. Proving the threshold 
suspected amount of unexplained wealth to be above $100,000, is important as to 
whether the court can utilise its discretion; 
2. The prosecuting authority (for example the relevant Department of Public 
Prosecutions) must assess, interpret and present the evidence to the court. This 
requires an understanding of accounting integrated with legal requirements; 
3. The Court must interpret the evidence within the context of the statute in order to 
make a decision to grant a confiscation order; and 
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4. The person (or associated persons) affected by the confiscation order has (have) the 
opportunity to defend against the order, most likely by providing an accounting 
explanation of the legitimate source of wealth. 
Specifically, the process of issuing an UW or POCA order varies according to the type of 
order (freezing, restraining, forfeiture, pecuniary or literary), however, there are process 
similarities pertaining to the presentation of evidence by an authorised officer
138
. In each case 
a supporting, sworn affidavit setting out the grounds for making the order must be presented. 
The affidavit must fulfil the specific requirements set out in the division describing how 
individual orders are to be obtained. The process requires initial investigation, at least to the 
extent that an authorised officer forms the reasonable opinion to support the claim being 
made for an order. That opinion must be based on expertise, most often forensic accounting 
expertise, which would be resident amongst the investigators. In practice, the report (forming 
the basis of the investigating officer’s affidavit) is filtered through the prosecuting authority 
(the Commonwealth – or State/Territory – Department of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’)). The 
DPP makes the decision whether to present the application to the court. It would be expected 
that the DPP includes forensic accounting expertise in its assessment of the investigator’s 
report. However, the accounting qualifications of the authorised officer are not mentioned 
because it is the officer’s formal authoritarian status (for example, their sworn position) that 
is the basis of their testimony, rather than their possession of expertise (for example, as is 
required for recognised expert witness testimony). More recent innovations (discussed in 
chapter 7) have seen the ability to prosecute some UW-POCA matters devolved directly to 
the Australian Federal Police. Early data indicates this has encouraged more successful UW-
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POCA Orders that have been sought and granted (see the discussion on effectiveness in 
Chapter 7). 
ii. The judicial function 
Before considering the specific detail of individual forfeiture legislation, it is interesting to 
consider the aspects of judicial function that integrate the statute with the court. Maxwell J. 
(2011) addressed this issue with reference to the juridification of forfeiture laws, in that, their 
provisions may intrude into the court’s naturally accepted process and liberties, for example, 
procedural fairness. Maxwell, J. referred to the Courts “taking the statutes as they found 
them” whilst the Parliament “takes the Courts as they find them” (2011, p5). The comment 
finds its basis in the Australian Constitution’s separation of powers
139
.  In this regard, the 
point is that Parliament has the prerogative to exclude procedural fairness despite the fact that 
procedural fairness may be applicable under normal circumstances. However, in doing so, the 
statute must be clear in its instruction, with language that illuminates the court’s interpretive 
task. French CJ commented in the International Finance Trust (2009) case: 
the conservative principle that, absent clear words, Parliament does not 
intend to encroach upon fundamental common law principles, including the 
requirement that courts accord procedural fairness to those who are to be 
affected by their orders (at 379-80) 
Further 
If parliament has used clear words to encroach upon the liberty or rights of 
the subject or to impose procedural or other constraints upon the courts its 
choice should be respected even if the consequence is constitutional 
invalidity (at 349) 
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This is the ‘principle of legality’ that recognises the long history of common laws protecting 
individual rights and freedoms and the notion that if such protection is to be removed (such 
as, in forfeiture procedure or reversing the onus of proof), then it must be clearly instructed 
by the legislature. The parliament, rather than the legal profession, deploys their primary 
legislative legitimacy based on Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Parliament has determined that an infringement of rights is necessary for the 
achievement of some public policy objective, and has done so with the 
requisite clarity of legislative expression, it is not for the courts to second-
guess that policy choice. (Maxwell, 2011, p7) 
Relating this notion to Victorian forfeiture law
140
 the Victorian Court of Appeal (in DPP v 
Ali) said: 
We have already concluded, for reasons set out earlier, that there is no 
ambiguity in the language of s 16 of the Act. It follows that there is no room 
for the application of principles dealing with strict interpretation of 
ambiguous legislative provisions dealing with forfeiture of property. 
Likewise, the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provisions leaves no 
room for the operation of the presumption against legislative interference 
with vested property rights. Plainly enough, the Act does interfere with 
property rights, and modifies many common law protections. Equally 
clearly, Parliament has done this deliberately. It has enacted a statute which 
contains its own procedures and protections. The fact that these procedures 
and protections are not as fair or comprehensive as those under common law 
does not mean the courts are at liberty to modify them so they accord with 
traditional values (at 54-55) 
Therefore, in considering the specific details of the forfeiture statutes it is important to 
understand the role of the court in the maintenance of judicial oversight over enforcement 
proceedings, within the separate legislative instruction of the statute. Courts must respect 
their statutory instruction whilst administering legal decisions in a manner conducive to 
public confidence.  The courts have been steeped in matters such as property rights, equity 
settlements, punitive incarceration and sentencing. As the Commissioner Hyde highlighted 
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with regard to policing, the role of the court with respect to forfeiture, particularly UW 
requires a cultural shift in support of confiscation as a court remedy.  
Forfeiture laws at the Commonwealth level are dealt with by the Federal Court of Australia 
and, if necessary by the High Court of Australia. These courts have 7 and 48 judges 
respectively all of whom have staff to assist them with research, interpretation and 
adjudication. Australian judges are appointed on the advice of government to the Governor-
General. They are always lawyers, mostly barristers (Constitutional Centenary Foundation, 
1999) hence their expertise is in law rather than accounting.  Each judge has a staff who are  
mainly legally educated. Surveys of Australian magistrates and judges (Freckleton et al, 
1999, 2001) highlight accounting expert evidence as some of the most difficult for legal 
professionals to understand, with generally the second highest concern (19%) being the 
difficulty in understanding technical language (including accounting). The conclusions of 
both the judicial and magistrate’s research highlight the need for improved training of judicial 
officers in areas technical areas, specifically accounting. That is, increased judicial expertise 
and support in areas likely to arise in court adjudication outside the legal professional genre. 
In this regard, it is worth the reflection that many judicial adjudications are about, and settled 
by, money, which is the primary domain of the accountant.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the ancient origins of forfeiture statute, noting that this type of 
legislation fell into disrepute and generally out of use, until its recent resurrection targeted 
mainly at organised crime and the huge profits that can apparently be amassed from illicit 
drug trafficking.  National and international support for forfeiture remedies, through vehicles 
such as United Nations conventions, have enhanced the juridification through the obligated 
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adoption of local confiscation statutes and provisions from template type legislative 
prescriptions.  
Specifically, in the Australian context there have been several reviews over the past two 
decades, providing insights and reflection on the more pragmatic effects of forfeiture statutes, 
particularly their extension into UW remedies. Aligned with this extension is the 
juridification of legislation such as the reduction in the standard of proof for confiscation 
matters from criminal to civil and the reversal of the onus of proof to the defendant. 
Importantly, this chapter provides a direct context with respect to the statutes that provide a 
procedural reference point for the deployment of expertise that contributes to the court’s 
adjudication on legislative orders. Forensic accounting expertise is required throughout the 
legislative process from investigation to interpretation, defence, judgement and 
implementation. A forensic accountant benefits from a solid understanding, not only of 
current forfeiture legislation, but from a balanced recognition of the legislation’s gestation 
and the relative influence of the broad jurisdictional reflections and contexts that have 
influenced statutory development, its continued maturation and the resolution of individual 
differences between jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 7: The Effectiveness of Forfeiture Legislation 
Introduction 
This research considers the juridification of Proceeds of Crime (‘POCA’) and Unexplained 
Wealth (‘UW’) statutory provisions, with a focus on the role of forensic accounting evidence 
at the pragmatic level of the juridification process. Of significant importance to the 
juridification process is the legitimacy that POCA and UW statutes gain or losely based on 
how the lifeworld perceives the legislative fulfilment of their espoused purpose. This 
legitimacy is established both at the individual case level and at the institutional level, where 
aggregated reporting is collated, presented and explained. At the case level, the lifeworld 
scrutinises how forfeiture cases are decided, whether their adjudication is informed and fair  
and  whether the decision can be justified. At the institutional level, the lifeworld views the 
pronouncements and public reporting of those institutions charged with the deployment of the 
relevant statutes. As shown in the research diagram (Chapter 3, Diagram 1, p420), the support 
of the lifeworld underpins the democratic support for the legislative process that, in turn, 
gives rise to statutory evolution (juridification). Chapter 5 explored the pragmatic aspects that 
validate forensic accounting evidence. However, juridification also requires the support of a 
broader validation of the statutes within the context of how they fulfil their espoused purpose, 
as considered by the lifeworld; in other words, how effective the legislative genre is in its 
contribution towards the community’s benefit and enhancement. Specifically, broader 
validation of forfeiture statutes is found in the community’s assessment of how effectively 
the POCA and UW statutes are institutionally deployed to achieve their espoused and, as they 
are introduced into the parliamentary process, democratically accepted objectives.  
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Measurements of effectiveness are particularly problematic in the Australian context, where 
nine separate jurisdictions and several multi-disciplinary task forces share responsibility for 
the legal aspects of various governments’ forfeiture responses. The Commonwealth (Federal 
jurisdiction) shares the aims and objectives of criminal confiscation with six states and two 
territories, which, in turn, sometimes distinguish their inter-jurisdictional responsibilities 
between prosecution authorities (for example, the various government Departments of Public 
Prosecutions, or Attorneys General) and task forces with a specific focus on forfeiture. Such 
task forces usually combine multi-disciplinary, multi-agency skill sets, such as those relevant 
for investigations and prosecution of organised criminals; however, their establishment is 
relatively new (in the Australian Commonwealth since 2013), and not yet broadly accepted. 
This chapter maintains the discourse’s primary focus on Commonwealth legislation, whilst 
also reviewing relevant data from other jurisdictions. This facilitates the discussion of how 
the data integrates or varies across the country. In this regard, it is sometimes difficult to 
establish a fully integrated picture of effectiveness, as criminals move seamlessly between 
jurisdictions, while authorities may experience provincial limitations that may impinge on the 
smooth operation of the law. 
Based on the parliamentary commentary that accompanies the introduction of forfeiture 
legislation, it appears that the community-supported drivers of such legislation reflect the 
primacy of a “law and order” debate, rather than the evolution of legal principles (Clarke, 
2002; Campbell, 2014). Parliament has not justified a “principled rationale” with “traditional 
notions of punishment, deterrence or reparation for victims of crime” (p82). Rather, the 
introductory narratives refer to the reversal of the economic benefits of criminal activity (with 
particular focus on organised criminal activity) in three areas:   
1. The economic benefit that the perpetrators directly receive from the crime; 
2. The economic capacity to prevent the funding of further criminal activity; and 
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3. The economic benefit arising from criminal activity. 
It is therefore relevant to review the overall effectiveness of deprival legislation with respect 
to the “policy concerns and public debates about the nature of organised crime and the threat 
that it poses to mainstream society and government” (Goldsmith et al., 2014, p115). To 
understand whether the amount of forfeiture seeks to satisfy any or all of the three variables, 
one might expect institutional measurements to be developed that show congruence between 
the reversal of the economic benefits of crime and the progressive quantitative and qualitative 
administration of the legislation. That is, the administration of forfeiture remedies applied to 
organised crime should adversely affect the criminal’s risk appetite, making the risk-reward 
rating unacceptable. Risk ratings are generally evaluated using a likelihood and consequence 
risk-rating matrix (see AS/NZS 43600 Series Joint Standards on Risk, 2004). If the threat of 
confiscation is to fulfil its narrative of  affecting organised and serious crime, organised 
criminals must see the forfeiture disruption and denial as highly likely to occur (to them) and 
of significant consequence (or material loss/cost). The instigation narrative that accompanies 
forfeiture legislation inevitably applies this narrative to the senior crime figures who plan, 
finance and direct the criminal action, not those not directly involved in perpetrating the 
crime.  
This chapter is organised as follows. The initial section reviews the claims regarding these 
three variables in terms of the parliamentary discourse and the preliminary narrative that has 
accompanied the introduction of confiscation legislation. The legislative objectives espoused 
at such times show little variation across jurisdictions, particularly throughout the 
Commonwealth of Australia and its states and territories. Similarly, the narratives of relevant 
task forces, bureaucracies and law enforcement and compliance agencies reiterate the 
discourses found in the political introductions, explanatory memoranda and the statutes’ 
introductory clauses (Explanatory Memorandum to the Crimes Legislation Amendment 
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(Unexplained Wealth and Other Measures) Bill, 2014; Dixson, 2012) (Queensland 
Parliamentary Library and Research Service, Unexplained Wealth Laws, research brief 
2012/09). 
The second section takes the form of assembly, aggregation, and quantitative analysis of 
measures of statutory effectiveness as the various responsible authorities across the 
Commonwealth of Australia and its states and territories have reported them. This 
information varies longitudinally due to jurisdictions adopting POCA and UW statutes at 
various times over the past 20 years; however, once the statutes are adopted, it is common for 
the lead prosecution agency (such as the relevant jurisdiction’s Department of Public 
Prosecutions) to report annually within a section of their annual general report.  These reports 
cover a wide range of the institution’s duties and roles where their UW/POCA obligations are 
minimal relative to the total organisation’s accountability.  The POCA/UW reports therefore 
devolve to a quantitative list of various legislative actions taken under the POCA and/or UW 
provisions, such as freezing orders and confiscation orders followed by the total value of 
seizure. No direct alignment to litigation cases is identified other than most reporting 
agencies providing an illustrative example of performance. A standard of seven years’ annual 
reporting (2008-09 to 2014-15) has been followed across the jurisdictions to facilitate 
comparison and aggregation that takes into account the more recent legislative changes 
discussed in Chapter 6. The chapter moves on to comment on the adequacy of such reporting 
with respect to the introductory claims and justifying discourse made when the confiscation 
statutes have been introduced or when major amendments have been passed. In particular, 
these measures of confiscation are compared to other measures for the economic impact of 
the type of crimes that the legislation is claimed to tackle, such as measures of organised 
crime sometimes produced by the same institutions that are accountable for POCA/UW 
reporting. 
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Further, the need for qualitative reporting measures is discussed with particular reference to 
actions taken to improve the outcome of the performance variables in jurisdictions where it 
has been recognised that the legislation’s effectiveness was lower than expected (for 
example, NSW). This description reflects a broader shift in criminal asset recovery from one 
that is “punishment-oriented and criminal offence-focused to one that is developing new 
capabilities for crime prevention including disruption and the removal of incentives” 
(Goldsmith et al., 2014, p116). The need for qualitative measures is taken from political, 
judicial and academic commentary. Finally, an estimate of the effectiveness of forfeiture 
legislation is espoused, and a distinction is made between the timing of significant 
amendments whose clauses may have changed the performance of the legislation; that is, 
whether the changes to legislation (such as the inclusion of UW clauses) and the adoption of 
best practice (for example, the formation of multidisciplinary task forces) are working. 
Principle Objects – Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Cwth – Sect 5 
Section 5 of the Commonwealth Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 states the principle objects of 
the legislation: 
                    (a)  to deprive persons of the proceeds of offences, the 
instruments of offences, and benefits derived from offences, against the laws 
of the Commonwealth or the non-governing Territories; and 
                     (b)  to deprive persons of literary proceeds derived from the 
commercial exploitation of their notoriety from having committed offences; 
and 
                   (ba)  to deprive persons of unexplained wealth amounts that the 
person cannot satisfy a court were not derived from certain offences; and 
                     (c)  to punish and deter persons from breaching laws of the 
Commonwealth or the non-governing Territories; and 
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                     (d)  to prevent the reinvestment of proceeds, instruments, 
benefits, literary proceeds and unexplained wealth amounts in further 
criminal activities; and 
                   (da)  to undermine the profitability of criminal enterprises; and 
                     (e)  to enable law enforcement authorities effectively to trace 
proceeds, instruments, benefits, literary proceeds and unexplained wealth 
amounts; and 
                      (f)  to give effect to Australia's obligations under the Council 
of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime, and other international agreements relating to 
proceeds of crime; and 
                     (g)  to provide for confiscation orders and restraining orders 
made in respect of offences against the laws of the States or the self-
governing Territories to be enforced in the other Territories. (Section 5) 
These principle objectives fall into several groupings, such that, they may lend themselves to 
matters of quantification and qualification. Such groupings are: 
1. To deprive persons of the benefits, reinvestment or commercialisation arising from 
the proceeds of crime; 
2. To punish and deter persons from undertaking crime; 
3. To enable law enforcement authorities to effectively trace the proceeds of crime; and 
4. To give effect to Australia’s obligations under international agreements. 
Whilst these four groupings cover responses to criminal activity generally, the political 
introduction of POCA, and particularly UW clauses, raises a discourse targeted at serious and 
organised crime. More specifically, the Explanatory Memoranda for the Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Unexplained Wealth and Other Measures) Bill 2014, quotes its purpose as:  
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to amend the POC Act to strengthen the Commonwealth’s unexplained 
wealth regime and improve the investigation and litigation of unexplained 
wealth matters (p2). 
The amendments were passed on 9 February 2015 and included upgrading the purpose of the 
POCA, reiterating the intent that the 2010 Unexplained Wealth laws (statutory sections) were 
a part of “a suite of reforms to more effectively prevent and investigate organised crime 
activity, and target the proceeds of organised crime groups” (p6). 
Articulated Objectives 
The Commonwealth Government’s response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement (PJC-LE) (2012) stated that “Organised Crime is motivated by the huge profits 
that can be made through illegal activity. The Government is committed to ensuring that it 
has strong laws to target the criminal economy; not only to removing the proceeds of crime, 
but also preventing its reinvestment into further criminal activity” (p1). The Government 
agreed to 15 of the Committee’s 18 recommendations, the key purposes of which were to 
“undermine the business model of serious and organised crime by eliminating criminal profits 
(PJC-LE, 2012, p1). 
On the occasion of the second reading of the introduction of Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Unexplained Wealth and Other Measures) Bill 2014, the Minister for Justice (Cwth) clearly 
positioned the legislation at organised crime. He stated, “The government is committed to 
ensuring our nation is safe and secure, and to taking tough steps to strike at the heart of 
organised crime. It is for this reason that we are today taking action to strengthen 
Commonwealth laws that target unexplained wealth.” He further targeted his speech toward 
preventing the “kingpins” of crime enjoying their tainted proceeds, reinforcing the reversal of 
proof necessary to avoid confiscation of illegitimate wealth. He confirmed that the PJC-LE 
(2012) found that the “Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POC Act) was not working as intended”. 
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He described the forthcoming legislative changes as “effective law enforcement framework.... 
Streamlining the processes for obtaining unexplained wealth orders…and…closing loopholes 
in the Act” (Hansard, 25 March 2014). Mr Keenan was subsequently supported by other 
members, including the member for Solomon, Natasha Griggs, who also focused on the use 
of the unexplained wealth provisions to target senior organised criminals (Hansard, 25 
September 2014).  
In earlier introductions to the POCA amendments (2010)
141
, the then-Attorney-General, 
Robert McClelland, outlined the purpose of the Bill:  
It is important that we put strong laws in place to combat organised crime. We 
need to target the profits of crime and remove the incentive for criminals to 
engage in organised criminal activity. We also need to empower our law 
enforcement agencies to defeat the sophisticated methods used by those 
involved in organised criminal activity to avoid detection, often with the 
assistance of highly skilled professionals. New unexplained wealth provisions 
will be a key addition to the Commonwealth criminal asset confiscation 
regime. These provisions will target people who derive profit from crime and 
those whose wealth exceeds the value of their lawful earnings. In many cases 
senior organised crime figures who organised and derived profit from the crime 
are not linked directly to the commission of the offence. They may seek to 
distance themselves from the offence in order to avoid prosecution or 
confiscation action. Unlike existing confiscation orders, unexplained wealth 
orders will not require proof of a link to the commission of a specific offence 
and in that sense they represent a quantum leap in terms of law enforcement 
strategy (Hansard, 19 February, 2010). 
The legislative focus on organised crime,  the proceeds of crime and unexplained wealth has 
been reiterated by politicians in all Australian jurisdictions, as they have clearly spelt out the 
primacy of this statutory objective. In Queensland, the Parliamentary Library key research 
brief to members states that unexplained wealth provisions are introduced as a “multi-
pronged approach to addressing organised crime and outlaw motor cycle gangs”, further 
noting that the targeted senior organised crime figures “fund and support criminal activities 
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 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Bill 2010 
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but seldom carry them out”, hence the need to uncouple statutory provisions regarding 
unexplained wealth from convictions for specific offences (Dixon, 2012). The NSW 
Attorney-General, Hon John Hatzistergos, on introducing the NSW unexplained wealth 
amendments, stated, “[T]hese reforms will give law enforcement agencies new and expansive 
powers to go after the ‘Mr Bigs’ of organised crime who attempt to conceal the sources of 
their wealth. These reforms are part of a coordinated plan to target organised criminals and 
will complement similar schemes that, to this point, have been implemented only by the 
Commonwealth, Western Australia and the Northern Territory” (NSWPD, 19 May 2010). In 
this manner, the discourse from politicians characterises the proceeds of crime and 
unexplained wealth legislation as providing measures for the effective control of higher-end 
criminals and organised criminal groups. This message concurs with, but particularises, the 
purpose stated in the legislation as well as creating greater alignment with international 
treaties (see Chapter 5).  
Hitting the Wrong Targets 
Civil Liberties Australia (CLA) (2011) has raised issues with respect to the use of 
confiscation and seizure laws, claiming that they are aimed at the wrong targets. The CLA 
asserts that the councils-of-state
142
 (such as meetings between the various Australian 
Attorneys-General are influenced by “media frenzy” that results in one side of the 
bureaucracy gaining “ascendancy over balanced and measured thought debate”. The CLA 
refers to several Western Australian and Northern Territory cases where confiscation action 
has been taken against family premises as a result of small-time drug cultivation in and 
                                                     
142
 “The best-known ‘ministerial councils’ are COAG (the Council Of Australian Governments, which involves 
the Prime Minister and the Premiers), and SCAG (the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, made up of 
the AGs of Australia and New Zealand). However, there are more than 40 of these ‘council’ bodies” (CLA 
2011). 
207 
 
around the home
143
. In effect, innocent parties such as wives and children are penalised  in 
addition to the perpetrator’s criminal sentence. Such cases do not reflect an attack on 
organised crime. Northern Territory Supreme Court Judge Dean Mildren spoke out against 
the misuse of forfeiture in the matter of Green (DPP(NT) v Green, 2009), stating, “The wide 
definition of crime-used property, particularly in s 11(1)(c)
144
 , gives rise to the possibility 
that what may be forfeited, for a relatively trivial offence, may be the offender’s own home if 
an act or omission was done in connection with the commission of a forfeiture offence on the 
offender’s own property” (at 21).  
Similar statements that question the appropriate targeting of confiscation legislation at targets 
of relatively low net worth have been made by several law societies (Law Council of 
Australia, 2009 ), especially in the Northern Territory, where examples include petty 
criminals of Aboriginal origin having their vehicles confiscated following alcohol-based 
convictions. This is similar to the United States experience, where law enforcement agencies 
have seen summary confiscation of motor vehicles as a quick remedy for minor drug offences 
(Burnett, 2008; Balko, 2014; Carpenter et al., 2015). In Western Australia, the highly 
publicised case of an elderly couple potentially losing their house after their son was 
convicted of growing marijuana in the back shed drew widespread condemnation (BJF v 
Western Australia, 2011). No research has been identified with regard to the appropriate 
targeting of forfeiture legislation; however, in light of this anecdotal evidence that 
confiscation laws are not being appropriately targeted, and therefore do not work effectively 
to address and prevent organised crime, this is an appropriate area for further research, as will 
be noted in Chapter 10. It is notable that the review of the agencies’ annual reports on 
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 R v King 2017 20170524; BJF v The State of Western Australia Supreme Court of Western Australia [2011] 
WASC 163   
144
 Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) 
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confiscation law outcomes does not show any real response to the Law Council’s concerns, 
nor any direct reply to the legislation’s organised crime reduction objectives. 
Target Drivers for the Control of Organised Crime 
The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) is Australia’s premier response agency  for 
Organised Crime; however,  its biannual public report, Organised Crime in Australia (2015), 
does not refer to the use of forfeiture strategies generally, or unexplained wealth action 
specifically, in its core compliance section, “How are we responding?” (p9). Reference is 
made to the National Organised Crime Response Plan (NOCRP) 2015–2018 as a plan for the 
targeted disruption of organised criminal activity. Initiative Five of that plan, “Tackling the 
criminal proceeds of crime”, refers to “targeting wealth and assets” (p14). Confiscation is 
referred to as “an important mechanism for undermining serious and organised crime” (p14). 
However, the rhetoric is not matched with a methodology, unlike other initiatives. There is no 
mention of the indirect accounting approaches
145
 necessary to properly fulfil the aims of the 
initiative; the focus instead appears to be on money-laundering responses to professional 
facilitators
146
. 
Interestingly, echoing statements from reports into unexplained wealth legislation over the 
previous seven years, the internal Report of the Panel on Unexplained Wealth (2014), led by 
former commissioners Ken Moroney and Mick Palmer, is quoted as finding: 
that current arrangements for dealing with unexplained wealth are not 
working effectively, particularly where criminal assets and activities are 
spread across multiple jurisdictions. The Report found that more needs to be 
done at a national level to seize more of the estimated billions of dollars in 
criminal proceeds in Australia, and effectively use unexplained wealth law 
to put criminal organisations out of business (NOCRP, p14). 
                                                     
145
 See Chapter 8. 
146
 In the absence of AMl/CTF Tranche 2, such facilitators are not substantially captured by Australia’s anti-
money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing (AML/CTF) regime. 
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The ACC has devolved its confiscation role to the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce 
since that organisation’s formation in January 2011. This means that the asset confiscation 
lead has been transferred to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), both as a general strategy 
and through specific strategies, such as the Eligo National Taskforce and Operation Zanella, 
which have targeted money-laundering networks used by organised criminals. The AFP 
Annual Report for 2015 claims seizures of $26.6 million and restraint of $246.6 million from 
these disruption activities. This compares to the target of restrained assets of $65.6 million for 
2015. No details are provided with regard to the number of cases or the type of matters 
leading to restraints, which makes the quantitative data rely on its own recognisance, 
unsupported by details such as the number of restraining actions taken under which statutory 
provision, the distribution of restrained amounts or the expected attrition levels before the 
high level of restrained assets can be counted as confiscations. Chart 7.1 highlights the 
increase in restrained assets, with particular reference to the period after the formation of the 
Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce. In this regard, without qualitative detail it is difficult 
to confirm that the formation of the taskforce has been responsible for the real significant 
increase in restrained amounts. It should be noted that the taskforce provides an alternative 
avenue for the Australian Taxation Office to apply for restraining orders, with the litigation 
process managed by the AFP rather than the Commonwealth Department of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP). There is no indication of any offsetting restraint activity that was 
previously undertaken under taxation legislation.  
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Chart 7.1: Criminal Assets Restrained under POCA (Cwth) 2008-09 to 2014-15 (reproduced 
from the 2014-15 annual report) 
 
Table 7.1 covers a similar period with respect to asset confiscations. 
Table 7.1: Commonwealth Forfeiture Reported from all sources for 2008-09 to 2014-15 
Australian Crime 
Commission 
2014-15      
$ mil 
2013-14    
$ mil 
2012-13     
$ mil 
2011-12    
$ mil 
2010-11    
$ mil 
2009-10    
$ mil 
2008-09    
$ mil 
Assets Restrained  $  237.90   $   34.00   $      4.10   $   25.81   $   42.95   $   21.14   $   26.17  
Assets Forfeited  $    52.40   $   76.10      
 
    
Percentage of forfeited 
assets to those restrained 22% 57% 249% 177% 32% 166% 73% 
Wickenby (Tax)  $  100.00        
 
    
Department of Public 
Prosecutions (Cwlth)         
 
    
POC Act 1987 Total 
Forfeiture Recovered 0 0 0  $     0.18   $     0.13  
 $      
0.12   $     0.89  
POC Act 2002 Pecuniary 
penalty orders  $       0.19   $     0.15   $      0.81   $   23.19   $     2.17   $   13.88   $   10.04  
POC Act 2002 Forfeiture 
orders  $       2.22   $     4.16   $      7.10   $   19.59   $     7.67   $   11.14   $     4.84  
POC Act 2002 Automatic 
forfeiture  $       3.58   $     0.54   $      2.27   $     2.83   $     3.54  
 $      
1.37   $     3.28  
Money recovered without 
formal orders         
 
 $      
8.48   $     0.01  
POC Act 2002 total 
(including sundries)  $       5.99   $     4.86   $    10.19   $   45.62   $   13.81   $   34.87   $   18.31  
Total Forfeiture, both Acts 
2002 & 1987  $       5.99   $     4.86   $    10.19   $   45.80   $   13.95   $   35.00   $   19.20  
Total Forfeiture DPP 
(Cwlth) & CACT  $    58.39   $   80.96   $    10.19   $   45.80   $   13.95   $   35.00   $   19.20  
Source: DPP (Cwlth) Annual reports 2008-09 to 2014-15:  Australian Crime Commission Annual Report 2013-14 to 2014-15 
Legislative changes in January 2011 launched the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce which allowed for the AFP to lead their own POCA 2002 
prosecutions: Table expressed in $ millions 
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Orders 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Commonwealth POCA/UW legislation provides for six types 
of orders under the second chapter of the confiscation regime: 
2.1A  Freezing Orders, against an account in a financial institution, or 
2.1  Restraining Orders, against property, in relation to certain offences; 
2.2  Forfeiture of Goods, forfeiting property to the Commonwealth if 
certain offences have been committed; 
2.3  Forfeiture on Conviction of a Serious Offence, converting a 
restraining order to forfeiture to the Commonwealth unless the 
property is excluded from forfeiture; 
2.4 Pecuniary Penalty Orders, ordering payments to the Commonwealth 
of amounts based on benefits derived from an offence or other 
unlawful activity;  
2.5 Literary Proceeds Orders, to facilitate payment of literary proceeds 
that have arisen in connection with an offence; and  
2.6 Unexplained Wealth Orders, requiring a person to pay an amount 
equal to so much of the person’s wealth as the person cannot satisfy 
the court is not derived from certain offences  
   (Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002, Chapter 2)  
 
The updated provisions of the 2010 Unexplained Wealth legislation introduced three types of 
orders relating to the explanation of unattributed wealth; that is, unexplained wealth 
restraining orders, preliminary unexplained wealth orders and unexplained wealth orders. The 
description of the orders is set out in the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights that 
accompanies the introduction to the amendments. Unexplained wealth restraining orders “are 
interim orders that restrict a person's ability to dispose of or otherwise deal with property. 
These provisions ensure that property is preserved and cannot be dealt with to defeat an 
ultimate unexplained wealth order” (p6). Therefore, numerical assessment of restraining 
orders does not necessarily directly lead to confiscation, as attrition can arise from the release 
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of orders or the funds sought under orders  differing from the funds eventually subject to 
forfeiture. 
 
The uncertainty of judicial discretion in not granting preliminary unexplained wealth orders 
has been a feature of 2010 legislative application. The 2014 amendments remove this 
discretion for unexplained wealth amounts reasonably estimated as greater than $100,000. 
“Preliminary unexplained wealth orders are orders requiring a person to attend court to 
demonstrate whether or not his or her wealth was derived from lawful sources. If the court is 
not satisfied that the person's wealth was not derived from an offence against a law of the 
Commonwealth, a foreign indictable offence or a State offence that has a federal aspect, it 
must then make an unexplained wealth order” (p6). The final court orders are Unexplained 
Wealth Orders made “payable to the Commonwealth an amount which, in the court's opinion, 
constitutes the difference between a person's total wealth and the value of the person's 
property which the court is satisfied was not derived from the commission of a relevant 
offence. That is, the difference between their total wealth and their wealth that has been 
legitimately acquired” (p7). Using orders as a measure of the effectiveness of the forfeiture 
regime should employ both qualitative and quantitative evaluation. In this regard the number 
of respective orders for each period forms the basis of a quantitative measure, whereas the 
use of such orders, accessibility, granting rates and reasons should provide richer qualitative 
knowledge. Such knowledge, although worthy of distinct academic investigation, is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  
Attrition 
Put simply, forfeiture has two steps: restraint, which can be obtained relatively quickly, and 
forfeiture, which requires a more detailed argument. Although some applications can proceed 
directly to forfeiture, the issue of attrition from restraint to forfeiture is significant, as  shown 
in Chart 7.2. That is, the value of assets reported as the subject of restraint orders varies 
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significantly compared to the value of assets eventually forfeited over each year. Whilst some 
forfeiture can be obtained directly the usual process is to obtain a restraining order prior to 
pursuing confiscation. This sometimes varies because of the long lead time between restraint 
and forfeiture, however there are other considerations worth noting and that require deeper 
quantitative and qualitative interpretation. With this in mind it is worth reflecting that 
physically the assets subject to both restraint and forfeiture may include property, cash, bank 
balances, cars, boats, jewellery and any other goods that may hold a reasonable value. When 
valuing assets for restraint orders there may be limitations on the financial investigation 
caused by a lack of due diligence (such as not recognising partial legitimate ownership of 
tainted assets), lack of resources and time due to the urgency in preventing the disposal of 
assets and the reliance on an early estimation of the benefits accruing from a particular crime 
in cases dependent on an estimation of proceeds arising from a specific criminal event. Chart 
7.2 is a crude  measure as this estimate fails to take into account a range of issues such as 
case completion times (from asset restraint to forfeiture), cases on hand between reporting 
periods, the relative size of individual forfeitures (smaller forfeitures more likely to be 
completely fulfilled than larger confiscation) and the nature of associated or predicate 
offences giving cause for forfeiture or confiscation (for example, forfeiture of cash from a 
drug activity compared to confiscation of tainted assets that have been otherwise invested 
(see Home Office Research Report 17, 2009, p7-8). 
 
Chart 7.2, which compares assets restrained with those forfeited, shows a significant jump in 
assets restrained in 2014-5; this aligns to the formation of the multi-agency task force 
approach to enforcement. Full details of these results have not been made available therefore 
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it is impossible to fully explain the spike in results and is an area for post-doctoral research. 
The attrition levels between restraining orders and ultimate forfeiture in Australian 
jurisdictions are significant and unexplained in qualitative terms. The United Kingdom also 
noted that “there is significant monetary attrition in the confiscation order system”, which it 
deemed as artificial due to “the broad assumptions that can be applied in the calculation of 
criminal benefit” (Bullock et al., 2009, p1). The UK Home Office Research Report 17 noted 
the need for a more methodical, systematic and strategic approach to ensure confiscation and 
revisiting cases where the sums recovered have fallen short of expectations. The report 
identifies a number of reasons for attrition; these include the lack of court-recognised 
patterned principles to determine the wealth used in a criminal lifestyle (indirect or gap 
methodology), and the lack and inadequate use of investigative resources. This means that 
estimates produced for the court in the earlier stages of forfeiture do not necessarily match 
the actual figures obtained in the later phases of actual forfeit. The complexity of forfeiture 
cases also contributes to an attrition effect, particularly where indecision about taking a 
matter through the court process capitulates into an out-of-court decision, the basis of which 
is a confidential compromise that is not available for public scrutiny. Further research is 
recommended that carries on to the Australian scenario where  agencies have neither 
undertaken research  nor made explanations. This is despite frequent institutional comments 
to newspapers and similar media that inflate the potential value of confiscated assets 
147
.   
State and Territory Jurisdictions 
In general the Department of Public Prosecutions, or its equivalent department in each 
relevant state and territory, is responsible for reporting details of restraints and confiscations 
under POCA and Unexplained Wealth statutory provisions. Key Performance Indicators 
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 See, for example, the Mokbel case in Victoria, where a significant number of assets were valued for 
forfeiture and publicised in the media at a top valuation. In one instance, the ketch Edwina was listed as being 
worth $323,000, but was eventually sold for $30,000. 
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(KPIs) reported by each jurisdiction generally provide numerical, enforcement interventionist 
goals, articulated as collated groups. Matters are almost always described collectively as 
disruption measures (see annual reports from the DPP in all States and the Commonwealth); 
however, the qualitative effects inherent in any concept of disruption are not articulated.  For 
example, measures such as the amount of drugs seized, the amount of money forfeited, the 
number of cases brought or the number of people arrested form only a crude basis for the 
representation of reduction or prevention of organised criminal activity through its disruption. 
The purpose of a disruption strategy is to interrupt the flow of criminal activity. Mere 
numerical statistics provide little insight into the interruption effect of either significant 
individual prosecution events or the collective intervention of aggregated legislative action on 
criminal activity and attitudes. “Success in contemporary organised crime policing is 
increasingly becoming defined in terms of ‘harm reduction’ (often at the ‘community level’)” 
(Mackenzie and Hamilton‐Smith, 2011). The primary objectives of modern forfeiture 
legislation are espoused in terms of the reduction in community harm, through the prevention 
of criminals’ ability to fund further activities and to inhibit the use and enjoyment of tainted 
assets (see Commonwealth and States and Territories DPP annual reports). However, the 
published measures of achievement focus on quantitative enforcement measures with 
minimal, qualitative analysis and no analysis of causal effects; for example, where an amount 
of drugs and money from drug trading is forfeited, what is the extended effect on drug 
availability or street pricing (note, the exception of the NSW Crime Commission 2014-15)? 
This accountingization of performance indicators has been questioned (in the British context) 
as rewarding “formality over substance” (Collier, 2006). KPIs in law enforcement have 
tended to be unambiguous and somewhat meaningless when compared to the more complex 
objectives that require contextual evaluation concerning the impact of actions and the fear of 
consequences. The use of ‘proxy’ KPIs may not give a true indication of how the activity (in 
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this regard, forfeiture) essentially engages the target issues (such as crime prevention) 
(Keeney, 1992). Instead, statistical variances in quantitative measures of prosecution activity 
and aggregated forfeiture are deemed, without direct explanation, to provide a measure of 
disruption to the organised criminal’s network and mindset.  Nevertheless, in the absence of 
better qualitative data, this research attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of forfeiture 
legislation in reducing organised crime, relying primarily on the published data of the 
responsible agencies.  
State and Territory Jurisdictions Reporting 
New South Wales (NSW) 
The office of the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP(NSW)) reports its interaction 
with confiscation matters under the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 (CoPoCA). 
At the same time the NSW Crime Commission reports more significant confiscations from 
civil proceedings taken under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) (CAR Act). The 
NSW DPP pursues forfeiture after a conviction has been recorded, with the most common 
property confiscated being cash, followed by motor vehicles, computer equipment, mobile 
phones and hydroponic equipment. The NSW DPP reports annually based on the orders 
obtained under CoPoCA and the estimated value of their forfeiture. Table 7.2 summarises the 
amounts reported annually since 2008-09. 
 
Table 7.2: NSW Forfeiture: DPP (NSW) Reported Results 2008-09 to 2015-16 ($ million) 
  2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 
Number of Applications 372 318 295 274 262 247 214 47 
Estimated value of forfeiture $3.70 $1.50 $1.00 $1.10 $2.10 $2.60 $1.80 $0.47 
Source: DPP (NSW) Annual Reports produced each year from 2007-08 until 2015-16 
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The NSW Crime Commission pursues matters that are not conviction-based. It has noted the 
associated difficulties associated with “measuring the performance of its operations” (2015, 
p15); specifically, the nature of long-running investigations, the accumulation of sufficient 
evidence for arrests and prosecution and the cumulative effect on criminal activities of the its 
active investigative presence. Nevertheless, the NSW Crime Commission reports in a manner 
similar to other jurisdictions: through the aggregation of forfeiture events and proceeds. The 
Crime Commission reports that “the illicit drug trade in Australia from drug importation 
through to street level distribution continues to be the chief source of income for organised 
crime in Australia”. The 2014-15 annual report notes the qualitative trend towards substantial 
drops in the wholesale price of drugs, indicating the increased availability of larger quantities 
of successfully imported drugs. They also report on trends in ethnic organised crime and  
outlaw motorcycle gangs. 
The Crime Commission notes the role of financial investigations in association with criminal 
investigations as a disruptive strategy that targets organised crime, with co-located 
investigative teams and forensic accountants to cross-pollinate between criminal investigative 
and financial investigative departments. The protocols of this relationship present challenges, 
particularly as confiscation proceedings are civil proceedings and a negotiated settlement 
may be preferable. In the case of a negotiated settlement the forensic accounting evidence 
may play a crucial role; however, the court is only notified of the forfeiture order, which is 
certified by the Commission to comply with the Management Committee Guidelines for 
negotiating the terms of settlement (2015, p21). The Commission reports on elements of the 
investigative process of forfeiture matters, as aggregated in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.  Such 
elements include information-gathering powers that use summonses and notices to produce 
reports under the Crimes Commission Act.  
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Table 7.3: NSW Crime Commission Activity Measures – Reported 2008-09 to 2015-16 
  
 
2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 
Summons and Notices issued         
Crime 
Commission 
Act 
Summons (s24) n/a 0 0 0 N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Notice to Produce (s28) n/a 15 13 16 N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Notice to produce (s29) n/a 1312 1192 1358         
Orders 
Total summons and 
notices 
  1327 1205 1374 0 0 0 0 
Examination orders (s 
12) 
108 58 81 60 79 N/R N/R N/R 
CAR Act 
Examination orders (s 
31D) 
2 1 5 5 41 N/R N/R N/R 
Statement of affairs 
orders (s 12) 
77 41 66 54 74 N/R N/R N/R 
Statement of affairs 
orders (s 31D) 
1 1 1 5 3 N/R N/R N/R 
Production orders (s 33) 1 0 0 3 20 19 14 16 
Search warrants (s 38) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Search warrants (ss 44 
and 45) 
31 27 33 25 39 49 38 50 
Monitoring orders (s 48) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Orders 220 128 186 152 256 68 52 66 
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 Table 7.4: NSW Crime Commission Forfeiture Reports: 2008-09 to 2014-15 ($ millions) 
  2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 
CAR Act restraining orders   91 54 81 61 82 106 88 126 
Confiscation orders sought 
without a restraining order  
 
11 18 12 16 15 11 15 0 
Assets Forfeiture Orders made   27 42 41 36 27 49 28 63 
Est’d realisable value of Assets 
Forfeiture Orders 
 
$11.36 $  18.20 $  16.12 $  12.60 $      5.46 $    13.56 $    15.50 $  12.88 
Process Assessment Orders 
made  
25 
35 42 36 40 51 72 60 
Est’d realisable value of Process 
Assessment Orders   
 
$16.24 $    7.91 $    7.76 $    5.56 $      7.87 
$       
7.42 $    29.42 $  11.12 
Unexplained Wealth Orders 
made  
8 
3 5 3 2 
See legislative changes 2010 
Est’d realisable value of 
Unexplained Wealth Orders   
 
$5.5 $    0.73 $    1.22 $    1.25 $      0.15 
Orders for breach of warranty   0 0 1 3 0 
Est’d realisable value of Orders 
for breach of warranty 
 
N/A N/A $    2.00 $    0.13 $           - 
Total no. of confiscation orders 60 80 89 78 69 100 100 123 
Total est’d realisable value of 
confiscation orders    
 
$33.09 $  26.51 $  27.12 $  19.54 $   14.89 $    20.99 $    44.93 $  24.06 
Unexplained Wealth as a % of 
Total Orders made 
 
13% 3.8% 5.6% 3.8% 2.9% 
   Unexplained Wealth as a % of 
Total Confiscation 
 
17% 2.8% 4.5% 6.4% 1.0% 
   Source: NSW Crime Commission Annual Reports - 2008 to 2015-16 
Reported in $ millions 
 
Chart 7.3 shows that NSW confiscations have steadily, but not dramatically, grown over the 
past five years. The reporting year 2015-16 shows a 28% increase; however it, is too early to 
confirm that this effect is due to the change in compliance structure. NSW appears to be the 
most effective state in terms of the implementation of forfeiture remedies. This is most likely 
due to their differentiated approach through the application of a multi-skilled task force 
approach that incorporates accounting and legal skill sets into a single task force unit 
covering casework from commencement to conclusion. Forensic accountants are directly 
integrated into the Crime Commission’s case load, contributing to the criminal narrative, 
which is both used as direct evidence and leveraged to assist other approaches such as 
perpetrator interviews. Because of the complexity and delay in finalising cases, further 
research after three to five years should be able to provide a reasonable assessment of 
effectiveness of the multi-skilled task force system. Such research should include a focus on 
settlement cases that occur without the transparent light of public scrutiny. 
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Victoria 
The Victoria DPP has reported annually regarding its use of the Confiscation Act 1997 since 
the Act’s inception in 1998. Each year the annual report contains a section titled “Proceeds of 
Crime”, where the general disruptive objectives are articulated and general comments about 
the competencies are brought to bear on criminal and civil confiscation. More recently (since 
2013), these have included specialist solicitors and forensic accountants. In the 2010-11 
annual report the DPP (Vic) flagged an increase in the use of civil forfeiture provisions (UW) 
as a method of addressing tainted assets without the need for linking prior criminal offences. 
This was followed in 2011-12 with the request for more funds to assist with confiscation 
cases, resulting in an increase in resources of $3.15 million per annum for four years from 
2012-13. Despite this increase, the results for the following year showed a decrease in 
confiscations of 29.5%. The 2014-15 results showed confiscations of $19.9 million, up 91% 
on the previous year but similar to 2011-12. 
The Victorian DPP claims to have been successful in using both criminal and civil 
confiscation legislation in response to significant criminal activity, such as in Project Entity 
(Drug Taskforce Unit), Project Parana (Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs) and the Mokbel 
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Chart 7.3: Comparison of annual forfeiture - NSW 
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(significant criminal and his enterprise) matters, and in response to the Victorian gangland 
wars
148
. The DPP have actively encouraged referral and joint work with the Victorian Police 
Force; to this end, they provide ongoing training on how police can identify assets for 
potential forfeiture. The annual report of 2008-09 stated that “one of the most valuable tools 
available to law enforcement agencies is the power to confiscate proceeds of crime and to 
freeze and forfeit criminals’ assets” (p7); however, no distinctive confiscation strategy was 
articulated. Table 7.5 aggregates the Victorian annual results for confiscation, donations to 
the state fund for victims of crime and number of restraining orders. Each annual report 
presents its figures somewhat differently, with no comparative performance tables and little 
comparative information of any kind. However, some case study items are highlighted, which 
indicate areas for future study, such as the attrition rate between the amounts restrained under 
order and the amounts of eventual forfeiture. For example, Operation Entity successfully 
restrained $18 million of assets, with only $2 million of these being eventually confiscated,  
or 11% (in other words, 89% attrition). The 2014-15 report provides information about the 
average time taken to pursue forfeiture cases, which declined from 36.9 months in 2009-10 to 
19.5 months in 2014-15 (p15). This still indicates that the average time taken to prosecute a 
forfeiture case exceeds a year and a half, and hence there is a delayed reporting effect of one 
to two years from the commencement date.  
  
                                                     
148
 The Victorian ‘gangland war’ was a series of tit-for-tat murders, commencing in 1998, which lead to 27 
deaths in Melbourne’s underworld (ergo.slv.vic.gov.au, 2016).  
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Table 7.5: Victorian Confiscations and Restraints 
 
2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 
Assets Confiscated  $30.0   $19.9   $10.4   $14.2   $19.8  
Contributions to Victims of 
Crime  $2.0   $1.4   $1.7   $0.5   $6.4  
Restraining Orders 113 114 120 101 N/R 
Value of Restrained Assets  $70.0  N/R N/R  $55.2  N/R 
Source: DPP(Vic) Annual Reports extracted from text 
$ millions: N/R = not reported 
 
The 2015-16 report notes that the VPP (Vic) contribution to “improv[ing] the effectiveness of 
the Confiscation Act 1997, including clarification that property acquired with loan proceeds is 
not lawfully acquired where that loan is repaid with proceeds of crime, regardless of whether 
that person has been charged with or convicted of that crime” (p13). In accordance with 
increased funding to pursue UW matters since 2013, and new laws enacted in 2014, nine UW 
cases were initiated in 2015-16 (the courts are still to finalise the matters). These matters 
broke new ground in the UW genre, in that they appeared to rely heavily on indirect 
accounting measurements “to restrain property based on a police member’s suspicion that the 
property owner is engaged in serious criminal activity or that a person has acquired their 
property unlawfully” (p13). Interestingly, the first confiscation of bitcoin was made for 
25,000 units associated with a drug matter. Chart 7.4 indicates a 50% increase in asset 
confiscations, as expected under the new unexplained wealth funding model; however, it is 
too early to fully assess the model’s effectiveness. Further research should be undertaken to 
ascertain the effectiveness of the expected increased reliance on accounting techniques and 
negotiated civil settlements
149
. 
                                                     
149
 Such settlements are by definition not reported individually in legal case references. Further research has 
been instigated to evaluate the increased role of forensic accounting in proceeds of crime and matters of 
unexplained wealth. It is noted that Victoria appears to be the only state taking active moves towards a pre-
emptive strategy for unexplained wealth. 
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Queensland 
The Queensland DPP administers and reports on the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 
2002, which commenced on 1 January 2003. The DPP (Qld) also conducts prosecutions on 
behalf of the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC). There are three 
principle and separate schemes in the Act: non-conviction-based schemes (Chapter 2); 
conviction-based schemes (Chapter 3); and conviction-based serious drug offender schemes 
(Chapter 2A). Chapter 2 schemes are not dependent on a conviction in connection with the 
confiscated property, whereas Chapter 3 schemes require a connection between the property 
and the criminal charges. The legislation was amended with effect from 6 September 2013 by 
introducing a scheme for recovering “unexplained wealth” (Chapter 2 Part 5A) and a serious 
drug offender confiscation scheme (Chapter 2A). At this stage, despite publicity  about the 
targeting of “drug lords” and “bikie gangs” (ABC, 2015, 2016; Qld Government Press 
Release, 2015), there does not appear to be any significant change in the number of new 
matters or the amounts restrained or confiscated. There is a notable attrition between amounts 
restrained and those eventually confiscated. Whilst there is a recognised lag effect due to 
lengthy prosecutions, over the seven years reported in Table 7.6, 53% of restrained orders led 
to confiscation, a 47% attrition effect. No explanation has been provided for this attrition. 
Chart 7.5 indicates an increase in confiscations since the introduction of the 2013 
unexplained wealth amendment; however case reviews (see Chapter 9) do not indicate that 
unexplained wealth methodologies are the basis for increased forfeiture. 
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Table 7.6: Queensland Forfeiture: Reported Results 2008-09 to 2014-15 
  2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 2009-10 
Chapter 2  
and  
2A 
Outcomes 
Restrained Property $ 19.05  $ 18.32   $   13.80   $17.09   $20.85   $14.11   $19.50  
Confiscated Property $10.01  $  8.38   $   17.65   $16.98   $  7.01   $  9.32   $  5.57  
% of confiscation outcomes 
52.5% 
46% 128% 99% 34% 66% 29% 
Chapter 3 
Outcomes 
Forfeiture Orders Collected $ 0.59  $  0.82   $     0.97   $  0.64   $  0.60   $  0.46   $  0.57  
Penalty Orders Collected $ 0.08  $  0.21   $     0.12   $  0.15   $  0.12   $  0.16   $  1.12  
New confiscation proceedings 50 37 40 25 31 34 69 
New restraining orders 73 88 65 48 64 44 97 
Serious Drug Offence Certificates 582 315 9   
 
  
 
  
Amended 
Legislation   
Source: DPP (Qld) Annual Reports 2008-09 to 2015-2016 
Table expressed in $ million.  
Confiscation to restraint comparisons may have a delayed effect due to the time taken to resolve matters.  
 
 
South Australia 
The DPP (SA) reports annually on the South Australian Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 
2005. The report typically makes a general statement of the powers of the act followed by 
minimal statistical reporting. The confiscation amounts are consistently low, with no 
qualitative explanation as to why the amounts appear to be so low as not to make an impact 
on organised and serious crime. The amounts reported appear to support Commissioner 
Hyde’s frustration when, prior to retirement, he expressed concern that police could not 
integrate a confiscation strategy into their modus operandi, preferring “lock them up” type 
remedies (Inquiry into Commonwealth unexplained wealth legislation and arrangements, 
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2012, Chapter 4). Unusually, the 2008-09 report provided much greater detail on confiscation 
application outcomes (2008-09, p10-20); the data indicated a 60% confiscation resolution of 
matters (by numbers of matters). Table 7.7 summarises the reporting of DPP (SA) from 2008-
09 to 2015-16, demonstrating the low value of confiscations compared to other jurisdictions. 
The trend is consistent and does not demonstrate any greater emphasis or outcomes with 
respect to confiscation in recent years. 
 
 
 Table 7.7 : South Australian Forfeiture: 2008-09 to 2015-16 
  2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 
Brief's Received 371 271 283 218 327 186 209 285 
Brief's Finalised 246 236 269 247 195 214 167 256 
Deposited to victims of 
crime fund 
 
$1.58 $      1.16 $      1.70 $      2.32 $      2.27 $      2.22 $      0.92 $      1.40 
Source: DPP (SA) annual reports 2008-09 to 2015-16 
Table expressed in $million 
In SA all confiscated funds are deposited into the victims of crime fund 
 
Western Australia 
The Western Australian DPP reports annually on the various outcomes of matters under the 
Western Australian Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000. This is despite the fact that 
WA Police may independently apply for Freezing Orders and Freezing Notices directly from 
a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace. The 2014-15 report notes that the number of notices and 
orders fell in 2013-14 due to a change of focus towards “high-end organised crime”, which is 
interesting  considering that the objectives of confiscation have always been to target 
organised crime. As previously noted, WA was an early adopter of POCA legislation; 
however, they have had challenges in appropriately focusing prosecutions, leading to a public 
backlash in which the community has perceived such prosecutions to be poorly targeted (see, 
for example Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers, 2010; Skead, 2016). Notably, 
the total orders received is down 60-69% on the 2008-09 figures. The change of focus toward 
organised crime appears to be reflected in the change in the contribution of drug confiscations  
to total confiscations, which  declined to between 52-57% compared to the figure of 78% 
reported in 2008-09. This tends to indicate a change of focus from confiscations from small 
drug producers, to confiscations from those who accumulate tainted wealth by other means. 
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Without reporting qualification details it is difficult to apply these figures to an enlightening 
narrative.  The WA emphasis on in personam and in rem confiscation has been a strong but 
controversial focus on property linked to crime rather than property funded by crime (Skead, 
2016). 
 
Table 7.8: Western Australian Forfeiture Reporting: 2008-09 to 2015-16 
    
2015-16 
$mil 
2014-15 
$mil 
2013-14 
$mil 
2012-13 
$mil 
2011-12 
$mil 
2010-11 
$mil 
2009-10 
$mil 
2008-09 
$mil 
  
 
Freezing Notices 
 
185 186 158 250 246 218 231 263 
  Freezing Orders 13 9 11 14 14 3 13 17 
  Total 198 195 169 264 260 221 244 280 
Drug Traffickers   
      
  
  Declarations Made 75 107 96 94 73 84 111 120 
  Amount Received $  7.69  $    5.76   $  4.26   $    5.77   $    5.23   $    5.19   $  10.05   $    6.07  
Crime Used or Derived  
      
  
  Declarations Made 45 42 49 66 39 54 34 20 
  Amount Received $  5.26  $    3.89   $  3.60   $    2.99   $    1.54   $    1.54   $    3.21   $    1.24  
 
 
$  13.02  $  10.14   $  8.19   $    9.36   $    7.52   $    7.33   $  13.44   $    7.83  
Source: DPP (WA) Annual reports 2008-09 to 2015-2016 
Table expressed in $ million.  
Other sources of confiscation include the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981; Criminal Benefits, Crime used substitution sections of the Act. 
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Tasmania 
Tasmania’s Crime (Confiscation of Profits) Amendment (Unexplained Wealth) Act only came 
into effect on 1 March 2014. The Tasmanian DPP (2014-15, p3) has noted that a pilot 
program has identified considerable work in the area of investigating unexplained wealth. 
The 2015-16 report gave the first outcomes:  
Pecuniary penalty orders    $37,490  
Forfeiture orders     $283,350  
Unexplained wealth orders $823,200  (2015-16, P3) 
Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory Department of the Attorney-General and Justice, including the 
Department of Public Prosecutions, which has carriage of proceeds of crime and unexplained 
wealth prosecutions, does not report such prosecutions separately in their annual reports. 
From published case judgements it is known that the Territory has pursued forfeiture as a 
proceeds of crime strategy; however, their strategies for dealing with unexplained wealth 
matters appear to have been limited to pursuing assets from criminals who have been 
classified as significant criminals after conviction for offences (usually drug trafficking) 
(Skead, 2016). It is estimated that the total amount of UW forfeited to the Northern Territory 
since implementation of confiscation statutes is $3.5 million, including one large settlement 
of $968,000 (Smith and Smith 2016). 
Total Confiscations in all Australian Jurisdictions 
Table 7.9 and Chart 7.7 detail the combined asset forfeiture outcomes across all reporting 
Australian jurisdictions from 2010-10 to 2015-16. In this context the Commonwealth is by far 
the leading protagonist in applying forfeiture as measured by total confiscated value. In most 
years the Commonwealth confiscated approximately double the value of the next jurisdiction, 
NSW, and approximately 35-40% of total confiscations. The most recent two years, 2014-15 
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and 2015-16, show significant increases in the value forfeited. This correlates with the 
expected results from the Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce (2011). Further research is 
required to attribute the enhanced results to the integration of accounting skills into the 
taskforce approach. Overall the leading performances over the past two years – for the 
Commonwealth, NSW and Victoria – appear to be due to the task force approaches employed 
in those jurisdictions over that period; that is, including accounting skills and knowledge into 
the legal approach to the implementation of forfeiture strategies. 
 
Table 7.9: Jurisdictional Confiscation Comparison 2010-11 to 2015-16 
Jurisdiction 2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 2010-11 
  $ $ $ $ $ $ 
Commonwealth 58.39 80.96 10.19 45.8 13.95 35.00 
NSW 33.09 26.51 27.12 19.54 14.89 20.99 
Vic 30.00 19.90 10.40 14.20 19.80 20.00 
Qld 10.01 8.38 17.65 16.98 7.01 9.32 
WA 13.02 10.14 8.19 9.36 7.52 7.33 
SA 1.58 1.16 1.70 2.32 2.27 2.22 
Tas 1.16 0 0 0 0 0 
NT N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Total Reported 
Forfeiture 147.25 147.05 75.25 108.2 65.44 94.86 
Source: Jurisdictional annual reports 
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The total forfeiture for the past two years across all jurisdictions was approximately $147 
million, up considerably from the previous periods (Chart 7.8). However, considering that 
one of the espoused aims of modern forfeiture juridification is to increasingly disrupt 
organised crime, this amount pales into insignificance compared to estimates of organised 
crime in Australia of $36 billion (ACC, 2014, p6). The confiscation value represents less than 
0.5% of the estimated annual value applied to organised crime. 
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The Measurement of Organised Crime 
The measurement of organised crime is, by the surreptitious nature of the crime itself, 
problematic. Savona et al. (2003), in their assessment of the United Kingdom context, 
commented that such measurement has “traditionally been impeded both by a lack of clarity 
as to what defines organised crime and organised criminals…[and] concomitantly a lack of 
reliable police or criminal justice data with which to monitor official performance” (in 
MacKenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2010, p10). Levi and Maguire (2004) also refer to 
traditional “situational”
150
 policing measures as not being suitable to adequately measure the 
impacts of organised crime in Europe, stating that “organised crime is a notoriously difficult 
concept to define and to measure” (p397). Measuring organised crime and any mitigating 
impact of legislation depends, in this case, on the definition and aims of the forfeiture 
methods of criminal behaviour moderation, the ownership of the problem and  precisely how 
                                                     
150
 In this regard the term ‘situational’ methods of crime recording and prevention refers to situations where 
specific changes are made to influence the offender’s decision or ability to commit crimes at a particular place 
or time. Situational crime prevention may not prevent crime but may displace criminal behaviour. Situational 
crime reporting is unitised, or accounting-like, in its collation and quantified presentation (see Joyce and Wain, 
2010). 
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the impact of the interventions is determined. Specifically, any measure of the reduction of 
organised crime should contain the prevention of harmful acts and the diminution of 
organised criminal groups or formations involved in such acts. The impact of organised crime 
transcends that of smaller groups and individuals in that it benefits from the cumulative 
“reputational benefits and economies of scale”, creating a greater social threat (p398). 
Measurement of the effectiveness of forfeiture legislation on its espoused objective to reduce 
and prevent organised crime should therefore be addressed according to its use against, and 
mitigating impact on, organised criminal groups, rather than on small criminal enterprises and 
individuals. The ACC nominates organised crime groups in Australia as ranging from outlaw 
motorcycle gangs to transnational syndicates based offshore. They also note that such groups 
use “professional facilitators and service providers to help or ‘facilitate’ their criminal 
activities” (ACC – Organised Crime Groups, 2016).  The 2014 estimation of the cost of 
organised crime activity in Australia is $36 billion annually, of which the direct cost of 
crimes such as illicit drug trafficking and organised fraud is estimated to be $21 billion 
(ACC, 2014, p6). Organised fraud is estimated at $6.3 billion per annum, targeting the 
financial, insurance and superannuation sectors; illicit drug activity is estimated to cost $4.4 
billion; consequential crimes (primarily arising from drug activities) $6.2 billion; and illicit 
commodities, identity crime and enabling crime $4.3 billion collectively. These costs have 
been estimated using collective statistical methodology that brings together the use of 
sensitive data and information that evaluates the serious and organised component of both 
detected and undetected crimes. This methodology is far more sophisticated than previous 
estimates based merely on a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. Earlier estimates had put 
the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia at $15 billion dollars per annum. Whilst 
these numbers quantify the total impact of criminal activity, from the breakdown of costs 
presented in the 2013-14 report it is estimated that $11 billion is the value of criminal 
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earnings that would give rise to the proceeds of serious and organised criminal activity (ACC, 
2013-14). Table 7.10 reviews the estimation of the cost of different types of organised crime 
in Australia; however, the overwhelming focus of jurisdictional reporting of forfeiture and 
confiscation case analysis (see Chapter 9) is  on the forfeiture of drug-trafficking proceeds or 
assets accumulated from the proceeds of drug trafficking. No jurisdictional reporting breaks 
down forfeiture results as applicable to types of organised crime. Similarly, discussion of 
organised crime over types of criminal activity does not refer specifically to the application of 
forfeiture strategies. 
 
Table 7.10: Consequential Serious & Organised Crime Costs 
Crime Type 
Estimated 
Cost Crime Type 
Estimated 
Cost 
Organised fraud $6.3 billion Cybercrime $1.1 billion 
Illicit Drugs $4.4 billion 
Crimes against the 
person $.089 billion 
Illicit 
Commodities $1.5 billion Crime Enablers $.5 billion 
Burglary $4.005 billion Vehicle Theft $.3 billion 
Identity Crime $1.2 billion Conventional fraud $3.3 billion 
Source: ACC 2013-14 
 
Ineffective Use of POCA and UW Confiscation as a Weapon Against 
Organised Crime 
From the above analysis, whilst recognising that quantitative measures alone do not provide a 
holistic view, it can be seen that the amount of confiscature is less than 1% of the amount 
estimated to be invested annually in the commission of, and profit from, organised crime in 
Australia. This low percentage casts doubt on whether POCA and UW legislation is having 
any significant effect on the commissioning of organised and serious crime, or the ‘Mr Bigs’ 
touted on the introduction of the statutes. Risk analysis (formally conducted or just as an 
assumed inherent assessment by perpetrators) would show both a low likelihood of being 
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brought to account and a low consequence of losing the use and enjoyment of the value of 
tainted assets. In summary, such a profile would be assessed as an acceptable risk, 
particularly if the form of crime is outside the realm of drugs and firearms. 
 
Reporting on the Strategic use of POCA and UW 
In the UK it has been reported that the use of available POCA and UW powers in high-wealth 
cases was “patchy” and that “evidence of co-ordinated prioritisation of asset recovery was 
rare” (Research Report 17, 2009, p3). Whilst the recently formed NSW and Commonwealth 
task forces include POCA and UW in their disruption strategies, their actual role within such 
strategies is not independently assessed or reported. The ACC does report on organised crime 
strategic identification and impact. For example, 54 organised crime syndicates or senior 
individuals have been identified and profiled (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission 
(CACIC), Criminal Syndicates, 2015). The ACIC also identifies criminal groupings, such as 
outlaw motorcycle gangs, professional facilitators, ethnic-based groups and transnational 
syndicates. If forfeiture legislation is to truly be deployed towards the prevention of organised 
crime, jurisdictional reporting should provide an end-to-end evaluation of the use of 
confiscation legislation that commences with forfeiture strategies that target the identified 
criminal syndicates in order to apply unexplained wealth provisions without the need for 
prior convictions. Police and task force leadership have previously commented on the 
difficulty for law enforcement to change their focus from criminal incarceration and detention 
strategies (Hyde, 2012); however, as portrayed in the juridification of POCA and UW 
statutes, confiscation provides a strong basis for a strategic response to serious and organised 
criminals. 
Standardised national reporting would provide a strong binding element in the design and 
deployment of an effective cross-jurisdictional POCA and UW strategic response. Consistent 
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accountingization according to the attributes of similar legislative orders, as adopted, would 
provide the basis for an aggregated and comparative analysis. Qualitative analysis with 
regard to the application of POCA and UW remedies to criminal genres, the size and nature 
of criminal activity, attrition rates, settlement rates and conversion rates, expressed 
consistently, should be included in all jurisdiction’s annual reports. Specifically, the 
development of direct POCA and UW strategies should be aligned to current organised crime 
measures and trends. Such strategies could include, for example, the automatic production 
and reporting of inventory in an offender’s assets when they are given a drug-trafficker 
declaration (CPCA, 2000) and strategic confiscation action taken against all serious and 
organised criminals identified by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 
irrespective of prior convictions or the lack thereof. The state police commissioners have 
expressed their confidence in the financial analyst roles of forensic accountants in tackling 
organised crime in their submissions to the Senate Inquiry into Commonwealth Unexplained 
Wealth Legislation and Arrangements (see Chapter 3); however, the annual reporting of all 
forfeiture jurisdictions does not align confiscation strategies primarily led by forensic 
accounting analysis to their approach to the mitigation of organised criminal activities. 
Quantitative reporting, rather than mere examples, should be directly linked to prosecution 
matters, allowing for transparent review of quantitative validity and the recognition of 
attrition and its reasons. The reasons for the lack of forensic accounting strategies requires 
further research and is revisited in Chapters 9 and 10. 
Postscript 
Chapter 7 was compiled for this dissertation between 2014 and 2015; however, when this 
dissertation as a whole was being compiled, a research article by Smith and Smith published 
in December 2016 was brought to light. This work triangulates much of the work presented in 
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Chapter 7, concurring with the analysis and conclusion. For example, they report that “the 
total value of assets confiscated in Australian jurisdictions between 199-96 and 2013-14 was 
approximately $800 mil or $44 mil annually as measured against the cost of organised crime 
in Australia of $33 bil.” (p1). The current research found $615 mil in the more recent six 
years 2010-11 to 2015-16. Nevertheless, the Smiths’ conclusion was that “the discrepancy 
between these two amounts clearly shows more needs to be done to target the profits of 
organised crime” (Smith and Smith, 2016, p1). The Smiths’ research included both analysis 
and interviews with those involved with unexplained wealth prosecutions. 
The Smiths’ research reiterated the need for financial expertise through integration of 
forensic accountants and lawyers in a task force approach. They concur with this 
dissertation’s articulated barriers of lack of national collaboration, lack of focus on ‘follow 
the money’ approaches, case complexity and reluctance for prosecution agencies to follow 
through the legal action (civil or criminal). Despite calling for the text referral of statutory 
powers from state and territory jurisdictions to the Commonwealth, they note the lack of any 
Commonwealth prosecution with regard to unexplained wealth provisions. With respect to 
the higher performance of New South Wales, they claim that “more than 95 per cent of 
unexplained wealth matters in New South Wales are finalised through negotiated settlement, 
rather than by litigating the matter at trial”. In considering litigation, they report that the 
NSW prosecutors take into account “the likely success, the cost of litigation and the extent to 
which any confiscated assets are actually recoverable” (p4). Finally, the Smiths recommend 
“uniform national data collection” including “discrete data for unexplained wealth 
proceedings and data on the value of restrained assets, confiscated assets and funds recovered 
through the use of court orders and/or negotiated settlements” (p8).    
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Chapter 8: Accounting Evidence 
Introduction 
Earlier in this dissertation concepts of structural coupling between the accounting and legal 
professions (chapter 3) and patterned principles (chapter 3) were discussed. This chapter 
explores further the content of both structural coupling and patterned principles at a 
pragmatic level in order to inform the research in regard to the appropriate calculation 
narrative and accounting discourse suitable for forfeiture legislation. Throughout this thesis 
the role of the accounting expert as an expert witness has been positioned within the context 
of the legal profession who control accounting’s entry into the adjudicative debate. This 
chapter, more specifically, reviews how the law has influenced the acceptability of particular 
accounting evidence beyond the specialised knowledge that is peer supported by the 
accounting profession
151
. In this regard, the discourse is about the content overlap between 
the professions rather than the professional overlap itself. Whilst the professional overlap has 
been considered by researchers (Greenwod et al, 2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ruef & 
Scott, 1998; Gulati, 1995), mainly from the viewpoint of the interaction between the 
hegemony of each profession, the specific overlap of subject matter has not been researched 
other than with respect to the legal authority given to accounting standards through the 
Corporations Act 2000
152
. 
                                                     
151 As the thesis’s focus is on the deployment of accounting technologies the example technologies presented 
in this chapter are not claimed to be in of themselves specialist or specifically determinant of a class of 
accountants, being forensic accountants. Instead these accounting technologies have been selected because they 
are both in the form of accounting patterned principles and have at some stage been recognised by the courts. By 
nature the accounting patterned principles described would most likely be recognised by member professional 
accountants as rather ‘simple and straight forward’ however, this recognition is not shared by the legal 
profession, nor the lifeworld and hence their specific expression is required in this chapter. The techniques 
described are not exhaustive. 
152
 The professional content overlap in this instance is with respect to the role and authority given to accounting 
standards arising from the CLERP9 process and sections of the Corporations Act 2000. It is not directly relevant 
to the current research discourse. 
237 
 
 As recognised earlier, the legal process of empowerment arises from precedent judicial 
comment, that influences the acceptability and probity of the content presented as expert 
opinion. For example, an opinion based on certain criteria (potentially aligning to a specific 
patterned principle) that has been accepted in a particular judicial genre, holds 
disproportional weight when repeated in respect of similar facts and circumstances in another 
case, usually within the same genre. In this manner senior judges or combinations of judges 
of a higher court (for example, an appeals court or the full court compared to a single judge), 
provide precedential endorsement that can rely upon similar methodologies in similar 
contexts that arise in the future. Judges are under peer pressure to adhere to such precedents, 
often extensively quoting their previous peers to avoid critical dissention. This then, provides 
some dilemma in legislative genres that are relatively early in their gestation, based on new or 
considerably revamped (juridified) legislation, such as the POCA and UW legislation (based 
on the Australian Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002 Cwth, and state and territory aligned statutes). 
In summary, the newer the legislative genre is, the less likely that the statute has been 
subjected to judicial interpretation and precedent, and therefore the legal debate is more 
uncertain with respect to the application of legal direction, principles and norms (such as 
fairness) to specialised knowledge. That is, the patterned principles required to reproduce 
decisions (or to instruct expert testimony) are not readily available from within the relatively 
few cases of the new legislative genre. 
This chapter is in three parts. Initially, it reflects on how the legal profession has intervened 
into accounting’s specialised knowledge, to create new internal legal norms that influence the 
acceptance, providence and interpretation of accounting expert evidence (Part 1). This is 
important to recognise with respect to the structure of accounting methodologies that form 
the basis of evidentiary reports, because, these new norms provide the court’s normative 
instruction, not only to the legal profession, or to the accounting profession, but to the 
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professional designations at the face of the structural coupling between the professions, that 
is, more specifically, forensic accountants. Viewed to the contrary, if a forensic accountant 
does not accommodate the legal genre’s perspective, the accounting evidence runs the risk of 
being deemed irrelevant, therefore denying access to the court or diminishing probity 
(Makita, 2001 (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles, 2001, (‘Makita’)). The chapter takes examples 
from areas of law outside the forfeiture objective, that nevertheless, have some alignment 
with the determination and redistribution of assets. For example, the ‘value to the owner’ 
concept in family law (that pertains to family wealth distribution); ‘intuition’ in settlement 
disputes (that integrates a logical ‘feeling’ with accountable facts and behaviours); asset 
tracing methodological nuisances in equity law (that pertain to fair economic resolution); and, 
equity compared to common law asset tracing and redistribution. This legal accommodation 
to normative closure covers the intersection between accounting and the courtroom and gives 
legal norms a distinctive flavour that caters for external references within the internal 
operations of the system. It is an autopoietic
153
 response where the system takes care of itself, 
“connecting the internal and external references by internal operations” (Luhmann, 1989, 
p142). 
In Part 2, the chapter moves on to review the peer accepted accounting methodologies that 
should comprise acceptable specialised knowledge for the purpose of confiscation matters 
under POCA/UW. Properly constructed, such methodologies should be given access to 
advise the court’s adjudication in these matters. These accounting methods are supported by 
their precedent access to courts in other jurisdictions where the court is attempting to answer 
questions similar to those relevant to UW/POCA cases. For example, matters that concern 
undisclosed income have often been considered under Taxation legislation. S 167 of the 
                                                     
153
 The legal extraction and adaption of particular norms instructing another profession’ body of knowledge is 
autopoietic because it is made by the legal profession for use within the legal system and is done so without 
prior approval or reference to the profession who own the knowledge. It is based on an internal legal discourse 
of approval under consequential penalty of non-recognition by the legal profession. 
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Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, allows the (Tax) Commissioner to “make an assessment 
of the amount upon which, in his or her judgement, income tax ought to be levied, and that 
amount shall be the taxable income of that person for the purpose of s 166
154
”. Further, 
assessments of undisclosed income have been considered in Family Law, Common Law and 
Equity Law, that provide precedents under their relevant statutes. The application of POCA 
and UW legislation to forensic accounting expert reports requires judicial interpretation 
within particular statutory clauses, however, judicial discretion remains informed by the 
broader context of methodologies recognised as similar to the application of the special 
knowledge of the forensic accounting opinion witness.  
At the heart of this discussion is the legally acceptable content of accounting’s body of 
knowledge. This is important because, whilst the law shows strong acceptance of accounting 
expert witnesses who attest to complex matters of valuation and interpretation of financial 
concepts, the courts have not always been as accommodating of accountants who propose to 
testify with regard to lower level accounting expertise. Whilst accounting clearly claims 
ownership of expertise that recognises, applies and builds on the double entry accounting 
concept (generally attributed to Luca Pacioli, 1494), the courts have refused to grant expert 
knowledge access to double entry based accounting analysis, such as the interpretation of 
bank statements, citing the court’s opinion that such knowledge and skill is generally 
available to the community. Further, Part 2 builds on the deployment of both direct and 
indirect accounting analysis of undisclosed income, that submit their outcomes  
based on the expert knowledge and skills notated in Makita. In this regard direct 
methodology refers to the analysis of transactions that directly reflect the movement of funds 
(such as those contained in bank statements) however they may have been misclassified (such 
                                                     
154
 S 166 compels the Commissioner of Taxation to make an assessment with regard to the amount of taxable 
income, the amount of tax due with regard to that income and the taxpayer’s offsets and refunds. 
240 
 
as from private rather than business sources) or remain unbalanced. Indirect methodology 
applies accounting technology to the extent that it identifies and quantifies a gap in the 
explanation of the funds flow, the gap represents the unexplained income or wealth.   
Part 3, introduces the legal and accounting content overlap when the ownership and control 
of assets is considered. Similar to the legal accommodation of accounting techniques within 
legal concepts, discussed in part 1, the formally recognised accounting control of entities is, 
in contrast, with the broader concept of control considered beyond the corporate veil. This 
concept can be complex and is the subject of legal discussion beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, however, a brief general consideration in this chapter paves the way for the 
application of control concepts when accounting concepts are deployed to assist the court 
adjudication in UW and POCA matters (See Chapter 9). 
Part 1 – Expert Opinion Consistent With the Norms of the Legal Genre 
Legal Accommodation – Asset Tracing in Equity 
An example of the legal accommodation of accounting evidence, facilitated by principles 
arising from different legal genres, is in matters that concern the tracing of assets. The two 
legal genres at question are common law and equity. Similar to the accounting technologies 
deployed to support expert evidence, asset tracing is not, of itself, asset recovery or a legal 
remedy, but is a precursor to the assertion of a personal or a proprietary claim either at 
common law or equity (Stone and McKeough, 2003). It is a methodology deployed by skilled 
practitioners to identify assets so that a court can decide what distributive remedy to apply, 
however that deployment must be cognisant of the patterned principles applying to the 
appropriate legal genre, that is, either common law specificity or equity’s unjust enrichment. 
241 
 
Each of these genres provides its own underpinning philosophical guidance that assists to 
validate the patterned principles deployed in the reporting of the asset tracing. In common 
law the claimant relies heavily upon specific records of legal ownership, whereas in equity 
claimants rely on their equitable interest in an asset. The application of asset tracing 
methodologies in common law may be defeated if records of ownership are obscured, such 
as, through integration with other untainted property or otherwise legal transfer of title, 
whereas an equitable title to an asset may continue as a concept of rights, distinct from the 
common law (legal) rights. In equity “the body of principles constitute what is fair and right” 
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 2001, p241). It was held in Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) that “equity 
looks on as done that which ought to be done”. Asset tracing is distinguished from following 
an asset or claiming an asset. From an equity viewpoint tracing is the “process of identifying 
a new asset as the substitute for the old” (Bryan and Vann, 2012 pp347-8). Following is the 
process of tracking the same asset from point to point and if such asset is retrieved under 
common law then this precludes the claim for equitable compensation as it would be double 
recovery (Creak v James Moore & Sons Pty Ltd, 1912). ‘Claiming’ is the process of 
regaining the asset or its substitute through a personal claim or a constructive trust over the 
property
155
. 
Legally tracing and claiming property at common law is more straightforward, but by the 
same account, limited. Common law claims are related to specific title for property, or for 
chattels, protected under actions of detinue, conversion or trespass
156
. Only detinue gives rise 
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 Constructive trust is a court created, equitable remedy of implied trust to the benefit of a party who has been 
deprived of the property or rights by another who had no right to do so. It is 
a “relationship by which a person who has obtained title to property has an equitable duty to transfer it to anothe
r, to whom itrightfully belongs, on the basis that the acquisition or retention of it is wrongful and would unjustly
 enrich the person if he orshe were allowed to retain it”  
(http://legal- dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/constructive+trust accessed December 2016). 
156
 Detinue, conversion and trespass (legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com): 
Detinue: the crime of wrongful detention of goods or personal possessions; one of the oldest forms of action in 
common law. 
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to specific restitution where a market substitute is unavailable (Whiteley Ltd v Hilt, 1918). By 
contrast, equity is more complex, with patterned principles having been established 
concerned with the tracing methodology presented to the court by appropriate experts. By 
necessity equity has developed rules for segmenting mixed property, such as a mix of 
legitimate and tainted funds in a bank account, provided that the plaintiff can prove they held 
equitable title in the property or funds. An expert reporting to the court regarding mixed 
property must first identify the party mixing the claimant’s funds with other funds, secondly, 
the claimant must prove title to the mixed money, followed by proof regarding the history of 
the mixed funds after mixing. Further, equity courts have developed patterned principles 
through precedent, which inform asset tracing and are potentially relevant to an accounting 
expert’s assessment of unexplained wealth. Briefly these principles are “the irrebuttable 
presumption” that the trustee has preserved trust money and spent his own first (Hallett’s 
Estate, 1880, and approved by the High Court in Brady v Stapleton, 1952), a policy of 
preserving trust assets through substitutions of property (Re Oatway, 1903); “lowest 
intermediate balance“ rule (Loftus v McDonald, 1974); “first in, first out” principle 
(Clayton’s Case, 1816, with limitations
157
); the appreciated value of the property rule (Scott v 
Scott, 2003
158
); constructive trust giving proportionate share of the profit or loss after the date 
of judgement (Foskett v McKneown, 2001); ‘rateable distribution’, where money is 
distributed on a proportional basis and money used in general operations has been dissipated.  
These principles are mainly concerned with the continuity of property rights and “its 
theoretical underpinning is property law, not unjust enrichment. The plaintiff’s property right 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Conversion: a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or 
inconsistent with his title or rights therein, or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such title or rights, without 
the owner's consent and without lawful justification. 
Trespass: an unlawful intrusion that interferes with one's person or property.  
157
 First in – first out (FI-FO) as applied in Clayton’s Case may conflict with the own money first rule applied in 
Hallett’s Estate. Therefore the FI-FO rule is applied where beneficiaries will share rateably in the remaining 
funds. 
158
 In Scott v Scott claimed for the proportion of the investment which represents their contribution to the 
investment, thereby preventing the defendant from profiting from their own wrong (Scott v Scott). 
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to the traceable product is a response to and a vindication of the plaintiff’s rights to the 
original asset.” (Read and Herbert, 2002, at 119). Reflecting on Nozik’s entitlement theory 
(chapter 3), the principle of justice in acquisition is injured by unjust transfer and should be 
rectified by compensation or readdressing past transgressions. Justice is broadly supported in 
the return of property wrongfully taken, however common law remedy depends upon the 
transactional proprietary links being established. With respect to unexplained wealth 
remedies this principle holds in reverse, in that the proprietary links are, by definition 
missing. There is a gap that is unexplained. Nevertheless the comment of McLure J still 
applies, in that, “it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the nature of the claimant’s 
property interest and when and how it arose in order to assess whether the claimant can trace 
to the traceable product” (at 95). In regard to unexplained wealth, the understanding pertains 
to broader wealth accumulation. Evans (1999) advocates a causal approach where the central 
focus is value, that is, “to trace the claimant’s value into the defendant’s assets even where it 
is not possible to trace the claimant’s value to any specific asset” (Stone and McKeough, 
2003, p391). Tracing therefore assumes an expanded doctrine of restitution, that vindicates 
property rights and reverses unjust enrichment (Lord Millett in Foskett v McKeown at 129). 
Legal Accommodation – ‘Value to the Owner’ 
The legal genre of Family Law can be vexatious, leading to strong feelings of entitlement, 
often played out through the valuation of marital assets (Australian Law Reform Commission 
CPS1, 2009). In this context, and in the absence of a unique epistemological approach to 
valuation, the Family court has adapted the concept of valuation to suit its needs. To this 
extent, the concept of “value to the owner” has arisen (see Reynolds and Reynolds, 1985) to 
accommodate valuations, where the market concept of the fully informed hypothetical buyer 
and hypothetical seller who make a transaction in a hypothetical market (Spencer v 
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Commonwealth, 1907) is not independently valid.  “Value to the owner” was developed from 
cases where, when a minority interest was held in a family company, the market test for the 
value of the shares, fails, as it can be argued that there is no market because no third party 
(outside the family) would buy the shares without any possibility of control. However, from a 
family assets point of view the shares may have a value and that value may be considerably 
enhanced by benefits received in the hands of the family member who owns the shares. 
Business valuations in the Family Law genre are frequently determined using the Future 
Maintainable Earnings Methodology
159
 where there is no ready market for shares, which 
determines the expected value of a future income stream to be generated by the business. This 
is not necessarily the price at which the shares of the business entity would change hands. 
From a Family Law viewpoint the value of the shares in the family business entity may 
provide other benefits such as employment, self-employment, lifestyle or links with other 
businesses. As explained in Scott and Scott (2006) her honour (after considering relevant 
precedents in Hull and Hull (1983), Turnbull and Turnbull (1991), Reynolds and 
Reynolds (1985) and Sapir v Sapir (No 2) (1989)) found: “`I am satisfied in the context of 
proceedings under the Family Law Act that when a judge is determining the value of shares 
held by a party in a family company, she or he must look at the reality of the situation and 
value the shares on the basis of their worth to the shareholder. In this case, the husband’s 
shares can only be valued on the basis of their worth to him in the context of 
the Harrison family as a whole. That worth is substantial.”(at 45). Further, as noted by Watt J, 
in Clarkson and Clarkson (2008),  
The authorities indicate that valuations performed pursuant to the value to owner 
objective consider benefits arising from ownership which encourage retention 
thereof for an indefinite period. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the likelihood 
                                                     
159
 That is the use of a method that provides the present value of income received in the future from the business 
activities.  
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of the party opting to sell his or her shares. Cases such 
as Hull, Reynolds and Ramsay and Ramsay (1997) indicate that if a party is likely 
to retain his or her shareholding, the appropriate objective for valuation is value to 
owner, on the basis that a benefit is derived over and above an eventual sale price 
(at 208).  
By the development of the value to the owner concept the Family court has given rise to a 
valuation ontology that recognises both the economic value of the family asset (usually 
shares) yet accommodates the legal notion of equalising the total relative benefit of share 
retention in marital asset redistribution. Therefore, the ontology instructs a patterned principle 
deployed by the accounting profession for the purposes of the legal profession’s obligations 
under the Family Law Act. 
Legal Accommodation – ‘Intuition’ 
A significant indicator of the law accommodating concepts of equity rather than the 
application of accounting methodology is in the example of Fitzpatrick v Cheal (2012) and 
Cheal Industries Pty Ltd (2012, 2013) (‘Chilli’) where Ward J considered the various forensic 
accountants’ evidence pertaining to the valuation of the business, preferring to rely upon her 
intuition instead. The matter concerned the actions of the husband who traded through an 
incorporated entity that the wife was an equal shareholder. The husband made surfboards 
under the name and trademark of “Chilli Surfboards” and the business, as valued (by 
accountants) according to its fundamental economic performance, had no goodwill. 
Motivated by his divorce, the husband, however, took significant steps to retain the Chilli 
Surfboards name and trademark within a new entity. Her honour surmised that “There was 
presumably some perceived value in the use of the Chilli name (even if Mr Cheal's 
accountant dismissed it as non-essential) since otherwise there is no reason for Mr Cheal to 
have undertaken the steps he did to change the name” and further that the “method of 
valuation may be adapted to the dictates of fairness in the circumstances — determination of 
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nominal value not a strictly mathematical exercise, but involves an element of intuition” 
(Fitzpatrick v Cheal (2012) at 38).  
The judgement in Chilli considered at length the legal concept of ‘fairness’ in valuation as 
distinct from the accounting concept of ‘fair value’.  In this regard the principles of fairness 
are overlapping content of each profession, similarly termed, but, differentially described 
according to the underpinning legal or accounting ontology. In the legal sense, ‘fairness’ is 
the determination of “what would have been the value of the shares at the commencement of 
the proceedings had it not been for the effect of the oppressive conduct of which complaint 
was made” (Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer, 1959, at 369). Further, the 
process of legal ‘fairness’ is described as “in looking to the fair value one must look at all the 
circumstances of the case and seek to put the oppressed in the same position as nearly as can 
be as if there had been no oppression, erring, if there is to be any erring, on the side of the 
oppressed” (ES Gordon Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd, 1995, at 540) (also referencing 
Re Associated Tool Industries Ltd , 1963, at 70; Re Golden Bread Pty Ltd, 1977, at 55; 
Coombs v Dynasty Pty Ltd,  1994, at 102). Ward J’s consideration of ‘fairness’ in Chilli is 
instructive as it represents a considerable point of professional content confusion that arises 
as the legal and accounting professions structurally couple. The important consideration for 
accounting expert witnesses is that, in the courtroom, the confusion will mostly be resolved 
by the legal gatekeepers, consistent with the legal interpretation such as of ‘fairness’ rather 
than ’fair value’. 
Part 1 – Conclusion 
From the above review of the legal instruction with regard to the suitability of accounting 
methodology for specific legal genres, the forensic accountant recognises that the strength of 
their evidence is directly affected by its concurrent accommodation of both the legal 
247 
 
principles and the accounting methodology. This is important if the accounting evidence is to 
be validly accepted as relevant by the trier of fact and to influence the court’s adjudication. 
Whilst specialist expertise and training is necessary to fulfil the Makita tests, the judicial 
weight of the accounting evidence reflects the structural coupling of the accounting process 
with appropriate legal norms aligned to specific legal genres. The relevance of such legal 
accommodation will be revisited in chapter 9, particularly aligned to unexplained wealth 
legislation and notions of economic or entity control.  
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Part 2 – Methodologies, Methods and Patterned Principles used by 
Accountants, as Expert Witnesses, to Identify Undisclosed/Unexplained 
Income
160
 
Part 2 of this chapter articulates the various accounting methodologies relevant to the 
investigation of undisclosed income that may be relevant for transition to underpin expert 
accounting evidence in the POCA and UW legislative genre. Whilst Part 1 recognised that 
legal norms can adapt accounting evidence to the court’s perspective, it is important to note 
the specific accounting methodologies and methods that are appropriate for such adaption. 
Following the argument in Makita and in Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull 
Australia Pty Ltd, 2002, (‘Red Bull’), it is important to demonstrate that forensic accounting 
evidence is based on an organised area of study as well as a peer recognised body of 
knowledge. In this regard, part 2 of this chapter, segments two types of accounting 
methodologies, those of direct estimation of unexplained wealth or proceeds of crime 
followed from documentation, connected with events, organisations and eventually a 
controlling entity or person, and those of indirect estimation that analytically establish and 
quantify a gap in the financial explanation where the gap is instructive of illegitimate wealth. 
Understanding the patterned principles deployed by both direct and indirect methodologies is 
important in both the legal arguments for court access and the court’s probative assessment.   
                                                     
160
 The selection of methodologies represents peer accepted methodologies for the professional estimation of 
unexplained wealth, deployed variously, given the sources and reliability of available information. These 
methodologies do not represent the totality of forensic accounting methodologies but are a comprehensive 
description of the patterned principles commonly deployed to establish unexplained wealth. Increasingly 
sophisticated computerised estimation techniques build on the manual principles as described.  
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Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Direct Methodologies - Basic Accounting Knowledge – Double Entry Bookkeeping 
The double-entry accounting methodology basically views accounting transactions as having 
two balancing sides, that of a Debit and that of a Credit. The existence of one side gives rise 
to the existence of the other, such that the balancing of both sides is equal but opposite, 
resulting in a zero equation. Whilst there were some double entry records amongst accounting 
functionaries in western literature dating back to the 14
th
 century (Italian Treasurer, Messari’s 
accounts, 1340), there are claims that similar accounting technology was used in Korea 
(Goryeo Dynasty, 918-1392
161
) and in Muslim civilisations (Al Khawarizmy and Al 
Mazendarany receipts AD 976
162
). Essentially early trade between locations (such as each 
end of the silk road
163
) was enhanced by the double entry of accounts balancing from one end 
to the other. Luca Pacioli, a Franciscan friar is accredited with the codification of the double 
entry methodology in his book, Summa de arithmetica, geometria, proportioni et 
proportionalita (Summary of arithmetic, geometry, proportions and proportionality), 
published in 1494, and which has led Pacioli to be referred to as the ‘father’ of accounting 
(see, for example, accountants-day.info). Double entry accounting is an important recognition 
of the sources and application of funds moving into and out of an accounting system, 
recorded as balancing debits and credits.  
There are two explanatory approaches to double entry accounting, either or both of which, are 
included in the university curriculum of early accounting subjects (see ACCY101, University 
of Wollongong). Competence in double entry methodology, as specified within these 
subjects, forms an integral part of the mandatory qualifications of an accountant, as 
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 Developed in Korea during Goryeo dynasty (918-1392) when Kaesong was a centre of trade and industry at 
that time. The Four-element bookkeeping system was said to be originated in the 11th or 12th century (Pretvits 
and Wolnizer, 2011) 
162
 Al Khawarizmy and Al Mazendarany in AD 976 which show receipts recorded on the right hand page and 
payments on the left hand page (Zaid, 2004) 
163
 The Silk Road is a historically important international trade route between China and the Mediterranean. 
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evidenced through fulfilment of industry association entry specifications (see the membership 
requirements of  CPA Australia, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand membership specifications). In the traditional approach
164
 to double entry accounting 
there are three account genres, ‘real accounts’ which relate to assets and liabilities such as the 
capital accounts of the owners; ‘personal’ accounts which relate to persons or organisations 
that deal with the accounting entity, such as debtors and creditors; and ‘nominal’ accounts 
that deal with funds received from trading such as revenue or income gains and funds spent 
by the business such as expenses and losses. Double entry technology demands that each 
financial transaction is recorded in at least two different ledger accounts, so that the total 
debits equals the total credits in the ledger, the accounts therefore balance. Double-entry 
accounting practice is rules driven, such that, real accounts create a debit for what comes in 
and a credit for what goes out; personal accounts debit the receiver and credit the giver; and 
nominal accounts debit all expenses and losses and credit all incomes and gains (Hyans, 
1916). Ledgers such as day books do not individually balance with debits and credits 
however they are balanced when posted to the nominal accounts such as to sales and 
(represented by) cash at bank. The concept of a ‘day book’ can be broadly applied to include 
a criminal’s ledger or notebook, recording one side of a transaction (for example, a notebook 
record of ‘$x’ from person ‘a’ on day ‘d’) is the same as recording daily sales which then 
should tally with other expenditure, banking or application of the funds. 
Alternatively, the accounting equation approach
165
 explains the same double entry 
methodology resulting in the same debit and credit rules.  The accounting equation governs 
the technology, that is, Assets = Liabilities plus Capital. This equation is then expanded to the 
five types of accounts that are assets, liabilities, income/revenue, expenses and capital. If 
there is an increase or decrease in one account, there will be an equal decrease or increase in 
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 Also known as the British approach. 
165
 Sometimes referred to as the American approach. 
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another account,: which must be equal according to where the account is allocated to the 
accounting equation. In this regard: 
 Assets Accounts: debit entry represents an increase in assets and a credit entry 
represents a decrease in assets. In this regard: 
 Capital Account: credit entry represents an increase in capital and a debit entry 
represents a decrease in capital; 
 Liabilities Accounts: credit entry represents an increases in liabilities and a debit entry 
represents a decrease in liabilities; 
 Revenues or Incomes Accounts: credit entry represents an increase in incomes and 
gains, and debit entry represents a decrease in incomes and gains; and 
 Expenses or Losses Accounts: debit entry represents an increase in expenses and 
losses, and credit entry represents a decrease in expenses and loss. 
The importance of double entry accounting methodology for evidence is that it is scientific (it 
has its own set of principles and rules), systematic (it records financial transactions 
systematically), complete (it records all aspects of each and every transaction), accurate 
(Debit and Credit transactions correspond arithmetically align) and controlled (the opposing 
nature of debits and credits carry through to a balancing equation which can be used to 
confirm that transactions were accurately and completely recorded
166
. The double entry 
accounting methodology forms the basis of the patterned principles a forensic accountant 
would apply to a financial investigation. The properly executed balancing concept of double 
entry methodology is either the balanced locking key on the financial analysis or 
confirmation of the unexplained gap where a balance is not achieved. When deployment of 
these technologies do not balance then the gap is both detected and quantified before the gap 
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 http://accountlearning.blogspot.com.au accessed Dec 2016.   
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is used to estimate unexplained cash, and put before the court as confirmation of unexplained 
wealth estimates
167
.  
Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Direct Methodologies - Bank Statement Analysis 
Whilst bank statements are designed for the lay person to be able to recognise the basic 
details of money transacted and held on their behalf, they form a vital component in both the 
bank’s financial system and the client’s financial system (Madinger and Zalopany, 1999, 
p199). The use of the double-entry method dictates that the cash and account transactions on 
the client’s bank account are recorded at the same value, in the opposite debit or credit, than 
is recorded in the client’s accounting system, they must match if the accounting systems are 
valid. This also applies to personal accounts, even where there is no formal business type 
accounting system being operated. The effect is that the bank’s accounting system must 
balance with the client’s banking system therefore the bank’s account statement should 
reflect a balancing record of periodic transactions, detailed chronologically, recorded in the 
opposite direction to that of the client (that is, a debit to a credit and visa versa). 
Prima facie, bank statements are merely a description of one set of debits and credits 
assembled within one real account of an accounting system, however, analysis of a bank 
statement by a skilled accountant recognises the deployment of an accounting technology that 
relates the personal and nominal accounts to each transaction entry on the bank account 
statement, either directly or through a string of related, balancing transactions. In this manner 
accounting technology takes transactions and binds them together into an informative 
narration of the financial performance (profit and loss) and the financial state (balance sheet) 
of a person, an entity or a set of transactions. In this sense the patterned principle, recognised 
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 For example, Net Worth Analysis, Sources and Applications and Gross Margin Analysis. These methods will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
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by accountants, is one of balanced debits and credits (often formally referred to as the ‘trial 
balance’).  
Bank statements (produced by a financial organisation) and other business ledgers, such as 
accounts receivable and accounts payable, should balance to the entity’s accounts that form 
an interlocking system of double entry balances between organisations. Further they inform 
the narrative, such as, the entity’s net worth is represented by an amount of cash at bank, or 
that business ‘a’ is owed $x from business ‘b’ which recognises that it has lent business ‘a’ 
$x, where $x = $x. The double entry accounting system is about balance. If transactions fail 
to balance they fail the double entry methodology and therefore they beg explanation. 
Financial auditors use the interlocking double entry logic to verify transactions as validated 
by the bank statements, produced at arms-length from the business (Arens, Elder and 
Beasley, 2005, pp683-688). Such an explanation, presented by an expert, is usually 
informative to the court, particularly with respect to unexplained wealth and financial 
remediation. An experienced forensic accountant builds on the simple double entry model, 
recognising where the model may have been defeated (such as the removal of cash trading 
balanced by reduced gross margins), manipulated (such as revaluating assets to increase 
ownership capital) or remains unbalanced (such as a loss not being brought forward). The 
simplicity of double entry methodology is a basic tenant of the accounting profession, 
enabling expertise to be applied to stand alone ledgers and transactional analysis, through to 
complex financial interpretation. Willemse, 2004, (in Jordaan 2007) describes the analysis of 
bank account statements as forming part of the “chain which establishes a causal link” 
between a financial activity (or a crime), noting that the bank transactions inform the “profits 
there from and the benefit obtained as a result of these profits” (p23).  
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Bank statements have been accepted in evidence in a plethora of matters across a range of 
jurisdictions
168
. They attest to individual transactions, account balances and underpin the 
documentation of the flow of funds. For example, in BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter 
(No 4) (2016), where an offshore transfer scheme, involving Israeli banks, was used to defeat 
creditors, specifically the Australian Tax Office. Transactions on bank statements were linked 
(by opposing debits and credits) to show a flow of funds between and out of the bank 
accounts of several entities including personal drawings. The bank statements were further 
used to sustain the narrative regarding the purpose of some of the entities involved such as 
Binqid Pty Ltd being “specifically set up for the purposes of borrowing money from IDB and 
then on-lending it to other entities for the purposes …..” (at 53). The narrative was sustained 
by the Binqid account’s bank statements only containing interest payments and withdrawals. 
Reflecting on the Chapter 5 discussion, with regard to the admissibility of expert evidence, 
this dissertation relates the basic review of bank statements and the double entry accounting 
methodology, to the ‘tests’ of expert opinion provided in Makita, which were reaffirmed in 
Red Bull. The ‘tests’ that pertain to the acceptance and treatment of expert opinion evidence 
under s79 of the Uniform Evidence Act, do not form a “basis rule” but “nonetheless the Acts 
require that weight and relevance interact at common law” (Australian Law Reform 
Commission, 2004, at 9.65). In Makita, Heydon JA referred to “the interaction between 
considerations of weight and relevance” (at 9.68) and described seven elements of common 
law said to be enacted by s79 (see chapter 5). Of particular significance to the issue currently 
at hand (recognition of double entry methodology), is that there must be an agreed or 
demonstrated field of “specialised knowledge” and that “there must be an identified aspect of 
that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or 
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 A search of the Westlaw database (Dec 2016) showed over 1,000 cases referring to bank statements in their 
judgements. The cases cover matters such as equity claims, real estate, taxation, financial disputes and 
liquidation. 
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experience, the witness has become an expert” (at 9.68). Further, the expert’s opinion must be 
wholly or substantially based on the specialised knowledge with the opinion properly 
anchored in identified facts. The expert must bring together the above in a demonstration of 
the intellectual basis for the opinion consistent with the application of the expert’s 
“specialised knowledge”.  
Makita was a decision on whether an employer failed to provide a safe means of access 
between the car park and offices, via stairs. An expert gave evidence that dealt with the 
slipperiness of the stairs at the time of the accident. The expert tested the stairs that formed 
the basis of the opinion nine years after the accident which gave rise to judicial deliberation 
of both the forensic consideration and the evidentiary concern of the expert opinion. In Red 
Bull the expert testimony was brought into question regarding whether marketing was 
considered an area of expertise and whether an expert can give evidence on matters of 
common experience. The matter arose with respect to the distribution of products of a similar 
nature to Red Bull beverages and whether that distribution was deceptive conduct. The 
justices in Red Bull referred to Heydon JA in Makita as the commencement of their 
deliberations with respect to the expert testimony of Dr Beaton, a marketer. Whilst these 
cases do not, in and of themselves, refer to accounting expertise the patterned principles 
elucidated, that give regard to the respective experts, carry across to many fields of expertise 
that include accounting. 
Application of the judicial principle for the acceptance of opinion evidence necessitates that 
there must be a field of “specialised knowledge” identified with respect to the analysis of 
bank statements. In this regard it is appropriate to consider the information contained on each 
statement as well as the process an expert should undertake in analysing bank statements, 
individually and as a group. The bank statements highlight details such as the name and 
contacts for the financial services provider, individualised account numbers and account 
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ownership details, with each statement page forming a numerically ordered, chronological list 
of transactions. These transactions are sorted in the language of accounting, that is, expressed 
in monetary terms, converted to a common currency and ordered under either a credit or a 
debit column. The debit or credit column informs the narrative as to whether the transactions 
represent the inflow or outflow of funds. The statement is prima face a ‘personal’ account in 
the traditional accounting methodology because it is created by a third party associated with 
the account holder, and in that form is held in high regard from auditors to validate business 
and personal accounts
169
. The bank statement also informs the skilled reader of evidence that 
pertains to the trading of the account holder and the entries on the nominal and real accounts. 
In detail the transactions on the bank statement are ineradicably aligned to the account 
holder’s general ledger, or, if an individual, their purchases and expenditure relating to their 
net worth and their financial behaviour. The evidential narrative is informed by the detail of 
each transaction (such as supplier purchase, cash withdrawal, the card on which the 
withdrawal was made, the date and time of purchase or payment, transfers between accounts, 
transfers to other banks, e-transfers, bank assisted transfers or withdrawals, cash or cheque 
deposits, bank cheques, any individual client notations). Bank account statements contain 
more than just numbers detailing the period’s activities, fees and balances. Behind this data is 
valuable information that a skilled practitioner relies upon to enrich the evidential story 
through aggregation, consistent with double entry methodology, aligned with the general 
ledger accounts or a combination of like transactions (such as expenses, direct costs, income, 
wages etc.). Once aggregated, these accounts can be analysed for trends with commonality 
and difference compared between time frames, between the accounts themselves, between 
accounts from varying sources and amongst comparable attributes (Gorr v McGrellis, 2012). 
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 Auditors recognise that bank statements have high reliability with respect to accuracy and completeness and 
therefore auditors use bank statements in their substantiation of business bank accounts and therefore the flow 
on to all forms of income and expenditure managed through the bank accounts. Auditors value the separation of 
duties between the management of client accounts and the bank accounts while recognising the indelible links 
between the accounts of both organisations conforming to the double-entry methodology.   
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In this regard what commences as a mere list of transactions on a third party statement 
leverages on the double-entry method to support increasingly complex vertical and horizontal 
accounting analysis
170
,
171
. 
Analysis of bank statements is not a skill generally held by non-accountants. Even amongst 
trainee financial investigators, Willemse (2003, 2005, in Jordaan, 2007), noted a lack of 
expertise in what to look for on bank statements, how to structure the data contained therein, 
how to analyse the data and how to effectively present the findings of the data effectively in 
court
172
 (Jordaan, 2007). Jordaan reviewed the use of bank statement analysis in the South 
African legal system and advise of an appropriate patterned manner of bank statement 
analysis to establish evidence of illicit financial activity. In the U.S. the New Jersey Division 
of Criminal Justice Training Academy, white collar crime and investigation course, teaches a 
stepped process of analysing bank statements that includes instructions on how data is to be 
searched, sorted, totalled and reported in a consistent manner. Specific formulae are applied 
to determine significant depositors and payment recipients both in terms of frequency of 
deposits and amounts of deposits (Peterson, 2002) (see Appendicies 7A and 7B). Further the 
explanation of how to use pattern analysis to establish usual and unusual patterns of receipts 
and payments is recognised as an accounting investigation skill (Peterson, 1998, p54). Some 
of the most common patterns are determined by general ledger coding, by reference, by date, 
by amount or by transaction destination (New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 2001, 
p228). ATM withdrawals also reveal location information that can provide an indication of 
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 Vertical analysis is a method of financial statement analysis in which categories of accounts (for example 
assets, liabilities, profit or expenses) are compared to the total account or to the total of another account (for 
example expenses as a percentage of gross profit) (www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vertical_analysis.asp 
accessed Dec 2016) 
171
 Horizontal accounting analysis is a fundamental trend analysis in which an analyst compares ratios or line 
items in financial statements over a period of time (www.investopedia.com/terms/h/horizontalanalysis.asp, 
accessed Dec 2016). 
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 Willemse made his comments based upon his experience training financial investigators at London’s 
Financial Intelligence Centre’s Financial Investigation Training Program where in 2004, 66 law enforcement 
officers were trained from 10 South African law enforcement agencies. 
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other activities such as a regular attendance at a club or hotel (Willemse, 2004, in Jordaan, 
2007; Fargher expert evidence in Gorr v McGrellis, 2012).   
 
The process of dealing with bank statement analysis is important because as Gleeson CJ 
emphasised: 
“… the provisions of s79 will often have the practical effect of emphasising the 
need for attention to requirements of form. By directing attention to whether an 
opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on 
training, study or experience, the section requires that the opinion is presented 
in a form which makes it possible to answer that question” (HG v The Queen, 
1999 at 39). 
The work of Jordaan, 2007, reviewed the performance of 20 financial investigators, 
interviews with senior financial investigators as well as relevant course material in the New 
Jersey, London and South African financial crime response jurisdictions, that lead him to 
articulate an ordered process for the analysis of bank statements, a process that has a logical 
flow and the pays attention to the requirements of form in order to produce an evidentiary 
report. The report, explains that the steps taken in the analysis should note the facts, 
assumptions and conclusions drawn by the expert analyst as the steps have been progressed. 
The analytical process is patterned and can be taught and learned in professional structured 
instruction, such that the analysis of bank statements suggests that it is appropriate for expert 
evidence.  Specifically the analysis process is: 
 Collation of the information contained in the bank account statements into an 
electronic format; 
 Identification of significant payees and depositors; 
 Compilation of summary statements which summarise the financial information in the 
bank statements; 
 Examine the information contained in the bank account statements over a period of 
time to produce a time series analysis; 
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 Draw up various graphical charts to visually display the information contained in the 
bank account statements; 
 Examine the bank account statements and the results of the previous stages of the 
analysis process to determine the patterns of activity with regard the accounts to 
determine any unusual activity; 
 Report on the findings of the analysis of the bank account statements either by way of 
an affidavit, if the analysis is going to be used as evidence, or by way of a report, if 
the analysis is going to be used for intelligence purposes. 
In the formation of a patterned process acceptable for the Australian jurisdiction one should 
add a point where the expert analyst discusses the selection of specific methods, any 
assumptions made in the selection of such methods or the rejection of other methods (“An 
expert witness' opinion evidence may have little or no value unless the assumptions adopted 
by the expert (ie. the facts or grounds relied upon) and his or her reasoning are expressly 
stated in any written report or oral evidence given”) (2.4 GPN-EXPT, 2016). Appendix 7B 
details the recommended patterned principle adapted
173
 for the proper process of analysing 
bank statements under the Evidence Acts as applicable to Australian jurisdictions. Properly 
managed, the use of accounting expertise and interpretive skills applied to bank statements 
allows for supported inferences to be developed and confirmed in order to assist the court’s 
deliberation. The importance of expert analysis of bank statements is that the deductive 
inference is based on the information contained in the bank statement, the relationships linked 
to the bank statements and the facts under examination, not new facts, but expertly presented, 
information that is extracted and displayed to the court. 
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 Adapted from the conclusions of Jordaan (2007) and the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice (2001) 
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Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Direct Methodologies – Inter Entity Transactions 
The double-entry methodology links transactions between entities such that a debit in one 
organisation gives rise to a corresponding credit in another. In Robson’s (1992) parlance, 
accounting inscriptions allow for the transportation of funds where the value remains 
recognisable, constant and convertible. This facilitates the “follow the money” approach to a 
forensic accounting analysis. The flow of money is initially identified through the 
transactions that eventually form the patterns of funds that flow between entities for genuine 
and manufactured purposes. The nature of the entities vary from individuals to incorporated 
entities, trusts and joint ventures. The structure of entities can be very complex and include 
provisions for opaque blockages, such as, the use of bare trusts driven by agreements rather 
than people
174
, the use of corporate trustees
175
, incorporation of shell companies
176
 and the 
registration of corporations in limited transparency jurisdictions (see, for example, Montessa 
Fonseca as a world-wide facilitator of such structures based in Panama, also known as ‘the 
Panama Papers’, 2016). 
The follow the money approach requires the progressive identification of documentary 
evidence in one entity that relates and corresponds to transactions in another entity. The 
correspondence may be cross jurisdictional. Following the money is predicated on 
information transparency and access which can vary considerably (for example, under legal 
authority, court directed scrutiny, international treaties or simply limited access making 
discovery difficult). Specific legislation and treaties help to facilitate following the money 
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 In such a bare trust the beneficiary has the absolute right to the capital and assets within the trust, with the 
legal and beneficial ownership of the property is separated by an agreement. The agreement details are usually 
stored in a low transparency jurisdiction.  
175
 That is the trustee is an incorporated body rather than a person, providing an extra layer with respect to 
beneficial ownership and trust decision making. 
176
 Incorporated shell companies (sometimes known as $2 companies) have minimal assets, such as the 2 x $1 
paid up share entitlement. They provide a financial vehicle through which to wash funds.  
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trail, however this is a complex and pragmatic area, beyond the scope of this dissertation
177
. 
Follow the money techniques have gained significant prominence as a result of the Financial 
Action Task Force’s emphasis on Anti Money Laundering over the past 20 years (see, for 
example, Australia’s international obligations as a member under the FATF 40 plus 9 
recommendations, 2003). The process of following the money in money laundering matters 
requires recognition of the placement, layering and integration phases. Placement describes 
the relocation of tainted funds, layering is the disbursement of such funds to confuse the 
money trail, with integration facilitating funds to be invested back into legitimate activities. 
As discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation, the international focus on anti-money 
laundering programs has been a significant catalyst behind the juridification of unexplained 
wealth legislation, however, the subject of Money Laundering and Anti-Money Laundering 
accounting techniques is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, the money 
laundering typologies published by the FATF Training and Research Institute (TREIN) give 
potential accounting expert witnesses a reference platform from which to update their follow 
the money techniques in reflection of changes in the methods and trends of criminals as they 
respond to the evolution and implementation of protective financial standards (see 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends). The study of typology reports is a 
legitimate skill acquisition technique that underpins a forensic accountant’s expert knowledge 
(see, for example, the Austrac typologies and case studies report 2012, 2013, 2014). 
Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Indirect Methodologies - Net Worth Analysis 
Forensic analysis of bank statements for the purposes of evidence is referred to by 
accountants as a direct methodology. This is because the record of transactions on the bank 
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 For example, the harmonisation and recognition of international treaties with similar domestic prosecutions 
in all associated jurisdictions.  
262 
 
statements is inclusive and ‘on account’ because of the fact that each line item record is for 
each transaction. The alternative to direct methodology is indirect methodology which is 
most appropriate where there are insufficient records to undertake a direct methodological 
approach to a financial investigation. The indirect methodology assembles a structured 
framework for financial analysis that adheres to the patterned principles of debits and credits 
(that represents the inflows and outflows of funds), however the process is cognisant of the 
need to balance the profit and loss inflows and outflows (debits and credits) to the eventual 
balance sheet accumulation from one period to another. That balance is deduced in 
accordance with the rules of the indirect method being deployed. That is, the gap between the 
balancing of known debits and credits, is acclaimed as unexplained income, which can be 
quantified by the need to balance the monetary inflow with the outflow and net accumulation.  
Net Worth Analysis (‘NWA’) is a method that expresses the financial gap between what a 
person is worth at one point in time and what a person is worth at a subsequent point of time, 
taking into account what funds have been brought into the person’s financial equation and 
what funds have been spent by that person. NWA if most often used with respect to an 
individual rather than an incorporated entity and is often a procedure triggered by observation 
of an ostensible, exorbitant and lavish lifestyle apparently beyond the target individual’s 
financial means. The NWA aims to establish evidence that an individual must have received 
funds from an unknown source and derives an estimation of the amount of funds received 
within a specified period. The evidence is portrayed through the gap that arises when there is 
a discrepancy between the assets owned by, and expenditure made by, an individual and their 
assets and income from known sources. Albrecht et al (2016) describe the NWA approach as: 
An analytical method that estimates a suspect’s unexplained income. 
Liabilities are subtracted from assets to give net worth, and then the 
previous year’s net worth is subtracted to find the increase in net worth. 
Living expenses are then added to the change in net worth to determine a 
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person’s total income, and finally the known income is subtracted from total 
income to determine the unknown income (p668). 
Expressed in steps: 
1. Assets – Liabilities = Net Worth 
2. Net Worth – Prior Year’s Net Worth = Net Worth Increase 
3. Net Worth Increase + Living Expenses = Income 
4. Income – Funds from Known Sources = Funds from Unknown Sources (p269). 
The NWA method is a broadly used forensic accounting technique deployed by the U.S. 
Federal Bureaux of Investigation, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (Albrecht, 2016, 
p269), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (Dorrell and Gadawski, 2012, p257) and the 
Australian Taxation Office. It builds on accountancy’s balancing principles and forms part of 
the knowledge and skills base of a forensic accountant (Dorrell and Gadawski, 2012). The 
NWA method is included in the curriculum of forensic accounting courses at both 
undergraduate and graduate level (see, for example, the University of Wollongong Master of 
Forensic Accounting subject curriculum for ACCY953 and ACCY954, undergraduate 
curriculum ACCY343). Appendix 7D describes the proper stepped deployment of the NWA 
method. 
The net worth method was used by the forensic accountant in R v Barker (2014) where the 
issue was unexplained income arising from drug trafficking rather than income personally 
acquired from the running of car yard and pizza businesses. The forensic accountant 
undertook a net worth analysis in conjunction with a sources and application analysis for the 
financial year ending 30 June 2008, then up to the 23 April 2009. She found unexplained 
funds in the first period of $151,000 and $1.61 million in the second period, substantially 
assisted by the amount of $995,000, in cash, found on the perpetrator’s property. The 
sentencing judge did not accept the assertion that the funds were from cash reserves, 
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accumulated by the defendant, from previous legitimate sources over 12 years earlier. On 
appeal the perpetrator agreed that there was unexplained income however he disputed the 
quantum estimated by the forensic accountant. He put forward two alternative methods of 
calculating the unexplained wealth, one pertaining to the estimated annual purchases of his 
four known customers (described under surveillance) and the other based on extrapolation of 
the amounts received during the surveillance period
178
. In his appeal judgement, Phillippedes 
J, (supported by Carmody J) upheld the use of the net worth method against the alternative 
methods citing weaknesses in the ad hoc nature of the proposed alternative calculations. That 
is, the judges supported the validity of the patterned principles described as the Net worth 
Method, as accepted by the accounting profession, over proposed alternative calculations that 
failed to validate the reliability of their methodology. 
The Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’) utilises a variation on the net worth method known 
as the ‘T’ account method. Referring to the reasonable basis for a section 167 (Income Tax 
Assessment Act, 1936) default assessment:  
68. The Commissioner may make a default assessment of a taxpayer's 
taxable income upon any basis that is reasonable and takes into account their 
particular circumstances. This includes the use of available external 
information, indirect audit methodologies, statistical information or 
extrapolation from previous years’ returns. Examples of the bases that have 
been supported by the courts include 'T' accounts, asset betterment 
calculations and unexplained deposits in financial institution accounts. 
69. Using a 'T' account, ATO personnel can compare cash available at the 
beginning of a period plus cash received during the period with cash 
expended during the period plus cash on hand at the end of the period. The 
two sides of the 'T' account should balance if ATO personnel have full and 
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 If the applicant’s proposed methodology was accepted this would have reduced the estimate of undisclosed 
income from $1.6 million to approximately $600,000. 
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accurate information. If the two sides of the 'T' account do not balance, it is 
likely there is undisclosed income. (PS LA 2007/24) 
The T account method has been accepted in Australian courts and the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal of Australia, particularly with respect to default taxation liability assessments. This 
method not only fulfils the Commissioner’s obligation with respect to creating a method of 
tax assessment but it provides a measure of undisclosed (unexplained) income. In 
Confidential v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2013) it was accepted as allowing “the 
Commissioner to compare: the cash available at the beginning of a period plus cash received 
during the period” (at 15) in a matter of undeclared cash assessment against a husband and 
wife. Branson J in Favaro v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) noted that “ … T 
accounts are a technique used as an indirect method of ascertaining a taxpayer's taxable 
income. They compare cash available at the beginning of a period plus cash on hand at the 
end of the period. With full and accurate information, the 2 sides of the exercise should 
balance. …” (at 5) after which he went on to accept T account submissions from both the 
respondent (the Commissioner) and the Applicant (Favaro). This acceptance confirmed the 
acceptance of the T account method allowing the matter to focus on individual items within 
the calculation179. Further, in Amirthalingham v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2012) the 
judgement notes that the Commissioner used the T account method to make the estimate of 
understated income and that the “The taxpayer had not sought to show that 
the T account method was flawed”(at 5). The tribunal affirmed the T account method as a 
valid methodology for determining and quantifying the taxpayer’s undisclosed income. 
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Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Asset Betterment Analysis 
Asset Betterment Analysis is similar to Net Worth Analysis, in that it broadly measures the 
net difference between legitimate and illegitimate funds based on the shortfall in explained 
earnings. Both methods are indirect methodologies. Asset Betterment is seen by the ATO as 
an alternative method to calculate default assessments under s167. “An alternative method to 
a T account available to ATO personnel is an asset betterment calculation. Under this 
method, the net worth of an entity at the end of each relevant year is compared with the net 
worth at the beginning of each of those years, and an estimate of annual asset growth is 
obtained. Non-deductible expenditure is added to this estimate and liabilities and exemptions 
are subtracted. A figure is then computed for total taxable income.” (PS La 2007/24 at 70). 
Asset betterment focusses on the difference between accumulated funds at one point in time 
and then at another, subsequent, point in time. The net asset position at each point represents 
a balance sheet, being a snapshot of the financial position at a point in time. The path 
between the two points is also mapped with operating expenses (personal and business) and 
loans offset against legitimate asset accumulation through realised capital and earnings. The 
asset betterment method is built upon both the fundamental double-entry method and 
financial accumulation and offset techniques which form part of the professional knowledge 
and skills of a recognised accountant. Accumulation of transactions is conducted under the 
rules of offsetting debit and credits, required to balance for completeness. On one hand assets 
are accumulated to the net extent of being reduced by liabilities. In the deployment of the 
asset betterment methodology, consideration of the net means during the points of 
accumulation measurement are made. For example income received and expenses incurred 
and paid are measured.    
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Asset betterment has been regularly used in the Australian taxation context
180
. The appeal 
from the Federal Court of Australia in the matter of Commissioner of Taxation of the 
Commonwealth of Australia and Manuela Gashi (2013) raised questions regarding the use of 
the asset betterment method. In summary the commissioner issued assessments from 2000 to 
2006 based on deployment of asset betterment accounting technology with results 
summarised in table 8.1 below: 
Table 8.1 Summary of Asset Betterment (snapshot 30/6/xx) results of unexplained income 
2000 to 2006 
 
Their Honours described the issuing of the amended assessments, in terms of the asset 
betterment method, as follows: 
A letter accompanying the assessments explained to Mr Gashi that the 
assessments included understated income quantified in an Asset Betterment 
Statement. The Asset Betterment Statement was enclosed with the letter. 
The Asset Betterment Statement comprised two distinct parts. The first part 
took the form of a balance sheet. It identified assets on hand as at 30 June 
1999 and then assessed the change in identified assets and liabilities from 
year to year. The assets listed included numerous bank accounts in Australia 
and overseas, motor vehicles and real property. The liabilities included 
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 A search of the use of the asset betterment method in the Westlaw.au database (Dec. 2016) highlighted 97 
reported cases. 
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home loans. A net asset position was then recorded for each year. After 
calculating the net asset position, the Commissioner then addressed what 
might generally be described as a cash flow statement. The Commissioner 
identified non-assessable receipts (in the form of loan repayments and 
capital profits on the sale of a principal residence) which were available to 
fund Mr and Mrs Gashi’s expenditure (and possibly, the increased assets). 
The Commissioner then identified expenditure by Mr and Mrs Gashi in each 
of the relevant years. 
In each year, the increase in net assets was added to the amount identified as 
specific expenditure less the amount identified as non-assessable receipts. 
The Commissioner then deducted the taxable income disclosed in that year 
to calculate the amount that was, in his judgment, undisclosed income. In 
other words, the Commissioner identified the amount required to fund the 
increased assets and to fund the identified expenditure which was unable to 
be funded by the amounts disclosed. The understated amount was split 
equally between Mr and Mrs Gashi and formed the basis of the default 
assessments and amended assessments issued to Mr Gashi as 1, 2, 4, 10, 12, 
14 and 16 in Annexure A. 
The Asset Betterment Statement had 11 attachments which provided details 
of the calculations for specific items in the Asset Betterment Statement. So, 
for example, in Attachment B the Commissioner identified a bank account 
in Luxembourg with a closing balance of $241,498 as at 30 June 2001. The 
attachment identified the balance at year end for the relevant period, the 
withdrawals from that account and the basis on which the Commissioner 
had calculated interest on the year end balances. Attachment C was the 
Commissioner’s analysis of the expenditure by Mr and Mrs Gashi recorded 
on their credit cards. Attachment D was an analysis for the interest expenses 
incurred in relation to various home loans. Attachment E was an analysis of 
funds sent overseas. It listed each transfer by date and amount. The amounts 
were obtained from a review of Austrac records. Attachment F was a list of 
asset purchases by Mr and Mrs Gashi. Attachments G and H were analyses 
of their bank accounts. Attachment I was an explanation of the 
Commissioner’s calculation of Mr and Mrs Gashi’s personal living 
expenses. Attachment J analysed Mr and Mrs Gashi’s overseas travel. 
Attachment K recorded the Commissioner’s analysis of Mr Gashi’s 
gambling losses. It will be necessary to refer to some of these attachments 
later in these reasons for judgment. For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
note that the Commissioner’s assessment of Mr and Mrs Gashi’s 
undisclosed income was not a figure plucked out of the air. It was an 
amount judged by the Commissioner to reflect the increase in their wealth 
which was not able to be explained by their level of disclosed income. 
 (at 9, 10 and 11) 
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The appeal rested on several grounds, two with respect to the asset betterment calculations. 
Firstly with respect to the undisclosed amount being of the nature of ordinary income (under 
its meaning s 6-5 (1) ITAA, 1936) and secondly that the use of asset betterment statement 
“were wrongly or without any proper evidentiary foundation” (at 58). The second ground of 
appeal was followed by specific calculations typical of an asset betterment statement, and 
included therein. Neither of these appeal grounds disputed the asset betterment method, but 
instead they relied upon taxation law with respect to the definition of ordinary income and the 
onus not to merely disprove an asset betterment statement but to (under s 14ZZO of the Tax 
Administration Act, 1936) “demonstrate the unexplained accumulated wealth in each of the 
relevant years was from non-income sources” (at 67) through identifying the source or 
sources of funds. The judges upheld the Commissioner’s use of asset betterment method as 
well as its application to s 167 (ITAA,1936) assessments. This judicial interpretation upholds 
the patterned principles of asset betterment methodology in the establishment and 
quantification of unexplained income, such that, the quantification is, in of itself, sufficiently 
valid not to have to further demonstrate a quantification of the application of funds removed 
from the income statement. For example the unexplained funds quantification did not have to 
rely upon an alternative explanation of the application of the missing funds, simply 
quantification of the unexplained gap was sufficient proof. 
Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Sources and Application of Funds Method 
The sources and application of funds method is one of the five indirect methods recognised 
by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRM Formal Indirect Method 4.10.4.6.3). It’s 
advantages are that it is simple to compile and explain as it uses cash flows to “compare all 
known expenditures to all known receipts” (Dorrell and Gadowski, 1012, p257). Similar to 
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the net worth method and the asset betterment method, the sources are combined before being 
compared with the total applications, such that excess applications gives rise to a gap amount 
deemed to be from undisclosed or unexplained sources of funds. If the sources exceed the 
application then there is no unexplained income. Statistical methods are used to estimate 
some of the applications where there is a lack of application detail (such as the use of 
Australian Bureau of Statistics data to establish living costs).  
The patterned principles utilised in the compilation of a sources and applications statement 
are similar to the corporate form (previously AAS12) which has now been subsumed into a 
company’s statement of cash flows (AASB 107; IPSAS 2). However, the application of the 
sources and applications statement to gap analysis has also been accepted by the courts to 
assist to establish fraudulent behaviour. In L&H New Developments v MYR Investments Pty 
Ltd (2013) the Supreme Court of Victoria investigated the financial behaviour of company 
directors and partners in a residential property development project by inspecting all the 
partnership dealings and transactions prior to the date of dissolution. The sources and 
application method was used to advise the court regarding monies advanced by Westpac to 
the partnership (joint venture) and “how those funds were appropriated by the partnership” 
(at 11). The matter was complex with “the only way in which a reconciliation could be 
satisfactorily performed, and conclusions reached in respect to indebtedness due to each of 
the Partners, was for an analysis to be performed on a project by project basis 
with sources and application of funds and derivation of profits covering all of the projects 
that the two parties had undertaken” (at 163). To this aim the sources and application method 
was applied to recognise where funds had been sourced and applied as directly reasoned on a 
transaction by transaction basis. Applied in such a way, the sources and application method 
informed the court’s narrative by tracking and allocating the funds and disentangling the 
mixture of funds to understand the purpose and relative project allocation. Sources and 
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application, through the narrative discards internal transactions, providing clearer focus on 
those transactions externally contributing to the enterprise (sources) and those external 
transactions paid out of the enterprise. The sources and application method therefore has 
attributes of both direct and indirect methodology, either by sustaining an improper inward 
transaction (such as funds received directly from an illicit activity) or confirming an 
inappropriate outward transaction (such as unapproved cash removal). Where sources or 
applications fail to balance transactions beg to be explained and may likely be the result of or 
benefit from illicit activity. 
Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence 
Gross Margin Analysis or Mark-up Method 
The gross margin / mark up method (‘GMM’) is an indirect accounting method of 
establishing what the gross profit of an organisation should be compared with what the 
declared gross margin has been reported. The issue is that if sales (predominantly cash) are 
not declared but the cost of sales is declared then the gross margin will suffer and will decline 
with respect to the real gross margin. This then flows onto the net margin after cost of goods 
sold and net profit which is established using normal accounting principles for calculation 
profit and loss (AASB 101, 2012). Over a period the balance sheet equity (net assets) is 
reduced through the lack of income inclusion and retention. This type of undisclosed income 
is referred to as “skimming” or “off book” (Dorrell and Gadawski, 2012; Kranacher et al, 
2012). In practice the GMM establishes what the gross margin should be by analysing the 
cost price and the sale price of each product then multiplying that product by the percentage 
of sales that it represents. That is the net profit (sales price less cost price divided by sales 
price) for each product is multiplied by the percentage of each product in the sales portfolio. 
This method may cover all products or be mitigated as a shorthand method by calculating the 
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top 20% of products, relying on the Pareto Principle
181
, however in this abridged form the 
assumptions stating reliance on 20% of the products would cause the accountant’s evidence 
to have reduced probity because the risk of error in the quantification is increased. 
The use of gross margin analysis is well known to the courts, mainly with respect to 
compensation or damages claims where a reduction in gross margin is calculated and often 
multiplied by actual and damaged turnovers
182
. Other matters taking note of gross margin 
analysis include misleading and deceptive conduct, business valuation and liquidation claims. 
Calculation of gross margin and the consequent elements of a profit and loss report such as 
cost of goods sold, income streams, stock valuation, stock losses, operating expenses, 
depreciation, normal and abnormal income are within the special knowledge of accountants, 
governed by the application of processes referred to under accounting conventions, Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles and Accounting Standards. Gross margin analysis and 
profitability ratios are a basic financial and internal audit review technique employed by 
auditors for both general and specific assurance (Moroney et al, 2011, p135). Gross margin 
analysis is an important, if more of an indicative technique, particularly relevant when 
demonstrating to courts predicate reasons (or symptoms) for investigations (Kranacher et al, 
2012; Albretch et al, 2016). 
Accounting Expertise as Opinion Evidence  
Unit and Volume Method 
The unit and volume method provides a benchmarking tool to analyse profitability based on 
benchmarking analysis of similar economic activity over a consistent input. For example, a 
                                                     
181
 The Pareto Principle, also known as the 80/20 rule, is a theory maintaining that 80 percent of the output from 
a given situation or system is determined by 20 percent of the input. 
182
 A general search referencing “gross margin” in Westlaw reported 147 reported cases where the gross margin 
was considered in some form, particularly with respect to damages claims. The courts have also routinely 
accepted discounted cash flow valuations of businesses which are based upon historic and projected gross and 
net margins (see Palepu et al, 1996) 
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taxi business may be benchmarked over the mileage travelled because the likely profitability 
(income less costs) has been accumulated and analysed over a large number of similar taxis 
operating in similar conditions. This method is particularly insightful where an input element 
is closely linked to the output unit that generates income. For example, throughput of Kebab 
wraps (one per Kebab) has a high correlation to the number of kebabs sold at a known sales 
price. The ATO has undertaken a longitudinal study of a large range of mainly high cash 
industries in order to establish unit and volume measures benchmarking reported profitability. 
The ATO analysis takes into account industry acceptable loss factors and they have made 
their results available to tax agents and therefore to the public. The ATO describes their 
program thus: 
Small business benchmarks are a guide to help you compare your business's 
performance against similar businesses in the same industry. 
 
The benchmarks: 
 are calculated from income tax returns and activity statements from 
over 1.3 million small businesses and are verified as being 
statistically valid by an independent organisation 
 account for businesses with different turnover ranges (up to 
$15 million) across more than 100 industries 
 are published as a range to recognise the variations that occur 
between businesses due to factors such as location and the 
businesses circumstances. 
We update the benchmarks each year using the latest available data. The 
current data is from the 2013–14 financial year. 
(http/www.ato.gov.au/Business/Small-business-benchmarks/) 
The unit and volume method is an emerging indirect accounting methodology that needs to 
be used with caution such that variables are clearly explained together with the analytical 
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assumptions. Use of this method is increasing with the increased availability of big data and 
the computer power to process analytical accumulation and comparison variables. The courts 
have not yet held the unit/volume method as having a high degree of probity with its validity 
more appropriate to the civil test of on the balance of probabilities rather than the criminal 
test of beyond reasonable doubt. 
Part Two Conclusion 
Part two of this chapter has considered a number of recognised forensic accounting 
techniques, which, when appropriately deployed by a properly trained and skilled accounting 
professional, can be validated against the Makita criteria. This is an important consideration 
in responding to the research questions. Chapter 9 will build on the peer accepted status of 
these accounting technologies to validate the application of appropriate patterned accounting 
principles to be applied when assisting the court’s adjudication in the UW and POCA genre.  
Part 3 – Entities and Beneficial Financial Control 
“A beneficial owner is a person who enjoys the benefits of ownership even though the title to 
some form of property is in another name. It also means any individual or group of 
individuals who, either directly or indirectly, has the power to vote or influence the 
transaction decisions regarding a specific security, such as shares in a company” 
(Investopedia, accessed Dec 2016). From an accounting point of view, the nature of 
ownership and equity is straight forward as it corresponds to the balance sheet and the 
financial entitlements of position holders, such as those held by shareholders or beneficiaries. 
Beneficial ownership includes less tangible behavioural aspects that nonetheless culminate in 
the receipt of an economic benefit, and in that regard the concept of beneficial ownership 
includes influence by a range of informal means such as through the provision of finance, 
intimate family relationships, contractual associations or through strategic decision 
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capabilities (FATF, Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, 2014 pp14-16). 
The concept of beneficial financial control is an important consideration when addressing 
accounting evidence in matters such as UW or POCA, because of the opaque (non-
transparent) means that may be employed to distract the reader from the normal transaction 
flow or purpose. To that end the matter of control will be further addressed in Chapter 9. 
Recognised Forensic Accounting Methods – Inter Entity Transactions 
Accounting analysis of inter entity transactions commences at the interlocking, double entry 
method where a transaction in one entity balances with an opposing transaction in another 
entity, with the accounts of each entity being kept distinctly separate according to the entity 
structure. In this way one company produces their financial accounts separately to another. 
Similarly partnerships keep separate accounts to the partners but record partnership to partner 
transactions. Trusts recognise the trust financial accounts separately from the trustee and 
from the beneficiaries. The accounting and the audit standards proceed on the basis of 
separate entity structures albeit they recognise (and at times focus upon) appropriate 
recording of associated party transactions.  
In the accounting sense the control of the entity is as defined by specific legislation such as in 
the Corporations Act (2000) with the roles and responsibilities of office holders, management 
and shareholders defined with respect to their status with the particular entity. The concepts 
of the separate legal entity principle is important as it protects shareholder rights, and is the 
prima face stance of the legal system (Saloman v Saloman, 1897). “When a company acts it 
does so in its own right and not just as an alias for its controllers” (Lord Sumner in Gas 
Lighting Improvement Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners, 1923, at 740).  However, the 
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courts have been prepared to “pierce the corporate veil”
183
 where there are significant 
economic or behavioural reasons. Categories for taking such action balance legal norms 
above structural factors due to issues which Jenkinson J described in five areas: agency, 
fraud, sham or façade, group enterprises and unfairness or justice (Dennis Willcox Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 1988). Similarly trusts legislation sets out control by 
responsibilities for the respective roles of trustee, appointor and beneficiary. However, the 
actual nature of control attributes may not reflect the formal structure and require the 
application of a behavioural recognition of actual control. 
Chapter Conclusion 
It is important to recognise that the legal profession and the accounting profession overlap in 
their interpretive view of what are essentially accounting techniques. This is not in the matter 
of facticity, but in the sense of purpose as adopted by the court. Part One of this chapter 
provided some examples of how the normative values of the court and its legal purpose have 
provided conceptual direction for the deployment of accounting technologies, such that the 
genre of the court, is reflected in the ontology of the expert accounting evidence. The court 
justifies this oversight under the expert witness concept of relevance. 
Further, the expert witness criteria for access and/or probity, requires the forensic accountant 
to produce an opinion that is within their expertise, that is, expertise based upon a body of 
specialised knowledge and training. Part Two of this chapter reviewed direct and indirect 
accounting methodologies accepted by the accounting profession and included in the training, 
and skillset, of forensic accountants. Importantly, the methods arising from these 
methodologies, when appropriately deployed, are accepted by professional peers, therefore 
                                                     
183
 Broadly speaking the concept of the “piercing the corporate veil” is a legal decision to treat the rights or 
duties of a corporation as the rights or liabilities of its shareholders. The courts “disregard the separateness of 
the corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the actions of the corporation as if it were the actions of 
the shareholder” (Ramsay and Noakes, 2001) 
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the determinants of expert testimony, as outlined in Makita, can be fulfilled.  Finally the 
chapter considered the application of the key accounting and legal concept of beneficial fiscal 
control. The discussion noted the accounting view of control which has been extended for 
legal purposes and therefore its relevance in compiling accounting evidence extended from 
structural control to the recognition of beneficial control attributes. Chapter 7 will relate these 
three parts to specific consideration of the research questions under the UW and POCA 
legislative genre that include matters from the court and issues that relate to juridification.   
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Chapter 9: Forensic Accounting Evidence for Forfeiture Matters 
Introduction 
In preparation to address the research questions, this dissertation has considered the legal and 
social philosophy of a range of authors, particularly that of Jurgen Habermas, Noizik and 
Michels. Further, regard has been given to the application of these philosophies to the 
practice of accounting by authors such as Laughlin and Power, Arrington, Latour and 
Robson. Accounting has then been considered in its role as an expert technology presented to 
the court as applied to the adjudication of matters. The evolution of accounting, presented as 
expert evidence, prompted reflection upon accounting’s cognitive authority in the expression 
of expert opinion evidence, such that, the accounting facts of the matter are understood both 
in order to assist with the court’s adjudication and with the translation of judicial decisions. 
The translation role connects money with purpose, linked to lifeworld norms and community 
confidence. In particular, the validation of accounting evidence has been viewed with respect 
to its consistency with the Makita principles, accepted accounting peer practices and 
precedential judicial logic. The appropriate deployment of professionally accepted patterned 
principles has arisen as the key to the determination of valid forensic accounting evidence. 
Diagram 9-1 expresses this approach figuratively, in that, it outlines how the court’s internal 
and external acceptance of trustworthy expert evidence is underpinned by properly deployed 
accounting techniques, applied to the facts of the matter at hand, through the implementation 
of patterned principles. The court and it’s interested external audience then validates the 
expertise, the proper use of patterned principles and their appropriate deployment in 
accordance with peer accepted principles (in this case, those of the accounting and legal 
professions), legal precedent (for example, the Makita principles) and community norms (for 
example, concepts of fairness and the correct verdict).  
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Diagram 9.1 
 
In the accounting context, the expert opinion witness, is admitted to provide evidence that, 
using accounting inscriptions, interprets and translates the facts in a manner that inform the 
court and assist with the adjudicative discourse. The evidence has evolved from both 
professional accounting philosophy and instruction, and the legal system’s norms, as suitably 
implemented for the specific legislative genre. The cognitive authority applied, by the expert, 
to the evidence, utilises expertly deployed accounting knowledge, skills and technologies, 
offered up for validation (see chapter 4), and communicated in appropriate structure and form 
(see chapter 5), such that it leads to action by the receiver of the communication 
(communicative action). The accounting expert therefore manoeuvers in the content area 
overlapping between their accounting discipline and corralled by the legal system at a 
disciplinary level (as is deemed suitable to each legal genre). 
 
In chapter 8, the dissertation considered how the Law influences accounting, in order to effect 
the definition of valid of accounting evidence, with respect to its acceptance within specific 
legal genres as well as consistent with peer accepted ontological knowledge, methodology 
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and methods. Examples of accounting evidence variations were considered that have arisen 
from legal categories such as taxation law, equity law and family law. However, these types 
of law are well practiced with a multiplicity of cases that have sought to test the limits of the 
law as applied to a variety of facts and as have been reviewed by the range of judicial and 
court seniority. Peer and court accepted accounting techniques, with the potential to be 
deployed to assess and quantify the proceeds of crime and unexplained wealth, have been 
discussed with respect to their accounting legitimacy and their acceptance in various 
jurisdictions. This chapter extends that discussion as specifically applied to the unexplained 
wealth and proceeds of crime legislative genre, which must be recognised as a relatively new 
body of law, albeit having been periodically extended by juridification (see chapters 1 and 2). 
Specifically, there have been a limited number of cases proceeding to judgement under 
POCA (Cth) and even less matters that have considered the application of the more recent 
unexplained wealth provisions. This research identified 48 Australian ‘unexplained wealth’ 
cases recorded by Westlaw arising from consideration of Proceeds of Crime or similar 
legislation.
184
 Table 9.1 lists these cases with Table 9.2 providing a summary across 
Australian jurisdictions. Part 1 of this chapter summarises the findings of the review of these 
48 judgements leading to the opinion that unexplained wealth provisions are being used to 
restrain assets and to forfeit the ‘low hanging fruit’, that is to forfeit assets already 
confiscated, such as cash money found in drug raids or in attempts to leave the country. This 
would not appear to be consistent with the objective to combat organised crime as discussed 
in chapter 7.  
Part 2 of this chapter reviews sections within the Australian Commonwealth Proceeds of 
Crime Act, 2002, with respect to their application to the operation of forensic accounting 
                                                     
184
 Cases were selected through a search of Westlaw.au such that they proceeded under Proceeds of Crime 
legislation within the Australian jurisdictions (Commonwealth, State and Territory). The search was further 
refined with respect to the use of Unexplained Wealth provisions within the POC legislation. The Appendix of 
Case References contains the case details. 
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techniques. This is important as forensic accountants deploy their skills and knowledge to 
assist in providing evidence that gives prosecutors confidence to bring  appropriate matters to 
court, as well as to assist the court’s adjudication and messages with regard to the court’s 
judgement, as is consistent with the statute. Correct understanding of the forensic accounting 
evidence is also pertinent to the defence role of a forensic accountant, given the adversarial 
nature of the Australian legal system and the particular reversal of proof obligations relevant 
to forfeiture legislation. Built upon the accounting practices reviewed in chapter 8, and the 
forensic accountant’s main role in confiscation, that of identifying value and quantifying 
forfeiture amounts arising from the proceeds of crime and unexplained wealth calculations, 
Part 2.4 - Division 2, Penalty Amounts, and Part 2.6 – Division 2, Unexplained Wealth 
Amounts, are particularly in focus. Consideration of these specific sections of the legislation 
is important to the statutory compliance of a forensic accountant’s report.   
Part 3 of this chapter recognises the importance of the legal stare decisis epistemology and in 
this regard it looks at the judicial obiter dicta pertaining to concepts contained in the 
forfeiture statute such as “derived” and “used”. This is important as the forensic accountant 
needs to recognise the applicable scope of their inclusions and the most likely consideration 
the trier of fact may apply to the latitude of transactions and valuations included in their 
report. Part 3 further dissects the obiter dicta of specific issues with reference to both 
Australian and United Kingdom cases. Whilst there are a limited number of cases from which 
to glean legal precedent, the courts have commented upon maters such as double counting, 
quantifying penalty orders for accomplices, mixing tainted and non-tainted funds, multiple 
equity holders and calculations potentially not requiring expertise. Part 4 returns to the 
research questions, armed with the context of earlier chapters, the accounting and legal 
precedents of chapter 6 and the genre specifications of the earlier parts of this chapter. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the role of patterned principles in the response to the 
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research questions, as they reflect the context of expertise, the legal requirements of 
recognition, precedent judicial consideration and forfeiture genre specifics.   
Part 1 Review of Proceeds of Crime Matters that reference Unexplained 
Wealth activity 
As noted in the introduction to this thesis the research reviewed 48 matters that considered 
Proceeds of Crime legislation across Australian jurisdictions where unexplained wealth was 
considered. These cases were selected from Westlaw under the search parameter of 
“unexplained wealth”; cases; 2012 to 2016. The consideration of unexplained wealth issues 
under proceeds of crime and unexplained wealth provisions of the various acts were material 
to the deliberations of the court in these cases, however, the prosecutions were only rarely 
brought directly under the specific unexplained wealth provisions. For example, there were 
11 Commonwealth cases considered however it is known that there have never been any 
matters brought before the court under the specific unexplained wealth provisions of the 
Commonwealth POC Act. The reported judgements of these cases were reviewed with 
specific emphasis on accounting related judicial comment. Part 1 of this chapter summarises 
the review with Part 3 providing a focus on specific issues noted in the review and referenced 
to specific judgements. Table 9.1 lists these cases with Table 9.2 providing a summary across 
Australian jurisdictions. Westlaw.au is a leading online law library and database providing 
authoritative online legal research solutions to law professionals, corporations, governments 
and universities. It is provided by Thompson Reuters and relied upon for its depth of 
information by over 50,000 Australian lawyers. Cases were selected through a search of 
Westlaw.au such that they proceeded under Proceeds of Crime legislation within the 
Australian jurisdictions (Commonwealth, State and Territory). The search was further refined 
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with respect to the use of Unexplained Wealth provisions within the POC legislation. Table 
9.1 contains the case details. 
Table 9.1: Case List used for Judgement Review  
  
Case Reference Name Case Reference 
1 New South Wales Crime Commission v De Jonk [2016] NSWSC 1668 
2 New South Wales Crime Commission v Mogy [2016] NSWSC 1667 
3 R v Gibbs [2016] SADC 144 
4 NSW Crime Commission v Nehme [2016] NSWSC 1410 
5 Queensland v Deadman [2016] QCA 218 
6 Queensland v Deadman [2015] QSC 241, (2015) 253 A Crim R 484 
7 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Hart [2013] QDC 60 
8 New South Wales Crime Commission v Ayik [2016] NSWSC 1183 
9 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Thasthahir 
[2016] VSC 468, (2016) 313 FLR 358 
10 Nguyen v The Queen [2016] VSCA 198, (2016) 311 FLR 289 
11 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Surinder Kaur 
[2016] VSC 423, (2016) 311 FLR 44 
12 Re Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police 
[2016] NSWSC 861 
13 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Swan [2016] TASCCA 9 
14 Zanon v Western Australia 2016] WASCA 91,  
15 New South Wales Crime Commission v Richards [2016] NSWSC 838 
16 New South Wales Crime Commission v Kane 
(No 3) 
[2015] NSWSC 1963 
17 Ruzehaji v Commissioner of the Australian 
Federal Police 
[2015] SASCFC 182,  
18 R v Barker [2015] QCA 215 
19 New South Wales Crime Commission v Nhu [2015] NSWSC 1643 
20 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Vo 
[2015] NSWSC 1523 , (2015) 302 FLR 209 
21 Re Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police (No 2) 
[2015] NSWSC 1447 
22 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Heng Jie Zhang (Ruling No 1) 
[2015] VSC 390, 
23 New South Wales Crime Commission v Rashidi [2015] NSWSC 995 
24 New South Wales Crime Commission v 
Warburton 
[2015] NSWSC 9 
25 R v Versac [2014] QCA 181 
26 New South Wales Crime Commission v Tindle [2014] NSWSC 879 
27 Crime Commission (NSW) v Huang [2014] NSWSC 642 
28 Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson [2014] HCA 13,  
29 Emmerson v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NTCA 4, (2013) 33 NTLR 1 
30 Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v 
Emmerson 
[2012] NTSC 60 
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Table 9.1: Case List used for Judgement Review  
31 New South Wales Crime Commission v Osman [2014] NSWSC 312 
32 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Trajkoski 
(No 3) 
[2014] WADC 32, (2014) 85 SR (WA) 199 
33 Crime Commission (NSW) v Tran (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1854 
34 New South Wales Crime Commission v Wenping 
He 
[2013] NSWSC 1855 
35 Lee v NSW Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39, (2013) 251 CLR 196 
36 Re Kim [2013] VSC 465 
37 Fuller v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 10 
38 New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar 
(No 2)H 
[2013] NSWSC 1011 
39 New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar [2012] NSWSC 1170 
40 New South Wales Crime Commission v Al 
Jannat 
[2013] NSWSC 935 
41 New South Wales Crime Commission v Choi [2013] NSWSC 437 
42 New South Wales Crime Commission v Choi [2012] NSWSC 658 
43 Commissioner, Australian Federal Police v Fysh [2013] NSWSC 81 
44 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v YeoC [2012] WASC 440 
45 Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v 
Dickson 
[2012] NSWSC 1339 
46 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Grimm 
[2012] NTSC 78, (2012) 269 FLR 322, 
[2013] ALMD 2356 
47 New South Wales Crime Commission v Lee 2012] NSWCA 276 
48 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v 
McPherson 
[2012] WASC 342 
Source: Westlaw.au case search "unexplained wealth" 
 
Table 9.2: Review Cases by Jurisdiction 
Commonwealth Queensland South Australia Tasmania 
11 4 2 1 
New South Wales Victoria Western Australia Northern Territory 
19 2 4 5 
 
Of the 48 review cases: 
 9 were with regard to formal confiscation of assets already seized as a result of their 
use in criminal activity (such as, cash being transported or drug ‘busts’); 
 9 were restraining orders only (requiring minimal accounting evidence other than an 
authorised officer presenting a case for reasonable suspicion of serious illegal 
activity); 
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 5 were for forfeiture of assets because they were directly linked to proceeds of 
criminal activity (for example, in the production of drugs or fraud); 
 19 for other reasons (such as clarifying questions of law, variation of sentences or 
concurrence of evidence that might prejudice other ongoing cases). 
Whilst is difficult to fully understand the connections of individuals to organised crime from 
the descriptive content of judicial decisions, it would not appear that any of the reviewed 
cases were directly linked to organised crime. For example, there was no separate mention of 
target organised criminal groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs, criminal family ties or 
organised criminal structures. No reference was found to complex economic structures such 
as multiple, linked, incorporated entities or trusts that are normally utilised for asset 
protection. On the contrary, the forfeited assets were referenced directly to individuals or 
simple shareholding in small business entities or property. There was a high incidence of 
apparently ethnic Asian defendants (as indicated by name). As necessitated by the statutes, 
statements by authorised officers were the primary accounting evidence presented, however, 
the judgements referred only to the direct outputs, such as, economic value, rather than any 
extended accounting methodology such as gap analysis. No jurisdiction showed signs of, or 
reference to, a strategic methodological approach to unexplained wealth forfeiture based upon 
any broad historical form of unexplained earnings analysis for example, a net worth analysis.  
In summary, the more complex judgements only referred to straight forward unexplained 
wealth with respect to known, closely linked, criminal activity. For example, known and 
convicted drug traffickers who had purchased property with funds but had no legitimate 
capacity to make the purchase. Drug linked convictions accounted for 22 of the 48 cases with 
3 cases being follow through from the automatic forfeiture contained in the Northern 
Territory’s determination of a person being a drug trafficker. Whilst the civil provisions of 
POC legislation encourage out of court settlements, it is not known how prevalent such 
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settlements are in any jurisdiction. 4 cases were merely a judicial sign off of negotiated 
forfeiture agreements brokered with law enforcement agencies, usually for assets restrained 
during other actions (such as, drug seizures)
185
. Of interest are the asset freezing actions that 
have not been followed up by formal forfeiture cases
186
. The areas of civil forfeiture 
settlements, attrition between freezing and forfeiture, the strategic use of unexplained wealth 
gap identification methodologies and inquiry into the use of asset preservation entities are all 
avenues requiring further and more detailed research. 
Part 2 Proceeds of Crime and Unexplained Wealth Statutory Application 
The Commonwealth POCA/UW Statute (2002) 
Whilst this dissertation has been focused on the deployment of accounting technology to 
assist POC/UW adjudication, review of case details (chapter 7) shows that most forfeiture 
penalties, under a proceeds of crime authority, have relied upon the easy route (from an 
accounting point of view), of applying s 54, POCA (Cth). S 54 allows that property merely 
has to be “in the person’s possession at the time of, or immediately after, the person 
committed the offence” (s 54(b)) for the property to be forfeited. In such situations contrary 
evidence must be presented that shows “that the property was not used in, or in connection 
with, the commission of the offence” for the court to reverse its presumption that the property 
was used in, or in connection with, the commission of the offence (s 54(c). “In any other 
case--the court must not make a forfeiture order against the property unless it is satisfied that 
the property was used or intended to be used in, or in connection with, the commission of the 
offence” (s 54(d)). In summary, s 54 only requires evidence of existence rather than 
                                                     
185
 In this regard issues of lack of transparency arise as details remain confidential and not available for public 
scrutiny. 
186
 In this regard the freezing order presumably expires or a negotiated settlement is pursued. In most 
jurisdictions a confiscation order is required to be applied for within 28 days of a freezing order being granted. 
Such an application requires greater evidence to be put before the court that provided for a freezing order. 
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accounting evidence in order to apply a forfeiture order. For example, in Re Commissioner of 
the Australian Federal Police, 2016, a sum of $4,164,525 was found in a drug supplier’s 
vehicle, frozen, then forfeited to the Commonwealth of Australia, as the perpetrator fled 
Australia after completing their period of incarceration.  
Legislative Discretion 
Legislation concerning repatriation of the proceeds of crime and unexplained wealth (see 
chapter 6) has been criticised for allowing administrators to have too much discretion 
(Leighton-Daly, 2015; ALRC Report 87, 1999; Fisse, 1989). This is contrary to the legal 
principle that “certainty in the law is fundamental to the rule of law” (Pagone J, in Raz, 
1977). Certainty requires that the formal conception of the law is delivered “through the 
medium of general rules (rather than particular commands) that are couched in sufficiently 
specific and objective language to make it clear to the subject what is required, prohibited or 
permitted” (Campbell, 2013, p138). Alternatively, the substantive conception of the law, 
which aims to protect citizens by building on morally supported community norms, instructs 
the rule of law within an administrative latitude, that informs citizens as to what is required, 
permitted or prohibited based upon meeting certain moral requirements (Leighton-Daly, 
2015)
187
. In summary, the offences created by POCA, 2002, which include those with respect 
to unexplained wealth, provide interpretational latitude by the administration (for example, 
the Department of Public Prosecutions) and the courts. This is particularly relevant to the 
establishment of a judicial quantification of “benefits derived” and “wealth” (matters of 
importance to a forensic accountants’ deployment of accounting technology). 
Fisse, 1998, observed, with regard to proceeds of crime legislation that, 
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 Further discussion of the seminal legal theories regarding formal (thin) or substantive (thick) law is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. In this regard the reference of Professor Campbell in Flores and Himma (2013) 
may provide further insight. 
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The war declared against organised crime in Australia has generated a new 
despotism in Commonwealth criminal law. We are now beginning to see 
major offences defined in such sweeping terms that the scope of liability 
depends very little on law and very much on administrative discretion. This 
despotism has gone to the extent of exposing lawyers, accountants, 
stockbrokers and financial institutions to an unwarranted risk of prosecution 
in their everyday professional or business lives (p5). 
He concluded that: 
The rise of money-laundering and related offences under POCA has been 
accompanied by the fall of basic principles of criminal liability. This is a 
regrettable legislative achievement, of totalitarian bent. Doubtless, the wise 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will do much to minimise the risk of 
injustice, but the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions and his 
officers is no substitute for the guarantees provided by rule of law (p10). 
Fisse, 1998, calls out a warning with regard to the DPP’s strong discretional rights, however 
pragmatic review of those matters brought to court shows that the DPP in most jurisdictions 
have failed to pursue matters where there is an adverse risk of successful prosecution, a side 
effect of which, is that the judiciary are not presented with matters that may benefit from 
judicial consideration, advice and comment. Consideration of the concepts defined in s 4 of 
POCA, 2002, of “benefit” and “tainted property” illustrate the difference between the more 
tightly defined “tainted property” and the broad consideration of “benefit”. “Tainted 
property” means “property used in, or in connection with, the commission of the offence”, or 
proceeds that is “any property that is derived or realised, directly or indirectly by any person 
from the commission of the offence” (s 4). Therefore the concept of “tainted property” is 
exclusively defined, with the concept of proceeds being inclusively defined to include 
benefits arising. Justice Kirby in Saffron v DPP (Cth), 1989, noted that a derived benefit to 
the applicant was included in the tainted property concerned, over and above the exclusive 
definition of tainted property. Therefore, for the purpose of POCA pecuniary penalty order 
provisions, a “benefit” must be able to be quantified but is not necessarily “property in an 
enforceable sense” (Leighton-Day, 2015, p7). This position is further supported when the 
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remedy sought is a civil provision rather than a criminal provision, where the traditional 
convention of mens rea is problematic as attached to the use of property
188
. In DPP (Cth) v 
Jeffrey, 1992, the applicant, convicted of a serious drug offence, had restraining orders made 
more generally in relation to property in which he had an interest. It was deemed that because 
tax had not been paid on the money used to purchase the property then the applicant had 
obtained a benefit from the use of funds that otherwise should have been used to pay tax. The 
monetary value of the tax that was not paid was deemed tainted funds arising from an indirect 
benefit (hence proceeds), that was the personal use of such money instead of the payment of 
tax. The quantification of the monetary value requires the appropriate deployment of 
accounting technology that recognises the original value of the instrument of the illegality, 
the direct benefit arising from the illegal activity, and the indirect benefit that flows from the 
direct benefit.  
Part 2.4 – Division 2, Penalty Amounts 
POCA Div 2 legislatively describes matters to be considered when determining penalty 
amounts. Of initial concern is, if the offence to which the order relates is, or is not, a serious 
offence. A serious offence is defined at POCA s 338, however, it’s broad definition can be 
summarised with regard to committing an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment for 
3 or more years
189
. This important differentiation requires the expert accountant’s 
quantification to be limited to the benefits the person derived from the offence (under 
subdivision B), less any allowable deduction (under subdivision C), if the indictable offence 
is not serious. Whereas, for a serious offence, quantification can be broadly extended to 
include “the commission of any other offence that constitutes unlawful activity” (s 
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 See Division 5 of Part 2.2 Chapter 2, Criminal Code 
189
 Specific money laundering and drug offences are also nominated. 
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121(3)(a)(ii)). S 123, Value of benefits derived for a non-serious offence, and s 124, Value of 
benefits derived for a serious offence are included in full in Appendix 9A and Appendix 9B.  
In the matter of the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Fysh (2013) (‘Fysh’), 
which concerned indictable offences for insider trading, the question arose as to the 
quantification of the amount of deprival that should form the penalty for the illegal activities 
(at 1). The defendant, Dr Stuart Fysh, had been found guilty of offences that pertained to the 
purchase and subsequent sale of 250,000 shares in Queensland Gas Company Pty Ltd. 
Following Dr Fysh’s sentencing for the insider trading matter, an application was made by 
the Commissioner under s 116 of POCA, 2002, for a penalty order that amounted to 
$1,437,500. Dr Fysh contended that the appropriate amount was the net amount of $640,857, 
which represented the profit from the insider trading transactions after the original cost of the 
share purchases had been deducted. McCallum J reviewed the tension within Division 2 of 
the POCA, 2002, that includes the concept of “benefit” in ss116 and 121 of the Act, the 
phrase “expenses and outgoings” in s 126 of the Act, as well as the “mischief sought to be 
addressed by the introduction of the Act and the desirability of coherence of the whole body 
of law in which it is to operate” (at 6). Importantly, after considering the intent of the 
confiscation law, the language of the Act and the general principle of legality
190
, his honour 
pointed out that “to construe the Act as having, as an object, punishment and deterrence, 
beyond confiscation or the denial of profits unlawfully earned, would duplicate the objects of 
sentencing in criminal proceedings and so expose offenders to double punishment” (at 14). 
His honour reiterated that the court must quantify a pecuniary penalty order in accordance 
with Div 2 of Pt 2.4. As discussed above, s 121 in Div 2 raises the distinction between those 
offences classified as “serious offences” and those that are not. Where the offence is a serious 
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 The principle of legality “holds that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to interfere with common 
law rights and freedoms except by clear and unequivocal language” (Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police v Fysh, 2013, at 7; see also Clissold v Perry, 1904, at 373) 
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offence quantification can look beyond that offence “to confiscate benefits derived from any 
other unlawful activity” (at 18). S 122 provides a list of matters to be considered for 
quantification of the benefits arising from the offence and unlawful activity: 
Evidence the court is to consider  
(1)  In assessing the value of benefits that a person has derived from the 
commission of an offence or offences (the illegal activity), the court is to have 
regard to the evidence before it concerning all or any of the following:  
                     (a)  the money, or the value of the property other than money, that, 
because of the illegal activity, came into the possession or under the 
control of the person or another person;  
                     (b)  the value of any other benefit that, because of the illegal activity, was 
provided to the person or another person;  
                     (c)  if any of the illegal activity consisted of doing an act or thing in 
relation to a narcotic substance:  
                              (i)  the market value, at the time of the offence, of similar or 
substantially similar narcotic substances; and  
                             (ii)  the amount that was, or the range of amounts that were, 
ordinarily paid for the doing of a similar or substantially similar act 
or thing;  
(d)  the value of the person's property before, during and after the illegal 
activity;  
                     (e)  the person's income and expenditure before, during and after the illegal 
activity.  
It is noted that subsections (d) and (e) instruct the court to take into account changing levels 
of assets (property), income and expenditure over the relevant period, including pre and post 
the illegal activity. Sections 123 and 124, as applied to serious and non-serious offences 
adopt a gain or net increase approach to quantifying the value of the relevant benefit to be 
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penalised by forfeiture. With the expansive definition in s 124 his honour pointed out that 
“the person may ultimately be required to pay a greater pecuniary penalty than the net 
increase in their position over the period of illegal activity as a result of expenses and 
outgoings incurred in relation to the illegal activity that are not deductible by virtue of s 126. 
That is, the expenses and outgoings, taken as their ordinary meaning (and not hijacked by 
extraneous accounting issues
191
), are limited in relation to the specific illegal activity” (at 24).  
S 126, in part, states: 
Matters that do not reduce the value of benefits  
                   In assessing the value of benefits that a person has derived from the 
commission of an offence or offences (the illegal activity), none of the following 
are to be subtracted:  
                     (a)  expenses or outgoings the person incurred in relation to the illegal 
activity;  
His honour did not include initial capital in the definition of expenses or outgoings, consistent 
with the accounting differentiation between capital investment and the cost or expense of 
operation. Similarly he distinguished between the term “profit” and “benefit”, noting that 
“benefit” does not mean “gross income”, but “permits more various subtleties of meaning , 
depending on the context” (at 34 and at 54). Again the context of Fysh was of share 
purchases, where it was undisputed that the capital used to purchase the shares was from 
legitimate sources. His honour applied in the context where Dr Fysh invested untainted funds, 
that he had “little difficulty in concluding that the value of the benefit derived from the sale 
of shares purchased unlawfully with inside information was the net amount received upon 
sale of the shares after deducting the original purchase price” (at 21). 
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 His honour made this point portraying the section to “foreclose the unseemly prospect of the court’s 
assessment of the value of the relevant benefits being hijacked by accounting issues and expanded to become a 
complex, costly auditing exercise” (at 29) 
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In contrast the judicial opinion applied to the drug cases of R v Nieves (1991), R v Peterson 
(1992), R v Fagher (1989) and  R v Pederson (2011), was the assessment of the benefit as the 
total amount of the trade. This is an important consideration in regard to the deployment of 
accounting technology to value the appropriate forfeiture penalty as the “benefit” calculation 
should not be reduced by costs (such a brokerage or cost of operation), in concurrence with s 
126 but should only reflect the deduction from gross proceeds of legitimately obtained capital 
investment. The consideration (deduction) of capital investment may be included where the 
capital investment is not, in of itself, an illegal activity. For example, in Fysh the investment 
purchase of shares was itself legal, whereas in the examples of drugs cases, the purchase of a 
quantity of drugs for resale was not, itself, a legal activity. 
Part 2.6 – Division 2, Unexplained Wealth Amounts 
The juridification of the POCA, 2002, continued with the 2010 amendments that introduced 
unexplained wealth provisions
192
. As previously discussed the amendments went further than 
the civil law provision to reverse the onus of proof (see chapter 6). If the appropriate court is 
satisfied that there is reasonable suspicion to suspect that the person cannot lawfully explain 
their total accumulated wealth, then it may (or under certain circumstances, must) compel the 
person to attend court and prove, to the civil standard, that their wealth was not derived from 
offences under Commonwealth jurisdiction. If the person fails to do so then the court can 
order the person to pay, to the Commonwealth, the difference between his or her total wealth, 
and their lawfully obtained wealth, or that wealth obtained from certain offences. This may 
include the court making an order for a particular asset or group of assets, or a cash 
substitution to the value of assets. Application of this forfeiture is a two-step process with the 
initial court request for the preliminary unexplained wealth order preceding the forfeiture 
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 Part 2-6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002 by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised 
Crime) Bill, obtaining royal assent: 19 February 2010. 
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order. The preliminary unexplained wealth order is considered by the court on evidence 
provided by an authorised officer (with either accounting expertise or advised by an expert 
accountant) as to the suspicion that the “person's total wealth exceeds the value of the 
person's wealth that was lawfully acquired” (s 179B (1) (b)) and the grounds on which that 
officer holds the suspicion (s 179B (2) (b)). The court must grant the order if the estimates of 
the “person's total wealth exceeds by $100,000 or more the value of the person's wealth that 
was lawfully acquired” (s 179B (4)). 
It may be expected that the of the authorised officer’s supporting affidavit is similar to the net 
worth or asset betterment methods, in that it compares an opening and closing wealth 
calculation (accumulated assets) in a calculation of total wealth minus known legitimate 
wealth (the gap shortfall in net worth analysis), however, from judicial comments, it appears 
that the authorised officer’s report may more often rely upon interview type evidence that 
produces a supporting narrative connected to an asset or group of assets rather than a total 
unexplained sum approach (for example a net worth analysis). This appears to have been the 
case in New South Wales v Kane (No 3), 2016, where the court tested the “reasonable 
grounds” for the authorised officer’s suspicion that a property was acquired using the 
proceeds of crime arising from a fraud committed by a minority – 10% - shareholder. The 
authorised officer’s reasoning was found insufficient (at 42) as it was based on interview 
evidence rather than transactional explanation
193
.  Leighton-Daly, 2013, agrees that the 2002 
Act’s unexplained wealth provisions are “more analogous to the Australian Tax Office’s asset 
betterment test than any previous federal forfeiture of criminal property law in Australia” (Pt 
2, 2014, p576-577). The mere statement by an authorised officer of their suspicion that the 
proceeds of crime have been used to acquire an asset, or have contributed to unexplained 
                                                     
193
 The court also analysed eight tests for considering the concept of “reasonable suspicion” as it is required to 
be held by an authorised officer. These tests arise from nominated precedent cases and are supported by 
elements of the explanatory memorandum to the Criminal Assets Recovery Amendment Act 
(Unexplained Wealth) Act 2010  (NSW). 
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wealth, appears to have been sufficient to obtain restraining or freezing orders, particularly 
where money or assets have been seized or particular property targeted. However such cases 
are “low hanging fruit” in the potential consideration of confiscation remedies (see, for 
example, New South Wales Crime Commission v Richards 2016; Commissioner of the 
Australian Federal Police v Surinder Kaur, 2016; New South Wales Crime Commission v 
Galloway, 2017; New South Wales Crime Commission v Tan, 2017; New South Wales Crime 
Commission v De Jonk, 2016; New South Wales Crime Commission v Calvert, 2017). 
Considering the recent dates of the examination orders that accompany most of these cases, it 
is expected that further unexplained wealth forfeiture matters will be heard over the near 
future, matters that should provide rich judicial comment for research. 
Part 2 – Conclusion 
The prima facie construction of the Australian forfeiture statutes, and their attendant 
explanatory memoranda, appear to provide for both an expedient manner of obtaining a 
restraining or freezing order based merely on suspicion, and a more complex asset betterment 
type analysis of a person’s unexplained wealth. The legislation appears to have been 
successfully used in its simplest capacity, by prosecuting agencies, however the case 
examples show that the targets for forfeiture are mainly limited to matters where cash and 
assets have been seized in and around direct criminal activity that gives rise to tainted funds 
from directly identifiable sources. Such cases would appear to be straight forward, in that 
they leverage the narrative in support of the authorised agent’s suspicion of illegal activity. 
This, in turn, supports the judicial issue of mandatory orders and the court’s demand for 
compulsory attendance at a financial examination. Alternatively, the use of an accounting 
patterned principle approach to establishing unexplained wealth by gap analysis does not 
appear to have been used other than to a basic extent. The lack of asset betterment based 
confiscations arising from examinations is notable, however the recent spate of successful 
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examination orders (2016, 2017), together with the enhanced accounting capacity of the task 
force approach to managing organised criminal responses, should give rise to broader use of 
patterned principles approach to unexplained wealth evidence and hence fodder for further 
academic research, in concurrence with comments in chapter 10.      
Part 3 Legal Stare Decisis and the Application of Key Concepts 
As previously noted the development of credible patterned principles, accepted as valid 
evidence, requires the support of the precedential pronouncements of eminent judges (or 
groups of judges, such as a full court). Pronouncements arise from matters under 
consideration, where issues are either new or call for reiteration and refined explanation (see 
chapter 8 with regard to the principle of stare decisis). This chapter reviews the obiter dicta
194
 
expressed in cases involving forfeiture judgements under Australian statutes and, where 
relevant, statutes from overseas jurisdictions. Without a significant or mature base of matters 
that have been considered in the Australian forfeiture jurisdictions, it has been necessary to 
consider issues that have arisen in other matters, which may be influential in responding to 
the research questions, as well as practical issues arising from the legislation itself. In this 
regard judicial comment from the United Kingdom has particular effect, whereas matters that 
emanate from the United States (either at their state or commonwealth level) may have 
limited application due to the peculiarities of those jurisdiction
195
 and high dependency on 
direct cash and asset forfeiture as a compliance source of funds. 
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 Obiter dictum (plural dicta) refers to the judge’s expression of opinion uttered in court or in a written 
judgement, but not essential to the decision and therefore not legally binding as a precedent; said in passing; 
made as comments, illustrations or thoughts  
(legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/obiter+dicta) 
195
 It should be noted that various U.S. statutes have given rise to sundry forfeiture exercised similar to an “on 
the spot fine system”, where the confiscated money and assets contribute directly to the costs of providing local 
legal services. This has sometimes led to an explosion of small matter confiscations (such as, the confiscation 
and sale of a van used to convey drugs between states). In this regard the U.S. use of forfeiture remedies is not 
aligned with its use in British based statutory regimes. (see Worrall, 2001) 
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Degree of Use or Derivation 
The interpretation of “use” or “derivation” from the POCA statutes is important to an expert 
accountant when making decisions about the extent to which a transaction or groups of 
transactions are associated with illicit funds or illegal activity. The ordinary meaning of “use” 
is taken to be “employ for a certain end or purpose” (www.dictionary.com/browse/use, 
accessed 2017). When used “in connection with”, such as when reference is made to the 
commission of an offence, it has “long been held to be a wide phrase which, depending on 
the context, can  describe the spectrum of relationships between two things …….. ranging 
from direct and immediate to tenuous and remote” (at 105; see also Collector of Customs v 
Pozzolamic Enterprises Pty Ltd, 1993, at 288). This can cover transactions before and after 
the confiscation offence. Macfarlane J (Canadian jurisdiction) commented: 
One of the very generally accepted meanings of ‘connection’ is “relation 
between things one of which is bound up with or involved in another”; or again 
“having to do with” The words include matters occurring prior to as well as 
subsequent to or consequent upon so long as they are related to the principle 
thing. (Nanaimo Community Hotel Ltd v British Columbia, 1944, at 639). 
Therefore the transactions to be considered in establishing forfeiture penalties should be 
legitimised using the ordinary meaning of ‘used’, applied with a wider scope than merely 
being employed in the commission of an offence and validated in the connection to a crime 
by fact and degree
196
. The connection of transactions and the unlawful activity therefore, for 
the accounting expert considering whether to include, or not to include, transactions 
connected between the “use and unlawful activity”, the link:  
 does not have to be substantial, but has to be more than slight or negligible 
(George Doyle CJ in DPP v George, 2008); 
 does not require a causal link ( in Chalmers v R, 2011); 
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 “It is not necessary for it to be established that there is a ‘substantial’ connection or that the crime could not 
have been committed without using the property” (Hart at 77) 
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 must be direct or immediate, in a very real sense (Carter J in Re Application 
Pursuant to the Drugs Misuse Act, 1986); 
 must not be tenuous or remote (Riley CJ in Dickfoss v DPP, 2012); 
 must not be accidental or incidental (Hunt CJ in Jeffrey v DPP No 1, 1995).  
(Hart, 2016, at 110, 113) 
“Derived” 
The word ‘derived’ is commonly used in the POCA, 2002, statute, such as in s 102(2)(c)
197
 
and deserves recognition by the accounting expert to the extent that it informs the inclusion 
of transactions for the quantification of a restraining or penalty order. The use of the word 
“derived” was considered in Hart, 2016, (at 114 to 165) where its instruction under normal 
definition is that (from the accounting perspective) proceeds are to be “traced from a source, 
or to show their origin from something” (at 216; also see Hunt CJ in Jeffrey No 1 at 320). In 
this sense “derived” has a broader context than merely “acquired” (Cole JA in Jeffrey No 2; 
also in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Corby). Reiteration of s 336, notes that the 
derivation of proceeds includes a reference to both the person and “another person at the 
request or direction of the first person” (at 166, see s 336(b)). For example, the accounting 
expert would be expected to confirm the derivation of transactions both directly with respect 
to the appropriate person, or at the instruction, or under the control of the appropriate person, 
as traced back to an original source that has been used in connection with unlawful activity, 
or in the instance of orders relating to the relief of forfeited property, that the original source 
has not been used in connection with unlawful activity. In a practical sense Redlich JA, in 
Markovski v DPP, 2014, considered the appellant’s contention that specified funds used to 
purchase a vehicle came from a nominated bank account. His Honour was requested to 
adjudicate whether the trace back to the bank account (which demonstrated acquisition) was 
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 102 (2)(c) the applicant's interest in the property is not wholly or partly derived or realised, whether directly 
or indirectly, from the commission of the offence or an instrument of the offence. 
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sufficient to satisfy the extended concept of derivation. His consideration was that the lawful 
providence of the funds deposited into the bank account was required as well as the funds 
expended to validate lawful derivation, stating: 
…… if the property is acquired by the use of funds that are the proceeds of 
criminal activity, the transaction by which the property was acquired will not 
be lawful. It would be inconsistent with those provisions were the term 
‘lawfully acquired’ to be construed as excluding from consideration the source 
of the funds and their effect upon the lawfulness of the transaction (Markovski 
at 81). 
The forensic accountant therefore has an obligation to explain the providence of funds (by 
transaction) coming into the account as well as going out of the account. Consideration needs 
to be made of how far back the tracing of funds needs to go. In this regard Nourse J in 
Davenport v Chilver, 1983, commented: 
Property may, therefore, be regarded as derived indirectly as a result of the 
commission of an offence where it has been acquired, for example, through a 
betting or dealing transaction financed by the proceeds of drug trafficking. In 
my opinion, the process of tracing to an indirect source may go back through a 
number of transactions (Davenport at 300). 
McGarvie J respectfully agreed that tainted funds would endure when “(i) unlawful funds 
being used to acquire a property (even as a loan), and that being paid off by lawful funds; and 
(ii) unlawful funds being used to repay lawful finance that was used to acquire a property” 
(Hart at 163). 
Of further note, McGavie J, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Allen, 1998, in determining 
the relative source of funds used to purchase a vehicle were from gambling or from drug 
trafficking, stated that “The source of the property is to be determined not as a legal concept 
but by the concepts of ordinary people” (Allen at 10; Hart at 146).  This, of necessity, raises 
the issue of partial derivation as may be demonstrated by the derivation or trace back. His 
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Honour, Morrison JA (in Hart), went on to comment that “the connection between the 
derivation and the unlawful activity is slightly different from that for ‘use’ (at 138) followed 
by his elements to be considered in connection with “derived” to be: 
 does not have to be substantial, but has to be more than slight or 
negligible; 
 does not require a causal link; 
 can be indirect; 
 must not be tenuous or remote; 
 must not be accidental or incidental.  (Hart at 138). 
To return to McGavie J’s concepts of the ordinary person, a claim for the mixed use of 
untainted and tainted funds must be supported by multiple sources of funds. In regard to the 
balance between tainted and untainted funds it is substantially one of relative quantification, 
in line with the evidence of derivation (as above) for each source of funds. Morrison JA (in 
Hart) noted that under a 102(2) or (3) of POCA the applicant for relief “bears the onus of 
showing that the property is not derived from an offence” (Hart at 148). Tracking the 
providence of “derived” may be a complex forensic accounting job, that involves constructing 
a narrative supported by transactional evidence, in all its detail, as linked to tainted and 
untainted sources and funds flow. Professional recognition of the balancing nature of debits 
and credits should support the proportionalisation of legitimate and illegitimate funds both 
progressively and as finally deposed onto the asset in consideration for forfeiture. 
Part 4 Specific Issues and Judicial Obiter Dicta 
Calculation of Unexplained Wealth - Not Requiring Special Skill? 
It has been recognised that the dispensation to give opinion evidence is dependent on the 
recognition of the witness having expert skills and that the evidence offered is consistent 
with the application of those skills (see chapters 5; Makita, 2001). This point was tested with 
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respect to the estimation of unexplained wealth in Fuller v the Queen, 2013. In this matter 
the expert accountant gave evidence of unexplained wealth arising from five notebooks that 
“contained a number of entries referring to weights of drugs, types of drugs and calculations 
of projected profits from drug deals” (at 9) as well as evidence of real property purchases. 
“There was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to have been satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that the five notebooks were authored by the appellant (perpetrator) and 
that they proved consistent drug selling over the period of the indictment” (at 11). Their 
honours, Riley CJ, Barr J and Hiley J were asked to adjudicate if “the learned trial judge 
erred in allowing the police forensic evidence of Mr Wall's purported expert opinion in 
relation to values contained in the journals found at the appellant's premises” and that “the 
learned trial judge erred in allowing the evidence of Superintendent Noy purporting to be 
expert opinion evidence in relation to the notations contained in the journals” and further 
that “the learned trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to how they should approach 
and evaluate the expert evidence of Robert Wall and the exhibits that were used by Mr Wall 
so they could make an independent assessment of the opinion and its value” (at 12.3, 12.4 
and 13). Mr Wall’s evidence was essentially a mathematical exercise, referring to data and 
making assumptions to reach dollar figures (at 50). 
Mr Wall performed two such exercises. One was to reach a figure of 
$976,200 as being the net profit that would have been derived by the 
appellant on the assumptions that 4881 units of drugs were sold during the 
indictment period at an assumed price of $1000 per unit and that the appellant 
would have received $200 per gram/unit profit. We shall refer to this as the 
net profit exercise. 
 
The other exercise was to identify expenditure by the appellant during the 
indictment period, which Mr Wall could not readily identify as having a 
legitimate source. We shall refer to this as the unsourced funds exercise. In 
the course of performing that exercise he examined bank records, credit card 
statements, tax returns and working papers in relation to the tax returns of the 
appellant and his wife (all of which were in evidence) and he looked for any 
record therein that identified the source of funds used for a number of 
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purchases. Mr Wall identified a number of purchases or other forms of 
expenditure for which he could not find a source and added the figures for 
those items to reach a total figure of $847,108.21. That did not include 
another $207,517.61 in cash deposits for which he could not find any source 
(at 51, 52). 
 
In his evidence, Mr Wall demonstrated his methodology, including by 
identifying the particular records he had regard to, his assumptions and the 
calculations he made (at 61). 
Mr Wall also submitted his evidence for validation through cross-examination and the trial 
judge “gave extensive directions as to the way in which the jury should assess and treat 
expert evidence, including Mr Wall's evidence. The court, and subsequently the appeals 
court, accepted the expert evidence albeit with a judicial summary that focused on the 
purpose and evaluation of an expert witness. At several points her Honour pointed out that 
the jury could reject the opinions of an expert where not satisfied of underlying facts or 
assumptions” (at 68). Similarly the allied evidence of Superintendent Noy regarding the 
interpretation of common drug terminology was supported based on his expertise in drug 
investigation. The importance of this case to an expert witnesses, is that, in applying 
accounting expertise to informal records (for example, the notebooks), the calculation of 
amounts such as profits from drug sales requires mathematical estimates and extensions that 
are not entirely consistent with the accepted tradition of transaction allocation as deployed in 
the assembly of a profit and loss or balance sheet report. Nevertheless it is an accounting 
exercise that, if it is adequately explained, through the articulation of assumptions and their 
calculative effect may be accepted by the trier of fact (judge or jury). In this regard the 
validation of the expert opinion is enhanced by reducing the exclusivity of the expert’s 
cognitive authority through adequate explanation and validation, linked to the facts of the 
matter, in this case, the informal (drug) nomenclature to the patterned principles of a profit 
calculation. The calculation of profit is an accounting exercise, therefore the assumptions 
and arithmetic that form part of the calculation arise from a valid base of expertise with its 
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probity dependent on the adequacy of the accountant’s reasoning and explanation, aided by 
concurrence with the proper deployment of patterned principles of accounting.  
Structure of Deposits 
S 19(d) of POCA, 2002, provides that a restraining order must be made if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the property is the proceeds of an indictable offence or an instrument of 
a serious offence. An authorised officer must provide an affidavit explaining reasonable 
grounds for their suspicion. In the matter of the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police 
v Nguyen (2013), in the supreme court of New South Wales, McCallum J held that the pattern 
of numerous deposits of $10,000 into four bank accounts held in the names of the defendants 
(as detected by AUSTRAC
198
) was sufficient to meet the s 19 reasonable grounds for suspicion 
that the funds were associated with illegitimate sources. The affidavit presented was 
principally (if not solely) supported by accounting evidence including bank statements and 
information from the relevant banks that allowed for quantification (at 5). In this regard the 
indictable offence referenced s 142(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006. The court’s satisfaction under the terms of s 19 allowed for the making of 
a restraining order without identifying any particular offender (s 19(4)) (at 4). The expert 
accounting evidence presented a narrative of 94 “non-threshold deposits”, that is, just below 
the $10,000 reportable limit
199
. The narrative was quantified to a total of $724,681 by addition 
of the bank deposits according to bank records. In this regard the evidence was presented in 
support of reasonable suspicion held by an appropriate officer. In Commissioner of Australian 
Federal Police v Minh Duc Pham, 2015, Beech-Jones J held that “property standing in a bank 
account which was deposited as part of a so-called structured transaction, that is, a transaction 
                                                     
198
 AUSTRAC – Australian Transaction Reports and analysis Centre is Australia's financial intelligence agency with 
regulatory responsibility for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing. They identify threats and criminal 
abuse of the financial system, and act to protect Australia's economy (http://www.austrac.gov.au/about-us/austrac ).  
199 The relevant reportable amount of $10,000 provided for in the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006  (Cth) (‘AMLCTFA Act’) 
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designed to avoid the reporting requirements of the AMLCTFA
200
, constituted property that 
was either wholly or partly realised or derived, whether directly or indirectly, from the 
commission of an offence constituted by the structuring of transactions to avoid the reporting 
requirement” (at 37)
201
. Therefore the aggregation of such amounts in the bank account, or that 
flow forward from that account, in total, can be subject to a restraining order, and further to a 
forfeiture order. Again the inference for the forensic accounting expert is that the court views 
the transactional narrative as being casual with respect to forfeiture which is strengthened 
through the patterned accumulation of transactions which have an individual, yet common 
purpose. Accounting inscription allows for the accumulation of these amounts characterised as 
either debits or credits. A Forensic accountant may be called upon to defend the single purpose 
narrative alongside the summation of transactions.  
Double Counting 
The determination of unexplained wealth is fraught with the danger of double counting. That 
is an amount, or an accumulation of amounts are combined (as both debits, or both credits) 
rather than having been offset (one amount as a debit and then another as a credit). In 
particular this can happen when an amount is included within the unencumbered value of an 
asset (for example, a property) and then also included as money used to make payments on a 
loan which in turn was used to make payments on the asset (for example, home loan 
repayments). An expert accountant must take particular care to recognised the effect of 
mixing income type transactions with capital assets, ensuring that the appropriate liabilities 
are matched against the purchase value of the property, accounting for the repayments. 
Further any capital gain made whilst the property has been held must be recognised as not 
being directly funded from revenue (for example, proceeds of criminal activity) but as an 
                                                     
200
 AMLCTFA refers to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act, 2006. 
201
 Also cited in Re Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, 2016, NSWSC 1327 
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indirect economic benefit that may arise from the utilisation of tainted funds already allocated 
to the original asset purchase. In this regard the capital benefit that arises from the asset needs 
to be apportioned in accordance with the proportion of tainted funds. 
McCallum J, in New South Wales Crime Commission v Ayik, 2016, referred to s 28B of the 
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), as providing “a simple mathematical formula for 
the calculation of the amount in which an unexplained wealth order must be made”. The 
Court is required first to calculate the “current or previous wealth” of a person by calculating 
the sum of the values of certain matters specified in subs (4) as follows: 
The “current or previous wealth” of a person is the amount that is the sum 
of the values of the following: 
(a) all interests in property of the person, 
(b) all interests in property that are subject to the effective control of the 
person, 
(c) all interests in property that the person has, at any time, expended, 
consumed or otherwise disposed of (by gift, sale or any other means), 
(d) any service, advantage or benefit provided at any time for the person or, 
at the person's request or direction, to another person, 
whether acquired, disposed of or provided before or after the 
commencement of this section and whether within or outside New South 
Wales.” (s 28B).  
Further that “Subsection (2) provides that the “unexplained wealth” of a 
person is, in effect, that part of the sum of the values calculated in subs (4) 
as to which the defendant has failed to discharge the onus of proving that 
the current or previous wealth is not or was not illegally acquired property 
or the proceeds of an illegal activity. The mechanism is accordingly one 
which turns critically on the discharge by the defendant of an onus of 
proof.” (at 11). 
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He noted, in this instance, that the respondent had not put on a defense or any 
evidence and was known to have left the country. Nevertheless, his Honour 
recognised the issue of double counting in the forensic accounting evidence which 
had been presented on the basis of a simple asset sources and applications statement. 
He recorded one issue in the application of the formula provided for in s 28B(4) that 
is “open to the possibility that certain values contributing to a person's “current or 
previous wealth” within the meaning of the Act might be double counted. Indeed it is 
clear from a close consideration of the evidence in the present case that, that has 
occurred here, there being for example inclusion of the value of a property and the 
value of loan repayments made to acquire the property” (at 15). Further, that the 
construction of the sources and applications accounting technology, deployed under 
s 28B(6) provides, where the value of anything to be included as part of the 
calculation relates to wealth that has been expended, for the court undertaking the 
calculation to count the greater of the value at the time the wealth was acquired and 
its value immediately before the wealth was expended. Similarly, subs (b) of subs 
28B(6) requires the person undertaking the calculation to count the greater of the 
value of wealth at the time it was acquired and its value at the time of the application 
for the unexplained wealth order.” (at 17). The matter of New South Wales Crime 
Commission v Kelaita, 2008, was also referenced with respect to the same 
accounting construction issue in respect of s 28A and s 28B. It is important then, that 
the deployment of patterned principles for sources and applications methodology, 
properly accounts for the wealth that has been expended in the net incremental or 
detrimental value of assets. 
In the matter of Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bridge, 2005, McLure J cautioned 
against double counting of unexplained wealth that arises from the value of property “in its 
different exchange forms” (at 34).  
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 … valuing a person's total wealth (and their total lawfully acquired wealth) is 
part of the process of calculating a person's unexplained wealth under s 144 of 
the Act
202
 ….. It cannot be the legislature's intention that regard be had to 
property in its many exchange manifestations (“related property”) in 
calculating a person's wealth. On the other hand, there is no reason in principle 
or policy to give primacy to property owned at the time of the declaration over 
previously owned property. To the contrary, to adopt the respondents' 
construction would exclude from the wealth calculus property that had been 
transferred for inadequate consideration (at 34). 
 
Having noted the wide and inclusive language of s 13(2), 13(3), 19(2), 19 (3) and s 143(1)(d) 
which define the economic inclusions he noted: 
In my view, where specified property is no longer available but can be traced 
to related property owned by the respondent at the time of the declaration, the 
State can select the property to be valued and that will determine whether s 
13(2) or (3) (or s 19(1) or (2)) applies. However, no account should be taken of 
the value of related property in the calculation of the value 
of unexplained wealth if that would lead to multiple counting of the same 
value. The selection of the property will be affected by whether the related 
property is of a lesser or greater value than the original property (at 35).  
 
Forensic accountants need to recognise that forfeiture statutes are necessarily written in wide 
language, which the courts have not seen to read down or to substitute for the language of the 
legislation, instead, keeping their interpretation in line with the broad discussion in 
explanatory memoranda
203
. Such language grants the accountant flexibility to include a 
variety of transactions when formulating an unexplained wealth valuation. However, such 
valuation is not unlimited and must take into account the balancing narrative, where credit 
funds transfer to, and offset, debit applications and visa versa. Mere addition of monetary 
amounts to form asset totals without appropriate offsetting is not proper deployment of 
                                                     
202
 In reference to the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000  (WA) 
203
 See Director of Public Prosecutions v Logan Park Investments Pty Ltd, 1995, for further discussion of this 
point from a legal perspective.  
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accounting technology, nor the appropriate application of the patterned principle of funds 
flow analysis methodology.    
Effective Control 
POCA, 2002, departs from traditional structural ownership that accountants use to define 
equity. Whilst the meaning of “effective control” is not fully defined in POCA 
(Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Hart (Hart), 2016, at 258) the Act ignores 
corporations and trusts law as it relates to the ownership of property by introducing a broader 
definition of “effective control” of property that may be subject to forfeiture. To this end s 
337 states: 
 
 
Meaning of effective control 
(1)  Property may be subject to the effective control of a person whether or not the 
person has: 
                     (a)  a legal or equitable estate or interest in the property; or 
                     (b)  a right, power or privilege in connection with the property. 
(2)  Property that is held on trust for the ultimate benefit of a person is taken to be 
under the effective control of the person. 
(4)  If property is initially owned by a person and, within 6 years either before or 
after an application for a restraining order or a confiscation order is made, 
disposed of to another person without sufficient consideration, then the property 
is taken still to be under the effective control of the first person. 
          (4A)  In determining whether or not property is subject to the effective 
control of a person, the effect of any order made in relation to the 
property under this Act is to be disregarded. 
           (5)   In determining whether or not property is subject to the effective control 
of a person, regard may be had to: 
(a)  shareholdings in, debentures over or directorships of a company that 
has an interest (whether direct or indirect) in the property; and 
                     (b)  a trust that has a relationship to the property; and 
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                     (c)  family, domestic and business relationships between persons 
having an interest in the property, or in companies of the kind 
referred to in paragraph (a) or trusts of the kind referred to in 
paragraph (b), and other persons. 
             (6)  For the purposes of this section, family relationships are taken to include 
the following (without limitation): 
                     (a)  relationships between de facto partners; 
                     (b)  relationships of child and parent that arise if someone is the child 
of a person because of the definition of child in section 338; 
                     (c)  relationships traced through relationships mentioned in 
paragraphs (a) and (b). 
  (7)  To avoid doubt, property may be subject to the effective control of more 
than one person. 
Notions of economic control commonly used by accountants rely upon some form of 
ownership that eventually relates an individual to the property in question. This may be a 
direct ownership, such as when a person is a sole trader or is recognised as the individual 
owner of property through a registration process (for example, a State government property 
register), or indirectly through the owner being an incorporated entity (a company) with a 
majority of shares in the company being held by an individual (for example, recorded as 
beneficially held on the ASIC share register). Accountants commonly use the equity method 
of treating investments as assets, that give rise to income which is recorded on financial 
statements in accord with the proportional share of the investment, and equities on financial 
balance sheets in accord with their proportional valuation (see Morris, 2004;  AASB 128, 
Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures, 2011). Slightly more opaque ownership many 
be attributed to other structures such as partnerships, joint ventures and trusts, where property 
is held on behalf of individuals based on a form of agreement (for example, a partnership 
agreement or a deed of trust) that may or may not be governed according to a specific statute 
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(for example, trust law which has evolved in Australia connected with company law, family 
law and taxation
204
). Part 1(a) of s 337 covers this traditional definition of equitable control. 
More recently, hybrid entity structures (for example, multiple interrelate trusts with corporate 
trustees), exploitation of international jurisdictions (for example, offshore companies in in 
low transparency countries), nominee directors (where a director may be nominated 
according to a separate agreement, terms or conditions) and shell companies (where a 
company does not hold any assets of its own) have been used as economic vehicles to 
obscure asset trails. The purpose of these complex and remote entity structures is to hide 
assets often arising from tainted sources or to avoid taxation (see Richardson 2015; 
Blackburn et al, 2012; Potas, 1993). Assets held within such structures are difficult to 
quantify, trace and restrain due to the lack of a clear “line of sight” between the real owner 
and the ultimate asset
205
 (see for example, Basel Institute on Governance, 2009). The 
juridification of POCA (Cth) as demonstrated in s 337 which from 1 (b) extends the equitable 
control to any “right, power or privilege in connection with the property”. This is further 
broadened by reference to several types of family, domestic and business “relationships” in 
subsections 5 and 6. 
In normal terms effective is defined as “actual, existing in fact rather than theory” and control 
as “under the command of” (Oxford Dictionary, 2003). Consistent with the Financial Action 
Task Force’s guidance on transparency and beneficial ownership (2014), subsection 2 
“Property that is held on trust for the ultimate benefit of a person is taken to be under 
                                                     
204
 A detailed discussion of trust law is beyond the boundaries of this dissertation, however it should be 
recognised that the general law of trusts evolves the duty, obligation or fiduciary relationship that a trustee has 
to the beneficiaries of a trust arrangement (Re Scott (deceased), 1948)  
205
 Exploration of this topic would bring into consideration topics of tax evasion, money laundering and asset 
tracing retrieval treaties. For the purposes of this dissertation it suffices to recognise that the growing use of 
opaque economic structures to obscure the real ownership of assets (property) has been the driving force behind 
the legislature’s move to more broadly define ownership to include the effective control of property.  
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the effective control of the person” brings the ultimate benefit test
206
 under the effective 
control definition. The consequence for the accounting expert witness is that they must 
consider the scope of deployment of their accounting technology to encompass a broader 
context than mere equitable ownership when defining property for unexplained wealth 
quantification. That is, the patterned principle must consider the meaning of effective control 
outside the accounting consideration of financial control. This means the recognition of, 
consideration of and detail with respect to controlling relationships, decision making, 
influence and behaviours. Of further note is the timing when effective control must exist, 
which is not specified in the legislation. In respect to this, consideration by the Queensland 
Court of Appeal in Hart, 2016, was that effective control ceases when “a restraining order, 
and other orders, take effective control away from the person” (at 259) and the property has 
not been excluded from forfeiture. The commencement of control is a matter of fact when the 
observation or structure of control was initially portrayed.  
Period of Deployment 
A standard concept considered when deploying accounting technology is that of the opening 
and closing dates of a period. For example, in the Australian context, financial reports such as 
profit and loss, balance sheet and cash flow statements consider a ‘financial year’ period 
commencing 1 July X1 and ending 30 June X2. Whilst this period is influenced by taxation 
requirements, nevertheless the concept of an opening period and a closing period as a rigid 
inclusion (if within) or exclusion (if outside) of transactions by date is an accepted accounting 
practice (see AASB 108, 2015). Subsection 4 refers to “within 6 years either before or after 
an application for a restraining order or a confiscation order” as the period with respect to 
divestiture of property that can be rolled back into the definition of effective control. This 
                                                     
206
 That is, the person (s) who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the assets or the income arising from the assets. 
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period may represent a convenient period for the deployment of the accounting technology, 
however, in order to meet validation criteria (see chapter 5) other considerations need to be 
balanced against the mere duration of deployment. For example, the conditions of sufficient 
enquiry; scope and accuracy, are more important to fulfil before the patterned principle 
required for validation can be accepted. In this regard the accounting technologist needs to 
establish and adhere to an opening and closing boundary for transactions, consistently applied 
to both credit and debit entries from all sources, but the actual duration of the quantification 
period has greater dependency on legitimate enquiry requirements, such as the availability of 
adequate and accurate transactional evidence (Michels, 2011). The patterned principle 
remains one of sufficient enquiry, such that, further investigation, applied to either an 
extended opening or closing period, would not materially effect the expert’s conclusion 
(p116). Consistent with evidentiary and professional direction the accounting expert needs to 
explain their opinion, in order to validate the choice and application of opening and closing 
periods against alternative periods. 
McCallum J considered s 124 of POCA, 2002, in the Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police v Fysh, 2013, noting that the section “adopts a gain or net increase approach” to 
determining the “value of the relevant benefit in the case of serious offences”. Subsection 
124(1) describes that “the court is to treat the value of the benefits derived by the person from 
the commission of the illegal activity as being not less than the amount of the greatest excess 
during or after the illegal activity, as exceeds the value of their property before the illegal 
activity” (POCA, 2002, s 124 (1). “Put shortly, the starting point is the net increase in the 
person’s financial position” (Fysh, 2013, at 24). 
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Accounting for Other Interests in Forfeited Property 
It is important, particularly from an accounting evidence point of view, that account is taken 
of legitimate and untainted interests in a property or assets which are subject to a forfeiture 
order. Accounting evidence segmenting the tainted and untainted equity in a property may be 
material in the apportionment of an asset or proceeds from the sale of an asset. S 55 reasons 
that the court may specify other interests in property under a forfeiture order where:  
(a)  the amount received from disposing of the combined interests would be 
likely to be greater than the amount received from disposing of each of the 
interests separately; or  
 (b)  disposing of the interests separately would be impracticable or 
significantly more difficult than disposing of the combined interests (s 55).  
In this regard the court may make “such ancillary orders as it thinks fit for the protection of a 
person having one or more of those other interests” (s 55(2)). As described at s 55(3) and (4) 
accounting for an ancillary order should include valuation of “the nature, extent and value of 
the person's interest in the property concerned” (s 55(3)(a). This value may be expressed in 
percentage or dollar terms. S 73 allows for the making of exclusion orders such that a 
specified interest is excluded from forfeiture. In this regard an accountant calculating the 
exclusion must be specific in identifying the “nature, extent and value (at the time of making 
the order) of the interest concerned” (s 73 (2)(a)) and explicitly explain that the interest is not 
the proceeds of unlawful activity nor the instrument of a serious offence (s 73(1)(i) and (ii). 
Recognition of an interest in forfeited property may be otherwise compensated for under a 
compensation order directing the Commonwealth to make restitution for “an amount equal to 
that proportion of the difference between the amount received from disposing of the property 
and the sum of any payments … in connection with the forfeiture order” (s 77(2)(d)(ii)). 
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Again, an accountant valuing the separate untainted interest must be specific in defining such 
interest for the court.  
Mixture of Tainted and Non-Tainted Funds 
The mixing of tainted assets with non-tainted assets is a common reintegration strategy
207
 or 
may simply be the outcome of business dealings where the legally obtained funds of one 
person or entity are mixed with tainted funds for a single purpose, such as the purchase of a 
property. In this regard the statutory provisions with respect to accounting for other interests 
may be the most appropriate consideration for segregating tainted and non-tainted funds. 
Where a single individual has mixed their funds from legitimate and illegitimated sources 
they can be distinguished either by separation or as a proportion of the realised value of the 
forfeited property. The role of accounting is important to determine the proportional 
separation between tainted and untainted funds, particularly where an asset involves an 
intangible component (such as in the purchase of a business). Procedurally the sections 
discussed above in regards to accounting for other interests in forfeited property are relevant 
in seeking relief for mixed, untainted funds, however s 94A should also be recognised as a 
means to attain compensation. The accounting role is specifically linked to s 94A(2)(a), in 
advising the court as to the specific proportion found by the court to be untainted source 
funds. 
Value of Property 
Under s 56 forfeiture orders must specify the value of forfeited property at the time the 
forfeiture order is made (s 56). Such value is made as if it has been derived at the time of 
                                                     
207
 In this regard money laundering strategies may be employed that include placement, layering or integration 
in combination with legitimate funds or activities. Such strategies may be considered as an individual activity 
for in confiscation or forfeiture matters rather than a holistic approach under AML-CFT or financial legislation. 
Whilst money laundering may arise in forfeiture matters it is not the focus of this dissertation. 
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assessment (s 125(1)). The court may also take into account the time value of money in the 
declining purchasing power of money between “the time when the benefit was derived and 
the time the court makes its assessment” (s 125(2)). Bearing in mind the aforementioned 
discussion regarding the broad recognition of a benefit arising from tainted assets, the 
contemporary nature of the assessment process allows for tainted assets to be valued at 
market value at the time of assessment, inclusive of capital gain. In the case of property or 
shares the capital gain could be considerable, representing a benefit arising due to the control 
and use of tainted funds that exceeds the funds themselves. S 122(d) notes that the value of 
the person’s property includes that arising “after the illegal activity” (s 122(d). 
Penalty Orders and Accomplices 
An interesting issue arose in the UK jurisdiction that puts Australian forensic accountants and 
those considering POCA/UW penalty orders on notice. Where there are partners in crime, 
that is accomplices, who have jointly been involved in the commission of a crime that 
resulted in property being acquired by them together, what is the proper approach for the 
court to adopt, and the proper orders for the court to make with regard to confiscation? (Doig, 
2014). The cases that considered the issues in the United Kingdom Supreme Court, were R v 
Ahmad, 2014 (Ahmad) and R v Fields, 2014 (Fields). In Ahmad the two appellants had been 
involved in carousel fraud with a benefit figure of 16.1 million pounds. A confiscation order 
was made in respect of each appellant for that sum, that is, a combined confiscation amount 
of 32.2 million pounds. In the matter of Fields there were three appellants who had each been 
assessed for the full amount arising from a credit agreement fraud worth 1.6 million pounds. 
“Both appeals turned on the ruling by the court of Appeal that each appellant should be 
separately liable for the whole amount of the confiscation order” (Doig, 2014). This is 
consistent with the joint and several liability concept accountants would attribute to 
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partnership activities or that may be applied in a compensation case for negligence
208
. The 
courts upheld the individual liability for the whole amount and recognised that the overall 
aim of POCA was to “recover assets acquired through criminal activity” (see UK POCA, 
2002; Fields at 38). However, as that effectively doubled (or tripled) the total forfeiture, the 
courts ruled that any moneys paid by one appellant would reduce the liability of all who were 
subject to the related confiscation order. The court cautioned that the finding of joint 
involvement in criminal activity should not be conflated as a matter of convenience (at 51), 
such that an accomplice with minimal involvement may be limited to confiscation of their 
‘fee’ for their activities.   
 
Forfeiture not Confined to Compensation 
The issue of the value of property forfeiture being limited by the amount required to 
compensate the community for the “cost of investigating and prosecuting the crime and that 
the court could not properly make a restraining order without an estimate of the cost of the 
amounts expended” in investigation and prosecution, was considered by Kelly J, in DPP v 
Wolfgang Grimm, 2012. This matter was brought under the (NT) Criminal Property 
Forfeiture Act, and concerned the forfeiture of a property storing stolen goods. His honour 
extinguished the argument stating “It is clear from s 10(3) of the Act that, contrary to the 
objector’s submission, the object of the forfeiture provisions of the Act are not confined to 
‘compensation’. They include compensation to the Territory for the cost of deterring, 
detecting and dealing with criminal activities, prevention of unjust enrichment and deterring 
                                                     
208
 In cases of joint and several liability, a person who was harmed or wronged by several parties could be 
awarded damages and collect from any one, several, or all of the liable parties. When two or more parties are 
jointly and severally liable for a tortious act, each party is independently liable for the full extent of the injuries 
stemming from the act. This type of liability may apply to business partners who form a general partnership, or 
to two or more people.  
See: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/joint_and_several_liability 
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crime (at 19). This extinguishment is an important consideration for accountants valuing the 
appropriate forfeiture penalty, particularly in the context of jurisdictions increasingly 
establishing forfeiture accounts to directly fund law and community resources.  
Part 4: The Research Questions 
In order to answer the research questions this chapter has considered the specific POCA/UW 
legislative context, its inherent orientation towards the validation of accounting technologies 
as put forward in chapter 8 and judicial consideration of specific issues arising from the 
application of the statutes to case details. 
To restate the research questions:  
1. Descriptively, how has the application of accounting technologies in forfeiture law 
cases evolved? 
2. What are the attributes of “appropriate” accounting technologies described in question 
(1)? 
In responding to the first question, accounting technologies have evolved in a contributory 
sense, over a variety of legislative genres, however, accounting’s evolution with respect to 
the forfeiture genre has been largely subordinate to the legal narrative. Accounting has 
provided lower level support through straight forward transactional documentation, rather 
than in a strategic sense, as may have been expected considering the crime prevention role of 
economic confiscation outlined in the explanatory memoranda accompanying the 
introduction of forfeiture statutes. That is, crime control strategies through forfeiture, have 
not been commenced from the foundation of accounting technologies where the financial gap 
provides the basis for litigation. This is despite the strategic use of asset betterment, net worth 
analysis and sources and applications analysis under taxation statutes, where these 
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methodologies have sustained the need for the taxation commissioner to rely upon an 
assessment method to form his opinion.  
In response to the second research question, this dissertation responds with consideration of 
appropriate accounting content from the theoretical, legal, peer professional and legislative 
viewpoints. From the theoretical perspective the accounting technology must be deployed 
with the dual purpose of contributing to the court’s internal adjudication and the court’s 
external communication, from the legal perspective the accounting knowledge deployed must 
fulfil the court’s access and probity requirements (previously discussed as the Makita rules), 
from a peer professional perspective the accounting technology must be consistent with 
generally accepted and practiced professional accounting methodologies, and from the 
legislative perspective the ontological approach to deployment must be consistent with 
statutory provisions and judicial interpretation. The concept of properly applied and presented 
patterned principles has arisen as the fulcrum enabling validation of the accounting outputs 
offered to the court and to the community. Pragmatically the composition of forfeiture 
statutes allude to the acceptability of accounting analysis ranging from the application of 
transactional flows to criminally employed and attained assets, to those methodologies with 
attributes that allow for the identification of gaps in the legitimate acquisition of wealth. 
Appropriately deployed accounting techniques such as asset betterment, sources and 
applications and net worth analysis should assist the court’s adjudication with respect to the 
sources and application of tainted funds, and the consequent quantification of appropriate 
redistribution remedy through confiscation. Simplified gap quantification should assist with 
the alignment of forfeiture remedies to community norms that ultimately support legislative 
validity and justify juridification.    
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Chapter 10: Conclusion and Further Research 
Response to the Title 
The title of this dissertation has two tranches; Accounting as a Medium of Juridification and 
in respect of The Pragmatic Context of Forfeiture Law and Its Application. This conclusion 
will look at these two tranches separately in reflection of what this thesis has discovered and 
argued. The first tranche presents accounting as a medium of juridification. In this regard the 
role of accounting in its enhancement and strengthening of active communication from the 
legal system to the community has been theoretically argued to support the democratic 
validity that underpins the context necessary for the juridification of statutes. This is an 
important aspect of the parliamentary process necessary as the legislation gains traction and 
is properly administrated by the system, through the implementation of the government’s 
policies within the lifeworld. Habermasian and other philosophical arguments have been 
examined to enlighten this role of accounting as a tool of validation and expertise when 
appropriately deployed. Further, accounting has been used as a lever by politicians and 
supporters of juridification in their public garnering of support for increased legislative 
remedies and statutory changes. The thesis finds support in this argument, as articulated in a 
stepped process (the research argument) and through examination of the economic reasoning 
with respect to “the deprival of the use and enjoyment of tainted funds by criminals”. The 
thesis recognises both the theoretical and practical role that accounting plays as a medium to 
justify economic remedies, which capitalises on stable and accepted accounting principles. 
Accounting is recognised as a legitimate fulcrum both within and outside the courtroom that 
can be properly positioned to move juridification forward. 
When the thesis addressed the second tranche, The Pragmatic Context of Forfeiture Law and 
Its Application, it found that the use of accounting as a fulcrum is not as readily apparent in 
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practice, as would be expected given the plethora of agency endorsement of “follow the 
money” and identification of “big boys” tainted funds, as articulated strategic objectives. 
Examination of the competent deployment of accounting technology in a range of legislative 
genres demonstrated that forensic accounting ontologies are suitable approaches to the 
control of crime through economic mediums. Specifically, the thesis reviewed a number of 
appropriate methodologies that have been accepted for the development of expert opinion by 
the courts, as well as the articulation of the proper deployment of the principles patterned into 
these professionally deliverable methods. The dissertation has argued that juridification of 
forfeiture legislation, such as the introduction of unexplained wealth provisions and the 
reversal of the onus of proof, is overtly supported by the deployment of the recognised 
patterned principles of accounting technologies. Further, that the design of the unexplained 
wealth clauses of the mostly uniform Proceeds of Crime Acts (in each jurisdiction) are 
constructed such that accounting gap methodologies are compatible with the ontology behind 
the drafting of the legislation. However, when individual case judgements are reviewed it 
becomes apparent that this is not being converted into action at the case level. Income gap 
analysis accounting methods are not being strategically targeted towards estimations of 
accumulations of unexplained wealth, with matters utilising unexplained wealth provisions 
being aimed at ‘low hanging fruit’ such as money found in drug houses, cash confiscated 
while being illegally transported across borders or assets being directly funded by the 
proceeds of a criminal act. Submissions to the Australian Senate enquiries into unexplained 
wealth discussed earlier lament the law enforcement priority for ‘lock ‘em up’ crime control 
strategies, relegating ‘follow the money’ processes to after a conviction has been obtained or 
where an assurance process has specified the location of funds (for example after drug raids 
or when funds are transmitted across borders). It is notable that neither of the recent high 
profile unexplained wealth related matters currently being brought for prosecution (not under 
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POCA provisions as yet) were detected through forensic accounting strategies, despite 
evidence of considerable illicit funds and obvious conspicuous consumption (see, for 
example, the Koubaridis, the Cranston matter, 2017; and Miranda, the Commonwealth Bank 
v Austrac money laundering matters, 2017). 
The reasons for the lack of accounting led strategies may be due lack of forensic accounting 
capability, particularly within the legal profession, or lack of confidence in accounting gap 
methods that could be used to provide evidence of unexplained wealth (for example, with 
regard to the assumptions within the execution of the methods, or the methodology itself) or 
due to lead agencies’ perception that the risk of a litigation failure is too high (such as the 
various DPP’s wishing to protect their prosecution records). This dissertation is therefore 
important in its contribution to the easing of tension in all three of these areas, in that, it 
articulates both the specific forensic accounting purposes, ontology and methodology with 
direct relevance to the dilemma of providing evidence of unexplained wealth. This 
dissertation, particularly chapters 8 and 9, should assist the legal profession in gaining 
confidence in the purpose and use of accounting technologies deployed to address 
unexplained wealth prosecution objectives. In some regard this may be rectified with the 
increased funding and compilation of multi-disciplinary task forces.  As discussed, the failed 
deployment is contrary to the espoused objectives of government ministers, notably the 
various Attorney-Generals in state and federal jurisdictions, and of the legislation itself. 
Therefore, it represents a failure of government policy to be delivered at the bureaucratic 
level. The policy failure has been recognised by creation of multifunction task forces and the 
very recent discussion that recognises that “state and Commonwealth legislation should be 
allowed to co-exist …. through a text based referral of legislative power from the states to the 
Commonwealth”. Further Smith and Smith (2016) notes an authoritative view that 
Commonwealth legislation should be amended to enable the Commonwealth to extend its 
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jurisdiction to the states and territories (p52). The lack of deployment of pre-emptive and 
ongoing accounting strategies is an important area for future research as it is widely 
acknowledged amongst Australian jurisdictions that an effective unexplained wealth regime 
is being hampered by “complexity and practical difficulties” (Smith and Smith, 2016, p51).  
This thesis may also serve to better articulate the role of accounting expertise and its potential 
impact on forfeiture litigation by emphasising accounting’s validation attributes. Of particular 
note, is the chapter 8 discussion on the scope of accounting expertise focused on the narrative 
that arises from bank statements which should prove useful against challenged admission 
arguments based on the ‘every man’ nature of bank statements. The author is aware of the 
argument in this thesis being prepared in the defence for the entry of an accounting expert 
witness report that was being challenged under Makita and Red Bull specialised expertise 
conditions. Unfortunately, the matter was settled on the steps of the court so it evaded judicial 
consideration. 
Response to the Research Questions 
Notwithstanding the above recognition, that income gap accounting methods are not being 
deployed as a strategic approach to forfeiture cases, the research questions can still be 
answered through the arguments of this thesis. Specifically this dissertation set out to respond 
to the two research questions: 
1. Descriptively, how has the application of accounting technologies in forfeiture law 
cases evolved? 
2. What are the attributes of “appropriate” accounting technologies described in question 
(1)? 
These questions have been considered broadly with respect to their external and internal 
context (inside and outside the court), and their epistemological validity. More specifically, 
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attention has been addressed towards the questions’ legislative genre, their ontological 
rationality (relational acceptability between law and accounting) and instructional obiter dicta 
that has arisen from forfeiture and similar jurisdictions. 
The response to the first question has been addressed both from a theoretic and practical 
viewpoint. Initially, the response was framed by consideration of theoretical approaches to 
the law and accounting, with the critical area of investigation being the intersection of both 
the accounting and legal professions. In this regard the philosophy of eminent authors such as 
Habermas, Nozick, Robson, Latour, McLauglin, Clegg, Michels and others was considered in 
light of the purposeful deployment of accounting technology to assist with the court’s 
adjudication process and in order to assist with the communication of the court’s legitimate 
and ‘right’ decisions. Here consideration of concepts of truth and validity were examined 
with respect to the purpose of maintaining the cognitive authority of expertise, in this case 
that of the forensic accountant as an expert witness. The circular dependency of the validation 
process, such that the linguisity of the law, articulating systemic norms, is synergistically 
supported by the facticity of accounting that underpins the requisite conditions for continuing 
juridification. An informed and cognisant community, democratically upholds changes and 
additions to legislation, as advocated by their representatives, and through communicative 
action accepts the judicial remedies implemented by the courts.  
The manner in which the court and community is informed and advised by the proper 
deployment of accounting technology was then reviewed with the recognition that accounting 
provides stable, transportable analysis of the facts of a matter for the very real monetary 
resolution of matters, such as in financial penalties, fines, compensation and economic 
settlements. However, before matters can be resolved the accounting story must be told to the 
court, and in this regard the legal profession controls the access gateway and the important 
measure of initial probity of the expert evidence. Pertinent compliance with the rules of 
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evidence as articulated in both evidence statutes and legal obiter dicta that have arisen from 
precedential cases such as Makita, must be recognised by the expert accounting witness if 
they are to execute influence on the adjudication. These areas of the discussion may be 
referred to as the external context that must be considered when the forensic accountant 
addresses the research questions, significant considerations for the appropriate management 
of their cognitive authority. 
Further, the dissertation reflected on the more specific authoritative content of the forensic 
accountant’s presentation to the court, consistent with precedential requirements in the area 
of the opinion witness exemption and with respect to the active communication objective. 
The importance of ontological validation of the forensic accountant’s presentation was 
highlighted, particularly in an environment estranged from direct community experience. The 
community’s reliance on peer accepted pronouncements and prescribed patterns of applying 
accounting technologies, provides a surrogate for first-hand experience, that allows the 
community the confidence of methodological accuracy as a judgement is digested, 
implemented and relied upon. Therefore it is important that the forensic accountant’s 
expertise and methods are soundly deployed in order to sustain epistemological justification. 
Specifically, the forensic accountant must pre-empt avail themselves for validation of their 
speech act by the court and the community, such as through cross-examination or judicial 
commentary. 
In the broader legislative context of the forfeiture genre in Australia, the dissertation reviews 
the espoused objectives of the statutes both as written and through contemporary 
commentary, pre and post royal assent. This review highlights the complexities in legislative 
variance, bureaucratic accountability and reporting across the Australian jurisdictions. This 
jurisdictional broth of commonwealth, state and territorial responsibilities and approaches has 
served to inhibit holistic strategic forfeiture approaches to the management and control of 
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organised crime. It has encouraged jurisdiction shopping and ad hoc application of 
confiscation remedies. Reporting measures appear limited to unitised counting and periodic 
comparison, rather than reporting against an agreed and articulated objective. That is, 
measured as a considered response to organised crime across the continent. In this regard the 
resent establishment of the Criminal Assets confiscation Taskforce and the Commonwealth 
Serious Financial Crime Taskforce, including in-house forensic accountants and taxation 
evasion information linkages and responses, is encouraging, deserving further research with 
regard to their strategies, practices and outcomes. Of future research interest would be the 
transfer of forensic accounting knowledge and skill recognition to the legal fraternity’s 
interface in the areas of investigation, prosecution and internal court proceedings. This 
includes the future judicial expression of acceptable forensic accounting practices in 
judgements that, through their own credibility, become reported precedents. Current law 
enforcement practice does not appear to have evolved past ‘picking off the low hanging 
fruit’. For example, the propensity for unexplained wealth orders to target already confiscated 
cash and assets on the reasoning of associated serious criminal activity, rather than, the 
deployment of accounting technologies such as asset betterment to establish a ‘ground up’ 
response to those criminals who display conspicuous wealth and effective control of a range 
of lucrative assets
209
. 
The specific issue of “control” within the meaning and application of forfeiture legislation 
deserves research and comment (particularly judicial obiter dictum), initially from the 
accounting facts to the legal interpretation and meaning. This is important in implementing 
strategies that commence with establishing control in both a practical and evidentiary sense 
before amalgamating the assets under control, against which to test net worth and asset 
                                                     
209
 For example, the effective control of night clubs, construction service businesses, gambling businesses, 
consultancies and money laundering placement businesses. Such criminals are often referred to in the media as 
“colourful identities” or similar euphemisms.  
326 
 
betterment methods. The particular focus for future confiscation remedies should be on the 
untainted liquidity of active business assets compared with progressive capital accumulation 
and ability to fund lifestyle commitments. Once compared with taxation attestations and the 
reasonably expected legitimate return on investment from such business investments the 
validity of reporting obligations can be assessed. The application of gap analysis (using 
expert forensic accounting knowledge) to such legitimisation strategies should detect and 
provide evidence of unexplained wealth to be brought to and tested in court.      
The first research question is informed by the contextual discussion, however, as the 
forfeiture genre is relatively new, few matters that have been brought before the courts that 
utilise the full possibilities of deploying accounting techniques as the main basis to making 
confiscation decisions. Confiscation appears to have been mainly deployed around the edges 
of organised criminal wealth. For example, there are 38 identified ‘one percent’ 
210
outlaw 
motorcycle gangs described as significant organised crime groups
211
(representing 4,500 
patched members, 900 prospects and over 2500 associates), none of which have been brought 
to account before the courts for their unexplained incremental wealth, despite claims that 
unexplained wealth legislation would directly target members of gangs “by forcing them to 
explain the source of specified assets, suspected of being acquired through illegal means” 
(Atkinson, 2009). Therefore discussion regarding the detail alignment of professional 
appropriate accounting evidence draws on accounting technologies that address similar 
matters of tainted or unexplained wealth applicable under other legal genres (such as taxation 
or equity). The foundation of valid forensic accounting evidence has its basis in the 
                                                     
210
 “one percent” members is a reference to motorcycle clubs that can be distinguished by a "1%" patch worn on 
the colours. This is said to refer to a comment by the American Motorcyclist Association (AMA) that 99% of 
motorcyclists were law-abiding citizens, implying the last one percent were outlaws. 
211
 See Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission report About Crime, https://www.acic.gov.au/about-
crime/organised-crime-groups/outlaw-motor-cycle-gangs. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs represent about 4,500 
patched members, 900 prospects and over 2500 associates. 
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requirement for recognised accounting expertise (Makita), which may be validated by its 
acceptance in alternative legal spheres and/or its recognition through proven peer practice.  
Specifically, in responding to the second research question: “What are the attributes of 
“appropriate” accounting technologies described in question (1)?” the role of the proper 
utilisation of peer accepted patterned principles is recognised as stable and portable, that 
arrange the quantitative nature of accounting, such that, it organises and enhances the 
description of issues to be considered by the trier of fact (such as the judge or jury). Patterned 
principles do not have the authority of stare decisis
212
 but they should be a powerful influence 
in the ratio decidendi (reason of deciding) of a case. Patterned principles are born out of the 
professional accounting body of knowledge, requiring skilful implementation to be 
appropriately employed in response to the matter at hand. Patterned principles that best apply 
to forfeiture matters are those whose ontological approach suit the quantification of a gap 
analysis. That is, the alignment of accounting knowledge, what is known, can be organised 
such that there is an identifiable and measurable gap in the knowledge, the unexplained gap. 
As accounting is an incremental discipline that facilitates the aggregation of numbers, 
quantities and facts into a narrative, it is the gap in that narrative that provides its own story 
by begging an explanation. Forfeiture laws put the onus of explaining the gap on to the 
accused, however this may be relatively easily fulfilled by a simple prima facie response 
(such as an inheritance or gambling wins). The forensic accountant’s narrative purporting to 
articulate an illegitimate gap, may be crucial in compelling the court to require a detailed 
explanation regarding the source of funds and acquisition of assets.  
The gap analysis is applicable to accounting know-how focused at the transaction level (such 
as, missing or inconsistent transaction details), at the aggregation level (such as, missing 
                                                     
212
 The doctrine of stare decisis means to “stand by decided matters”, that is, cases should be decided in a 
consistent manner when their material facts are the same. It is the doctrine of precedent. (Williams, 2013)  
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transactions in a series), at the methodological level (such as, the results from a net worth 
analysis, sources and application flow or asset betterment calculation) and at the logical level 
(such as, a cash component, gross margin or trading conditions analysis). Therefore an 
important attribute of accounting technologies suitable for forfeiture matters is that they 
clearly define the gap between what are explained earnings and acquisitions, and what are 
unexplained. Similarly when applied to capital accounts the important attribute of the 
equation is to differentiate the gap between tainted and untainted assets. This gap may be 
distinguished in terms of separate assets (for example, where a particular purchase is funded 
from the proceeds of a crime) or in terms of separate periods of time (for example, for assets 
purchased in a period after a date when criminal activity was known to commence) or across 
separate geographic locations (for example, when transactions are associated with a particular 
locale or business site). Specific accounting technologies ranging from basic transaction 
alignment through to differential wealth assessments (such as asset betterment, sources and 
applications, net worth analysis) have been discussed in chapter 6 as suitably transferable for 
application in confiscation matters. Chapter 7 further articulated issues that a forensic 
accountant should consider in adapting accounting technologies to the forfeiture genre. 
Importance for the Legal Community 
This thesis has explored the content located within the overlap of the accounting and legal 
professions, that is, forensic accounting. The legal profession’s role as the court’s gatekeeper 
needs to respect both the context of statutory law and community norms, thus maintaining the 
credibility that ultimately, through democratic process, validates the proper application of 
new and existing laws. This is not an autopoietic task. It must be referenced across the 
professional boundaries of the accounting profession, that is, within the forensic accounting 
overlap. Recognition of the synergistic effect of the proper deployment of factitious, stable, 
transportable accounting quantification, when structurally coupled with the legal narrative 
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(integrated with the facts of the matter), is an important tenant of the smooth functioning of 
the legal system and its active communication with its internal and external communities.  
Accounting is an integral stakeholder in court decisions involving money. Therefore it is 
important that the legal profession recognise appropriate accounting principles and their 
ontological orientation, such that they can be validly applied to the adjudication of specific 
matters within identified legislative jurisdictions. Specifically, the application of patterned 
accounting principles that narrate and calculate the fiscal gap are applicable for confiscation 
and forfeiture matters, particularly with respect to unexplained wealth decisions. This 
dissertation has directly positioned methodologies and methods enabling gap analysis as 
having the appropriate attributes for determining unexplained wealth by expert opinion 
witnesses. Legal professionals can refer to these methods and methodologies in fulfilling the 
Makita criteria for expert witnesses.     
Importance for Forensic Accountants 
This dissertation centrally positions the forensic accountant in the role of expert opinion 
witness, discussing the technicalities of the function, along with the recognition of the tension 
cognitive authority inherently brings with it. Accounting expertise has both an internal 
advisory and external communication roles within and outside the court. Within the legal 
system accounting evidence remains subservient to the legal structures that define the 
delivery of evidence, its probity and validity testing through cross-examination. This research 
theoretically discusses the friction between the legal and accounting professions, eventually 
prioritising the structurally coupling effect of professional combination rather than conflict. 
From this the attributes of professional consideration have been discussed from both the 
accounting and legal viewpoint in order for the forensic accountant to be cognisant of both 
their facts and the legal and community norms within which they apply those facts. 
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Recognition of particular patterned principles suitable to be relied upon in matters of various 
jurisdictions has arisen as the primary validation process able to accommodate accounting 
technicalities within the specific legal chronicle required for that legislative genre. 
Peer accepted accounting principles and practices support the methodologies and methods 
consistent with the recognised patterned principles. To this end, this dissertation has reviewed 
gap analysis methodologies that display suitable attributes for reliance upon in confiscation 
matters and that have been accepted in court. It is important for forensic accountants to 
recognise that particular patterned principles must guide the deployment of gap analysis 
methodologies in keeping with the judicial interpretations applicable to specific legal genres 
and to tailor accounting methods accordingly. Important examples of areas from the 
Australian forfeiture statutes and cases that may influence moulding of accounting methods 
(such as the breadth of inclusion due to the application of “derived”; the expanded definition 
of “effective control”) for the confiscation judicial genre have been discussed in chapter 7.   
General Importance 
 Of general importance to both the legal system and the community (or lifeworld) is the 
recognition that the juridification of legal statutes requires the circular support of active 
communication. Where legal decisions involve monetary remedies, such as economic 
redistribution, accounting has significant capacity to translate both for the adjudication 
process and in communicating the court’s final determination. Accounting positions itself as 
a reliable validation tool, able to remain stable when interpreted by a variety of stakeholders, 
enhancing the valid speech act presented by the accounting expert in assisting the court. This 
stability comes from the proper application of patterned principles of accounting, supported 
by peer attested methods, objectively targeted towards the facts of the matter at hand. It is 
important for active communication to reference the appropriate deployment of patterned 
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principles in order to gain the confidence of the listener, rather than merely articulate the 
quantification of a remedy. Accounting expertise enriches the narrative validating its 
reception as a correct and true response.  
Policy Reform 
Whilst the research per se does not call for policy reform, it does add impact to the call for 
policy reform to better enable the performance of unexplained wealth provisions. The 
research (independently confirmed by Smith and Smith, 2016) shows that the Australian 
forfeiture regime is not fulfilling its stated purpose therefore policy change is required in 
order to reinvigorate and appropriately facilitate improvement. Policy change is required in 
the form of structure (to integrate broader skill sets), funding (such that complex cases can be 
brought through the costly court process), risk acceptance (such that prosecuting agencies 
engage with the prosecution with a balanced assessment of the risk of failure rather than 
complete reluctance), with respect to the transfer of intelligence between agencies and with 
respect to common or harmonised statutory jurisdictions.   
The research has explained the need for multifaceted expertise in order to progress 
unexplained wealth strategies, specifically the need to engage forensic accountants for the 
duration of the investigation and prosecution. The advent of the multi-skilled task force 
approach in NSW and the Commonwealth jurisdictions is relatively new and is showing early 
signs of success, particularly in NSW. This research adds impact by highlighting the purpose 
of accounting evidence that reaches above the immediate perpetrators to those with control of 
the tainted funds. Further the research informs the proper ontological and methodological 
approaches to integrate accounting technologies with the legal objectives suitable for such 
targeted prosecution. A Deputy Commissioner of the NSW Crime Commission once referred 
to the need for more forensic accountants, because they were “keepers of the dark arts” that 
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enabled his investigators to release the “purgators” when they interviewed suspects
213
. This 
research has policy implications in that the forensic accounting ‘dark arts’ should become 
more main stream, recognised in ‘follow the money’ strategies and involved in the design as 
well as commission of forfeiture programs and strategies. This requires the institution of 
multi-faceted task forces in policy concepts that target the ‘Mr Bigs’ of crime, complimented 
by appropriate government funding. 
Further this research has noted the uncertainty around the exercising of proceeds of crime 
legislations between jurisdictions. The dissertation supports the growing policy argument 
towards the establishment of a “text-based referral of legislative power from the states and 
territories to the Commonwealth to allow agreed Commonwealth legislation to be used to 
confiscate unexplained wealth located in states and territories” (Smith and Smith, 2016, p8). 
Smith and Smith (2016) also call for a national forum to “clarify issues  (that block a national 
approach) and move towards an agreement on the wording of the legislation, operational 
processes, interagency cooperation and responsibilities, initiatives, financial intelligence, and 
analysis, and the improvement of intelligence sharing at the national level, particularly 
through the Criminal Asset Confiscation Taskforce” (p8). In chapter 7 this research 
recognised the shortcomings of the Australian forfeiture regime to date, with chapter 8 
strengthening the ontological connection between accounting and law that gives greater 
certainty to the adoption of a national approach to the deployment of unexplained wealth 
provisions
214
. These matters in turn provide a supporting influence with respect to the validity 
of the Smiths’ call for policy change that expands the national approach to legislative referral.  
                                                     
213
 This reference was to the ‘purgators’ in the Harry Potter movies, that is the effect of the guilty mind and 
other pressures that can be manipulated in an interrogation scenario. Unrecorded discussion with Assistant 
Commissioner, Legal, 2013. 
214
 For example, the integration of accounting gap methodologies whose expert interpretation has already been 
accepted in the Commonwealth taxation arena. 
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Further Research 
Throughout chapter 7 and this concluding chapter, 10, a number of issues have been noted for 
further research. There appear to be two specific directions for further research; validation of 
quantification reporting, and qualification of structurally coupled strategies directed at 
achieving the forfeiture objectives of serious and organised crime prevention. In this regard 
the first research direction is important because it brings to account those bureaucratic 
overseers of the state confiscation objectives in such a manner that connects real outcomes 
with those objectives. Issues such as the attrition between the inflated forfeiture estimates in 
introductory orders or press releases and the actual realised value of forfeited property should 
be transparent and responsive. Qualitative research should be undertaken to transparently 
assess the applicability of “best practice” solutions such as task force operations and a higher 
utilisation of accounting led strategies to target serious and organised criminals. 
Concluding Comments 
Throughout this research it has been recognised that the forfeiture genre is relatively new and 
therefore suffers from the lack of stare decisis (precedent decisions), a vital technique of legal 
reasoning. Legal reasoning under the stare decisis doctrine requires decisions of higher courts 
within a jurisdiction to provide the stability and certainty of binding precedent authority. As 
described by Benjamin Cardozo (1921) in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process:  
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants 
and the opposite way between another. “If a group of cases involves the same 
point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to 
decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me 
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I 
am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and 
wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my 
rights.” Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception 
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if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the 
courts. (at 33-34, including quote from Miller, 1903, at 335). 
In the absence of a binding precedent the legal argument may be constructed by relying on a 
non-binding precedent from another jurisdiction, by crafting an argument from first principles 
or by developing an argument that the decided cases have evolved to a general principle 
(which can be applied to the current circumstances. In the absence of an effective body of 
precedents, this research should assist both the application of precedents from other 
jurisdictions to forfeiture cases and to the construction of a legal argument based upon the 
first principles validation of accounting evidence. It is only by bringing matters to court that 
judicial precedents can arise, be tested and decisions made which give confidence in building 
the critical mass of unexplained wealth forfeitures that allow the statutes to fulfil their 
ambitious promise to bring redress to organized crime and the associated criminals. 
It remains to be seen if the recently established, multi-agency, Commonwealth Serious 
Financial Crime Taskforce can invigorate the unexplained wealth focus as a viable tool in 
regard to preventing the use and enjoyment of tainted funds by organized criminals. With the 
wind down of Project Wickenby
215
 and renewed focus on Phoenix activity
216
 and the misuse 
of trusts and superannuation funds, it does not appear that any strategic approach to the use of 
unexplained wealth remedy will arise. If the laudable comments of those politicians that 
introduced the UW/POCA legislation to the various houses of parliament in Australian and 
who subsequently supported juridification amendments, are to be brought to effect, a strategic 
approach needs to be implemented. Such a strategy would require the harmonization of legal 
and forensic accounting operatives, accommodating their professional facts and norms as they 
                                                     
215
 Project Wickenby focused on tackling offshore tax evasion and crime. https://www.acic.gov.au/about-
crime/taskforces/commonwealth-serious-financial-crime-taskforce 
216
 Phoenix fraud involves a company deliberately liquidating assets to avoid paying creditors, taxes and 
employee entitlements. https://www.acic.gov.au/about-crime/taskforces/commonwealth-serious-financial-crime-
taskforce 
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investigate from first principles the unexplained wealth controlled by known criminal groups 
and individuals. Deployment of the accounting patterned principles that pertain to gap 
analysis such as asset betterment methods are necessary tools in the fight against organized 
crime in Australia.  
Post Script 
This dissertation has carried the case that crime prevention strategies need to adopt more 
complex methodologies such as gap measurements based on the deployment of forensic 
accounting skills. Confronting more sophisticated, senior criminals requires detailed pre-
emptive and evidentiary work. This means policy decisions must be supported by politically 
approved budgets for agencies deploying more complex strategies such as costly, integrated 
multi-skilled task forces. Therefore it is topical, but disappointing that the retiring head of the 
NSW Crime Commission, Peter Hastings, claimed that “we won’t improve our control of 
organised crime if we continue down the path of reducing budgets”. Despite the NSW Crime 
Commission being Australia’s best performing unexplained wealth and proceeds of crime 
authority, he noted that “the budget is not matching the growth in crime”. Further, that “the 
work we are doing is more resource-intensive at the same time the budget is being reduced” 
(Morri, Daily Telegraph, 31 October 2017). These comments from the outgoing NSW 
Commissioner, after five years at the helm, reinforce the importance and currency of this 
thesis in arguing the need for, and process of, implementing more complex anti-organised 
crime strategies and the political acceptability for the funding the cost of the necessary 
combination of investigation skills, such as forensic accounting.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1A: Unexplained Wealth Case Selection 
Case List used for Judgement Review (Also Table 9.1) 
  
Case Reference Name Case Reference 
1 New South Wales Crime Commission v De Jonk [2016] NSWSC 1668 
2 New South Wales Crime Commission v Mogy [2016] NSWSC 1667 
3 R v Gibbs [2016] SADC 144 
4 NSW Crime Commission v Nehme [2016] NSWSC 1410 
5 Queensland v Deadman [2016] QCA 218 
6 Queensland v Deadman [2015] QSC 241, (2015) 253 A Crim R 484 
7 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Hart [2013] QDC 60 
8 New South Wales Crime Commission v Ayik [2016] NSWSC 1183 
9 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Thasthahir 
[2016] VSC 468, (2016) 313 FLR 358 
10 Nguyen v The Queen [2016] VSCA 198, (2016) 311 FLR 289 
11 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Surinder Kaur 
[2016] VSC 423, (2016) 311 FLR 44 
12 Re Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police 
[2016] NSWSC 861 
13 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Swan [2016] TASCCA 9 
14 Zanon v Western Australia 2016] WASCA 91,  
15 New South Wales Crime Commission v Richards [2016] NSWSC 838 
16 New South Wales Crime Commission v Kane 
(No 3) 
[2015] NSWSC 1963 
17 Ruzehaji v Commissioner of the Australian 
Federal Police 
[2015] SASCFC 182,  
18 R v Barker [2015] QCA 215 
19 New South Wales Crime Commission v Nhu [2015] NSWSC 1643 
20 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Vo 
[2015] NSWSC 1523 , (2015) 302 FLR 209 
21 Re Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police (No 2) 
[2015] NSWSC 1447 
22 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v 
Heng Jie Zhang (Ruling No 1) 
[2015] VSC 390, 
23 New South Wales Crime Commission v Rashidi [2015] NSWSC 995 
24 New South Wales Crime Commission v 
Warburton 
[2015] NSWSC 9 
25 R v Versac [2014] QCA 181 
26 New South Wales Crime Commission v Tindle [2014] NSWSC 879 
27 Crime Commission (NSW) v Huang [2014] NSWSC 642 
28 Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson [2014] HCA 13,  
29 Emmerson v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] NTCA 4, (2013) 33 NTLR 1 
30 Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v 
Emmerson 
[2012] NTSC 60 
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Case List used for Judgement Review (Also Table 9.1) 
31 New South Wales Crime Commission v Osman [2014] NSWSC 312 
32 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Trajkoski 
(No 3) 
[2014] WADC 32, (2014) 85 SR (WA) 199 
33 Crime Commission (NSW) v Tran (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1854 
34 New South Wales Crime Commission v Wenping 
He 
[2013] NSWSC 1855 
35 Lee v NSW Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39, (2013) 251 CLR 196 
36 Re Kim [2013] VSC 465 
37 Fuller v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 10 
38 New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar 
(No 2)H 
[2013] NSWSC 1011 
39 New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar [2012] NSWSC 1170 
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Appendix 7A: Significant Payees and Significant Depositors 
The New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice documented scientific process to determine 
significant payees or depositors. 
Identifying Significant Payees and Depositors 
The required task is to sort the data into groups for payees and depositors using a scientifically 
defensible method.  
Determining and Listing Primary Payees (p218) 
One of the analysis techniques used when evaluating the data obtained from the bank account 
statement is the identification and listing of the primary payees for the accounts under examination  
According to the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice (2001 p213), there are two primary 
methods to determine the primary payees for an account. 
The first method involves identifying primary payees by means of identifying larger than average 
payments for the account, and the second involves identifying primary payees through more 
numerous than average payments for the account. These are detailed below: 
 Determining Primary Payees Using the Larger than Average Payments Method 
The formula for determining primary payees using the larger than average payments method is as 
follows: 
T / N = P 
T is the total amount paid from the account under the period in review; 
N is the number of payees for the account; and  
P is the average payment for the account. 
A primary payee is determined by the formula (P x 2) + 1. 
 
To illustrate the use of this formula, the following example is used. If $150,000 is paid to 23 payees 
then P = $150,000.00/23 = $6,521.74. Thus a primary payee is ($6,521.74 x 2) + 1 = $13,044.48. 
Thus any payment of $13,044.48 or greater is considered a primary payee for the account. 
 Determining the Primary Payee Using the More Frequent than Average Payments Method 
The formula for determining primary payees using the more frequent than average payments method 
is as follows: 
T / P = N 
T is the total number of payments made from the account;  
P is the total number of payees for the account; and  
N is the average frequency of payments for a debit. 
A primary payee is determined by the formula (N x 2) + 1. The answer should always be rounded up. 
To illustrate the use of this formula, the following example is used. If 1,234 payments are made to 987 
payees the N = 1,234/987 = 1.25. 
Thus a primary payee is (1.25 x 2) + 1 = 3.5. The result is rounded up to 4, thus a primary payee is 
any payee that has received 4 or more payments during the period under examination. 
 
Having identified the primary payees for an account, the data must be complied for use. A list should 
be drawn up containing the name of the payee, how many payments they received, the date span over 
which they received the payments and the total amount of payments received. The list should also 
indicate the total amounts paid to all the primary payees.  
It is, in addition, recommended that a summary also be included for the primary payee for the 
account, which should indicate the total amount paid from the account, the total amount paid to 
primary payees, and the percentage that the payments to primary payees represents of the total 
payments. 
 
Determining and Listing Deposits to Account by Source (p219) 
Determining the primary depositors of deposits into an account is a critical component of the analysis 
process in bank account transaction record analysis. There are two methods used to analyse the 
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deposits to account by source. The first method involves identifying primary depositors by means of 
identifying larger than average payments for the account, and the second involves identifying primary 
depositors through more numerous than average deposits into the account. These are detailed below: 
 Determining Primary Depositors Using the Larger than Average Deposits Method 
The formula for determining primary depositors, using the larger than average deposits method, is as 
follows:  
T / N = D 
T is the total amount paid into the account under the period in review; 
N is the number of deposits for the account; and  
D is the average deposit into the account. 
A primary depositor is determined by the formula (D x 2) + 1. 
To illustrate the use of this formula, the following example is used. If $150,000 is paid into the 
account by 23 deposits then D = $150,000/23 = $6,521.74. Thus a primary source is ($6,521.74 x 2) + 
1 = $13,044.48. Thus any deposit of $13,044.48 or greater is considered a primary deposit for the 
account. 
 Determining the Primary Depositors Using the More Frequent that Average Deposits Method 
The formula for determining primary depositors using the more frequent that average deposits method 
is as follows: 
T / P = N 
T is the total number of deposits made into the account;  
D is the total number of deposits into the account; and  
N is the average frequency of deposits for a depositor. 
A primary depositor is determined by the formula (N x 2) + 1. The answer should always be rounded 
up. 
To illustrate the use of this formula, the following example is used. If 1,234 deposits are made from 
987 sources then N = 1,234/987 = 1.25. Thus a primary source is (1.25 x 2) + 1 = 3.5. The result is 
rounded up to 4, thus a primary depositor is any source that has made 4 or more deposits during the 
period under examination. 
Having identified the primary sources of income for an account, the data must be complied for use. A 
list should be drawn up containing the name of the source, how many deposits they made into the 
account, the date span over which they made the deposits and the total amount of deposits made. The 
list should also indicate the total amounts deposited by all the primary sources. 
It is, in addition, recommended that a summary also be included for the primary sources for the 
account, which should indicate the total amount paid into the account, the total amount deposited by 
primary sources, and the percentage that the deposits by primary sources represents of the total 
deposits into the account. 
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Appendix 7B: Bank Statement Analysis 
Details the recommended patterned principle for the proper process of analysing bank 
statements under the Evidence Acts applicable to Australian jurisdictions 
1. Collation of the information contained in the bank account statements into an 
electronic format; 
2. Identification of significant payees and depositors; 
3. Compilation of summary statements which summarise the financial information in the 
bank statements; 
4. Examine the information contained in the bank account statements over a period of 
time to produce a time series analysis; 
5. Draw up various graphical charts to visually display the information contained in the 
bank account statements; 
6. Examine the bank account statements and the results of the previous stages of the 
analysis process to determine the patterns of activity with regard the accounts to 
determine any unusual activity; 
7. Discusses the selection of specific methods used in the above steps noting any 
assumptions made in selecting such methods or the rejection of other methods. 
8. Report on the findings of the analysis of the bank account statements either by way of 
an affidavit, if the analysis is going to be used as evidence, or by way of a report, if 
the analysis is going to be used for intelligence purposes. 
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Appendix 7C: Bank Deposits and Expenditure Method 
Bank Deposits and Expenditure Method 
United States of America - Internal Revenue Service  
Practice Manual 
Part 9 Criminal Investigations  
Chapter 5 Investigative Process 
Section 9 Methods of Proof 
9.5.9.6  (11-05-2004) 
Expenditures Method of Proving Income 
1. The expenditures method of proving income utilizes circumstantial evidence, i.e., several material 
facts which, when considered in their relationship to each other, tend to establish the existence of 
the principal fact, to establish a subject’s understatement of taxable income. The expenditures 
method of proof is, in theory, closely related to, if not identical to, the net worth method of proof. 
This method is based on the theory that if the subject’s expenditures during a given year exceed 
his/her reported income, and the source of the funds used to make the expenditures is unexplained, 
it may be inferred that such expenditures represent unreported income. 
2. The similarity between the net worth and expenditures methods of proof is further demonstrated 
by the fact that the same items or accounts used in determining taxable income by the net worth 
method are also considered when the expenditures method is employed. 
3. Judge Goodrich defined the Expenditures Method of Proof in United States v. Caserta, 199 F. 2d 
905, 907 (3d Cir 1952), as follows: 
It starts with an appraisal of the subject’s net worth situation at the beginning of a period. He may 
have much or he may have nothing. If during that period, his expenditures have exceeded the 
amount he returned as income and his net worth at the end of the period is the same as it was at the 
beginning (or any difference accounted for), then it may be concluded that his income tax return 
shows less income than he has in fact received. Of course it is necessary, so far as possible to 
negate nontaxable receipts by the subject during the period in question. 
9.5.9.6.1  (11-05-2004) 
Authority for Using the Expenditures Method 
1. Like the net worth method, there is no statutory provision defining the expenditures method of 
proof and expressly authorizing its use by the Commissioner. There are, however, many 
investigations in which the courts have approved the use of this method. The following is a list of 
some of the more prominent investigations: 
1. United States v. Johnson, 319 US 503, 517 (1943) 
2. United States v. Caserta, 199 F. 2d 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1952) 
3. Taglianetti v United States, 398 F. 2d 558, 565 (1st Cir. 1968), aff’d, 394 US 316 (1969) 
2. These investigations outline the broad principles governing the prosecution and review of 
investigations based on the expenditures method of proving income. 
9.5.9.6.2  (11-05-2004) 
When and How the Expenditures Method is Used 
1. The expenditures method of proof is used when the subject’s net worth does not substantially 
increase during the period under investigation, or when significant extravagant living expenditures 
are apparent. Therefore, when a subject has spent substantial income on consumable goods and 
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services such as food, vacations, travel, gifts to third parties, etc., as opposed to durable and 
tangible property such as stocks, bonds, or real estate, the expenditures method of proof would be 
an appropriate method of proving income. 
2. In investigations where the subject has several assets (and liabilities) whose cost basis remains the 
same throughout the prosecution period, the expenditures method may be preferred over the net 
worth method because a more concise presentation can be made of the computation of taxable 
income. This is true because assets and liabilities which do not change during the investigation 
period may be omitted from the expenditures statement. 
3. The expenditures method is used most often in investigations where the subject spends income to 
support a lavish life-style and has little, if any, net worth. 
4. In an expenditures investigation, it is desirable to prepare a complete net worth statement which 
may be required to rebut a defense that the funds in question came from the conversion of some 
asset not considered in the expenditures computation. 
5. In submitting a prosecution report based upon an expenditures investigation, the special agent 
should also submit proof of the subject’s unreported taxable income using the net worth method of 
proof. Because these two methods of proof are so similar, in that they require the same 
investigative steps be taken, proving unreported income through both methods substantially 
strengthens the prosecution recommendation. 
6. If both methods are shown, the trial attorney can make the final decision as to which method of 
proof best presents the investigation to the jury. 
9.5.9.6.3  (11-05-2004) 
The Expenditures Method of Proof Formula 
1. The expenditures method of proof formula is as follows: 
  Expenditures (Money Spent or Applied) 
Less: Non-Taxable Sources of Funds 
Equals: Corrected Adjusted Gross Income 
Less: 
Itemized/Standard Deduction  
Personal Exemptions 
Equals: Corrected Taxable Income 
Less: Reported Taxable Income 
Equals: Additional Taxable Income (Unreported Income) 
9.5.9.6.4  (11-05-2004) 
Establishing the Starting Point 
1. To establish a starting point, the subject ’s assets at the beginning of the tax periods under 
investigation should be identified and monitored to determine if any assets were converted for use 
as personal expenditures. 
2. While establishing a starting point, special agents may prefer to use a net worth analysis, 
depending upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the investigation. (See IRM 9.5.9.5.5, 
Establishing the Starting Point.) 
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9.5.9.6   
Expenditures Method of Proving Income 
9.5.9.6.5  (11-05-2004) 
Expenditures Summaries Prepared by the Special Agent 
1. See Exhibit 9.5.9-2, Expenditures Statement, to view an expenditures statement which may be used 
to summarize the evidence supporting the computation of taxable income. 
2. The following steps have been found helpful in the preparation of an expenditures statement: 
1. Prepare a net worth statement. 
2. Determine the amount of increase or decrease in each asset and liability appearing on the net 
worth statement in each taxable year (for instance, if the beginning and ending bank balances 
for a taxable year were $4,500 and $150, respectively, it would be determined that this asset 
has decreased by $4,350. The amounts so determined and the amounts appearing as 
adjustments to net worth increases or decreases are then posted to the expenditures statement.) 
3. Money spent or applied on nondeductible items, i.e., personal living expenses, Federal income tax 
payments, etc., should be posted to the following sections: 
1. increase in assets 
2. decrease in liabilities 
4. Nontaxable source items i.e., gifts, inheritances, etc., received by subject should be posted to the 
following sections: 
1. decrease in assets 
2. increase in liabilities 
9.5.9.6.6  (11-05-2004) 
Defenses in Expenditures Method Investigations 
1. The defenses regarding the net worth method of determining income are equally applicable to the 
expenditures method. (See IRM 9.5.9.5.9, Common Defenses.) 
9.5.9.7  (11-05-2004) 
Bank Deposits Method of Proving Income 
1. The bank deposits method of proving income utilizes bank account records to establish a subject’s 
understatement of taxable income. When there is no, or insufficient, direct evidence of income 
and/or expenses, the government can still make its investigation indirectly through the use of 
circumstantial evidence. 
2. The theory behind the bank deposits method of proof is simple. There are only three things a 
subject can do with money once it is received, i.e., he/she can spend it, deposit it, or hoard it. 
Accounting for these three areas considers all funds available to the subject. If non-income sources 
are eliminated, the remaining currency expenditures, deposits, and increases in cash on hand will 
equal corrected gross income. 
3. The bank deposits method of proof requires the special agent to conduct a thorough analysis of the 
deposits and canceled checks which relate to any and all bank accounts controlled by the subject. 
Additionally, the special agent must document the subject’ s currency expenditures and cash on 
hand. 
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4. If the subject reported income on the accrual basis, adjustments should be made in the bank 
deposits method to reflect accrued income and expenses. 
5. The following represents an overview of the bank deposits method of proof formula. This 
particular overview illustrates the steps taken if the subject had business income and expenses. 
  Total Deposits $ 
Add: 
Currency Expenditures 
Increase in Cash on Hand 
Subtract: Non-Income Deposits and Items 
Equals: SUBTOTAL 
Subtract: Cost of Goods Sold 
Equals: GROSS INCOME 
Subtract: Business and Rental Expenses 
Equals: TOTAL INCOME 
Subtract: Adjustments to Income 
Equals: ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME 
Subtract: Personal Deductions and Exemptions 
Equals: CORRECTED TAXABLE INCOME 
Subtract: Taxable Income Reported 
Equals: ADDITIONAL TAXABLE INCOME 
9.5.9.7.1  (11-05-2004) 
Authority for Bank Deposits Method 
1. There is no statutory provision defining the bank deposits method of proving income and 
specifically authorizing its use by the Commissioner. The bank deposits method of proof is not 
defined by the USC or regulations. It is primarily based upon the Supreme Court ’s decision 
inGleckman v. United States, 80 F. 2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935), which affirmed a lower court ruling 
that recognized the bank deposits method as an acceptable method of proving income. 
9.5.9.7.1.1  (11-05-2004) 
Legal Requirements to Establish a Prima Facie Bank Deposits Investigation 
1. As a result of the Gleckman decision, the following evidentiary facts are used to establish a prima 
facie bank deposits investigation: 
1. The subject was engaged in an income-producing business, activity, or profession. 
2. The subject made periodic deposits of funds into his/her bank accounts, or into nominee bank 
accounts over which he/she exercised control. 
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3. The deposits into the above referenced accounts reflect current year income and an adequate 
investigation of deposits was made by the investigating special agent to negate the possibility 
that deposits arose from nontaxable sources. 
4. Unidentified deposits have an inherent appearance of income. 
2. The fact that a subject deposited a sum of money in a bank account does not prove the funds 
deposited therein were taxable. The fact that the subject received and cashed a large check, in and 
of itself, does not prove the funds received were taxable. In order to establish those funds 
represented taxable income, the following must be shown: 
1. The subject has a business or other regular income source. 
2. The subject made regular deposits into an account. 
3. The subject draws against the account for personal use. 
4. There is testimony that the subject has income. 
5. Deposited amounts exceed exemptions and deductions. 
3. The courts have held there is no necessity to disprove the accuracy of the subject’s books and 
records as a prerequisite to the use of the bank deposits method. 
9.5.9.7.2  (11-05-2004) 
When to Use Bank Deposits Method 
1. The bank deposits method of proof is recommended as the primary method of proof when: 
1. The subject’s books and records are not available. 
2. The subject’s records are not complete and do not adequately reflect their correct income. 
3. The subject deposits most of his/her income and uses bank deposits to calculate gross receipts 
on their return. 
2. In addition to being a primary method of proving income, the bank deposits method is also used to 
corroborate other methods of proof and to test-check the accuracy of reported taxable income. 
9.5.9.7.3  (03-19-2012) 
Method of Accounting 
1. The use of the bank deposits method of proof is not affected by the subject’s method of 
accounting. The bank deposit analysis may reflect the subject’s corrected taxable income by 
whichever method of accounting is used by the subject. Reflecting a certain accounting method in 
the bank deposit computation is accomplished by including certain accounts in the bank deposit 
analysis and omitting others. For instance, to compute the income of a physician who uses the cash 
basis method, patient accounts receivable and business accounts payable at the beginning and end 
of each year would be omitted. If the physician used the accrual method of accounting, these 
accounts would be included in the bank deposit analysis. 
2. When a subject reports income on the accrual basis, adjustments must be made in computing gross 
receipts and deductions to account for accrued income and accrued expenses. 
3. Under the accrual basis, credit sales are included in income when the sales are made, not when the 
money is collected; purchases and expenditures are deducted when the liability is incurred rather 
than when the account is actually paid. 
4. These accounting adjustments are made by adding or deducting the increase or decrease in 
receivables and payables. Rather than compute the increase or decrease in the account receivables 
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during a year, simply add the ending accounts receivable figure and deduct the beginning accounts 
receivable figure in computing gross income. The beginning accounts receivable figure is 
subtracted from the bank deposits computation of income because the accounts were collected and 
the proceeds deposited during the year. The ending accounts receivable figure is then added to the 
bank deposits computation because the funds are taxable and have not been accounted for in the 
subject’s deposits, expenditures, or cash hoard. 
5. The same rationale applies to beginning accounts payable which were deducted in the prior year 
and ending accounts payable that need to be deducted in the taxable year in which they are 
accrued. 
9.5.9.7.4  (03-12-2012) 
Complete Bank Deposits Method of Proof Formula 
1. The full bank deposits method of proof formula is followed by sections that explain each formula 
heading and subheading: 
BANK DEPOSIT METHOD OF PROVING INCOME 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 
bank accounts: (Business/Personal/Nominee) 
checking accounts 
savings accounts 
IRA and Keogh accounts 
credit union 
investment trusts 
other accumulation accounts 
brokerage accounts 
certificates of deposits 
ADD: INCREASE IN CASH ON HAND 
ADD: NON-NEGOTIATED INSTRUMENTS PURCHASED OR RECEIVED DURING 
YEAR AND HELD AT YEAR END 
cashier’s checks 
money orders 
customer’s checks 
US savings bonds 
ADD: OTHER 
amounts automatically withheld from wages 
withheld taxes, health/life insurance premiums 
retirement funds, savings, other payroll deductions 
ADD: CURRENCY EXPENDITURES 
business 
personal (including cash gifts) 
capital (investment) 
ADD: NON-CASH INCOME 
payments in kind 
forgiveness of debt in lieu of payment 
property in lieu of payment 
constructive dividends 
ending accounts receivable (if on accrual basis) 
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BANK DEPOSIT METHOD OF PROVING INCOME 
SUBTOTAL (TOTAL FUNDS AVAILABLE) 
LESS: NON-INCOME DEPOSITS AND ITEMS 
currency withdrawals 
transfers between accounts and re-deposited items 
checks to cash (and cashed third-party checks) 
loans, gifts, inheritances received 
beginning accounts receivable (if on an accrual basis) 
decrease in cash-on-hand 
exclusions under IRC 
return of capital (Basis of stock and capital items) 
capital losses — carry forwards 
bank errors and missing checks 
returned customer checks 
Federal tax refunds and insurance proceeds 
savings accounts withdrawals 
IRA and Keogh payments 
life insurance proceeds 
US savings bonds redeemed 
social security payments received 
veterans benefits received 
nontaxable portion of pensions and annuities 
cost basis of property sold 
child support payments received 
travel expense reimbursement 
repayments of loans made by others 
ADD: CAPITAL LOSSES EXCEEDING $3,000 
EQUALS: SUBTOTAL GROSS INCOME (if there is no cost of goods sold) 
LESS: COST OF GOODS SOLD 
beginning inventory 
Add: purchases 
Less: ending inventory 
Equals: cost of goods sold 
EQUALS: GROSS INCOME 
(if cost of goods sold is involved) 
LESS: TOTAL BUSINESS EXPENSES 
Add: business expenses per bank records 
Add: additional expenses identified 
Add: depreciation 
Add: ending accounts payable re: business expenses (if accrual basis) 
Less: fraudulent expenses identified 
Less: beginning accounts payable re: business expenses (if accrual basis) 
Equals: total business expenses 
EQUALS: TOTAL INCOME 
LESS: ADJUSTMENTS TO INCOME 
IRA deduction 
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BANK DEPOSIT METHOD OF PROVING INCOME 
spouse IRA deduction 
moving expenses 
one half self employment tax 
self employed health insurance deduction 
Keogh retirement plan and SEP deduction 
penalty on early withdrawal of savings 
alimony paid 
total adjustments to income 
EQUALS: CORRECTED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME 
LESS: ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS/STANDARD DEDUCTIONS (AS CORRECTED) AND 
PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS (AS CORRECTED) 
EQUALS: CORRECTED TAXABLE INCOME 
LESS: REPORTED TAXABLE INCOME 
EQUALS: ADDITIONAL TAXABLE INCOME FOR CRIMINAL PURPOSES 
9.5.9.7.4.1  (11-05-2004) 
Total Deposits 
1. In the analysis of bank deposits, the sums deposited (or credited) to all of the subject’s various 
accounts are totaled to determine gross deposits. This includes any interest and dividends credited 
to the subject during the investigation period. When the subject holds bank accounts in fictitious 
names, or with special titles such as trustee account or trading account, deposits to those accounts 
must also be included in the subject’s total deposits. The analysis of bank deposits is not limited to 
bank checking and savings accounts, but includes deposits to: 
1. savings and loan accounts 
2. credit union accounts 
3. brokerage accounts (all credits to accounts) 
4. investment trusts 
5. individual retirement accounts and Keogh plan accounts 
6. certificates of deposits 
2. If the subject itemized checks on a deposit slip and then deducted an amount for "less cash," only 
the net amount deposited should be considered in computing income. 
9.5.9.7.4.1.1  (11-05-2004) 
Unidentified Deposits 
1. The source of individual deposits can often be identified by the subject’s admissions, deposit slips, 
bank ledger sheets, transfer letters, bank microfilm, and the testimony of witnesses. 
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2. In the event there are unidentified bank deposits, the following elements are required before 
treating unidentified bank deposits as current taxable receipts: 
1. evidence showing the existence of an income-producing business or activity 
2. regular or periodic deposits having the inherent appearance of current receipts; occasional or 
irregular deposits may also be considered as current income if evidence supports this 
assumption 
3. In the Gleckman investigation, deposits were principally derived from unidentified sources and the 
investigation was successfully prosecuted. It is far easier to present a bank deposits investigation 
to a jury when many of the deposits have been specifically identified as current taxable income. 
For example, when multiple specific omitted sales are traced to the subject’s bank accounts, but 
other deposits of a similar nature remain unidentified, the government’s investigation is 
strengthened immeasurably. Through the specific identification of multiple omitted deposits, the 
special agent’s assertion that unidentified deposits of a similar nature are current taxable income 
becomes more credible. 
9.5.9.7.4.1.2  (11-05-2004) 
Currency Deposits 
1. Currency deposits are subject to claims that the source of the deposits came from a cash hoard. If 
the subject raises this claim and it cannot be refuted, the amount of cash deposits in question must 
be included under "Non-income Deposits and Items" and subtracted from the bank deposits 
computation. 
2. However, this type of claim can often be refuted. By firmly establishing the beginning cash on 
hand, a special agent can rule out the cash hoard defense. 
3. The computation of gross receipts is based upon the assumption that most deposits are derived 
from a taxable source. The subject should be interviewed to determine whether or not there were 
any deposits made into the accounts from non-taxable sources. The special agent should follow-up 
on any lead offered by the subject or uncovered during the course of the investigation that 
indicates certain deposits were from a non-taxable source. 
9.5.9.7.4.1.3  (11-05-2004) 
Starting Point 
1. In a bank deposits investigation, the starting point refers to the cash on hand at the beginning of 
the first year under investigation. 
2. Establishing a firm starting point is necessary in all bank deposits investigations involving cash 
deposits, currency expenditures, and increases or decreases in cash on hand. The special agent has 
the same obligation to firmly establish beginning cash on hand while employing the bank deposits 
method of proof as in the net worth method of proof. He/she is required to show that the income 
being charged to the subject is current taxable income and not funds accumulated in prior years in 
the form of a cash hoard. Additionally, establishing a firm ending cash on hand will enable the 
special agent to determine whether there has been an application of cash (in the investigation of an 
increase in cash on hand) and/or whether the subject has a source of non-taxable funds (in the 
investigation of a decrease in cash on hand). (See IRM 9.5.9.5.5, Establishing the Starting Point.) 
350 
 
9.5.9.7.4.1.4  (11-05-2004) 
Brokerage and Security Accounts 
1. Deposits (credits) to a brokerage account are not treated any differently than any other type of 
deposits. However, when analyzing security account deposits, it is necessary to be familiar with 
what documents are available and with the terms associated with these statements. These include: 
1. Confirmation slips — issued by brokerage houses to verify purchases and/or sale of stocks. 
2. Margin account— a type of brokerage account through which the account holder is extended 
credit. Stocks can be purchased at a given percentage of their actual cost, the balance being 
owed to the brokerage firm. The account holder maintains a debit balance in this account. 
3. Cash account — within a certain number of days (usually 3 banking days) after purchasing 
stocks, the account holder must remit the entire purchase price to the brokerage firm. No credit 
or debit balance is maintained. 
4. Street holdings — an account holder can purchase stocks through his/her brokerage firm and 
leave those stocks in the account. These shares are held by the brokerage firm on behalf of the 
account holder. The actual certificates being in the name of the brokerage firm. These stocks 
appear on the brokerage statements as security holdings or are noted as securities positions 
(PSN). 
5. Personal holdings — after purchasing stocks through a brokerage firm, an individual may 
have those stocks delivered to him/her to become personal holdings. Certificates in the 
person’s name are issued and sent to him/her along with a cover letter or securities delivered 
slip. Those shares will no longer appear on the brokerage statements as securities positions. 
Personal holdings of an individual must be traced through the appropriate stock transfer agent. 
Use the Moody’s Handbook of Common Stocks as a reference to determine the stock transfer 
agent for a particular stock. 
6. Securities delivered — noted as SEC DEL, indicates when the stocks were delivered or sent to 
the account holder to become personal holdings. 
7. Securities received — noted as SEC REC, indicates when the account holder send funds to the 
brokerage firm to cover the purchase of stocks or a debit balance. It does not necessarily mean 
currency. 
8. Cash disbursed — noted as CSH DSB, indicates when the brokerage firm issues a check to 
the account holder. 
2. One important difference between many brokerage statements and bank statements is that, when a 
stock is sold, the amount of the sale appears as a credit to the account on the date of the sale. If the 
account holder requests a portion of the proceeds of the sale to be paid to him/her by check, those 
proceeds are then shown as cash disbursed/check for that same date. The net deposit amount does 
not appear on the statement. When analyzing brokerage statements, the special agent must 
manually make the computation to net the deposit. Only the net amount should be picked up as a 
deposit. 
9.5.9.7.4.2  (11-05-2004) 
Cash on Hand Increase 
1. An increase in the subject’s cash on hand is treated as a currency expenditure. Since the subject 
may contend that the unexplained deposits into the bank accounts came from a cash hoard, it is 
crucial to thoroughly establish and document any increase in the subject ’s cash on hand. 
2. The special agent must begin by documenting the cash on hand at the starting point and then 
document cash on hand at the end of each year under investigation. The cash on hand increase (or 
decrease) is then determined for the first year of the investigation by subtracting the cash on hand 
351 
 
at the starting point from the cash on hand at the end of the first investigative year. (Cash on hand 
decreases will be discussed later.) 
3. It is important to interview the subject early in the investigation to accurately identify a maximum 
cash accumulation for each year under investigation. (See IRM 9.5.9.5.5.(11).) 
4. All of this information is necessary to establish the consistency and reliability of the subject’s 
statements. Usually, no direct evidence of cash on hand is available. Statements made about the 
source, amount, and use of funds can be corroborated or refuted with additional evidence. 
9.5.9.7.4.3  (11-05-2004) 
Non-Negotiated Instruments Purchased During the Year and Held at Year-End 
1. Non-negotiated instruments purchased or received during the year and held at the end of the year 
must be properly accounted for in the bank deposits formula. Non-negotiated instruments include: 
1. cashier’s checks 
2. money orders 
3. US savings bonds 
4. travelers checks 
5. non-negotiated income checks 
2. When non-negotiated instruments are purchased by check, total deposits are increased by the 
amount of the non-negotiated instruments. Non-income items are increased by a like amount. This 
is similar to a transfer as money deposited in the bank is being converted to a non-negotiated 
instrument. 
3. If the subject receives a monetary instrument as a gift and has not negotiated it at year-end, total 
deposits and non-income items are each increased by the amount of the instrument. 
4. Total deposits are not increased to reflect the value of non-negotiated instruments purchased in 
currency. This amount is included as a currency expenditure in the bank deposits formula. 
5. Technically, if a cash basis subject received checks as income and had not negotiated them at year-
end, they must be added to total deposits to accurately calculate income. The checks are income in 
the year they are received. However, if this is the subject’ s normal business procedure, then the 
relevance of this "timing" issue should be discussed with the Criminal Tax (CT) Counsel. 
9.5.9.7.4.4  (11-05-2004) 
Amounts Automatically Withheld from Wages 
1. Amounts that are automatically withheld from the subject’s wages must be included when using 
the bank deposits method, unless they are included in deposits to another account. These items 
include withheld taxes, health and life insurance premiums, retirement fund contributions, savings 
account allotments, Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), child support and or alimony 
payments, loan payments, and any other payroll deductions made by the employer for the benefit 
of the employee. The special agent should include only those items that are not included elsewhere 
in the computation. An example of an item that may appear elsewhere in the computation would 
be automatically withheld savings account allotments. These allotments would be picked up with 
the total deposits to the savings account. 
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9.5.9.7.4.5  (11-05-2004) 
Currency Expenditures 
1. All documented cash expenditures, regardless of the source of the currency, are added to total 
deposits. Even in the most thorough investigations, there are certain currency expenditures that are 
impossible to document. These expenditures, i.e., groceries, laundry, meals, gasoline, etc., cannot 
be added to total deposits unless they are fully documented. Only those currency expenditures 
which are documented, either directly or indirectly, can be included in the bank deposit 
computation. 
2. If the subject claimed business expenses on his/her return in excess of the amount of business 
expenses he/she paid by check, the balance should be treated as a cash expenditure and included in 
the bank deposits computation. 
3. If the subject alleges additional currency business expenses not claimed on the return, these should 
be allowed, after adding a like amount to the cash expenditures figure in the computation. 
4. Any documented expenditure made by the subject (business or personal) should be analyzed to 
determine what portion of that expenditure was made by check. If the amount of the expenditure 
exceeds payments made by check, the balance should be considered a cash expenditure and 
included in the bank deposits computation. 
9.5.9.7.4.6  (11-05-2004) 
Non-Cash Income Items 
1. In addition to currency expenditures, all non-cash items should be added to deposits. These items 
include: 
1. payments in kind 
2. forgiveness of debts in lieu of payments 
3. property received in lieu of payments 
4. constructive dividends 
5. accounts receivable increase, if the subject is on the accrual basis 
9.5.9.7.4.7  (11-05-2004) 
Non-Income Deposits and Items 
1. All potential nontaxable sources of funds should be discussed with the subject during the initial 
interview. If the subject refuses to communicate with the special agent outside the presence of an 
attorney, consider contacting the subject’s attorney. Explain to the attorney that if their client has 
received funds from nontaxable sources that could explain the apparent understatement of income, 
it would be to the subject’s advantage to come forward with this information. 
2. It is the government’s responsibility to elicit all available information concerning the subject ’s 
claims as to his/her nontaxable sources of funds. The special agent should attempt to obtain this 
information early in the investigation. The sooner the subject’s claims can be verified or refuted, 
the sooner the special agent can determine whether or not there is a viable investigation. 
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3. All potential nontaxable sources of funds should be thoroughly investigated by questioning the 
subject’s spouse, relatives, friends, and associates. 
4. The special agent should examine all available documents, i.e., (banking records, public records 
etc.,) and follow-up leads that could identify potential nontaxable sources of income and/or 
commingled funds. 
5. The special agent should determine the source or disposition of funds related to the acquisition 
and/or sale of assets. 
6. Nontaxable items will often appear as large or unusual deposits in the bank accounts. 
7. All funds from nontaxable sources must be accounted for when using the bank deposits method of 
proof to calculate the subject ’s potential understatement of income. 
8. Deducting nontaxable funds ensures that all deposits, cash expenditures, and increases in cash on 
hand which are included in the subject’s gross income are derived from taxable sources. Failure to 
eliminate all known non-income deposits and items results in an overstatement of income and 
could prove fatal to the criminal investigation. Examples of non-income deposits and items 
include: 
1. income earned in prior years 
2. cash on hand decrease 
3. loan proceeds received 
4. repayments of loans made to others 
5. gifts 
6. inheritances 
7. re-deposited items 
8. transfers between accounts 
9. return of capital 
10. cashed third party checks 
11. checks to cash and currency withdrawals 
12. other non-income deposits and items specifically excluded by the USC 
13. life insurance proceeds 
14. tax-exempt interest 
15. Federal income tax refunds 
16. US savings bonds redeemed (cost basis) 
17. Social Security payments 
18. veterans’ benefits 
19. nontaxable portion of pensions and annuities 
20. payments made to individual retirement accounts 
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9.5.9.7.4.7.1  (11-05-2004) 
Checks to Cash and Currency Withdrawals 
1. Currency withdrawals from accounts and checks payable to cash are generally treated as non-
income items and must be discarded when computing gross income. Unless there is strong 
evidence to the contrary, the government usually cannot disprove the defense that the currency 
was: 
1. re-deposited by the subject later in the tax period 
2. used as a source of currency expenditures already included in the bank deposits computation 
3. used for a business expense paid in currency not previously claimed 
4. used to increase cash on hand 
9.5.9.7.4.7.2  (11-05-2004) 
Automated Teller Machines and Debit Card Transactions 
1. Automated Teller Machines (ATM) withdrawals are considered to be currency withdrawals. 
However, when an ATM card is used as a debit card to pay a merchant, the amount debited and 
paid to that merchant is not considered a currency withdrawal. (This is really an electronic check.) 
9.5.9.7.4.8  (11-05-2004) 
Cash on Hand Decrease 
1. Cash on hand is one of the most common and troublesome areas in any indirect method 
computation. Because a cash hoard defense is so difficult to refute, subjects frequently claim their 
cash hoard was of a sufficient amount to account for any understatement of income. The special 
agent must anticipate this potential defense and be able to prove that the subject had a large sum of 
cash which is not represented in the bank deposit computation. 
2. Evidence that may negate the existence of a cash hoard includes: 
1. written or oral admissions of the subject to the special agent(s) which indicate a small amount 
of cash on hand 
2. financial statements prepared by the subject showing a low net worth 
3. compromises of overdue debts by the subject 
4. foreclosure proceedings against the subject 
5. collection actions against the subject 
6. tax return (or no returns filed) indicating little or no income in prior years 
7. loan records 
8. consistent use of checking and savings accounts 
9. recurring overdraft on NSF charges or other bank penalties. 
10. minimum payments on credit card balance 
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3. It may be possible to reconstruct the subject ’s cash on hand from prior earnings records. If cash 
on hand for an earlier period can be reasonably established, income earned from that period 
forward to the starting point could be used to establish a maximum available cash on hand. ( See 
IRM 9.5.9.5.5.1, An Indirect Approach for Establishing a Starting Point.) 
4. If an investigation discloses an increase or decrease in cash on hand during the prosecution period, 
an adjustment to the bank deposits formula must be made. If there is an increase to cash on hand, it 
is added to deposits and currency expenditures in the bank deposits computation; at the same time, 
any decrease in cash on hand is considered a non-income item. 
9.5.9.7.4.9  (11-05-2004) 
Loan Proceeds 
1. Loan proceeds received by the subject must be accounted for as a non-income item. The key word 
in the above sentence is "received." The subject must have physically received the funds. 
2. If a subject has a mortgage on his/her home, the mortgage was paid directly by the lender to the 
seller of the home. Since no funds passed through the subject’s hands, there is no need to account 
for any loan proceeds in this transaction. 
3. However, if the subject had obtained a loan from a lender and actually received the loan amount in 
cash, a check that was subsequently cashed, or by way of a transfer of funds to the subject’s 
account, the loan proceeds must be accounted for as a non-income item. 
9.5.9.7.4.10  (11-05-2004) 
Loan Repayments Received 
1. If the subject made a loan in prior years and contends that part of the understatement of income is 
in fact a repayment of that loan, the special agent must document the repayment of principal by 
contacting the borrower. All repayments of principal loaned by the subject should be treated as a 
non-income item. 
9.5.9.7.4.11  (11-05-2004) 
Gifts and Inheritances 
1. Monetary gifts, cash, checks, etc. must also be included as a non-income item in the bank deposits 
formula. 
2. The special agent should document the gift and determine whether the donor was financially able 
to make the gift. Obtain all of the necessary documents and other information from the donor. 
Check for filed gift tax returns, if applicable. 
3. If the subject received an inheritance, obtain all necessary documents and information from the 
executor or administrator of the estate to verify the inheritance. Check for filed estate tax returns 
and check the probate records of deceased relative’s estate. Any such inheritance is also treated as 
a non-income item. 
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9.5.9.7.4.12  (11-05-2004) 
Transfers Between Accounts 
1. Transfers between accounts should be classified as non-income items. 
2. A subject who maintains several accounts, or one who has opened and closed accounts during the 
years under investigation, generally will have transfers between accounts. A detailed examination 
of deposit slips and account statements should be made to determine all possible transfers between 
accounts. 
9.5.9.7.4.13  (11-05-2004) 
Return of Capital 
1. Generally, any return of capital is classified as a non-income item in the bank deposits method. 
However, the treatment of assets sold in a bank deposits investigation differs depending on the 
nature of the asset, i.e., whether it was a personal asset, a business asset, or stock. 
2. When the subject sells a personal asset there is no allowable loss relative to the transaction. 
Instead, such transactions are treated as a return of capital which is limited to the cost basis or 
adjusted basis of the asset, if there is a gain, or the sale price if there is a loss. The following 
example is an illustration: 
If the subject purchased a vehicle in 1995 for $20,000 and sells it in 1996 for $15,000, the special 
agent would treat the $15,000 as a return of capital in the bank deposits formula for 1996. If the 
subject managed to sell the same vehicle for $30,000, the special agent would allow the subject a 
$20,000 return of capital reduction to the bank deposits computation. 
3. The above stated tax treatment applies only to personal assets that are sold. Using the same 
example above, if the subject traded in the 1995 vehicle on a 1999 model that cost $30,000, there 
is no return of capital. The subject did not physically receive the money. The return of capital was 
rolled into the new vehicle. 
4. The sale of a business asset or of stock is treated somewhat differently because it can result in an 
allowable taxable loss. The proper way to treat these assets is to use the cost (or adjusted basis) as 
the return of capital. 
5. When stocks and/or other business assets are sold, and the sale results in a net capital loss, that loss 
must be limited to $3,000 in accordance with USC loss limitations. This is done by adding back 
any disallowed loss to the bank deposits formula. See ADD: Capital losses exceeding $3,000 in 
the formula. (See IRM 9.5.9.7.4, Complete Bank Deposits Method of Proof Formula.) 
6. In order to compute the return of capital on a stock transaction, the special agent must first 
determine the subject ’s basis in the stock. If the stock sale (gain or loss) was reported on the 
subject’s return, use the method the subject elected on their return when computing the gain or loss 
for the stock transaction. 
7. If stock sales are not reported on the return, and stock sales have been made during the period 
under investigation, the special agent should analyze any available evidence and determine if it is 
possible to identify the shares that were sold. If the subject only bought the stock on one occasion, 
then multiply the number of shares purchased by the purchase price and add in the sales 
commission. The total is divided by the number shares purchased to arrive at the basis per share. 
This figure is then multiplied by the number of shares sold to arrive at the basis for the shares sold. 
This figure is then subtracted from the sales price realized, not including the sales commission, 
and the resulting figure is the subject ’s gain or loss on the sale. 
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8. An attempt to identify the shares sold can also be made by contacting the brokerage firm and 
comparing the date on the stock certificates being held with the information available on the 
statements. An example of this would be if the subject purchased 200 shares of SAYS stock in 
January 1996 with a basis of $10 per share. Then, in February 1996, the subject purchases 50 more 
shares of stock with the basis of $5 per share. In March 1996, the subject sells 100 shares of stock. 
It cannot automatically be assumed the 100 shares sold were the initial 100 shares purchased. 
However, if the brokerage firm is contacted and they are holding only the certificate for the 50 
shares purchased in February 1996, then it can be concluded that the subject did indeed sell the 
initial 100 shares purchased. 
9. If the brokerage firm is not holding the stock certificates, and the special agent cannot determine 
from the available records which shares were sold, the special agent must resort to computing the 
gain or loss using the method which is most advantageous to the subject. This involves computing 
the basis of the stock using the Last-in, First-out (LIFO), First-in, First-out (FIFO), and Average 
methods. The sales commission should be included when computing the basis of the stock 
purchased. However, when stock is sold, the commission is not included in the computation. This 
computation is only made when the basis of the stock cannot determine the basis from available 
records. 
9.5.9.7.4.14  (11-05-2004) 
Cost of Goods Sold 
1. When dealing with a subject who reports business activity through a Schedule C, it may be 
necessary to include a cost of goods sold computation when utilizing the bank deposits method. 
2. A reduction in inventory is a situation where there is a deduction and no cash outlay. Whenever 
inventories are a factor in determining income, it is necessary to make an adjustment for changes 
in inventory, unless the subject ignored them on the return. This requires that the special agent 
compute the cost of goods sold. This is done by adding purchases to the beginning inventory and 
subtracting the ending inventory. The cost of goods sold is then included in the computation of 
gross income. These steps are illustrated in the bank deposits formula. 
9.5.9.7.4.15  (11-05-2004) 
Business Expenses 
1. All business expenses and costs must be allowed to the subject whether paid by check or in cash. 
If the analysis of checks or other evidence leaves doubt about the disbursements, it is preferable to 
allow all items, except those which are undeniably nondeductible, i.e., items such as personal 
expenses, investments, and gifts. When canceled checks are not available for analysis and 
classification, every effort should be made to identify any and all items which constitute allowable 
expenses whether paid out of a bank account or from undeposited cash. 
2. Often, the total business expenses on a Form 1040, Schedule C will exceed the expenses for which 
checks or specific evidence of cash disbursements are found. In these instances, the amounts 
claimed by the subject should be allowed by assuming the difference was paid in cash. Increasing 
currency expenditures in the bank deposits formula offsets the effect of allowing business 
expenses paid in cash as a deduction. 
3. If personal or capital expenditures are improperly classified as business expenses, the deduction 
for business expenses will be overstated, gross receipts will be unaffected, and net taxable income 
will be understated. Without proof that personal or capital items were claimed fraudulently as 
business expenses, they cannot be disallowed. 
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4. The allowable depreciation on all known depreciable assets must also be deducted. Depreciation is 
treated separately, since this is a deduction from which no cash outlay is required in the year the 
deduction is taken. 
9.5.9.7.4.16  (11-05-2004) 
Adjustments to Income 
1. All the available adjustments to income must be allowed in computing adjusted gross income. This 
would include applicable Individual Retirement Plan (IRA), Keogh and Simplified Employee 
Pension Plan (SEPP) deductions, moving expenses, one half of the self employment tax deduction, 
the self employed health insurance deduction, penalty on early withdrawal of savings, and alimony 
paid. 
9.5.9.7.4.17  (11-05-2004) 
Personal Deductions and Exemptions 
1. All allowable personal deductions, itemized or standard, and exemptions must be deducted from 
adjusted gross income to arrive at taxable income. 
2. Per statute, itemized deductions and personal exemptions may be subject to limitation or phase out 
depending on the subject ’s income. The special agent should make adjustments to these amounts 
as necessary. 
9.5.9.7.4.18  (11-05-2004) 
Technical Adjustments 
1. In a criminal investigation, reported taxable income can be increased only by the amount of the 
criminal adjustments. If an error was made in the preparation of a subject’s return and income is 
understated, the amount must be included as a non-income item in arriving at taxable income for 
criminal purposes. 
2. If the subject unintentionally overstated expenses, no adjustment is necessary. The subject would 
be allowed the expenses per the return. Each non-fraud item must be separately allowed as claimed 
on the return or as corrected whichever is to the best interest of the subject. Technical adjustments 
in favor of the government cannot be made, offset, or netted against technical adjustments in favor 
of the subject. 
9.5.9.7.5  (11-05-2004) 
Schedules and Summaries in Bank Deposits Investigation 
1. The schedules and summaries in Exhibits 9.5.9–3 through 9.5.9–6 are illustrative of those which 
may be submitted during trials when the bank deposits method of proof is used. 
2. Exhibit 9.5.9–3, Bank Deposit Statements — Schedule A, shows the computation of taxable 
income of John and Mary Roe. The computation of this same income by the net worth method was 
previously shown in Exhibit 9.5.9–1, Net Worth Statement. 
3. Comparison and study of these two schedules will be beneficial since corrected taxable income 
can be calculated using multiple methods of proof, one tending to corroborate the other. 
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4. See Exhibit 9.5.9-4, Bank Deposits Statement — Schedule B, to see how a computation may be 
used to determine the amount of currency disbursements to be added to total deposits. 
5. See Exhibit 9.5.9-5, Summary — Analysis of Checks and Currency Disbursements, for a summary 
of disbursements made by check and by currency. This schedule should be studied together with 
the net worth statement and the bank deposits schedule. 
6. An analysis of deposits is the vital part of a bank deposits investigation and too much importance 
cannot be placed upon its accuracy. See Exhibit 9.5.9-6, Analysis of Deposits to Checking 
Account, for an illustrative of a schedule that may be used to show the results of this analysis. 
9.5.9.7.6  (11-05-2004) 
Defenses in Bank Deposits Investigation 
1. The chief defense contentions in bank deposits investigations (other than lack of criminal intent) 
are: 
1. that the sporadic nature or unconventional amounts of the deposits indicate that prior 
accumulated funds, not current receipts, or non-taxable funds are involved 
2. that the deposits reflect, in whole or in substantial part, non-income items or income items 
attributable to other years 
3. that the deposits are a duplication of current year income items already accounted for by the 
subject 
2. The proof concerning what cash a subject had on hand at the beginning of the taxable year in 
question is relevant to the bank deposits method of proof. 
3. If the deposits or expenditures are from funds accumulated in prior years, they do not represent 
current income. 
4. The lack of proof of the amount of cash on hand would not preclude prosecution if all the 
requirements are met set forth in IRM 9.5.9.7.4.8, Cash on Hand Decrease. 
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Appendix 7D: Net Worth Analysis Method 
Description of the proper stepped deployment of the Net Worth Analysis method. 
United States of America - Internal Revenue Service  
Practice Manual 
Part 9 Criminal Investigations  
Chapter 5 Investigative Process 
Section 9 Methods of Proof 
9.5.9.5  (11-05-2004) 
Net Worth Method of Proof 
1. An investigation utilizing the net worth method of proof differs from a specific item method in that 
direct comparisons of income, expenses, and credits can not be made. The net worth method of 
proof utilizes evidence of income applications such as asset accumulation, liability reduction, 
expenditures, and other financial data to indirectly establish correct taxable income. 
2. An accounting is made showing how funds generated from income were applied by identifying 
increases to net assets and various expenditures. 
3. After making adjustments for exemptions, itemized deductions, nontaxable income, and 
nondeductible losses, the courts permit the IRS to infer, indirectly, that the remainder is taxable 
income. 
4. By comparing this to taxable income reported on the subject’s return, if a return was actually filed 
an understatement of taxable income can be determined. 
5. The net worth method is a very effective way of proving taxable income in criminal income tax 
investigations. The formula for calculating the subject’s correct taxable income can be broken 
down into four steps: 
1. The special agent must first calculate the change in a subject’s net worth (assets less liabilities). 
This is done by determining the subject’s net worth at the beginning and end of a period of 
time (a taxable year or years) and then subtracting the beginning period’s net worth figure from 
the ending period’s net worth figure. This computation will yield a change in net worth (either 
an increase or decrease in net worth). 
2. The amount of this change in net worth is then adjusted for personal living expenses, 
nondeductible losses, and nontaxable items to arrive at a corrected adjusted gross income 
figure. 
3. The corrected adjusted gross income figure is then adjusted for itemized deductions or the 
standard deduction amount, and then for exemptions, to arrive at a corrected taxable income 
figure. 
4. Finally, by comparing the corrected taxable income figure with the taxable income reported on 
the tax return, the special agent can determine whether the subject failed to report any taxable 
income. 
9.5.9.5.1  (11-05-2004) 
Authority for Net Worth Method 
1. There is no statutory provision defining the net worth method and specifically authorizing its use 
by the Commissioner. However, every judicial circuit has endorsed the net worth method of proof 
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and the Supreme Court has approved its use in a number of investigations. The following is a 
listing of some of the more prominent of those investigations: 
1. Holland v. United States, 348 US 121 (1954) 
2. Friedberg v. United States, 348 US 142 (1954) 
3. Smith v. United States, 348 US 147 (1954) 
4. United States v. Calderon, 348 US 160 (1954) 
5. Massei v. United States, 355 US 595 (1958) 
6. United States v. Johnson, 319 US 503 (1943) 
2. These investigations outline the broad principles governing the prosecution and review of 
investigations based on the net worth method of proving income. 
9.5.9.5.1.1  (11-05-2004) 
Legal Requirements to Establish a Prima Facie Net Worth Investigation 
1. The Supreme Court, while firmly approving the net worth method of proof, cautioned, in Holland 
v. United States, 348 US 121, 125 (1954), that " it is so fraught with danger for the innocent that 
the courts must closely scrutinize its use." 
2. The Supreme Court set forth three requirements that the government must satisfy prior to using the 
net worth method of proof: 
1. establish an opening net worth with reasonable certainty 
2. negate reasonable explanations by the subject inconsistent with guilt 
3. establish that the net worth increase is attributable to currently taxable income - Id. at 132 - 
137. 
3. Net worth increases are determined by establishing a net worth at the beginning of a given year 
and then comparing this beginning net worth with the net worth at the end of the year. The 
opening net worth is the point from which net worth increases are measured. While every effort 
should be made to identify all of the assets and liabilities of the subject at the starting point, the 
government does not have to establish the opening net worth with mathematical certainty. 
4. Without a doubt, determining how much cash an individual has "on hand" at the beginning or end 
of a year is an extremely difficult task. To require mathematical certainty would eliminate the 
possibility of using the net worth method of proof. 
5. The thoroughness of the investigation is crucial in determining whether the government has 
established the subject ’s opening net worth with reasonable certainty. When the government 
chooses to proceed against a subject using the net worth method of proof, " the government 
assumes special responsibility of thoroughness and particularity in its investigation and 
presentation." United States v. Hall, 650 F. 2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1981). 
6. Success in overcoming attacks on the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an opening net 
worth is directly related to the extent and thoroughness of the investigation. Although not a model, 
the Mastropieri investigation does furnish an excellent example of a number of steps that must be 
taken to establish an opening net worth. US v Mastropieri, 685 F. 2d 776, 779 (1982). For 
example, in Mastropieri: 
 The special agent canvassed 47 banks, 71 brokerage firms, and 13 lending institutions. In 
addition, the special agent searched the local property records of Bronx, Nassau, Queens, 
Kings, and Suffolk counties for the years during the investigation and prior to 1967. 
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 The special agent checked records of the IRS and the county clerk and interviewed unnamed 
friends and relatives of the subject. 
9.5.9.5.2  (11-05-2004) 
When to Use the Net Worth Method 
1. The net worth method of proof is most often used when one or more of the following conditions 
exist: 
1. the subject maintains no books and records 
2. books and records are not available 
3. books and records are inadequate 
4. subject withholds books and records 
2. The fact that the subject’s books and records accurately reflect the figures on the return does not 
prevent the use of the net worth method of proof. The government can look beyond the self-
serving declarations in the subject’s books and records and use any evidence available to refute the 
accuracy thereof. 
3. In addition to being used as a primary method of proving taxable income in civil and criminal 
income tax investigations, the net worth method can be used: 
1. to corroborate other methods of proving income 
2. to verify accuracy of reported taxable income 
9.5.9.5.3  (11-05-2004) 
Method of Accounting 
1. The net worth method of proof is not limited by the subject’s method of accounting. The net worth 
statement may reflect the subject’s corrected taxable income by whichever method of accounting 
(cash, accrual, etc.) is appropriate. Reflecting a certain accounting method in the net worth 
computation is accomplished by including certain accounts in the net worth statement and omitting 
others. For instance, to compute the income of a physician on the cash basis, patient accounts 
receivable and business accounts payable at the beginning and end of each year would be omitted. 
If the physician used the accrual method of accounting, these accounts would be included in the 
net worth computation. 
2. In preparing a net worth statement or summary for use in a criminal investigation, special agents 
should ensure that: 
1. The subject’s method of accounting is used. 
2. The cost of assets and actual amounts of liabilities are used and that values other than cost, i.e., 
market value or reproduction value, are not considered in the net worth computation. 
3. Estimated nondeductible expenditures are eliminated from the net worth computation, unless 
the subject agrees to the estimated amount or it is proper to include some minimum estimated 
personal living expense figures. 
4. Generally accepted accounting principles are followed. 
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5. Technical adjustments that increase income are eliminated, e.g., unintentional errors or 
omissions relating to capitalized expenses, depreciation, revaluation of the basis of property, 
and changing inventory basis, or doubtful items such as unidentifiable commingled funds. 
9.5.9.5.4  (11-05-2004) 
Overview of the Net Worth Method of Proof Formula 
1. The net worth formula expanded: 
Assets: 
Cash on hand   
Cash in accounts     
Checking     
Savings     
Brokerage     
Securities     
Vehicles (motor homes, airplanes, motorcycles, etc.) 
Business equipment   
Real estate investments   
Personal items     
Negotiable instruments   
Subtract: Liabilities and Accumulated Depreciation 
Loans     
Notes     
Accounts payable     
Credit card balances     
Mortgages     
Accumulated depreciation   
Equals: Net Worth 
Subtract: Prior Year’s Net Worth 
Equals: Increase (Decrease) in Net Worth 
Add:Adjustments for Personal Expenditures and Nondeductible Losses 
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Assets: 
Note: 
Personal living expenses (including payments that may later be allowed as itemized deductions or 
adjustments to arrive at adjusted gross income) 
Federal income taxes paid 
Life insurance premiums   
Nondeductible portion of capital losses 
Gifts of property made by subject 
Losses on the sale of personal assets   
Subtract: Adjustments for Nontaxable Items 
Federal tax refunds   
Gifts and inheritances received by subject 
Veteran ’s benefits     
Nontaxable portion of pensions and annuities 
Tax-exempt interest   
Capital loss carryover   
Net operating loss carryover   
Honest mathematical and bookkeeping errors 
IRA and Keogh Plan payments   
Other nontaxable income   
Equals: Corrected Adjusted Gross Income 
Subtract: Allowable Itemized Deductions or Standard Deductions 
Personal exemptions   
Equals:Corrected Taxable Income 
Subtract: Reported Taxable Income 
Equals: Unreportable Taxable Income 
2. In determining the value of assets, all assets in the computation are entered at cost or other tax 
basis. Fluctuations in fair market value are of no consequence in determining taxable income. 
Paper gains or losses resulting from changes in fair market value of assets are not taxable or 
deductible until said gain or loss is realized. 
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9.5.9.5.5  (11-05-2004) 
Establishing the Starting Point 
1. The key to a successful net worth investigation is establishing a reliable beginning net worth 
(opening net worth) which includes all of the assets and liabilities on hand. It is this starting point 
from which all future increases or decreases will be calculated. This starting point is normally 
referred to as the base year. In a net worth computation, it is extremely important to firmly 
establish a beginning net worth (starting point or base year) with the best evidence available. 
2. In calculating annual net worth, be aware that an inverse relationship exists between one year and 
the next. If the subject ’s opening net worth is understated, there is a resulting overstatement of the 
increase in net worth for the following year. Conversely, if the subject’s opening net worth is 
overstated, there would be a resulting understatement of the increase in net worth for the following 
year. 
3. The first step to establishing a firm starting point is to determine the date (opening or base year) 
best suited for the investigation. The interview with the subject will strengthen the starting point. 
While questioning the subject, the special agent should attempt to develop all information relating 
to the subject’s assets and liabilities for the years involved. The subject should be questioned about 
the value of any item which cannot be determined from available books and records, e.g., cash on 
hand as of a particular date, personal living expenses, assets held in the names of others, gifts, 
inheritances, loans, and other nontaxable sources of income. 
4. The establishment of cash on hand is critical. The inability to establish a firm and accurate amount 
of cash on hand can be fatal to the investigation. Uncertainty about the amount of cash on hand is a 
common defense in net worth investigations. It will be easier to refute this defense if the special 
agent has established a firm beginning and an ending cash on hand amount is established. Cash on 
hand is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence. 
5. The best source of information in establishing an accurate cash on hand figure may be obtained 
from the subject during an interview. The special agent may not always have the opportunity to 
interview the subject in every investigation. However, when the opportunity does exists, the 
special agent should attempt to establish the beginning and ending cash on hand. In determining a 
firm cash on hand figure, the following subsections offer insight into possible techniques to 
employ during a subject interview. 
6. During the subject interview, the subject should be questioned in detail about cash on hand. The 
questioning should be preceded with an explanation of what constitutes cash on hand and elicit the 
subject ’s answer as to cash on hand. Cash on hand is coin and currency (bills, Federal Reserve 
notes, etc.) in the subject’s possession, i.e., on the subject’s person, in the subject’s residence, or 
other place, in nominee hands, or in a safe-deposit box. It does not include any money the subject 
has on deposit in any account with any type of financial institution. 
7. The special agent should use caution in using terms such as cash because people often refer to 
money on deposit in banks as cash on hand. The special agent should be specific and explain that 
he/she is referring to undeposited coin and currency in all locations. 
8. Most people have difficulty recalling specific dates and amounts, especially when several dates are 
involved, and they extend back for a number of years. Direct questions, such as "How much cash 
on hand did you have on December 31, ____" will frequently be answered with "I don’t know" or 
"I can’t remember that far back" . In such investigations, the special agent should persist in 
questioning about whether the subject had a depository for coins or currency and/or whether the 
subject placed any coins or currency in the possession of another person. The special agent should 
obtain a description of the depository. If the depository is a safe-deposit box or home safe, the 
special agent should relate the questions to when and where the box was rented or purchased. The 
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special agent should obtain a description of the depository and a description of the funds (their 
denomination and quantity) to determine whether it was possible to have such a sum of money in 
that particular depository. 
9. The special agent may determine the amount of cash on hand by asking questions about the 
maximum amount of cash that the subject could possibly have had at any particular time. For 
example, such questions as, "Did you ever have more than $100 in cash on hand? More than 
$5,000? More than $10,000?," may result in admissions that can establish the total amount of cash 
on hand at a particular date. 
10. Discussing the accumulation and purpose of the cash on hand may establish the minimum and 
maximum amount on a particular date. Determining the ultimate disposition of this cash on hand 
can provide a lead to a specific amount of cash on hand on a particular date. For example, a 
statement like "I used all my cash on hand to pay for my house in 1994" indicates how much cash 
the subject had on the date of payment. It also provides a cut-off date for cash on hand, since the 
subject evidently had no more cash after using all the cash on hand to pay for the house. The 
special agent should question the subject further to elicit an admission that the subject did not have 
any additional cash on hand as of the specified date. 
11. The special agent’s questioning should be directed toward developing: 
1. the maximum amount of cash on hand (undeposited currency and coin) claimed at the starting 
point and at the end of each year under investigation 
2. the amount of cash on hand at the date of the interview (This data is sometimes useful in 
computing cash on hand for earlier years.) 
3. how was the cash on hand accumulated and from what sources 
4. where the cash was kept 
5. who knew about the cash 
6. whether anyone ever counted the cash 
7. when, where and for what was any cash spent 
8. whether any record is available with respect to the alleged cash on hand 
9. the denominations of the cash on hand 
10. was the cash shown on any net worth or personal financial statements 
11. ask to see the cash on hand 
12. In addition to questioning the subject about cash on hand, also: 
1. question the subject about prior years’ earnings 
2. obtain prior years’ tax returns to determine if no return was filed or if the returns indicate little 
or no income in prior years 
3. determine if the subject had financial difficulties prior to the starting point, e.g., compromises 
of overdue debts by the subject; foreclosure procedures against the subject; collection actions 
against the subject, etc. 
4. obtain copies of financial and or net worth statements 
5. question the subject as to the contents of any safe-deposit boxes 
6. question the subject concerning all taxable and nontaxable sources of income 
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7. obtain loan records 
8. determine consistent use of checking and savings accounts 
9. determine if there are recurring overdrafts on non-sufficient funds (NSF) charges or other bank 
penalties 
10. determine the minimum payments on any credit card balances 
11. determine if there was ever a divorce and division of assets 
13. In addition to interviewing the subject, the following investigative steps should be taken when 
establishing a firm starting point in a net worth investigation: 
1. The special agent should interview the subject ’s spouse, relatives, and close associates to 
determine if the subject received loans, gifts, or inheritances in prior years. The interview of 
the subject’s spouse should include cash on hand and sources of taxable and nontaxable income 
so that the subject cannot claim the increases resulted from funds the spouse received. 
2. The special agent should canvass banks and stockbrokers to determine whether the subject has 
or had any accounts that could be a source of funds, or whether he/she submitted any financial 
statements to the financial institution. When reviewing bank records, the special agent should 
determine whether the subject has ever had checks returned for insufficient funds. 
3. The special agent should examine financial statements presented for credit or other purposes at 
a time prior to or during the periods under investigation. The special agent can obtain these 
types of documents from banks, loan companies, bonding companies, and the other operating 
divisions of the IRS (offers in compromise and financial statements). 
4. The special agent should check the following records for potential assets, liabilities, and 
sources of funds: 
 
 
real estate records to determine if the subject owns or has owned property that could be a 
source of funds 
bankruptcy, foreclosure, and repossession record (If the subject filed for bankruptcy, this could 
be used as a starting point for net worth) 
divorce records 
social security records for prior earnings and receipt of any funds from social security 
welfare records 
probation records 
5. The special agent should determine the subject ’s borrowing habits, especially borrowing at 
high interest rates. 
6. The special agent should analyze available Federal and state tax returns. Tax returns can be 
obtained from the IRS, the state where the subject resided, the subject’s accountant and/or 
return preparer, or financial institutions where the subject has applied for and/or obtained loans. 
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7. In the event the special agent is unable to firmly establish a starting point through the above-
described steps, the special agent may have to rely upon an indirect approach to establishing a 
starting point. This can be accomplished by using a Source and Application of Funds 
computation. 
9.5.9.5.5.1  (11-05-2004) 
An Indirect Approach for Establishing a Starting Point 
1. Another method of establishing a starting point for cash on hand is to analyze the subject’s 
available finances for the years leading up to the starting point. Such a "source and application of 
funds" approach can also be used to bridge the years to the starting point from some point in time 
when cash on hand has been firmly established. The following is an example of how a source and 
application of funds computation can be used to establish a firm starting point in a net worth 
investigation. 
1. The subject filed bankruptcy in 1993. Immediately following the bankruptcy, the subject did 
not have any assets or liabilities. The starting point for the investigation is December 31, 1996, 
the prosecution years are 1997 and 1998. For the purposes of using the source and application 
of funds computation in determining a firm starting point (cash on hand figure on December 
31, 1996), the years 1993 through 1996 would be treated as one unit. 
2. First, the special agent must determine the total amount of funds available (taxable and 
nontaxable) during 1993 through 1996. From this amount, he/she will subtract the subject’s 
personal expenditures for the period. This will yield the maximum amount of funds available for 
the subject’s net worth at the beginning of 1997. 
3. Second, the special agent subtracts the subject ’s beginning net worth figure (the amount the 
investigation revealed as of December 31, 1996, without the cash on hand figure) from the total 
funds available for net worth. This will account for non-personal living expenditure payments by 
reflecting the payments made to increase assets and decrease liabilities. 
4. Funds used to purchase assets disposed of prior to the starting point can be included as funds 
applied, if their disposition is traced and the funds from the disposition are accounted for as funds 
available. The advantage of using this method is that the beginning net worth can be used as funds 
applied. If the subject has a large beginning net worth, it may be possible to overcome the 
subject’s reported income for prior years and show that he/she could not have had cash on hand at 
the starting point. This can also be used to establish a maximum possible cash on hand figure. It is 
important that the subject be given credit for all sources of funds available (both taxable and 
nontaxable) in the period for which the source and application method is used. 
5. When using the one unit source and application of funds method to establish a firm starting point, 
the beginning net worth must be adjusted for any asset purchased and completely paid for prior to 
the source and application years. This is necessary because no funds were applied during the 
source and application period to purchase the asset. This point is illustrated in the following 
example: 
1. The subject purchased and paid off a residence 10 years prior to the starting point. The cost of 
the residence $20,000, is included in the beginning net worth. The source and application of 
funds only covers a period of six years prior to the starting point. The beginning net worth must 
be adjusted by subtracting the cost of the residence because the residence was purchased with 
funds acquired by the subject prior to the years included in the computation. This is illustrated 
as follows: 
Funds available (1991–1996) $105,000 
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Less: Funds applied to personal living expenses -50,000 
Equals: Maximum funds available for an increase in net worth 55,000 
Beginning net worth per investigation $72,000 
Less: Cost of residence purchased prior to 1991 -20,000 
Funds applied by the subject to acquire the adjusted beginning net worth $52,000 
Maximum funds available for an increase in net worth $55,000 
Less: Funds applied by the subject to acquire the adjusted beginning net worth -52,000 
Equals: Maximum possible cash on hand at starting point 12/31/1996 $ 3,000 
6. This method can be used to establish cash on hand at the starting point if the subject does not 
cooperate during the investigation, or to corroborate the subject’s admission of cash on hand. A 
source and application of funds cannot be used in every investigation but, in certain instances, can 
be a valuable tool in determining possible cash on hand. 
9.5.9.5.5.2  (11-05-2004) 
Presenting Cash on Hand Figures 
1. As mentioned earlier, the cash on hand figure is often the most difficult item to establish. 
Whenever possible, it is best to establish specific cash on hand figures for each year. However, 
after exhausting all of the various leads, contradictions may still exist or the special agent may 
have no specific information at all. In order to work around this issue, approximate figures are 
often used; however, this may not be the best solution. In investigations where no cash on hand 
information can be found, the special agent can enter beginning cash on hand as zero. 
9.5.9.5.5.3  (03-22-2005) 
The Dash Theory 
1. In situations where the subject had some available currency which was used in previously 
identified currency transactions, a constant figure of an unknown amount represented by a dash (-) 
can be used in a net worth calculation to symbolize cash on hand. 
2. The dash (-) indicates that the " inventory" of undeposited coin and currency cannot be quantified, 
but that facts and circumstances, i.e., evidence in the investigation, indicate that cash on hand or 
inventory of undeposited currency either remained constant or increased during the period. United 
States v. Giacalone, 574 F.2d 328, 333 (6th Cir. 1978) (" The recognition of a cash bankroll 
treated as a constant, together with proof which would support a finding that no significant cash 
hoard existed, [is] a sufficient accounting for cash in the opening net worth computation. " ) See 
also United States v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 1072 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit makes clear 
the dash method cannot be used to overcome the defense of a cash hoard, or as a way to avoid 
determining an opening balance of cash on hand. 
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9.5.9.5.6  (11-05-2004) 
Taxable Source of Income 
1. In order for income to be taxable, it must come from a taxable source, Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co,75 S. Ct. 473 (1955). In the Holland investigation, the Supreme Court opined that, an 
"Increase in net worth, standing alone, cannot be assumed to be attributable to currently taxable 
income. But proof of a likely source, from which the jury could reasonably find that the net worth 
increases sprang, is sufficient. . ." Holland, supra at 138. 
2. Following the Holland decision, it appeared that proof of a likely source was necessary in every 
net worth investigation. This premise was clarified by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Massei, 78 S. CT. 495 (1958) when it stated: 
In Holland we held that proof of a likely source was "sufficient" to convict in a net worth 
investigation where the government did not negate all the possible nontaxable sources of the 
alleged net worth increases. This was not intended to imply that proof of a likely source was 
necessary in every investigation. On the contrary, should all possible sources of nontaxable 
income be negated, there would be no necessity for proof of a likely source. 
3. In view of these decisions, it appears that the government must either prove a likely source of 
taxable income or negate all nontaxable sources of income. In investigations where the 
government resorts to negating all nontaxable sources of income, it is even more critical to 
establish a firm starting point, particularly with reference to cash on hand. 
4. Proof of a likely taxable source of income has been found sufficient in a number of criminal 
investigations by: 
1. Showing that the subject did not report certain income on the tax returns. United States v. 
Chapman,168 F. 2d 997 (7th Cir 1948). 
2. Showing that the subject did not report certain income for years prior to indictment 
period. United States v. Skidmore, 123 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir 1948). 
3. Comparing the business operations and profits of the subject for the years under investigation 
with profits or prior operations for a comparable period. In the Holland investigation, the 
Supreme Court pointed out that the business of the defendant, a hotel, apparently increased 
during the years in question, whereas the reported profits fell to approximately one quarter of 
the amount declared by the previous management in a comparable period. 
4. Effectively contradicting the subject’s assertions as to nontaxable sources. 
5. Opportunities of the subject to receive graft. 
6. The nature of the business has the capacity to produce income in amounts determined by the 
net worth method. 
5. A likely source of income is established in net worth investigations by showing the source of 
income identified by the subject had the potential to produce income substantially in excess of that 
reported. 
6. Negating nontaxable sources of income may be accomplished by substantiating the subject’s 
admissions as to the receipt or non-receipt of loans, gifts, and inheritances. If the subject alleges to 
have received nontaxable sources of income, the special agent should verify the claim by 
reviewing Federal gift tax returns filed by the alleged donor or probate records of the deceased 
relatives’ estates. Additionally, the special agent should interview the person who allegedly made 
the gift to the subject. However, if the subject advances a specific explanation as to the sources of 
nontaxable funds expended, the government does not have to pursue other possible nontaxable 
sources of income when the one given is proven false. 
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9.5.9.5.7  (11-05-2004) 
Investigation of Leads 
1. When a subject offers leads or information during a net worth investigation that, if true, would 
establish his/her innocence, such leads must be pursued. This also applies if the subject offers 
leads or information after the completion of an investigation but within sufficient time before trial. 
2. During the trial, if the government fails to show an investigation into the validity of the leads 
provided by the subject, the trial judge may consider the defendant’s information as true and the 
government’s investigation insufficient to go to the jury. 
3. Most leads refer to cash hoards, gifts, inheritances, and loans. These leads should be checked as 
routine steps taken during the investigation. 
4. The courts have held that the government does not have to investigate leads that are not reasonably 
verifiable. This is a question of judgment and, in the final analysis, is always a matter for the court 
to determine. 
9.5.9.5.8  (11-05-2004) 
Summaries and Appendices Prepared by the Special Agent 
1. In investigations utilizing a detailed computation of net worth, the factual data may be best 
presented via a summary of the details broken down into at least one main appendix and various 
sub-appendices. 
2. An appendix is a document developed to summarize and present, in a concise manner, voluminous 
information that is contained in the exhibits of an investigation. A sub-appendix supports the main 
appendix and is generally prepared when there are a number of items of a particular type of asset, 
liability, or other adjustment. Sub-appendices are also used when there are numerous witnesses or 
exhibits to support a particular net worth item. Keep the main appendix as simple and brief as 
possible to aid in its presentation and clarity. While there is no set format for a sub-appendix, it 
should be organized in a manner which presents the information in a clear and concise manner. 
3. A copy of each appendix and sub-appendix must accompany each copy of the final prosecution 
report. The exhibits to the investigation accompany only the original report. If sub-appendices are 
used, they must refer to the proper witness, the exhibit number, and a description of the evidence 
used to support the item. 
4. Sub-appendices are prepared to summarize the pertinent information that is found in the exhibits. 
The totals from the sub-appendices are forwarded to the main appendix, where the information is 
summarized. The main appendix is then cited in the body of the final report. Multiple main 
appendices are common in net worth investigations. 
5. During a trial of an income tax investigation involving the net worth method of proving taxable 
income, the special agent may introduce the sub-appendices and main appendix used to support 
the final report. It is important to remember that the special agent’ s work product (main appendix 
and supporting sub-appendices) is not evidence. These schedules and appendices should 
summarize documents and testimony already admitted into evidence during the trial. These 
schedules and appendices are admitted for the purpose of aiding and assisting the jury in 
considering the evidence admitted. The admissibility and use of appendices and summaries are 
discussed in IRM 9.6.4, Trial. 
6. The special agent should become most familiar with the appendix or summary showing the 
computation of taxable income. (See Exhibit 9.5.9-1.) 
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7. In addition to appendices, schedules, and summaries, net worth computations have been presented 
to the jury through the use of graphs and charts. 
9.5.9.5.8.1  (11-05-2004) 
Adjustments to Net Worth 
1. After the special agent has established a firm starting point and identified the amount of cash on 
hand, the next step is to calculate the subject’s change in net worth for the prosecution years. Once 
the change (increase or decrease) in the subject ’s net worth has been determined, the special agent 
makes adjustments to that figure and arrives at the subject’s corrected adjusted gross income. 
Perhaps the most difficult phase in calculating a subject’s corrected taxable income is identifying, 
documenting, and correctly applying the adjustments to the subject ’s change in net worth for the 
nondeductible and nontaxable items. These adjustments are necessary in arriving at the subject ’s 
corrected adjusted gross income figure from the calculated increase or decrease in net worth. The 
following paragraphs will identify common adjustments to the calculated increase or decrease in a 
subject ’s net worth. 
2. The following are examples of adjustments for personal expenditures and nondeductible items 
which are added to the subject ’s change (increase or decrease) in net worth: 
1. personal living expenses 
2. Federal tax payments 
3. nondeductible portion of capital loss 
4. losses on sale of personal assets 
5. gifts made 
6. life insurance premiums 
3. The following are examples of adjustments for nontaxable items which are subtracted from a 
subject’s change (increase or decrease) in net worth: 
1. for capital gain transactions see the appropriate instructions and forms for statutory inclusions 
and exclusions 
2. gifts received 
3. inheritances 
4. nontaxable pensions 
5. veterans benefits 
6. non-taxable portion of social security income 
7. tax exempt interest 
8. proceeds from life insurance 
9. disability income received (USC §104–§106) 
10. errors in subject’s records (in his favor) which relate to honest mathematical and bookkeeping 
errors found in the subject ’s books and records, and which tend to account for part of the 
understated income 
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11. gains on the sale of a personal residence (depending upon the date of the sale, the gain could be 
entirely non-taxable) pursuant to the applicable law concerning these transactions and to the 
extent of whatever non-taxable gain the subject may have received 
12. net operating loss carry-back and carry-forward 
13. allowed capital loss carry-over 
14. Federal income tax refunds 
4. No adjustment is necessary to net worth increase or decrease for: 
1. net short-term capital gain 
2. deductible portion of net short-term capital loss 
3. excess of net short-term capital gain over net long-term capital loss 
9.5.9.5.8.2  (11-05-2004) 
Adjustments to Corrected Adjusted Gross Income to Calculate Corrected Taxable Income 
1. The adjustments to corrected adjusted gross income are the standard or itemized deductions and 
the personal exemptions. 
2. Due to the calculated increase in adjusted gross income, the special agent should increase the 
itemized deductions for items allowed which the subject failed to claim. Likewise, the special 
agent should also decrease the itemized deductions for threshold items affected by an increase in 
adjusted gross income. 
3. Corrected adjusted gross income less the itemized deductions and personal exemptions results in 
the subject’ s corrected taxable income. When the taxable income that was reported on the income 
tax return is deducted from the corrected taxable income, the final figure is additional taxable 
income based on the net worth method of proof. 
9.5.9.5.9  (11-05-2004) 
Common Defenses in Net Worth Investigations 
1. Special agents can overcome the following common defenses in net worth investigations by 
thoroughly investigating them at the onset of the investigation. 
9.5.9.5.9.1  (11-05-2004) 
Lack of Willfulness 
1. Defense counsel usually contends there is no evidence of willfulness. This contention may be 
overcome by evidence outlined in IRM 9.1.3, Criminal Statutory Provisions and Common Law. 
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9.5.9.5.9.2  (11-05-2004) 
Cash on Hand 
1. The subject usually claims that there was a large amount of cash on hand which the government 
has not considered in the beginning net worth. The subject also may claim that cash balances are 
wrong for years subsequent to the base year. 
2. In all investigations where the net worth method is the primary method of proving income, the 
special agent should anticipate this defense and accurately establish the cash on hand figure for the 
starting point and throughout the prosecution years to negate this defense. 
3. Admissions by the subject are most effective to determine the cash on hand amount and should be 
obtained during the initial interview or early in the investigation. (See IRM 9.5.9.5.5, Establishing 
the Starting Point.) 
4. In most investigations, the subject’ s spouse should also be questioned about cash on hand, as well 
as other matters. In order to avoid any misunderstanding by the subject, it is suggested that the 
meaning of cash on hand be explained prior to discussing the matter. 
5. The subject (and spouse) should be questioned regarding their financial history from the time they 
were first gainfully employed. This information will serve in many investigations to check the 
accuracy of the subject’s statements about cash on hand. 
6. In addition to admissions, evidence used to establish the beginning net worth will most often be 
sufficient to refute the defense of cash on hand. 
9.5.9.5.9.3  (11-05-2004) 
Failure to Adjust for Nontaxable Income 
1. The usual sources of nontaxable income claimed by the subject are gifts, loans, and inheritances. 
Negating evidence of the type will often be sufficient to overcome these claims as described in the 
subsections listed below: 
1. see IRM 9.5.9.5.6, Taxable Source of Income 
2. see IRM 9.5.9.5.7, Investigation of Leads 
9.5.9.5.9.4  (11-05-2004) 
Inventories Overstated 
1. Special agents should not rely upon inventory figures on the subject’s returns as prima facie 
evidence to establish the values of assets in the net worth computation. Some subjects, either 
through ignorance or for other reasons, report inventory at retail value instead of at cost or some 
other value. (In a net worth computation where the assigned value of the inventory used exceeds 
cost and is larger at the end of the investigative period than the beginning, income will be 
overstated.) To resolve this, the special agent should attempt to corroborate the inventory figures 
shown on the subject’s returns by admissions of the subject, statements of employees who took the 
inventory, copies of inventory records, amounts shown on state or local property tax returns, etc. 
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9.5.9.5.9.5  (11-05-2004) 
Holding Funds or Other Assets as Nominee 
1. In certain investigations, a subject may falsely claim to be holding, as nominee of another (usually 
unidentified) individual, funds or other assets the government included in the subject’ s net worth 
computation. Special agents should interview the subject about this matter in the early stages of 
the investigation. 
9.5.9.5.9.6  (11-05-2004) 
Net Operating Loss Carry-Forward 
1. This defense is usually based upon a net worth computation of taxable income made by the 
subject’s accountant for years prior to the starting point. This computation will show an operating 
loss prior to the prosecution. The defense strategy is to carry forward the loss to the prosecution 
years and reduce the alleged tax deficiency as much as possible. 
2. To overcome this defense, special agents should make a net worth determination of income for 
several years prior to the prosecution period and then on the basis of this computation either: 
1. allow the carry-forward loss, or 
2. show the incorrectness of the accountants’ determination 
9.5.9.5.9.7  (11-05-2004) 
False Loans 
1. The objective of this defense is to reduce taxable income by claiming nonexistent loans, usually 
from the subject’ s friends or relatives. This defense may be overcome by showing that the alleged 
lender was financially unable to lend the amount claimed. The special agent should attempt to 
obtain and then corroborate the details of the claimed loans by interviewing the individuals who 
allegedly made the loans to the subject. 
2. The matter of loans should be covered during the initial subject interview. 
9.5.9.5.9.8  (11-05-2004) 
Jointly Held Assets of the Subject and Spouse 
1. In some investigations, the subject and spouse may report income on separate returns, but assets 
they acquired are held jointly. If the jointly held assets are included in the net worth computation, 
the claim may be made that they were acquired with the spouse’ s income. 
2. This defense can be overcome by tracing the invested funds back to the subject and showing the 
disposition of the spouse’s income. 
3. There may be investigations in which the funds of the subject and spouse are so intermingled that 
it is not possible to trace the invested or applied funds to either party. In such investigations, use 
the net worth method of proof to determine the corrected taxable income of both the subject and 
the spouse, and then deduct the taxable income of the spouse to arrive at the subject’s corrected 
taxable income. 
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4. There are several states that have community property statutes. Under community property laws, 
income, assets and liabilities are equally divided between spouses. If the subject and/or his/her 
spouse reside in a community property state, the appropriate laws must be applied to compute the 
subject ’s income, expenses, assets, and liabilities. 
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Appendix 7E: Asset Betterment 
Asset Betterment Analysis as a Reasonable basis for section 167 default assessments, including 
statistical information 
68. The Commissioner may make a default assessment of a taxpayer's taxable income upon any basis 
that is reasonable and takes into account their particular circumstances. This includes the use of 
available external information, indirect audit methodologies, statistical information or extrapolation 
from previous years returns. Examples of the bases that have been supported by the courts include 'T' 
accounts, asset betterment calculations and unexplained deposits in financial institution accounts. 
69. Using a 'T' account, ATO personnel can compare cash available at the beginning of a period plus 
cash received during the period with cash expended during the period plus cash on hand at the end of 
the period. The two sides of the 'T' account should balance if ATO personnel have full and accurate 
information. If the two sides of the 'T' account do not balance, it is likely there is undisclosed income. 
70. An alternative method to a 'T' account available to ATO personnel is an asset betterment 
calculation. Under this method, the net worth of an entity at the end of each relevant year is compared 
with the net worth at the beginning of each of those years, and an estimate of annual asset growth is 
obtained. Non-deductible expenditure is added to this estimate and liabilities and exemptions are 
subtracted. A figure is then computed for total taxable income. 
71. Whatever the source of the information, each step in the process of estimating the taxpayer's 
taxable income must be recorded, so that the decision or decisions will be supported if the resulting 
assessment is contested. 
72. Statistical information from compliance improvement research, corporate databases or external 
sources such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) may form an important part of decision-
making. However, such information, its source and the rationale for any calculations based upon it 
must be fully documented. Additionally, the statistical information should be related to the 
circumstances of each particular taxpayer. In the past, where properly recorded decision-making has 
been presented in evidence, the use of information such as ABS cost-of-living figures has been 
successfully argued in support of section 167 default assessments. 
73. The application of this approach may be demonstrated through the reference to ABS Household 
Expenditure Survey data in Favaro v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 34 ATR 1 at 6. In 
that case, Branson J held that the taxpayer's tastes 'were not, it seems, universally frugal' before 
accepting that the ATO's reliance upon the data was supportable. This was an answer to the taxpayer's 
[unsupported] argument that their lifestyle was less extravagant 'than the hypothetical average 
individual'. 
74. This approach is supported by the Privy Council in Gamini Bus Co Ltd v. Commr of Income Tax, 
Colombo (1952) AC 571, (1952) TR 44 which involved a comparison with available statistical data 
on the performance of taxpayer companies in the same area of similar size and scale. 
75. Additionally, a similar result was found in an Australian Board of Review case, (1951) 2 
TBRD Case B1 , where the taxpayer's earnings were estimated by comparison with the earnings of 
other taxi drivers, although the assessment was reduced on the basis of evidence of greater than 
average fuel consumption for that particular taxpayer. 
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Appendix 7F: Unit and Volume Method 
Unit and Volume Method 
United States of America - Internal Revenue Service  
Practice Manual 
Part 9 Criminal Investigations  
Chapter 5 Investigative Process 
Section 9 Methods of Proof 
9.5.9.9  (11-05-2004) 
Percentage Markup Method of Proving Income 
1. This method is a computation whereby determinations are made pursuant to the use of percentages 
or ratios considered typical of the industry or business under investigation. By reference to similar 
businesses or situations, percentage computations are secured to determine sales, cost of sales, 
gross profit, and net profit. Likewise, via the use of some known base and the typical percentage 
applicable, individual items of income or expense may be determined. 
2. The percentage markup method is used on a limited basis. 
9.5.9.9.1  (11-05-2004) 
Use of Percentage Markup Method 
1. Special agents should resort to the percentage markup method of proof only when other traditional 
methods of proof have proven unsuccessful. 
2. With respect to specific applications of the percentage markup method of proof, its use should be 
limited principally to retail establishments, rather than illegal businesses, because more reliable 
information regarding opening and closing inventories, and the appropriate percentage markup, is 
generally available for retail establishments. 
3. An exception to these preferences may be narcotics trafficking investigations so long as substantial 
inside evidence from members of the narcotics organization is available to account for the 
pertinent variables inherent in narcotics trafficking and this method of proof. 
4. Special agents should include an explanation of efforts made with respect to the utilization of the 
traditional methods of proof and an explanation for the inadequacy or inapplicability of those 
methods. 
9.5.9.9.2  (11-05-2004) 
Application of Percentage Markup Method 
1. The percentages used in the percentage markup method may be externally derived or may be 
internally derived from the subject’s accounts for other periods or from an analysis of subsidiary 
records. 
2. Percentages may be secured from the examination of the subject’s records even though such 
records are only partially available. 
3. Gross profit percentages may be determined by comparing purchase invoices with sales invoices, 
price lists, and other similar data. 
4. Other years not covered by the investigation, or portions of years under investigation, may indicate 
typical percentages applicable to the entire year or years under investigation. 
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5. Substantial internal evidence from which a reliable percentage markup computation can be 
obtained is strongly emphasized. Testimony of employees, accountants, or sales managers with 
direct knowledge of sales prices is important in determining not only the actual percentage markup 
employed in a given investigation, but also opening and closing inventories. 
6. Consideration should be given to obtaining internal documents, such as operating memoranda and 
subsidiary books and records. 
7. The questionable tax returns and the amounts stated therein for sales and costs of goods sold 
should not be used in determining the appropriate percentage markup. Use of such returns 
contradicts the theory that both sales and cost of goods sold are fraudulently reported on the tax 
returns. 
9.5.9.9.3  (11-05-2004) 
Limitations on Percentage Method 
1. Although the percentage method may be useful in determining or verifying income, especially 
when the books and records are inadequate, special agents must ensure that the comparisons are 
made with situations that are similar to those under investigation. Some of the factors to be 
considered are as follows: 
1. Type of merchandise handled—In order for a proper comparison to be made, the businesses 
must be dealing in the same type of merchandise or service. Comparison of the gross profit of a 
restaurant with that of a grocery store would be of little value and should not be used. 
2. Size of operation—In many instances, gross profit, cost of goods sold, and net profit 
percentage on sales will vary according to the size of a business. This is especially true with 
respect to expense items and the net profit compared with sales. The percentage of net profit to 
sales of a large department store might vary considerably from that of a small independently-
owned general store. 
3. Locality—Markups and costs of operations will normally vary with the size of the city or the 
location of the businesses in the city. As an example, a small business in a community of 5,000 
may use newspapers as a means of advertising, whereas a business doing the same volume in a 
city of 500,000 will normally find the cost prohibitive and confine advertising to some other 
medium. 
4. Period covered—Since gross profit ratios and expense ratios will tend to vary year to year with 
economic conditions, the comparison should normally be made with similar periods covered by 
the investigation. 
5. General merchandising policy—Comparison should not be made between businesses having 
different merchandising policies. Some businesses may operate on a large volume with a small 
markup and little customer service, while other businesses have the opposite merchandising 
policy. In situations of this kind, comparisons should be made only with those businesses 
having similar merchandising policies. 
9.5.9.9.4  (11-05-2004) 
Examples of Percentage Method 
1. See Exhibit 9.5.9-7, Examples of Percentage Method, for an example of the computation of the 
percentage markup method. The percentages used are arbitrary and are not necessarily applicable 
to the businesses mentioned. 
9.5.9.10  (11-05-2004) 
Unit and Volume Methods 
1. In many instances the determination or verification of gross receipts may be computed by applying 
price and profit figures to the known or ascertainable quantity of business done by the subject. 
This method is feasible when special agents can determine the number of units handled by the 
subject and also when the price or profit charged per unit is known. 
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2. The number of units sold or quantity of business done by the subject may be determined in certain 
instances from the subject’s books, since the records may be adequate with respect to cost of 
goods sold or expenses, but inadequate as to sales. 
3. There may be a regulatory body to which the subject reports units of production or service. For 
example: 
1. A funeral director is required to report each burial to the city or town where the burial takes 
place. 
2. A garment manufacturer with union employees buys union labels to be sewed into the 
garments it manufactures. 
3. A subject may be required to report production and payroll to a trade association allied with the 
labor union. 
4. There are instances where the fees paid for leased machinery is based upon the units of 
production. 
5. A piecework system of wages for production workers might give an accurate measure of units 
produced. 
4. The use of this method lends itself to those businesses in which only a few types of items are 
handled, or there is little variation in the type of service performed, since the charges made by the 
subject for the merchandise or services are relatively the same throughout the taxable period. 
5. The following example is illustrative of the unit and volume method of computation: 
Volume of Merchandise (Manufacturer): 
Number of machines manufactured 92 
Average sales price $1,100 
Computed total sales $101,200 
Sales reported $93,500 
Omitted sales $7,700 
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Appendix 9A: Section 123 POCA (Cth) 2002 –  
Value of benefits derived- non-serious offences  
             (1)  If:  
                     (a)  an application is made for a pecuniary penalty order against a person in 
relation to an offence or offences (the illegal activity ); and  
                     (b)  the offence is not a serious offence, or none of the offences are serious 
offences; and  
                     (c)  at the hearing of the application, evidence is given that the value of the 
person's property during or after the illegal activity exceeded the value of the person's 
property before the illegal activity;  
the court is to treat the value of the benefits derived by the person from the commission of the 
illegal activity as being not less than the amount of the greatest excess.  
             (2)  The amount treated as the value of the benefits under this section is reduced to 
the extent (if any) that the court is satisfied that the excess was due to causes unrelated to the 
illegal activity.  
  
384 
 
Appendix 9B: Section 124 POCA (Cth) 2002 –  
Value of benefits derived- serious offences 
(1)  If:  
                     (a)  an application is made for a * pecuniary penalty order against a person in 
relation to an offence or offences (the illegal activity ); and  
                     (b)  the offence is a * serious offence, or one or more of the offences are serious 
offences; and  
                     (c)  at the hearing of the application, evidence is given that the value of the * 
person's property during or after:  
                              (i)  the illegal activity; or  
                             (ii)  any other * unlawful activity that the person has engaged in that 
constitutes a * terrorism offence; or  
                            (iii)  any other unlawful activity that the person has engaged in, within the 
period referred to in subsection (5), that does not constitute a terrorism offence;  
                            exceeded the value of the person's property before the illegal activity and 
the other unlawful activity;  
the court is to treat the value of the * benefits derived by the person from the commission of 
the illegal activity as being not less than the amount of the greatest excess.  
             (2)  The amount treated as the value of the * benefits under subsection (1) is reduced 
to the extent (if any) that the court is satisfied that the excess was due to causes unrelated to:  
                     (a)  the illegal activity; or  
                     (b)  any other * unlawful activity that the person has engaged in that constitutes 
a * terrorism offence; or  
                     (c)  any other unlawful activity that the person has engaged in, within the period 
referred to in subsection (5), that does not constitute a terrorism offence;  
             (3)  If evidence is given, at the hearing of the application, of the person's expenditure 
during the period referred to in subsection (5), the amount of the expenditure is presumed, 
unless the contrary is proved, to be the value of a * benefit that, because of the illegal 
activity, was provided to the person.  
             (4)  Subsection (3) does not apply to expenditure to the extent that it resulted in 
acquisition of property that is taken into account under subsection (1).  
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             (5)  The period for the purposes of subparagraph (1)(c)(iii), paragraph (2)(c) and 
subsection (3) is:  
                     (a)  if some or all of the person's property, or property that is suspected of being 
subject to the * effective control of the person, is covered by a * restraining order--the period 
of 6 years preceding the application for the restraining order;  
                     (b)  otherwise--the period of 6 years preceding the application for the * 
pecuniary penalty order;  
and includes the period since that application for the restraining order or the pecuniary 
penalty order was made.  
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